The Salafization of the Muslim Brothers

The Erosion of the Fundamental Hypothesis and the Rising of Salafism within the Muslim Brotherhood: The Paths and the Repercussions of Change

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Introduction

This paper is a study of the recent shifts within the Muslim Brotherhood, the major Islamic social movement in Egypt and the Middle East. The movement, which has attracted much attention, both in political circles and in the mass media, has recently undergone the biggest internal organizational shakeup in its history since the 1950s and 1960s. The shakeup occurred during the internal elections that were held at the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, and which resulted in the notable success of the conservative candidates. The transformations under study not only reveal the dominance of the conservative stream, but also highlight the movement’s tendency to revise some controversial issues including unresolved jurisprudential problematics. This shows that the revisions going on in the group have affected the very ideology of the movement itself.

The confusion that has characterized the Brothers’ standpoints is the result of the development of some *salafi* attitudes latent in the movement. These *salafi* attitudes only help distance the group from the communal, mediating temperament that characterized it in the early years of its formation, and direct it instead towards “*salafization*” as the group is turned into a total *salafi* entity. The new attitudes reflect the internal changes affecting the group over a certain period of time and leading to the expansion of the *salafi* stream, which became the most operative stream within the group. The rise of the *salafi* stream necessitates further research into the roots of the latent *salafi* trend within the Brotherhood, the factors leading to its development, and the most prominent features shaping its present form.

Salafism: Multiple Perspectives

Many intellectual groups and movements struggle with the idea of *salafism*, which can be interpreted on more than one level. It could be viewed as a dogmatic conviction, a jurisprudential conviction or simply as an intellectual trend¹. This last concept is perhaps what has caused researchers to view *salafism* not as a well-defined category but rather to differentiate
between salafi and political Islamic movements. Whereas the Islamist actor could adopt a salafi approach in its attempt to Islamize the state and the society, the salafi actor need not be an Islamist. He might prefer to stay away from politics, attempting the re-Islamization of society through enforcing morality.

Yet, we argue that the tendency to establish institutions is latent in salafism – hence, its promotion of the concept of the “Muslim Group” – and the political component is latent in it as well. In this case, salafism could be regarded as a social movement. Two perspectives of salafism are thus combined: one that is related to the original idea, and one that focuses on salafism as a “movement” that interacts with its surroundings, a movement that may develop, move forward and backward, or fill in the gaps resulting from the withdrawal of other actors.

We can safely assume that salafism in Egypt exploited the political opportunities created by the political, economic and social environment at the beginning of the presidency of Anwar Sadat. This went hand in hand with the regress of Egypt as a leader in the Muslim world, the diminution of the role played by the Islamic institution of Al-Azhar (the Egyptian Islamic school of religion), and the concurrent expansion of the influence of the Wahhabi salafism. The Muslim Brotherhood re-framed and re-molded the Wahhabi salafi ideas to suit the Egyptian context, which was, from the end of the seventies and the beginning of the eighties, open to a diversity of ideas. We will see how the changes which have swept the Egyptian religious scene for the second time since the mid nineties encourage the salafi expansion both inside and outside the Muslim Brotherhood group.

At the beginning of the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood turned to Wahhabi salafism. This change was hastened by the hostility of Nasser’s campaign towards the group, something which caused many of its prominent figures to flee from Egypt and settle down in Saudi Arabia, the stronghold of the Wahhabi salafi trend. The change began during the 1970s, a decade
that saw the strongest outburst of the Wahhabi stream outside Saudi Arabia and was supported by the Kingdom’s modernization at that time. This is in addition to the changes that developed after the failure of Nasser’s transnational project with the defeat of June 1967, the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970, the oil boom, and the rise in gas prices after the October 1973 victory. Many Gulf countries benefited from this price leap, and it helped the Wahhabi call to extend its religious influence all over the Islamic world, including Egypt. Salafism then made use of the downfall of other Islamic schemes, including the Muslim Brothers, from the mid 1990s.

The Historical Dimension: A Movement of Overall Reform

Hassan El-Banna attempted a clear definition of the movement that he had founded in the 1920s. The Muslim Brotherhood, according to El-Banna, is “a salafi call, a sunni approach, a sufi truth, a political institution, an athletic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic organization and a social idea”. It is clear from this definition that the salafism of the Muslim Brotherhood in its formative years was different from the salafism of today. The earlier incarnation sought to combine the different cultural components of a Muslim society (including Sufism, politics, economics, sociology, science, culture and athletics) rather than limit itself to the rules and principles drawn from the early years of Islam – the times of the venerable forefathers who were the incarnation of ideal Islamic practices – as was advocated by Wahhabi salafism.

For some time, both during the life of El-Banna and shortly after his death, the Brotherhood emphasized its inclusive organizational structure (inherent in the concept of al-jama'a). In a sense, the Brotherhood, which was founded only four years after the fall of the Ottoman caliphate, was influenced by the debate going on at that time about the caliphate. No wonder, then, that its intellectual framework stressed the necessity of an all-inclusive Islamic association under whose shadow all Muslims might be equally united.
Aware of the critical historical circumstances through which Egypt was passing, El-Banna moved his group away from anything that might cause dissent. Egypt and the rest of the Arab world were experiencing serious intellectual and political turmoil, due to colonization; and, because of the heated intellectual debates on religion and on national identity stimulated by the immediate contact with the West. This meant that the largest Sunni group was denying, if not fighting, all kinds of sectarian discrimination.

Firstly, the early salafism of the Brotherhood avoided dogmatic disagreement with the sectarian “Other”. El-Banna, following in the footsteps of his sheikh Rashid Reda in adopting a comprehensive vision, founded an association for the reconciliation of the different Islamic sects along with some other Al-Azhar sheikhs. Thus, the group did not provoke any fights with Shi‘ism or with any other sect or religious division, even the schools of jurisprudence (madhabih). El-Banna did not encourage his group to adopt any of these madhabih. Indeed, this approach is likely to have informed his invitation to Sheikh Sayyid Sabek to write a book on Sunni jurisprudence so as to help the group overcome any jurisprudential or madhhabi bias that was prevalent at that time. El-Banna, however, was not against the madhabih as were some later salafi thinkers.

Secondly, the Brotherhood sought to offer an understanding of Islam that did not reject different people and ideas. Its aim was rather to reinforce Islam, both on a practical and a behavioral level, not only among the members of the group, but also outside the group and even outside the borders of Egypt. El-Banna believed it better to avoid negotiating controversial dogmatic issues, and he preferred, instead, to focus more on activist works. The salafism of the Muslim Brotherhood at that time called for the avoidance of debates related to the dogma. It called for reliance on Qur’an and sunna as the basic reference for believers, adopting a rational interpretation (a‘ql) rather than a literal interpretation (naqil) in approaching holy texts, and rejecting the kalami interpretation of the ontological traits of God (ayat al dhat wa al
safat) and of all that has to do with the doctrine. The group also rejected the methodology employed by the a’qida books which have a kalami tendency as could be traced in the group publications like the *Doctrine of the Muslim* by Sheikh Mohamed El-Gazaly.

**The General Guide: A Salafi Movement with a Sufi Flavor!**

As the Muslim Brotherhood was not opposed to Sufism, El-Banna used to define his group as a “Sufi truth”. When El-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, he registered the group as a “charitable institution”, like many other Sufi institutions of that time. He determined early in his career to channel his missionary activity into the strengthening of the Brotherhood movement. But El-Banna’s interest in Sufism went a little bit beyond the narrow limits of the Sufi paths and ceremonies. For him, Sufism could still affect people’s daily life and could help in an Islamic revival by breaking its isolation, and by working as a spiritual guide for the behavior of all Muslims.

The Sufi influence could be traced in the Brotherhood’s organizational structure and educational methodology. It could be safely assumed that based on Sufism, El-Banna established the largest Islamic organization ever. In so doing, he founded a movement that combined Sufism with militarism.

The Sufi element greatly affected El-Banna in his youth (since he joined the Husafy Shazily Tariqa and was much dedicated to Al-Zaryuqiya Qur’an wazifa prayer) to the extent that he well integrated the Sufi component into the Brotherhood’s educational and cultural curricula, something which appears in the wazifa prayers (the major wazifa and the minor wazifa) and the awrad (sections of the Qur’an recited for specific purposes or on specific occasions) which he implemented in his group. He also integrated in the educational curricula of the group, in its early years, state of the art Sufi books like *Sharh Hekam Ibn Ata’ Al-Sakandary, Resalat Al-Mustarshideen* by Al-Harith Al-Muhasaby, *Al-Mawahib Al-Ludniah* by

*Al-Kasedeen* by Ibn Kodamah Al-Makdesy. In approaching these books, El-Banna focused on what had a link to the great organizations and overlooked what pertained to a specific *tariqa*. *Sufi* practices were never wholly absent from El-Banna's Brotherhood, however. He was keen to consistently celebrate the birth of Prophet Mohammad within the group. He also set as a spiritual goal the kind of sublimation that could be achieved through *Sufi* paths and practices. A book entitled *Al-Tawabum* by Al-Harith Al-Muhasab’ was a main part of the Brotherhood's educational curricula, as it was studied in groups in some of the nights dedicated to worship and *dhikr*, in a passionate scene of pious practice.9

El-Banna added a spiritual dimension to the organizational structure of his group. The criteria for promotion within the group included spiritual considerations having to do with inner piety, such as fasting, patience, tolerance, punctuality in prayers, *dhikr* and night prayers. Members of the families10 and battalions11 were connected by a relationship akin to blood kinship. This organizational structure, and also the fact that the El-Banna’s title of “General Guide” connoted spiritual authority, unmarred by any competition for leadership, were all notions that probably derived from El-Banna’s *Sufi* background.

The retreat of the *Sufi* trend in the Brotherhood was accelerated by colonization and by the growing importance of political activism within the group. But there was a more significant change that took place within the Brotherhood afterwards; a change that moved it away from the *Sufi* framework (which gave primacy to the spiritual side) to the *salafi* approach (which prioritized dogmatic purity). The latter approach was associated with a confrontational attitude towards *Sufi* practices, perceived by the *salafis* as at odds with the *Qur’an* and the sunna.
El-Banna’s Era: In the Beginning was the Brotherhood’s Salafism

In short, the Muslim Brotherhood was a *sunnī* Islamic movement adopting an approach or arbitration close to that adopted by *Ašbarā*ī. Present day *salafī* openly accuse it of being an *Ašāri* Movement. Some of El-Banna’s views were so controversial that they generated a jurisprudential *sharia* dispute in the seventies.

These controversial issues are once again the focus of attention in the Brotherhood’s arguments.

