TOWARDS CROSS-BORDER NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Linking communities and institutions in the Onchocerciasis-Freed Zone of Burkina Faso and Ghana

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Abbreviations

AVV	*Autorité des Aménagements des Vallées de Volta* (Volta Valleys Development Authority)
BADECC	Business And Development Consultancy Centre (local NGO based in Tamale)
BEWDA	Bawku East Women Development Association (local NGO based in Bawku)
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CVD	Commission Villageoise de Développement
CVGT	*Commission Villageoise de Gestion du* Terroir (village land management committee)
DA	District Assembly
DANIDA	Danish International Development Assistance
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
LAP	Land Administration Project
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NR	Natural resources
NRM	Natural resource management
OCP	Onchocerciasis Control Programme
OFZ	Onchocerciasis Freed Zone
OFZP	Onchocerciasis Freed Zone Project
PNGT(2)	*Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs* (2nd phase) (national land management programme)
PNTD	Participatory, Negotiated Territorial Development
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RAF	*Réforme Agraire et Foncière* (agricultural and land tenure reform)
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
STA	Social Territorial Agreement
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Executive summary

The eradication of river blindness, or Onchocerciasis, has opened up substantial areas of land along rivers for more intensive use, facilitating economic development. Many of these so-called Onchocerciasis Freed Zones (OFZ) lie across international borders and interventions in one country could thus affect neighbouring countries. For that reason a coordinated international development approach has been called for.

The *Socio Economic Development Programme for the Transborder Onchocerciasis Freed Zone of Burkina Faso and Ghana* was initiated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to explore the modalities to institutionalise such a cross-border planning and development approach. The first phase of this programme (the 'OFZ Project') was implemented from 2003 to 2007 by FAO in the Upper East Region in Ghana and the adjacent Nahouri and Boulgou provinces in Burkina Faso.

One of the activities was to test the suitability of the *Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development* (PNTD) approach for cross-border natural resource based planning and development in the OFZ. PNTD has been developed by FAO and offers a structured approach to consensus building and joint planning on natural resource management. This made the approach potentially useful, considering the complex institutional environment made up of communities, traditional authorities, and government agencies in two countries with partly overlapping mandates on natural resource management.

SNV provided advisory support to the OFZ Project to pilot the PNTD approach through its teams in Tamale (Ghana) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso).

The PNTD process was tested in a single pilot area spanning the border. Most of the people in the pilot area belong to the Gruni (Frafra) ethnic group. They thus share a common language, culture and ancestry, but are divided on the basis of nationality.

A team consisting of staff members of local government and non-government organisations was established and trained to facilitate joint planning, to provide technical expertise, and to liaise with relevant institutions. An active learning approach was followed in which short workshops alternated with field level application.

Main findings

Need for a cross-border multi-level planning framework. There is a clear need to embed the community-based natural resource management structures into higher level planning and development strategies (vertical linking), as well as to create linkages between adjoining communities (horizontal linking). Natural resource management is still firmly within the domain of the traditional authorities and by-and-large community-based, but communities often share resources. Moreover, changes in use or management instigated by one community may well affect a much larger area. It emerged that such effects and

relationships often extend across the border and increasingly create conflicts and disagreements.

PNTD provides an appropriate framework for cross-border planning. The pilot exercise resulted in development proposals that were jointly prepared and widely supported by communities on both sides of the border. The attention to negotiation and consensus building helped create better understanding between communities on their claims on, and use of, shared natural resources. The local communities and their leaders also saw the value of the process in a much wider context, i.e. beyond natural resource management. In the words of the Bongo Chief: 'it brings people with same ancestry back together'.

The main lessons learnt with respect to up-scaling and internalising the PNTD approach are:

a *Local governments need to take ownership*. Local governments saw PNTD piloting essentially as another OFZ project activity, rather than an opportunity to become more involved.

b *Capacity of local (government) organisations needs to be strengthened.* The capacity to place community needs and planning into a wider perspective using negotiation and consensus building appears to be very limited and needs to be built up. Cross-border collaboration between these organisations also requires differences in mandates and work culture to be understood, appreciated and bridged.

c *Operational challenges need to be addressed.* The establishment of a joint support structure by both countries for cross-border planning and development would need to take into account the following issues:

- High operational costs for government institutions. This is because of the international travel allowances, the reduced efficiency due to the language gap, and time consuming border crossings;
- Administrative complications. Civil servants require authorisation from central government to cross the border on official duty;
- Restricted areas of operation of NGOs. NGOs are licensed to operate within specific countries and administrative areas only.

