The third, related consequence following from the Anthrax attacks has been the huge spending on biopreparedness:

Even before 9/11, during the 1990's US virologists and public health experts capitalised on the historical association of public health with national security and International commerce interests, arguing that 'emerging diseases' presented a threat to US political and economic interests (King 2003). In April 2000, Clinton designated HIV / AIDS as a threat to US national security, following a 2000 National Intelligence Council report which warned that the 'nontraditional threat' of infectious disease would threaten US citizens and interests at home and abroad (King 2003). And in early 2001, Congress authorised the spending of over $500 million for bioterrorism preparedness through the Public Health Threats and Emergencies Act.

In the wake of the attacks, the CDC requested that all states seeking nearly a billion dollars of federal funding for bioterrorism prevention to prepare systematic response plans (Hodge 2003). Following the Anthrax letters, the NIH budget allocation for antibacterial and antiviral agents alone increased from tens of millions of dollars to about $1.5 billion in light of what is widely considered to be an inevitable future bioterror attack. (Sarasin 2006:149)

Some argue that emergency preparedness initiatives will lend strength to public health infrastructure and for example, enhance understanding of the human immune system and ability to address toxicological disasters or new and re-emerging infectious diseases. However, disproportionate US government support for high cost domestic bioterrorism initiatives for others lead to inevitable comparisons with the lack of conviction that characterises federal support for reforms such as inclusive health coverage (Eckenwiler, 2003).