El-Banna’s stand regarding the issue of *tawasul* (plea), especially to prophet Mohammad, was quite flexible. He believed it is one of those debatable minor issues which could be permitted as it is something that is not related to the essence of a’qīda or faith. The *salafī*, on the other hand, almost deem tawasul as heretical. El-Banna, though allowing cemetery visits, still considered tawasul to the dead, requesting their help and building tombs to be used for petition, *as kaba’er* or great sins.

In addressing the relation with the religious “other”, El-Banna does not over-emphasize those aspects of the disagreement related to faith. In this early period, he attributed his clash with the Jews to political rather than religious differences. By contrast, the Brotherhood group today bases its antagonism towards the Jews on the religious disparity between Islam and Judaism. In dealing with the Copts, El-Banna tended to place the relation within the framework of human fraternity, especially emphasizing that the Egyptian environment then was not encouraging any ethnic or sectarian clashes. However, El-Banna was very decisive in confronting the Christian missionary expeditions of this period. He even requested, as he mentions in his memoirs, the invalidation of the licenses given to schools, hospitals and other institutions that missionaries used for preaching.

The Muslim Brotherhood at that time did not want to differ markedly from others in their outer appearance. Some were even advised not to grow
a beard so as not to create a barrier between themselves and other people. This attitude was later changed in the seventies under the influence of salafism when the issue of the relation between sunna and external piety was more in focus. Similarly, a woman’s costume was not given the same importance that it acquired later. The women of the Brotherhood group were modestly dressed, merely using a head cover or a simple scarf that did not differ much from what other Egyptian women wore at that time. It was not until the 1970s that loose-fitting clothing and the face veil became an important part of the Brotherhood ideology.

Thus, in its formative years, the Muslim Brotherhood started as an heir to the reforming salafism whose last prominent figure was probably sheikh Rashid Reda. But it was a collective, comprehensive and extremely flexible salafism, a salafism that produced the first generation of the Brotherhood’s sheikhs, preachers and transmitters of prophetic traditions like Youssif El-Karadawy and Mohamed El-Ghazali. It is also the salafism that influenced thinkers like Abd El-Halim Abou Shoka, who wrote The Freedom of Women in the Age of the Prophet; Gamal El-Deen Attia who issued the Contemporary Muslim magazine, a publication that led the Islamic jihad movement for years; and even Fathy Othman, who later articulated a vision of the Islamic left.

Significantly affected by contemporaneous events, the salafism of the early Muslim Brotherhood was crystallized into an all-inclusive Arabic Islamic form that did not negate the aspects of the community different from itself, that could be incorporated in its totality. El-Banna realized, early on, that the Brotherhood would have to operate in a political milieu open to a multiplicity of ideologies shared by liberals, nationalists, Islamic reformists, and populated by a number of prominent figures. Together, all these forces formed an intellectual milieu with a high degree of political awareness. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood was only one variable – important, though not the most important – in the Egyptian social makeup in a period open to various imported intellectual
currents. It seemed that the point of departure in El-Banna’s project was the restoration of identity. That is why his tendency towards mediation was clear from the very beginning when he defined his group as a *salafi* group\(^1\). Based on its context and on the personality of its founder and General Guide, Hassan El-Banna, we could consider this *salafism* a “pragmatic” *salafism*. This leads to the question: What are the factors which led the Muslim Brotherhood to adopt a different direction in later years?

**The Aftermath of the Nasser Era: The First Wave of the Brotherhood’s Salafization**

The Brotherhood movement’s interactions with the Nasser regime would play a vital role in changing the group’s intellectual and ideological direction. From then on, the internal structure of the group would also play an important role in determining significant internal changes (There was an obvious trend toward a division of attitudes inside the group).

The most significant of these interactions was the confrontation that took place after the 1952 Revolution. The rise of Nasserism seemed to implicitly require displacing the influence of the Brotherhood, a conflict which became apparent even before an explicit policy developed after the Suez War in 1956. The first wave of Muslim Brothers fled Egypt in 1954, after the execution of six Brotherhood leaders and the imprisonment of a large number of its members. The Muslim Brothers traveled to many countries of the Arabian Gulf, especially Kuwait and Qatar, and then to Bahrain and Emirates in smaller numbers. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia received the largest number of Brothers in these years.

The Kingdom was the main refuge for the Brotherhood leaders and for its cadres who were fleeing Nasser’s regime. It opened its doors to the fleeing Brotherhood and gave the Saudi nationality to a great number of its figures and leaders. For instance, Said Ramadan, the son-in-law of *Sheikh* Hassan El-Banna played a vital role in establishing the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), financed by the Kingdom. *Sheikh* Manna’ El-Qattan
became the Godfather of the Kingdom’s Brothers and a religious authority, and then Sheikh Ashmawy Soliman and Mostafa El-Alem and Abd El-Aziem Lokma, who was engaged in enormous economic activity in the Kingdom until he became one of the richest members of the group in the world 18.

The strategic alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Kingdom undoubtedly led to the deep influence of Saudi Wahhabism on the Brotherhood group. The Kingdom was a key country in the significant ideological division between Nasser’s Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom also served as a model of the Islamic country. The depth of the alliance became apparent, for example, in the Kingdom’s objections to the harsh verdicts issued by a military court in 1965 against five of the Brotherhood’s leaders and the execution of Sayyid Qutb and two of his companions, despite the Kingdom’s attempts to prevent it.

All this will gain centrality at the beginning of the inter-marriage between the Brotherhood salafism and the growing wahhabi salafism, or what is now known as the first wave of the salafization of the Brotherhood, an elitist wave that smoothly began at the end of the 1950s and through the 1960s producing a good number of those whom we considered the Saudized sheikhs of the Movement.

**The First Wave: A Quiet Salafization**

The Muslim Brothers who settled in the Kingdom could not resist the effect of the Saudi Wahhabi environment. It was a closed environment and there was no space for tolerant interactions, religious pluralism, or ideological multiplicity within the quite conservative Saudi atmosphere. This somewhat explains the fact that the Brothers coped with the sensitivity of the Saudi situation and they did not try to establish a branch for the Saudi Brothers in the Kingdom, like the other branches of the group established in other Arab countries at that time. By so doing, the Muslim Brothers in Saudi Arabia were following the footsteps of the General Guide Hassan El-Banna regarding the same problem 19 that aroused in the era of King Abd El-Aziz, only this
time the Brothers were immediately dealing with the Saudi political and social environment. This obliged them to cope with the utter dominance of Wahabism, either by adopting it – since they embraced many of its ideas which they could not resist – or through avoiding clashes with the Wahabis, since some of the Brotherhood’s ideas were not acceptable to them (like their favoritism towards Al-Asharia, or their attitude towards Sufism).

The first wave of the *salafization* of the Brotherhood went side by side with their withdrawal from the political scene in Egypt in the Nasser era due to the successive blows and the continuous legal pursuit the group was subject to, together with the complete absence of the group from public life. In addition, the Brotherhood’s hypothesis was absent from the religious sphere in Egypt at that time as a result of the seizure and the harsh criticism directed to it, even from the formal religious institution. In the meantime, there were heralds of a *salafi* expansion that was moving within narrow elitist limits, and that manifested itself in editing and publishing traditional religious books, and producing some of the books that institutionalized the *salafi* current like the books of Ibn Taymiyyah.

In Egypt, the atmosphere was right for the *salafi* leak. There also started a quiet elitist *salafi* wave that gradually gained ground at the expense of the Brotherhood’s hypothesis. This was enhanced by the concurrent recoil of *Sufism* under the pressure of the accelerating modernization project, the State’s control of the religious institution, and the elimination of *awkaf* (religious endowment funds) and *Sharia* Law (jurisdiction based on Islamic law).

Nasser participated in curbing the Brotherhood’s hypothesis when he overlooked the emergence of some *salafi* societies and institutions. Since these were quite elitist, attracted limited populace, and did not contest the regime, they did not trouble Nasser. In this period, there emerged the religious group called “*Ansar El-Sunna El-Mohammadiah*” (Exponents of Mohammad’s *Sunna*), an obviously the Wahabi *salafi* group founded by Hamid El-Fiky.
Around the same period, there was a restoration of traditional salafi books at the hands of some salafi scholars and investigators like Muhyddin Abd El-Hamid, Mahmoud Mohamed Shaker – the infamous critic and investigator—and his brother Ahmed Mohamed Shaker the renowned spokesman and investigator, both sons of Sheikh Mohamed Shaker (an associate of Al-Azhar and one of the prominent figures of salafism in Egypt) who issued some important fatwa regarding the implementation of Islamic Law. There are also the works of Abd El-Salam El-Harras and the works of Mohamed Rashad Salim, the investigator who introduced Ibn Taymiyyah.

It seems that the “quiet” salafi expansion has extended to the Brotherhood inside Nasser’s prisons. In this period, a number of salafi writings are reported to be included in the Brotherhood’s curricula, among the books that used to be studied in these prisons like “Sobol Al-Salam”, “Al-Moghny”, “Zad El-Ma’ad”, “Ma‘arej Al-Kobool”, etc. Starting from the end of the sixties, the Brotherhood’s curricula began to show some obvious salafi traces.

The Context of Change in the Seventies: The Second Wave of the Brotherhood’s Salafization

1. Saudi Arabia

The accelerated modernization in Saudi Arabia also channeled the Saudi-Brotherhood consensus in a more effective direction to the extent that it historically documented the second wave of salafization of the Brotherhood which started in the seventies. This was no longer be limited to the elitist leading force, but it also extended to the common Brotherhood cadres and a great number of the Brotherhood families who settled in the Kingdom in search of a better life standard.

A good number of Brothers came out of prisons in the Sadat era. Thousands of these, who normally lost their jobs as a result of the detention, started to immigrate to other countries. Needless to say, Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, were their most favorable...
destinations. In the Kingdom, the Brotherhood stood for an Islamic current that did not have a problem with the rapid modernization administered by King Faisal as opposed to the fanatic Wahabi stream that was steadfastly against the foreign “other”.