Initial conclusions and way forward

Experiences in pilot area confirm that x-border agreement and cooperation would be required for development of the larger OFZ. An approach along the lines of PNTD, would create the level of consensus on natural resource use and management that would be required for further development.

To enable significant up-scaling of this process, the following is proposed:

- *Government involvement* would shift from full engagement in integrated cross-border planning processes, as was the case in the pilot area, to cross-border co-ordination. There is no need for government staff to continue to work jointly at field level, provided the activities on both sides of the border are well coordinated. This would significantly reduce operational costs and logistical complications. Governments would require technical and financial assistance to build up specific capacities at the various administrative levels. Operational budget support can probably not entirely be avoided at this stage, but should be limited as much as possible, and phased out within a realistic period of time.

- *The traditional authorities* should take a prominent role in local level planning, as they are best positioned to effect (cross-border) collaboration between communities on natural resource management. They will require support to build up their technical capacity, as well to strengthen their position to ensure adequate service delivery from government and NGOs.

- *Local NGOs* should be engaged in this process to strengthen field level support. Moreover, the NGOs could play an important role as 'watch dogs' to ensure that governments are delivering the services required. Local NGOs in the OFZ generally have a limited technical capacity and depend by-and-large on project funding for their operations, and will require technical and financial support to play these roles, particularly in the short term.

From the above it is clear that *external financial and technical support* will continue to be required, but its focus would shift. More emphasis will have to be placed on building institutional capacity, rather than on direct project-based implementation as has been the case so far.

1 Introduction

River blindness, or Onchocerciasis, has been largely eradicated from West African valleys. This success is the result of the Onchocerciasis Control Programme, a joint initiative by the affected countries and international agencies that was started in the mid-1970's. In the affected areas, the eradication of river blindness has opened up substantial areas of land along rivers for more intensive use, facilitating economic development in these areas.

Many of these so-called Onchocerciasis Freed Zones (OFZ) lie across international borders and interventions in one country could thus affect neighbouring countries. For that reason a coordinated international development approach has been called for. The *Socio Economic Development Programme for the Transborder Onchocerciasis Freed Zone of Burkina Faso and Ghana* was initiated by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to explore the modalities to institutionalise cross-border planning and development. The programme commenced in 2003 and the first phase was implemented by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and completed by mid 2007. One of its activities was the introduction of the Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development (PNTD) approach.

The Netherlands development organisation SNV has provided advisory support to this programme from 2006 onwards. The SNV support focused on the testing of the PNTD approach for cross-border planning of natural resource based development. SNV's role was that of process manager and the work was done jointly by its teams in Tamale (Ghana) and Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). BADECC, a Tamale-based NGO, conducted training and supervised field activities.

This document covers part of an ongoing development process. The focus is on piloting the PNTD planning procedure, the field experiences, results and lessons learnt on institutionalising cross-border planning and development processes. The pilot took place in a specific geographical area. The findings are of importance to other Onchocerciasis Freed Zones, as well as for cross-border development in general between Francophone and Anglophone countries in West Africa.

This working paper starts with a description of the OFZ programmes and natural resource management in the border areas of Burkina Faso and Ghana. Next the PNTD planning approach and the pilot programme are introduced, followed by a presentation of results and lessons learned. The final chapters discuss challenges for institutionalisation and draw some conclusions.

2 Context

2.1 The Oncho Freed Zones

The Onchocerciasis Control Programme

Onchocerciasis, or river blindness, is a disease caused by worms that grow inside the human body. The disease is carried by black flies that breed in fast flowing water. It, therefore, specifically affects people who live near rivers. It is endemic in the West African savanna zone, and it occurred there widely in river valleys. In the 1970's, it was not unusual to find 60 percent of the adults living in these areas affected with the disease, and 5 percent of the adult population blind.

The Onchocerciasis Control Programme (OCP) was a multi-lateral effort initiated in 1974 by seven West African countries and nine donors (including the World Health Organisation, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations). Later on, the programme was expanded to eleven countries. The OCP targeted infested areas in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Togo, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Senegal and southern Mali with a total population of about 30 million people, of which two million were infected. This expanded regional-wide effort was essential to avoid re-infestation, as the black fly's flight capacity of up to 300km, gives it considerable potential for colonialisation (Norgbey, 1997).

The OCP was one of the most ambitious public health interventions in the world. Its objectives were dual: the first one aimed at improving public health by eradicating the disease, the second one aimed at rural development in general by opening up 25 million hectares of land in the infested zones for cultivation and settlement. The OCP was therefore also seen as part of an international response to the desertification of the Sahel.