Thus, the role the Brotherhood played in Saudi Arabia was enhanced by their participation in the modernization project that King Faisal started at the end of the sixties. The Brotherhood’s influence expanded to most Saudi universities being established at that time and which were recruiting both faculty and staff. The role of the Brotherhood extended to their participation in economical activities which attracted a good number of them like Abd El-Azeem Lokma and Mostafa Mo’men and other members of the Brotherhood group who founded some construction companies mostly due to the civilizational expansion brought about by the oil boom and the significant rise in gas prices after the 6th of October war. Cadres of the Brotherhood group who were interested in trade or specialized in accounting worked in banking and Islamic banks. Members of the Brotherhood group also joined a considerable number of formal and quasi-formal Islamic institutions, the most important of which being “The International Seminar of Islamic Youth” which had a salafi basis and still affiliated with the Brothers. It is also worth mentioning that Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh Guide of the Brothers, worked there for a while and so did Gomaa Amin, current member of the advising office and Sabry Arafa El-Komy, the previous director of the upbringing division and member of the previous advising office23. In this period as well, a good number of leaders and figures of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in Saudi Arabia (like Tawfik El-Shawy, Kamal El-Helbawy, Ali Greashah, Abd El-Mone’m Te’elab, Abd El-Satar Fateh Allah Said, and Ahmed El-Assal, in addition to Sheikh Mohamed El-Ghazali, Sheikh Sayyid Sabek and some others who were associated with the Brotherhood) though they broke with the group as an organization.
This second wave is crucial since it helped accelerate the salafization of the Brotherhood on the social and organizational levels. On the social level, the members of the Brotherhood immediately interacted with the Wahabi Saudi environment. On the organizational level, members of the Brotherhood in Egypt were affected by the oil boom that affected Egypt and the whole region.

The Wahhabi religious institution could by no means challenge King Faisal’s modernization project or interfere in hiring the Brotherhood or any other group. But it was able to impose its religious outlook, especially the one that has to do with salafi beliefs, on the social level in a Saudi society that was not yet open to foreign influences. All Imams, preachers, holy men, and Arabic language teachers were required to pass a test in the Wahhabi creed to make sure that they are not Ashari or Sufi but believed in salafism, or else they were driven out. The teachers and the Imams thus used to learn and study the Wahhabi creed in order to evade such fate. Sometimes, imams and preachers coming from Al-Azhar were obliged to take off their Azhar costume since Al-Azhar was regarded as the stronghold of Ashari Islam. That is why this wave aimed to emphasize the salafi side of the Brotherhood in a way that makes it very similar to Wahhabi salafism, particularly in its fanatic attitude towards the religious “other”, even within the Islamic framework.

Salafism crept into the Brotherhood group in the context of a critical political and social environment in the Kingdom. The women and families of the Brotherhood group who lived in the closed environment of the Kingdom gradually got affected by the salafi mood and its apparent manifestation like the face veil (niqab) and the over interest in whatever has to do with outer appearance. The areas where the Brothers willingly opened to art and literature and to a variety of lifestyles thus shrank to a great extent. In Egypt, members of the Brotherhood group mostly came from middle class families or were educated peasants. They
were not known to have a different lifestyle from that of the rest of the Egyptians. Though they seemed conservative, they sometimes showed open-mindedness in their homes. Ahmed El-Malt, for example, had a piano in his house, before he became vice Guide afterwards. Women of the Brotherhood group used to wear a simple scarf on their heads. All this significantly changed when the situation in Egypt was getting even more affected by the interactions of the Saudi era.

2. Egypt

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was politically coming into focus thanks to the oil boom and the role it played in the 1973 war, and due to the decline of Nasser’s transnational project after the defeat of 1967 and the death of Nasser in 1970. There was also the improvement in the Egyptian/Saudi relations that took place due to the common interests which the two countries shared regarding the communist Soviet expansion in the region. Egypt’s religious role was also on the wane. Al-Azhar was curbed and it recoiled from both the African and the Arab religious scene giving ground to the growing authority of the Kingdom; an authority that aimed at spreading the Wahhabi ideas beyond the Saudi borders reaching out to other countries including Egypt.

The religious scene in Egypt at that time was also ripe for the salafi turn. Many Egyptians worked in Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf countries. They got affected by the lifestyle they experienced there, especially by the salafi religious component, so they tried to transfer many of its aspects to Egypt. Let us take, for example, the Qur’an cassette tapes recorded by the Saudi Sheiks like Huzaify, Soudais and Agamy that came to replace those of the renowned Egyptian reciters like Abd El-Baset Abd El-Samad, Husary, Menshawy and others.

Starting from the seventies, the open-door policy that President Sadat adopted has helped in creating a general atmosphere of openness,
though it happened gradually. The political openness that came with the platform experience in the “Social Union” in 1976, synchronized with the openness to the Western world (something that indirectly led to the peace treaty with Israel). A mass media group in Egypt particularly got interested in opening some of the pre-Sadat era files, among which was the file of the imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood group. But the most important aspect of the openness policy was the religious aspect. This period was characterized by a religious freedom that covered both freedom of expression and freedom of practice, not available before under Nasser’s modernization project and the revolutionary mobilization it necessitated. The openness in the religious field was an indication of the desire to relieve the severe congestion that prevailed after the 1967 defeat, especially after losing faith in the national project. Thus, the time was ripe for a re-birth of the Islamic movement, this time with a clear salafi direction.

**Egyptian Salafism: The Islamic Groups in Egyptian Universities**

At the beginnings of the seventies, the young members of the Islamic Groups, who were mainly students in the Egyptian universities, formed an entire Islamic generation whose fundamental basis, despite the multiplicity of dogma-building paths it followed, was salafism. It was a generation that opened up to a variety of intellectual and fiqhy references like those of Mohamed El-Ghazali, Mohamed Abou Zahra, Sayyid Sabek, Youssif El-Karadawy, and others like Eissa Abdou, Al-Bahy El-Kholy, and Kamal Abou El-Magd who represented the moderate stream. This was in addition to the writings of Sayyid Qutb and Abou El-Alaa El-Mawdudi which addressed political thought, revolutionary concepts and radical change. Nevertheless, this generation, as many significant members of the Muslim Brotherhood pointed out, had a pure salafi structure. It was based on the critical argumentative salafi approach regarding both 'aqida (faith) and fiqh, and it was structured through extensive internal and external contexts.
The support that the formal and informal religious Saudi institutions (Grand Scholars Association, Ministry of Awkaf and Religious Affairs, Guidance, Preaching and Fatwa Department) used to give to the Islamic groups in Egyptian universities was one of the channels of the sustainable Saudi/Brotherhood relations. This support mainly took the form of printing, publishing and distributing a huge number of Wahhabi salafi books. The Students’ Unions in Egyptian Universities also benefited from some Haj (pilgrimage) and Omra group trips. Through such trips Wahhabi salafism streamed into Egypt. Students would come back from these trips loaded with piles of free Wahhabi religious books stamped by the “Not For Sale” stamp. Most of the leaders and the representatives of the Islamic groups went to these cost-free trips. They used to stay in the Kingdom for the months that extend from Ramadan to the pilgrimage season, most welcomed by the Saudi Wahhabi scholars. At times they even had the chance to study under the supervision of some of Wahhabism’s most prominent Sheikhs like Ibn Baz and Othimin and were themselves sometimes considered the disciples of these scholars in Egypt.

The salafi component was present in the Egyptian environment as well. “Ansar Al-Sunna” group was very close to the Wahhabi ideas. Its founder, Hamed El-Fiky, was the first to introduce the figures of Wahhabi salafism to Egypt. Most of those who lectured the university students of the Islamic group belonged to “Ansar Al-Sunna” group. Then there was also the important salafi library owned by Moheb El-Din El-Khatib in Cairo, a library that greatly helped in providing the students of that generation with the salafi books they used to study. They even re-printed those books and sold them for cheap prices. For instance, the Sawt Al-Haq booklet series, produced by the Islamic group in Cairo, included new editions of salafi books written by the figures of Saudi salafism or by the Egyptian Sheikh Abd El-Rahman Abd El-Khalik.

The common Wahhabi jurisprudential issues started to surface at that time, such as the relation between men and women and the necessity of
separating them, the subjects of music, arts and literature, and even football! In that period too, members of Islamic groups started to show impatience towards opposition and opponents, whether to those who moved within the Sunni framework or to those outside it. There were a lot of arguments and of jurisprudential clashes between the young people of the Islamic groups and Al-Azhar sheikhs. Such clashes sometimes ended by accusing the sheikhs of collaborating with the enemies of Islam. At other times, there were clashes between members of these Islamic groups and some of the sheikhs whom they used to attend their sessions and learn from them like Mohamed Abou Zahrah29. The spirit of conservatism and fanaticism prevailed on what could be considered obscene from a salafi viewpoint that concentrated on outer appearance and external piety as much as it stressed the fundamental issues related to aqida.

Since the beginning of the Islamic movement in the twenties, the history of the Islamic call has never highlighted issues of disagreement. Let us take, for example, the issue of women’s dress, a topic that was under discussion only when there was an argument against nudity and vulgarity, something which all social parties would agree upon. Even more, the wives and sisters of those members in the Brotherhood group used to wear clothes that were not significantly different from those of other members of the conservative Egyptian community. They used to wear a simple head scarf; which was one of the subjects on which the students later criticized the Brothers. However, the salafi temperament that was imposed on the Egyptian community moved the topic of Muslim women’s costume (bijab), and, afterward, salafi whole body cover (niqab), to the circle of the basic shar’i problematics, something which generated disagreement in the Egyptian community and among members of the Brotherhood as well. There appeared the idea of the “shar’i dress” which was a controversial issue in Alexandria University, where it first appeared and where salafism was a hit among students. Then it moved to Cairo University, and from there it spread to other Egyptian universities and then to the rest of the Egyptian community30. The same argument extended,
though in a lesser degree, to other issues like men’s beards, mixed education in schools and universities, studying at the hands of female teachers and professors and even to watching television programs and attending football games.

By so doing, the salafi stream opened another gate for the isolationism that characterised that generation at the beginnings of the seventies of the twentieth century. It went along with a general tendency towards conservatism coupled with a zealous desire for change that turned later into an “ideological” project that aimed at building an alternative society based on Islam.

At that time, the experience of the secretive military work that was based on the culture of obedience, which a whole generation of the Brothers inherited from the pre-revolution years and from the experience of the Special Organisation during El-Banna’s era, was forcibly present in the Egyptian society. Mostafa Mash’our and Kamal Sananiry were notorious figures of the quasi-militant “Special Organisation”. This is in addition to the Qutbian stream which had a strong effect on the Brothers who lived in the period between 1954 and 1965 when the Brotherhood project received the second blow. It is necessary to differentiate between two types of Qutbians: the first type includes those who insisted on clinging to the ideas of Sayyid Qutb when the group started to hold trials inside the prisons of Nasser in order to filter the Brotherhood’s basic hypothesis. The most prominent figures of this type who were dismissed from the group are Ahmed Abd El-Meguid, Abd El-Samee’ El-Shazely and Abd El-Meguid El-Shazely. The second type is represented by some members of the Brotherhood who were affected by Sayyid Qutb’s ideas but who succumbed to the attempts of the group to block the Qutbian ideas which were then considered a deviation from the main stream of the first General Guide and the founder of the movement, Hassan El-Banna. However, those members kept some of the Qutbian viewpoints – that did not make accusations of disbelief, pre-islamic paganism
and sovereignty – and tended to lighten them. For instance, they believed in the importance of preserving the solidarity of the group, and of ensuring its sustainability through structuring the distinctive Quranic generation and pursuing emotional detachment in a community that deserted the righteous path of Islam. Some of the major Qutbian figures inside the Broterhood group in that period were Goma’ Amin and Sabry Arafa El-Komy. This eventually led to a diverse stream that combined militarism, secrecy and Qutbism and which paved the way for the appearance of what we term as the Qutbian stream in the body of the Brotherhood32, and which would continue to grow side by side with the great leaders of the Brotherhood who were contemporaries of El-Banna and who were released from the prison middle-aged33.

The New Salafi Brotherhood... The Transformation and the Foundation

Thus, the expansion of salafism in Egypt was enhanced by a societal and student salafi temperament that prevailed as a reaction to forms of vulgarity that were widespread at that time34. This also resulted from the retreat of the Brotherhood’s venture after the blow that ruined its project, its cadres, and its organizational structures. This assimilation formed the second level of the second wave of the salafization of the Brotherhood. During this wave, some sort of “structural” integration took place between the salafi components and the Qutbian components. This wave, however, demonstrated an obvious return to public activity35 after the stagnation of Nasser’s era.

The body of the Brotherhood group, exhausted by Nasser’s blows in 1954, and then in 1965, was in need of a fresh blood supply that was practically supplied by the young people of the Islamic groups36. From the very first moment of negotiations, which basically aimed at recruiting those students for the Brotherhood, there was some sort of debate on the salafi nature of the Brotherhood. Those known as the “Reawakening Youth” charged the Brotherhood with negligence, religious leniency, and inattention to the
research done on ‘aqida issues. They were also skeptical about the salafism of the Brotherhood especially regarding issues of outward piety like growing beards and the attitude towards arts, literature and the like. This caused the leaders of the Brotherhood to subtly get around El-Banna’s original definition of the group (and his definition of salafism as we explained before) in order to go along with (and even surrender to) the youth enthusiastic for salafism.37

In fact, when the Brothers succeeded in engaging the great majority of young people in the Brotherhood group, salafism was being consolidated as it was filling in the gap which the Brotherhood had previously left. It suffices to know that the first edition of the “Basics of the Salafi Approach” by Mostafa Helmy was printed in a publishing house owned by the Brotherhood and which was later on known as “Dar El-Da’wah” in Alexandria. The Brotherhood leaders also followed the pattern set by the Islamic groups’ youth regarding issues of outward piety. Headed by people like Mostafa Mashhour, later the General Guide of the Brothers, Abbas El-Seissy and others, they grew beards and abided by the rest of the sunni values related to outwards appearance. When the Brothers started to re-issue their “El-Da’wah” magazine, their platform, in 1976 (the bulletin that used to be issued in the days of Hassan El-Banna and which stopped because of the blows directed against the group) there seemed to be a fusion that was taking place between the Brotherhood group and the salafi approach. Such a fusion was apparent since the bulletin contained views and ideas closer to the salafi discourse than to the call of the Brotherhood. So it addressed issues like the contract of Ahl Al-Dhema – the free non-Muslim subjects living in Muslim countries, who enjoyed protection and safety and were supposed to pay capital taxes in return, the transgression of building churches, the necessity of applying shari’a laws regardless of the concurrence of the ruler or the ruled, and the sinfulness of music and singing. And that is why the bulletin was also considered an important reference for the young people of the Islamic groups (or the Muslims of the seventies generation) particularly
in the second half of the seventies when the Brothers increased their efforts in recruiting them to the group.

It seems that the debate on the possibility of joining the different Islamic groups was one of the reasons for the split which happened to the Islamic movement that was having a revival at that time. Those affected by the Wahhabi salafi component in the area of fiqh and aqida had an argument with others regarding the issue of joining the Brotherhood, then they finally rejected it. Their rejection was not based on matters of aqida as much as it entailed a refusal of the Brotherhood's dominance over a movement which—they thought—could not be credited with founding. Thus, they formed the school of salafi call (Da'wah) in Alexandria in 1976. Then they adopted Wahhabi salafism as an ideology that distinguished them from other streams and came to represent the scholarly salafi school. There were also some of the young people of the Islamic groups who were affected by the Qutbian stream and by Al-Mawdudi's political ideas. So they built a stern, reclusive and revolutionary Hakim paradigm which took shape later with Saleh Sareyah and Abd El-Salam Farag in the organizations of Jihad and Jama'a which have an Egyptian origin, though mingled with a salafi aqidi depth. Lastly, the greatest number of them was affected by El-Ghazali and Al-Karadawi and by the open-minded stream that agreed upon joining the system of the Brotherhood. This comprises the largest cluster of the Islamic groups members who actually joined the Brotherhood, yet still with salafi aqidi sensibilities, to form what could be considered the cluster of the “salafi Brothers”.

Hence, the most important salafi-Brotherhood intermarriage in Egypt would take place. The salafi component would heavily influence the ideas of the group's members and leaders and would be transferred to a large number of those who joined the group later at the end of the seventies. The Brotherhood's discourse was affected by the Wahhabi salafi paradigm as never before.
Like the *salafi* discourse, the “new” *salafi* Brotherhood rejected other components of its discourse which formed the totality of the Brotherhood’s ideology. These components were regarded as the “other” that should be rejected. The *Sufi* component was the most damaged as it was charged with every defect and was completely demolished. Then, the *Ash'ary Azharite* “other” became an example of religious deviation and an example for compliance and hypocrisy. When the Iranian Revolution took place, the Brotherhood was not able to join the largest “Islamic” radical movement in the region because of the *salafi* expansion that was happening within it. At the same time, some debatable jurisprudential issues moved to the surface and stayed there throughout the seventies42.

**The Era of the Eighties or the Dormancy of the Salafi Brotherhood**

But Egypt was experiencing a number of accelerating changes and Egyptians were preoccupied with some major issues. Therefore, *salafism* was peripheral to important historical moments; particularly the repercussions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the beginning of negotiations, then the rejection of peace, and later on the Camp David treaty and the demonstrations against it; then Afghanistan and even the attitude towards President Sadat. In addition, there was a great number of scholars and preachers in Egypt at that time, i.e., Abd El-Halim Mahmoud, Metwally El-Sha’rawi, Mohamed El-Ghazali, Ahmed El-Mahalawi, Salah Abou Ismail, Hafiz Salama, Abd El-Hamid Kishk, Abd El-Rashid Sakr, Mahmoud Eid, Salah El-Sawi, Ibrahim Ezzat. There were also many prominent figures in political parties, law, and the media who belonged to different intellectual streams, worked in the different fields of public work, and dominated the Egyptian political and media scene. On the eve of the 1981 detentions, there was a detention list that contained more than one thousand names representing different streams… something which indicates that Egypt was experiencing an ambiance of unprecedented political turmoil.
In such an atmosphere, the conviction of the importance of having an active role in public action was so effective that it resisted all sorts of pressure, including salafi pressure. The political climate and the ripe opportunities helped the public work train in the group to take off. The salafi Brothers from the Islamic groups youth did not have enough reasons not to join it, as they supposed it was an inactive principle in the salafi agenda as well. This accounts for the fact that when Egyptian Wahhabism first rejected the 1976 elections, the students consulted some sheikhs, and, in contrast to the Wahhabi ideals, received a fatwa from sheikh Mohamed Naguib Al-Motai’y approving the elections. Thus, the Brotherhood leaders of the Islamic groups backed some candidates in the 1976 elections among whom was Adel Eid, the prominent lawyer. They supported his campaign in Alexandria under the motto “An Islamic Egypt Once More”.

Starting from this period, those group members (the Brotherhood leaders of Islamic groups) represented the students’ movement which led the Brotherhood’s activism group from the end of the seventies. What made them even more effective in the Brotherhood’s body was the fact that they had previously participated in the student union elections in universities and had control over them. They also interacted with the cultural sensitivities of the students’ movement at that time, the same way they were practicing Islamic work and praying the Eid prayer under open sky. They ensured their presence in the public action areas allowed to them, just before they began the strategy of participating in the general elections at the beginnings of the eighties when they made use of the truce policy employed by Hosni Mubarak’s regime, something which totally institutionalized their fusion with the Brotherhood group. This rendered them subject to criticism from the other two salafi streams which were concurrently being crystallized: Whereas the first stream took a scholarly form in the salafi Da’wa school in Alexandria, the second stream took a Jihadi shape through the Islamic group and the jihad organization.
Thus, we can notice that the mutual influence between the Brotherhood and *salafism* took a certain shape. The Brotherhood’s influence on Wahhabi *salafism* was organizational while the *salafi* influence on the Brotherhood was ideological. On the one hand, we will note how the intermarriage in the former led to the birth of two organizational branches in *salafism*: The first was the Qutbian branch that produced a new stream termed “*Jihadi salafism*” via the branch of the Palestinian Brotherhood Sheikh Abd-Allah Azzam. The second was the Saudi revivalist trend via the Syrian Brotherhood sheikh Mohamed Sorror Zein El-Abedeen who intermixed the concept of Brotherhood public action with the *salafism of a’qida* in Wahhabism.

At the same time, we can note that the interaction that took place in the other direction and which produced what might be termed the “*salafi* Brothers generation” was deep, extensive and accelerating. Yet, it remained lean and dormant, rising at some times and ebbing at others according to the circumstances of the Egyptian context in the decades to come on the one hand, and the identity of the Brothers themselves on the other.

The Era of the Nineties and the Alterations of the Religio-Political Scene in Egypt

The “*Salsabil case*” (1992) is commonly used to date the beginning of the confrontational stage between President Hosni Mubarak’s regime and the Brotherhood. The movement that had enjoyed a relative freedom in participating in public activism for one and a half decade of Mubarak’s presidency, started to be continually observed and cordoned in a way that gradually limited its existence to its headquarters in professional syndicates and student unions. Its participation in elections shrunk even before its economic institutions and fund sources were pursued. In the mid nineties, when the confrontations between the regime and the group stopped, the political field was firmly set so as not to allow the Brotherhood to go on with the expansion and participation strategy.
The horizon of the public work was curbed under the influence of the regime's blows, as was the case in Nasser’s era. Around two and half decades, the cultural and intellectual jurisprudential scene (with El-Karadawi and El-Ghazali) was protecting the move to participate in public work with a campaign of *Ijtihad*. This campaign of *Ijtihad*, though down to earth and never overlooking factual events, formed an infallible barrier that prevented any attempt of retreating from public activity whether it came from within the Brotherhood group or was a reaction to a critique from outside. Youssif El-Karadawi issued a *fatwa* that parties in politics are very much equal to *madhabib* in *fiqh*. Mohamed Seleem El-Awa well placed non-Muslims in the structure of a Muslim State, Tarek El-Beshry addressed the problematic of perfect citizenship, Fahmy Houidy solved the problem of the Copts by categorizing them as “citizens, not Dhimis”, Mohamed El-Ghazali was staunchly against “Bedouin *fiqh*” and he wrote about the Muslim woman.

Yet, by the mid nineties, the effect of most of these figures vanished: some passed away like El-Ghazali, Gad Al-Haq, Al-Sha’rawy, Khaled Mohamed Khaled, and later Adel Hussein, others like Al-Beshry, Al-’Awa, and Houidy withdrew. Later on, all these somehow added to the complexities of the Egyptian scene like the religious sectarian dissension. This is in addition to the regional complications that followed the second gulf war and which helped split the Islamic movement into two parties: those supporting Saddam Hussein and those opposing him. The disagreement extended to the branches the Brotherhood had in different countries, hence giving another reason for the weakening of the Egyptian Brotherhood center and the development of the Gulf branches, especially the one in Kuwait.

Attacking the Brotherhood and restricting their presence to the syndicates, student unions and associations, confiscating their economical organizations, damaging their social circles, and finally gaining control of the mosques led, together with other reasons, to a retreat. This coincided with the new openness of the Egyptian scene to new and latent actors, the most important of which was *salafism*. There flourished the *Da’wah*...
salafi school in Alexandria, and the Ansar Al-Sunna League, which was less ideological. A number of independent preachers appeared and filled in the gaps in mosques like Yassein Roushdy in Al-Moasaa mosque in Alexandria and Omar Abd El-Kafy Shehata in the mosque of Assad Ibn Al-Fourat in Cairo. This was followed by the “New Preachers” stage, referring to preachers who made good use of the spread of satellite broadcast starting from the second half of the nineties. There were later developments where salafism gained ground in the areas from which the Brotherhood hypothesis retreated. Salafi mosques and salafi preachers throve in the absence of the qualified Brotherhood preachers who were by then exhausted by politics. The salafi list was prolonged later to include heritage revival movements, mosques networks, economic institutions, and investments in the now distinctly salafi satellite media.

While there was relentless demand on religion and religious knowledge, it was clear that the social base for the Brotherhood group and its hypothetical audience was now leaning more towards conservatism and salafism than it was with the religious temperament of Egyptian society, especially those who belonged to the generation of the nineties and who joined the Islamic movement in contexts where there was high demand for salafi notions and for conservatism. This meant that the new changes in the group came about as a result of the expectations and demands of the Egyptian society and did not necessarily represent a radical confounding of expectations. No wonder that some salafi Brotherhood figures like, for example, Mohamed Hussein Eissa, the historic leader in Alexandria, Gamal Abd El-Hady, professor at Al-Azhar University and Abd El-Khalek Al-Sherif, the prominent figure in the missionary division, smoothly combined both aspects.

Transformations in Education, Organization and Ideology: The Consequences of Salafization on the Muslim Brotherhood

In light of the foregoing, the inner rupture that affected the emergent Islamic movement in 1976, due to the issue of merger with the Brotherhood
group, was not yet crucial. Salafism, which had gained grounds within the Brotherhood group, remained dormant until it exploited the openness of the religious scene in Egypt to new actors and media channels, as mentioned above. This time, it re-filled the gaps created by the absence of the Brotherhood in the same areas: framing issues and education, on the organizational level and, consequently, in the Brotherhood’s ideological response.

**Brothers in the Salafi Call: A Generation of Salafized Preachers**

Possibly the field of proselytizing was the most unproblematic for the expansion of salafism within the Brotherhood. Salafi literature started to be included in the Brotherhood’s educational curricula in Nasser’s prisons in the 1960s. Its study was an instrument for building worldview and solidarity in prisons, exactly as was the case with embracing pure religious ethics and reciting and memorizing the Holy Qur’an, all means of reinforcing patience and endurance in members of the group. This could relate to the nature of the stage the Brotherhood was going through, as the group was trying to distance itself from pre-Islamic ideas and practices and from the aftermaths in the history of the movement that resulted from Sayyid Qutb’s ideas. This could also account for the group’s adoption of salafi literature related to topics of the hermeneutics of holy texts, religious observances and morality so as to stay away from confrontation with political regimes.

Though the salafis created their own independent stream when they launched the salafi Da’wah school in Alexandria, hence founding the scholarly salafism stream in Egypt in 1976, the salafi branch remained dormant inside the group. Starting from the mid-nineties, the Brotherhood organization would give in to the rising salafi religious wave spread within the Brotherhood group, particularly among the young people who newly joined the movement. Accordingly, there appeared some Brotherhood sheikhs who almost totally adopted the salafi costume and the salafi temperament. Those sheikhs exemplified the vigor that the salafi branch had in shaping the beliefs of many members in the Brotherhood group during the seventies.
The *salafi* brotherhood sheikhs usually belonged to a relatively new generation. Firstly; it was a generation that frequently combined “civil” scholarly aspects with Islamic jurisprudence epistemology which they had previously acquired whether in Egypt or in Saudi Arabia. Secondly; those sheikhs made use of the same *salafi* vocation tools; including satellite channels, websites and the like where they were welcomed and where they enjoyed good graces. Thirdly, this did not entail a deviation from the Brotherhood’s venture as much as it reflected interaction between the educational and cultural aspects of the Brotherhood group and the generic principles of the *salafi* vocation.

Thus, the *salafized* Brothers started to attend, and even to present, some religious, educational talk shows of interest on *salafi* channels, interacting with (and even competing with) its celebrity preachers. For instance, Safwat Hegazy (b.1963) presented a program called “Zaman Al-Ezzah” (Times of Pride) on Al-Nas *salafi* satellite channel and he also participated in the widespread show entitled “Fadjidah” (Leisure Talk) on the same channel. Safwat Hegazy, who became a star in the Muslim Brotherhood, spent a number of years in Saudi Arabia for work and study before he returned to Egypt in 1998. Al-Nas channel also welcomed Brotherhood Sheikhs, who preferred to study history, like for example Dr. Ragheb Al-Sergany (b.1964), chairman of the Cultural Center for Historical studies in Cairo and who supervises a website narrating the story of Islam. Rageb Al-Sergany presents more than one program on Al-Nas channel including a program called “A Daring Decision” on the history of Sahaba (disciples of Prophet Mohamed), and another weekly program on the “history of Islam”, and also a program entitled “clashing point” about the challenges that face Muslims in Turkistan, Tibet, South Sudan and Africa. His missionary interests therefore extend from the history of Islam, to Jerusalem, to the Hijab, and positive thinking, in a unique mixture of *salafi* and Brotherhood ideas. Yet, he wrote an article on the topic of *shi’ism* and Hizbullah in Lebanon in the relentlessly oppositional *salafi* style. Sheikh Gamal Abd El-Hady focuses on the history of Islamic
victories in his “Pages of History”, a weekly program that the channel promotes as a return to the golden age of Islam.

Sheikh Mohamed Hussein Eissa (b.1937) wrote more than 40 books on *fiqh*, social issues, family, and education, and proselytizing. He was head of the administrative office of the Brotherhood in Alexandria. Sheikh Eissa has made important contributions to the educational constituent of the Muslim Brotherhood which he had joined back in 1967. He has retained his proselytizing and educational tendencies which continued to draw on the *salafi* branch formed at the end of the sixties when the Brothers were absent from the political and the religious scene in Egypt. This is clear in his website.

In 2005, the group did not hesitate to nominate Sheikh Hazem Salah Abou Ismail as a candidate to the People’s Assembly elections for Dokki constituency to compete with the ex-minister Amal Othman. Sheikh Abou Ismail won the overwhelming majority of votes, though the government officially announced the success of his competitor. Though the Sheikh is commonly referred to as a son and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood group, he seems closer to *salafism* even in his attire and outer appearance. He also presents weekly programs on Al-Nas *salafi* channel like “Al-Tebian” which he followed by “Leqa’” (Meeting) and “Fadfadah”.

Sheikh Abd El-Khalek Al-sherif seems to be the most important and the most influential among the *salafized* Brotherhood sheikhs; a preacher of the Brotherhood, a member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, director of “Manarat” Center for Islamic Studies, and one of the founders of “Islamic Vocation Society” in Beni Soueif. Al-Sherif presents a talk show on “Al-Hafez” *salafi* channel. Though the *salafi* component in his discourse is not dominant, it has a significant effect since he is one of those in charge of the missionary division of the group and one of those who give additional attention to the missionary aspect of the Brotherhood movement in a way that competes with *salafi* efforts in that field. This implies an obvious possibility of a diffusion of the *salafi* missionary discourse that the logic of
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proselytizing now imposes on its hypothetical audience, an audience that is leaning more and more towards conservatism.

This shows that the Brotherhood now depends on some salafi-Brotherhood figures for education since the salafized sheikhs and preachers now serve as connectors in the chain that links the Brotherhood to salafism.

The field of proselytizing was an imperative field where the venture of the Brotherhood and that of salafism competed due to three overlapping reasons. Firstly, to attract a now-common audience after the increasing demand on religiosity and religious knowledge that is not necessarily related to a particular organization and that only draws on individual channels. Secondly, because of this first reason, the cultural resources on which the members of the Brotherhood draw on are composed of hybrid content that combines the Brotherhood’s political and organizational aspects with the salafi vocation that gives priority to issues related to aqida, creed, disagreement, dress and outer appearance, and social relations in general. Thirdly, the openness of the Brotherhood’s cultural channels to the new communication media, including those that have a salafi orientation, linked local and international topics to issues related to doctrinal disagreements like the relation with Shi’ism, the attitude towards Iran, the conditions of Muslims all over the world, fatwas related to the Palestinian issue and the Gaza strip, and other similar issues. In all topics, both the salafi and the Brotherhood components were poignantly present, yet none of them absolutely took over.

Nevertheless, we could argue that this competition ended in favor of the salafi stream which was refreshed by the salafized Brotherhood stream that was keen to underscore its affiliation with salafism. This necessarily led to an adoption of its topics under discussion and the use of its missionary platforms (including broadcast channels, and salafi websites, though this could imply some coercion that might negatively affect the Brotherhood discourse), and ended in many cases by the adoption of the salafi outfit.
The Flourishing of Salafism... Reflections on Organizational Aspects

Accordingly, the Brotherhood’s internal organizational structure was ready to respond to the transformations of the religious scene. There moved to the surface the dormant *salafi* components; first, what was left of the Saudized generation of sheikhs from the 1960s, whose influence in the generic Brotherhood path remained limited, then there was the generation of the *salafi*-Brotherhood students who belong to the era of the seventies and who went through public action battles and mingled in public life and hence their *salafism* remained dormant in spite of everything.

But the most obvious forms of the *salafi* components resulted from the internal filtration processes. The presence of the *salafi* component in the Brotherhood group played an important role in revealing the different trends and tendencies at work within the group. These trends started to lose their ability to coexist in the extensive Brotherhood body, though it has not yet reached a clashing point.

It is not easy to separate, for the sake of analysis, the different streams inside the group which significantly overlap on generational, sociological and ideological levels. The “organizationalists” do not only belong to the old men’s club in the group whose members are the remaining leading Brothers, many of whom belong to the generation of the seventies, the young people of the Islamic groups at that time and of subsequent generations. Yet, the new developments happening pertained to the interaction between the Qutbian stream on one hand; the stream that was still limited to the discourse of emotional solitude; the establishment of a unique generation, Qur’ani both in its upbringing and its education, ready to deal with a society that was viewed as *jahili* (pertaining to pre-Islamic paganism), or a partially *jahili*, society – and on the other hand, the organizational ideas that give utter priority to organizational solidarity, and control the sifting and stepping up processes, together with the boosting *salafi* approaches which move in a
more conservative direction. The effect of this triple alliance became obvious in the critical moments through which the group passed during the last few years.

The program the Brotherhood prepared for their party in 2007 revealed a lot of what was going on inside the movement. The program showed, out in the open, many discussions that were taking place inside the movement and which addressed some controversial issues, among which the topics related to women and Copts became central all of a sudden. The political program which the Brotherhood proposed for its hypothetical political party in 2007 formed a turning point in a history of good relations between the “organizational” stream and the “reformative” stream within the group. The reformist trend proposed a political vision based on a shift towards partisanship, a separation between the missionary aspects and the political aspects of the movement, an openness to reformative Western discourses, in addition to the willingness to engage in political action and the subsequent acceptance of unconditional citizenship, including women’s right to vote and to run for elections. Yet, this happened in an atmosphere that was characterized by political inflexibility in a way that allowed the organizational stream to start its war to lay hands on all the areas previously controlled by the reformative stream. This was followed by an attempt to illegalize this stream, then to directly interfere in the political program, making some radical changes through the addition of the two recognized items which prevent women and Copts from running for elections, and which lay religious supervision on the performance of the legislative council.

The internal elections within the Brotherhood group enabled for the organizational reshuffling destined to affect the reformative ideas resulting from the group’s participation in political life for three decades, and which was strengthened after the 2005 elections. Towards mid 2008, the supplementary by-elections of the Brotherhood’s Shura council took place. They ended in the landslide victory of the organizational stream that was in control, and which
succeeded afterwards in promoting five of its members to the “Guidance Office”. This comprises the movement’s highest organizational level and powerful executive department. In the 2009 elections, the organizationalists were in full control of the “Guidance Office” where the only reformativists left were Essam El-Erian, whose reformative tendencies were contained after his promotion to the “Guidance Office” (after the most significant figures of the reformative stream Mohamed Habib and Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh went out). The process that aimed at re-organizing the Brotherhood’s “family house” ended by the election of Mohamed Badie, who also belongs to the organizational stream, as the eighth General Guide of the Brotherhood group in January 2010. More emphasis was thus laid on the organizational aspect, as the leaders of the organizational stream started an organizational campaign that aimed at adding more discipline and strictness to the promotion standards inside the group, all for its own benefit. The group’s confrontations with the ruling system give utter priority to maintaining the unity and stability of the group, and to enhancing its organizational coherence.

The results of the internal elections led to some objections on the side of the reformist stream in the group. It also led to the anxiety of the political and intellectual elite outside it. This was due to what many people, including some of the Brothers, considered as a “kidnapping” of the Brotherhood group by the Qutbian stream that succeeded in putting the group under its organizational control, with three of its sons holding the most critical organizational posts in the group; the post of the General Guide and two out of his three assistants. Mohamed Badie, Mohamed Ezzat and Gomaa Amin were considered the most important figures of the Qutbian stream inside the group, in an indication of the historical dimension of the group’s intellectual experience through recalling the ideas of Sayyid Qutb. The intellectual disarray that the group suffered from in 1965 was the real beginning for the appearance of the Qutbian stream inside the group, a trend that kept the Qutbian ideas as its reference in topics like *Al-Hakimiah*, and the preparation
of the generation of the Vanguard to carry out the radical change aspired. Even when the movement set up trials for the Qutbians inside the prisons to isolate what was then considered an intellectual deviation from the group’s main path – especially when it issued its well-known book “Preachers not Judges” – many remained loyal to this trend and formed an extension to it. That stream was definitely distinct from the Qutbian trend whose descendent still exists within the group, including those who remained from the 1965 organization, the most notorious of whom are the new (Eighth) General Guide Mohamed Badie, the iron man Mohamed Ezzat, and Sabry Arafa Al-Komy, all participated in implementing the Qutbian thought inside the basic Brotherhood venture.

Salafism inside the Brotherhood: From Arbitration to New Orthodoxy

We will notice that the response to these intellectual and organizational changes would be basically ideological, affecting certain issues which remained for long out of the zone of ‘aqida controversy. Such a response appeared in the major events where the Brotherhood found itself face to face with some newly debatable issues which had to do with the Muslim “Other”. There is, for example, the topic of the Shi’a, since the leaders of the Brotherhood were engaged in a discussion that touched on some issues related to ‘aqida in the guidance office, when Youssif Nada, a Brotherhood leader living abroad, raised the topic of the disagreement between the Brotherhood and the Shi’a in the context of the Brotherhood’s attitude towards Iran and its project. Two visions were reconciled: A salafi vision, represented by Mahmoud Ghazlan, and a Qutbian vision, represented by Gomaa Amin, both members in the “Guidance Office”, the highest organizational level in the movement. Mahmoud Ghazlan was a student in the seventies, and he supervised the “Sout Al-Haq” series, whereas Gomaa Amin was imprisoned with Qutb in 1966, then he worked at the international seminar in Saudi Arabia. Amin wrote the bulletin that read: “follow fiqh and stay away from
polytheism” addressing the Brotherhood and the Shi’a. We could trace afterwards the clash with the Sheikh of Al-Azhar regarding the “niqab” topic, which was turned all of a sudden into an Islamic issue, though the “niqab” had never been of the movement’s ideological concerns.

Thus, latent salafism and potential salafi members came out in the open. Then the salafi component gradually matured and started to show in various topics, especially those related to evident piety. So, some new/renewed battles started, all evolving around niqab, growing beards, and strict religious dress. Only four out of the fifteen members working in the “Guidance Office” are not wearing beards (currently Essam El-Erian wears a beard). Then the niqab started to spread among the sisters and it was emphasized in families. There was also some salafi confusion concerning the issue of censorship and of monitoring books and works of art.

On the ideological level, there was an obvious change in the Brotherhood’s overall paradigm that ruled for over half a century. Such a change distanced the group from an inclusive framework of arbitration to a salafi framework that gives priority to issues related to ‘aqida purity and to all what that entails of disagreement and clashes between the different streams and ideologies, and the practices which are seen as disagreeing with Qur’an and sunna. This means that the Brothers who were always known to accept the different cultural components of society are today heading towards a total separation from the Brotherhood’s heritage.

The salafi discourse, which addressed itself to issues like costumes, arts, literature and music, is now about to concentrate on these topics in a way that is completely alien to society and in a way that overlooks the cultural component and negates historical and geographical differences, only to focus on a’qidi purity that has to be unified regardless. By so doing, it negates the very notion of pluralism and denies the possibility of difference, drawing on the concept that pure Islamic values presupposes agreement and consensus among all believers. This shows, for example, in the discussion of the issue
of niqab which has been regarded as the one and only socially acceptable form of religious costume that pertains to Islamic jurisprudence; the same alteration that had previously made of the loose-fitting hijab the acceptable religious costume of the seventies, the time when salafism was just starting to gain grounds inside the Brotherhood. In this case, the components which led to the intellectual disagreement within the Brotherhood (though they are not the only Islamists), and in its relation to other actors, are now being gradually standardized into a mono vision that is not simply conservative but is also heading towards more orthodoxy. This accounts for the severe disagreement regarding issues like niqab, religious education curricula, status of minorities, shiism, and clashes with sheikh Youssif Al-Karadawi (who was regarded until recently as the main resource person of the Movement) then with the sheikhs of Al-Azhar.

This reflects a transformation in the Brotherhood’s Orthodoxy which was moving away from a restoration of Islamic identity, in the face of the foreign influences of the thirties and the forties, towards a concept of Hakimiah that sets itself in opposition to the state and to the society of the seventies. This happened before it dedicated its efforts to the idea of enforcing morality within the institutions of the regime in the nineties, reaching out to a salafi orthodoxy that is alien to contemporary culture and society.

The siege that the regime imposes on the group, considering the role it might play in the coming elections, remains the most significant factor that could guarantee the continuation of the organizational solidarity and the basic attitude towards the political regime. It does not seem that the “new” salafi Brotherhood will oppose political participation, in the general sense of the word, as much as it will have negative effects not only through turning it to direct preaching but also because it might cause some kind of confusion in the political fiqh of the group, after decades of the group’s interaction with the society and the state, as it will limit the group’s participation for years to come. Citizenship, the most vital political and cultural issue in Egypt,
comes on top of the confusing issues which the group has to deal with. In 1953, when the Brotherhood attempted to develop an Islamic constitution, the citizenship issue was easily decided upon. However, after 50 years of successive developments, it became the issue where the group retreated most as it appears in the 2007 party program.

Therefore, the phenomenon of the double salafization of the Brotherhood appears to be a social and intellectual phenomenon that resulted from a number of decisive internal and external factors that contributed to deepening the effect of Wahhabi salafism on the Brotherhood movement. Yet, it is obvious that the salafi version was more affected by the intellectual and social Egyptian context than by Wahhabism.

The oil decades from the beginnings of the seventies until the mid-eighties led to a wave of Egyptian (and Brotherhood) migration to Gulf countries, especially to Saudi Arabia. This was a gigantic demographic movement that transferred the salafi mood and creed outside the Wahhabi incubator. The Egyptian environment was prepared for the reception of the Wahhabi stream due to the open religious atmosphere in the days of Sadat, the retreat of the Brotherhood’s gambit, and the active interactions that took place in the seventies after the defeat of Nasser’s trans-national project and the concurrent ebbing of the modernization wave. Such alterations were synchronic with the growing external ideological role that Saudi Arabia played in re-directing Wahhabism outside the borders of the Kingdom.

The salafi expansion, hence, coincided with a number of historical turns that resulted in the rise of the trends that demonstrated a conservative attitude, not only towards issues of vulgarity and religious leniency inside the community, but it was also an attitude that resulted from the failure of the ideological reform projects (the Muslim Brotherhood in this case), and the retreat of the political movements that were leading the project of modernization (Nasser’s regime in this case). These were developments which strongly supported the salafi rise.
Yet, the expansion of the salafi trend in the Egyptian society, among university students, and eventually in the overall Islamic movement, was not domineering. It was rather affected by the Egyptian context that was characterized by pluralism, openness and an accelerating societal movement. Societal and cultural efforts framed salafi Wahhabism due to the intellectual and communal variables in Egypt. The leading figures of the Brotherhood group facilitated the most vital part of the process as they transferred it to the organizational level and added to it some organizational, ideological and intellectual dimensions (as mentioned above) that could not be denied.

Finally, based on the developments which were addressed in this study, we could assume that the Brotherhood group will lose a good part of its flexibility and its ability to sustain internal variety under the group’s broad tent, moving in the direction of more standardization and conservatism as supported by organizational, Qutbian and salafi components. Programs of constitution, cultural framing and education are expected to play a great role in the next stage.
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Endnotes

1 Hossam Tammam, “Questions of the Salafi Times.” IslamismScope, http://islamismscope.net/articles/152.html


4 See the letter of the fifth convention in the Letters of Sheikh Hassan El-Banna (The Muslim Brothers have a salafi call because they attempt to return Islam to its pure origin, to the Qur’an and the sunna).

5 Sheikh Reda was interested in the idea of a union based on regaining the lost caliphate, and many of his reformist ideas draw on this. In his early years, Reda leaned towards Sufism as he was affected by the writings of Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali and the emphasis he laid on internal personal piety perhaps with Sufism as its agency. Rashid Reda called for overlooking sectarian and denominational differences and he came up with a golden rule that was frequently quoted afterwards: “We agree on the stem and we excuse each other for the branch differences”. El-Banna adopted this rule throughout his missionary career to avoid clashes between salafism and Sufism, or between salafism and Asharis Islam as represented by Al-Azhar sheikhs or between Sunna and shia later on, something that sheikh Rashid Reda himself did not have a chance to do.

6 The Zat and sefat issue was, and still is, one of the greatest points of controversy between the Brotherhood and the Salafi Wahhabis. The Wahhabis blame El-Banna for believing in the notion of the “delegation of the particulars” that occurred in the Qur’an in relation to Allah’s Dhat and Sefat. The “delegation of the particulars” proves Allah’s sefat and enhances the belief in these sefat in the delegation of the particulars to Allah Who certainly knows what best describes His majesty and His divine perfection. “With the belief in the sublimity of Allah and His departure from the [sefat] of his subjects, and let it pass as such”. Imam Malek summarized the argument in his explanation of “sefat Al- istewaa”: (“Al istewaa” is “the mysterious unknown” which is not intelligible through rationality but must simply be taken as a matter of belief, or faith.)

7 The book was serialized in the Judicatory Issues magazine between the years 1951 and 1952. El-Gazaly published this book as part of a series of books to develop the cultural abilities of the group. In these books, El-Gazaly attacked the kalami approach. See: Mohamed El-Gazaly’s, The Doctrine of the Muslim, 4th ed. (Alexandria: Dar El-Da’wah El-Islamiah, 1994).

9

10 The “family” is the smallest organizational unit of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is close to the concept of the cell in communist organizations, yet it differs from communist cells in as far as it has a highly spiritual nature. This makes it closer to the traditional family where the human relation between its members is based on a bond of fraternity that draws on mercy and mutual support and a strong connection that resembles a blood bond. Group Awrad, dhekr, and charity works were part of the family’s routine activities.

11 The “battalion” is a monthly organizational meeting where a number of families meet. The battalion does not necessarily have a military association. Instead, it is based on worshipping activities like fasting, night prayers, a testing of tolerance (like walking for long hours uttering dhekr), or climbing mountains, an activity that combines physical athletic practice with the sunna of meditating on Allah’s miracles in the universe.

12 In this context, Al-Asharia, generally speaking, refers to those of Almo’tazelah who faced Al-Motakaleem. Al-Asharia are also classified by Ibn Taymiyyah, in the same box with ahl al-kalam, though he still affiliates them with Ahl el-Sunna and al-Gama’a. Ibn Taymiyyah describes them as those who “faced a big bed’a (novelty) by a smaller one and who blocked a (batel) wrongdoing by a lighter one”. He also said that they had some opinions based on Ijtihad, though these opinions do not go along with sunna and gama’a”. In other words, he thought that this type of Asharia belong to sunna and gama’a, even if they were not right (like Nawawy and Ibn Hagar). Nowadays, the Wahhabis consider the sheikhs of Al-Azhar and the whole religious institution a stronghold for the Al-Asharia, now viewed as more of an accusation of resentment to true faith and as an indication of antagonism to the Muslim Brothers.

13 The official website of the Brotherhood group on the internet that contains an explanation of El-Banna’s stand regarding this point: "موقع الإخوان المسلمون". In this Brotherhood’s (ikhwani) article, the fatwa of the Wahhabi salafi sheikhs are frequently referred to as evidence, something which supports our hypothesis in the upcoming analysis.

14 Farid Abd El-Khalik traces this attitude of Hassan El-Banna’s in his autobiography edited by the writer of this paper. Farid Abd El-Khalik, The Digest of the Years… A Witness on the Call of the Muslim Brotherhood, edited by Hossam Tammam. (Forthcoming). Farid Abd El-Khalik was very close to Hassan El-Banna as he was El-Banna’s chief assistant.

15 There is a more detailed and more accurate analysis of the subject of the Brotherhood’s attitude towards women, especially the part that has to do with women’s costumes, in the memoirs of Mrs. Fatma Abd El-Hady, the first vice leader of the Muslim Sisters. 
division. See: Fatma Abd El-Hady, My Journey with the Muslim Sisters: From the Martyr Imam Hassan El-Banna to Nasser’s Prison.


17 It was not surprising for El-Banna to define his group as a salafi call in a period of history where salafism was affecting every single current, and where it was considered the jurisprudential and shari basis for all aspects of contemporary Islamic thinking. It is worth mentioning that when Hassan El-Banna joined the Faculty of Jurisprudence (Dar El ‘loom) in Cairo, he was greatly influenced by Sheikh Rashid Reda. In Cairo, too, El-Banna met Mouhib El-Deen El-Khatib, the salafi figure whose library, headed by El-Banna, would play a vital role in spreading the Wahhabi salafi literature at the end of the sixties. See: Hassan El-Banna, Memoirs of the Mission and the Preacher (n.p., n.d.): 59.

18 Tammam, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Wahhabism”, in Alterations in the Muslim Brotherhood.

19 Ibid.

20 Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh has alluded to this point in his autobiography as he was trying to account for the negative attitude he and his colleagues adopted towards Al-Azhar at that time. They believed that Al-Azhar took sides with the 1952 revolution against the Brotherhood. He also mentions that the Brotherhood’s writings were banned. Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh, A Witness of the Islamic Movement in Egypt, edited by Hossam Tammam. (Forthcoming).

21 Albert Hourani traces this idea in his book first published in 1962. Hourani notes how the Wahhabi ideas - not yet as rigid - started to affect the writings of the figures of the so called “liberal age of the Arab intellect” within the ongoing dialogue between the liberal ideas and the Islamic reformation at that time. But Ibn Taymiyyah’s ideas represented traditionalism in Islamic thinking since he focused on issues of faith and monotheism and disregarded some vital issues which resulted at that time from the interaction with the booming Western civilization. See Albert Hourani pages 268-270. This is what could be easily applied later on to the insistence on the reference to Ibn Taymiyyah, then to the Wahhabi Saudi Sheikhs, especially Sheikh Ibn Baz and Sheikh Othimmin, as an evidence for the loyalty to the salafi sources, even among the Brotherhood.


23 Tammam, “The Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Wahhabism”.

24 The nuclei of the Islamic groups were most probably the religious societies founded in universities, which were either affiliated to students’ unions or separated from them.
These societies were gradually turned into active entities in the totality of Islamic work when the students belonging to them won elections and assumed control of students unions, something which enabled them to practice their work freely. The first Islamic group was founded in Kasr El-Ainy (Faculty of Medicine), Cairo University, and in Alexandria, the first Islamic group was founded in the Faculty of engineering, then spread to the rest of the Egyptian universities. The title “Islamic group”, which first appeared in 1973, was probably taken from the Islamic group of Pakistan, since El-Modawy’s books were spread among the students at that time. Some of the well-known students of the Islamic groups in the seventies are now members of the second generation of the Muslim Brotherhood group. These leaders include: Abd El-Mon‘em Abou El-Fotouh, Mahmoud Ghazlan, Isam El-Erian in Cairo and Hamed El-Defrawy, Khaled Dawood and Ibrahim El-Za‘farany in Alexandria.

25 See the statement of Dr. Yasser Bourhamy, one of the pillars of the salafi school in Alexandria and one of the founders of the Islamic group in Alexandria University in the seventies. Nowadays, he is considered one of the leading figures of the salafi approach: http://islamyoun.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?C=ArticleA_C &cid=1252188116162&pagename=Islamyoun%2FIYALayout.

26 As a young man, El-Banna used to go to the salafi library owned by Moheb El-Din El-Khatib in Cairo even before he founded the Muslim Brotherhood. No wonder, then, that El-Banna defined his group as a “salafi call”.

27 At first, the young people of the Islamic groups were interested in reading books on faith (aqida) and monotheism (tawheed), the most important of which were books by Ibn Taymiyyah like Raf‘ el-Malam ‘an al’aemah al a’lam and Iktida’ el-serat al-Mostakeem Mokhalafat Ashab al-Gaheem, then The Book of Monotheism by Mohamed Abd El-Wahab and Ma’areg al Kooool by Hafez El-Hakmy and Nayl Al-Awtar, a jurisprudential book by Al-Showkany, then Al-I’tesam book by El-Shateby and The Borderline between Atheism and Faith by Abd El-Rahman Abd El-Khalek.

28 Certainly the salafi book was not the only interest of the series that also produced other books like “letter of the fifth convention” by Sheikh Hassan El-Banna, The Four Terms and Theory of Political Islam by Abou El-A’la Al-Modawy, This Religion and This is the Religion of the Future by Sayed Qutb and some chapters of books or letters by Qutb like “There is no God but Allah: a Life Style”, also The Road to Allah by Sheikh Mohamed Metwaly El-Sharawy, Tafseer Surat Al-Fatiyah by imam Ibn El-Kayem, and The Hijab of the Muslim Woman in Qur’an and Sunna by Sheikh Nasser El-Din El-Albany. Mahmoud Ghazlan, current member in the Muslim Brotherhood, played a major role in issuing the series, selecting its topics and editing it.

29 Khaled Dawood narrates more accurate details in his memoirs (prepared and edited by the writer of this paper, forthcoming) about the disagreement of the members of the Islamic groups with those who did not believe in salafism. Such disagreement had to do either with outward appearance like growing beards or wearing hijab or with jurisprudential arguments with Al-Azhar sheikhs or with others. Khaled Dawood is
one of the most important founders of the Islamic group in Alexandria and one of those who chose to join the Brotherhood group in the mid seventies.

30 Hossam Tammam, “The Islamists and Women’s Costume: From Decency to Hijab and then Niqab”, Lebanese Al-Akhbar (2 Nov 2009).

31 The emotional detachment from the social vulgarities and from a revolution that was considered “non-Islamic” – in spite of the fact that a good number of the Free Officers were members in the Brotherhood group – and from those who supported the revolution and opposed the Brothers, draw heavily on the belated ideas of Sayed Qutb. But we will notice that the notion of separation or “mofasalah” on which the idea of emotional detachment is based has first appeared in the early writings of Sayed Qutb. At the beginning of 1954, Sayed Qutb first mentioned the idea of separation in the bulletin entitled “The Brothers in the Battle” which he used to edit and whose place of publication was unknown.

32 Members of the Brotherhood group who were released from the prisons around the mid seventies led the steady attempts of attracting the young people of different Islamic groups, who were then part of the active students’ movement, to the Muslim Brotherhood group. The intellectual kinship between two quite extremist streams; the secretive, militant, Qutbian Stream of the Brotherhood and that of the young people of the salafi fanatic stream, helped accelerate the incorporation of the students into the Brotherhood Movement which was at that time subject to re-structuring.

33 In this period, the leaders of the Brotherhood who were contemporaries of El-Banna grew up to be middle-aged or old men like Abbas El-Seesy, Omar El-Telmesany, Farid Abd El-Khalek, etc. The young people of other Islamic groups came to respect them widely after their being released from prison. On the other hand, members of the Brotherhood took the responsibility of easing the young people’s austerity, rigorousness and also perhaps their salafism practically and gradually, especially that the Brotherhood did not have, after El-Banna’s era, a cadre of scholars who might take over the task of teaching and preaching those young people.

34 The period after the defeat of the June 1967 war that extended well throughout the seventies witnessed a rise of vulgar commercial movies.

35 We argue that the very concept of public work, which was not termed so until the eighties, was present since the foundation of the Brotherhood group by El-Banna since it was described as a social institution that combined preaching activities with social activities. It also had a social role that was later turned into a political role which was intensified by developments that befitted the Egyptian context and the colonization.

36 The collaboration took place in point of fact between the years 1975 and 1976 after a number of meetings between the Brothers and the student leaders of the Islamic groups. We notice that this was the same period that witnessed the stability of the Brotherhood, proved by the publication of the first issue of “Al-Da’wa” in 1976 too. This was the same bulletin that used to be issued in the days of Hassan El-Banna before it stopped and before the Brothers were allowed to publish it once more. Many
infamous scholars of fiqh and of intellect published articles in that bulletin, among them were Sheikh Youssif El-Karadawi, Mr. Ali Greashah, Fathy Yakan from Lebanon, in addition to Imam Abd El-Halim Mahmoud, Al-Azhar Sheikh at that time.


38 It is the print house which was managed by Abd El-Hakim Khayal and Mahmoud Shoukry and which produced the most important book at that time attempting to theorize for salafism and written by a professor of Islamic philosophy.

39 Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh dedicates a part of his autobiography (edited by the writer of this study) to the role that “El-Da’wah” bulletin played at the end of the seventies.

40 The most famous of whom in Alexandria are Mohamed Ismail, Ahmed Farid, Said Abd El-Azeem and Yasser Bourhamy. These were students in the seventies before they became the most prominent figures of salafism in Egypt. They had already established the Islamic group in Alexandria before together with some of their colleagues who finally decided to join the Brotherhood like Hamed El-Defrawy, Khaled Dawood, Ibrahim El-Zafaraany and others. In Cairo, there were others who eventually adopted salafism like Osama Abd El-Azeem and Abd Allah Sa’d who was very active at Al Azhar university and was one of those who founded the group in Cairo and who refused the idea of joining the Brotherhood when the issue was at stake end of seventies.

41 The most prominent of which is the Jihadi group which instituted for the violent stream in Minya, and Assuit, headed by Karam Zuhdi, Osama Hafez, Naghe Ibrahaim, Asem Abd El-Maged and Essam Derbalah. See the autobiography of Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh and the memoirs of Khaled Dawood both edited by the writer of this paper (forthcoming).

42 Certainly, this is not the only reason, but at least it is the most significant in the intellectual a’qidi context under discussion. There are other reasons which have to do with the Egyptian government and its attitude towards the Iranian Revolution, together with its ability to stop it from affecting the Egyptian religious milieu.

43 “Bourhamy’s Testimony”, Mdarik. Bourhamy, as it is mentioned earlier, was one of the most prominent sheikhs of the salafi vocation in Alexandria.

44 The Encyclopedia of the Muslim Brotherhoods, http://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%A8_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A.

45 Islamhistory.com, http://www.Islamstory.com. The site contains an interesting mixture of topics, yet salafism clearly prevails it all as there is a stress on a’qida issues and on the points of debate disagreement that could not be compromised, though the sheikh is a member of the Brotherhood group.

See his most important articles of all on the website of Islam Way in: http://www.islamway.com/iw_s-Scholar&ciw_a-articles&scholar_id=361.

See the interview with the sheikh on the official website of the Brotherhood on the web: "الداعية الكبير الشيخ محمد حسين يفتح جعبة ذكرياته"، الإخوان المسلمون، http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=23911&SecID=270.

The official website of Sheikh Mohamed Hussein Eissa on the web is http://nfaees.com where jurisprudential and vocational issues are highlighted whereas issues related to the Brotherhood’s organizational nature are absent.

He is son of Sheikh Salah Abou Ismail, the preacher and the Azhar sheikh who was close to the Brotherhood group and who joined the Egyptian Parliament from 1976 till his death in 1990.

This is clear in the interview that was conducted with him and was published on the Brotherhood’s official website: "الشيخ عبد الخالق صريف: شرف لي أن أنسب إلى الإخوان"، الإخوان المسلمون، http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=9174&SecID=270.

Such as the content of the culture and education division on the Brotherhood forum website. See http://www.ikhwan.net/vb/forumdisplay.php?f=17.

Read, for example, the script of the interview that was conducted with Sheikh Abd El-Khalek Al-Sherif, and specifically the question related to Jihad, on the website of the Dakahlia Brotherhood: http://dakahliaikhwan.net/viewarticle.php?id=303 "لقاء مع "الداعية عبد الخالق صريف"، إخوان الدقهلية.

See the script of the interview that the official site of the Muslim Brotherhood group conducted with the Sheikh, and where he discusses his views regarding the importance of the missionary aspect, and an implied desire for widening the space assigned to it within the group after the significant increase in the political activities during the former years; a desire mostly generated by the salafi efforts in the same field. See the interview on: "الشيخ عبد الخالق صريف: شرف لي أن أنسب إلى الإخوان"، http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=9174&SecID=270.

Nevertheless, the researcher has his own thesis, which he expressed in this paper, regarding the divisions that occurred in the group throughout its history. There were consequences that resulted from the massive numbers of the Islamic generation of the seventies who joined the Brotherhood Movement, followed by the leading role which they played in the Movement’s political action starting from 1984 during the legislative elections, hence the interaction that happened between the resultant stream and the Egyptian context – including the political components, the different social classes, the media and means of communication (ranging from interviews on satellite channels to internet websites). A gradual and accelerating disparity that the group experienced for twenty years, starting from the mid eighties to the mid nineties, took place between what we consider to be the stream of public work in the Brotherhood.
group and a stream that insisted to cling to the organizational aspects, the stepping up paths and the instructional and educational methods in the group. The various generations of the group, its ideological components, and the social and geographic origin of its members could thus be measured against this major polarity which made use first of the context of re-structuring the group in the seventies, then of the compromising policies of the eighties, and finally the political openness years between 2004 and 2007.

56 The relationship with the West, especially with the United States, was a rich topic for discussion in the Brotherhood group. During such discussions, charges of loyalty to the United States and of attempts to reach power positions through collaboration with American military forces, were raised against figures of the reformatory stream in the Brotherhood group like Abd El-Moneim Abou El-Fotouh and Essam El-Erian. This particularly took place within the context of the launching of some American reform programs, and of the remarkable political rise of the Justice and Development Islamic party in Turkey.

57 This shift was not only limited to the party program in 2007, which was more critical in the context of revising previous opinions adopted by the Brotherhood regarding the participation of women in political action. In year 2000, the salafi Brothers objected to the Brotherhood’s choice of sister Gehan Al-Halafawy as the group’s candidate in parliamentary elections for Al-Raml constituency in Alexandria. Later on, they renewed their objection to the idea when the Brotherhood group selected Makarem Al-Deery to run for elections in parliamentary elections for Nasr City constituency in Cairo in 2005, supporting the ex-member of the Brotherhood group Abd El-Sattar Abd Allah Said Al-Azhary, whom it seems was affected by Sayyid Qutb.


60 As far as art and literature are concerned, the salafized Brothers accused the leading Brotherhood figure Abd Al-Moneim Abou Al-Fotouh of belying ‘aqida when he visited Naguib Mahfouz and asked him to issue another edition of Awlad Haritna (Sons of our Alley). They interpreted his act as a belying of ‘aqida and Abd El-Sattar...
Fateh Allah Said gave a sermon at a Brotherhood mosque making the same accusation. They also criticized him because of his objections to Sayed Qutb’s ideas, forming some sort of a salafi Qutbian front to defend Qutb’s ideas.

61 It seems that the rhetorical confrontations between both the salafi Brothers and the Qutbian Brothers on the one hand and the sheikhs who used to be considered by the Movement a source of opinion, ijtihad and fatwa, on the other, are considered an obvious turning point. Sheikh Youssif Al-Karadawi was criticized for criticizing Sayed Qutb’s ideas, arguing that some of Qutb’s ideas imply accusations of blasphemy and disagreement with Ahl Al-Sunna. Al-Karadwai was even subject to some sort of a violent reaction when he supported the promotion of the leading Brotherhood figure Essam El-Erian to the “Guidance Office”, declaring that the reformatory stream in the Brotherhood group is under siege. See the letter Mahmoud Ghazlan wrote to Al-Karadawi on the Islamyoun website: Mahmoud Ghazlan, “An Open Letter to Dr. Youssif Al-Karadawy”, Mdarik, http://mdarik.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?C=ArticleA_C&cid=1256034073772&pagename=islamyoun/IYALayout