The OCP was very successful with respect to its first objective. River blindness is now largely eradicated in the target areas (World Bank, 1995). Concerns about resurgence of the disease are, however, real, requiring continued monitoring and control in the OFZ (Norgbey, 1997). The OCP ceased operations in 2002, and its responsibilities have since been devolved to the individual countries.

The OCP's success with regard to its second objective is more difficult to establish. In the design of the programme it was widely assumed that the high incidence of river blindness beyond the mid twentieth century had prevented or even reduced the utilisation of fertile lands along the rivers. The eradication of the disease would thus open up new land for agricultural production. Some studies have since questioned the validity of this assumption, at least in part of the targeted area. Hervouet (1978), for instance, found no evidence that the incidence of river blindness had restricted settlement along the White and Red Volta in Burkina Faso. His conclusion is supported by rural settlement rates in the same area over the period 1990-2005 which were particularly low (less than 2 percent) and do not suggest that a substantial influx of new settlers occurred here fol-

lowing the eradication of river blindness (ECOWAS, 2007). What these statistics do suggest is a wide variation in population increase between the OCP areas: in some the population has increased substantially in the last ten years, in others it has not. It should be noted that these rates are averages over fairly large administrative entities (regions and provinces) and therefore hide local movements, i.e. within these administrative areas from higher lying areas into river valleys.

Settlement approach

Government support to settlement programmes in West Africa has followed different approaches, which can be typified as follows:

1. Sponsored settlement: the government (directly or indirectly through a parastatal or a commissioned private agency) controls all aspects of the program from land distribution, infrastructural development to production regimes.

2. Assisted spontaneous settlement: the government provides some services and infrastructure to settlers who have moved on their own

3. Spontaneous settlement: settlers make their own decisions and receive little or no government assistance in the settlement process.

In an effort to control the expected migration to the OFZ, governments initially embarked on sponsored settlement. In Burkina Faso, for instance, the AVV (*Autorité des Aménagements des Vallées de Volta*) was set up to fully develop 30,000 km^2 of land, superseding all pre-existing claims to land in the project areas in the process. With time, it became increasingly clear that the rate at which the sponsored settlement schemes were developed was insufficient to cater for the needs of the rural population, and that spontaneous settlement continued to occur (McMillan, 1993).

A ministerial meeting between the OCP countries was held in 1994 to agree on a set of guiding principles to enable the settlement and management of the reclaimed lands to occur in a coordinated and more sustainable manner (see Box 1). It was agreed that an assisted spontaneous settlement approach would be the most practical and appropriate within the OFZ context; that a process of consultation and coordination was to be put in place to resolve regional (x-border) issues; and that inclusive and community-based natural resource management should be firmly supported. The meeting also underscored that all developments should be embedded in national and regional development frameworks (World Bank, 1995). The meeting placed the responsibility for supporting the developments in the OFZ with the national governments: support programmes should be part of national development plans, and delivered through coordinated action by existing structures. It was also recognised that the settlement of the OFZ would continue to require donor support.

Need for regional coordination

Considerable parts of the OFZ are located in border areas. The proximity to international borders complicates the development within these zones, because of the different standards and regulations that apply on both sides of the border. Typically, border areas are also vulnerable to land use changes in the adjacent countries. For instance, the expulsion of pastoralists from Ghana increased the pressure on grazing lands in the Kompienga basin in Burkina Faso straining the indigenous tenure systems (McMillan et al, 1993). Norgbey (1997) argued that a coherent regional approach from the OCP countries to the development of the OFZ would also be essential to ensure future control of the disease: 'A piecemeal approach to economic development in the OCP zones will not only jeopardise successful settlement in the vector-free areas, but will put the disease free areas at risk for re-infestation resulting from uncontrolled settlement' (ibid.: 23).

BOX 1: Guiding principles for sustainable settlement and development in the OCP

1. Promote the social and economic integration of hosts, settlers, and pastoralists
2. The governments of the OCP area should put in place a process of consultation and coordination to resolve regional issues, particularly problems associated with the movement of transhumant populations
3. Encourage 'assisted spontaneous settlement' as the most appropriate for the OCP area, given the volume of migration and the financial and managerial capacities of governments
4. Institute, at a national level, a process of coordination regarding all development activities in settlement areas
5. The responsibility for implementing projects in settlement areas should rest with the line departments
6. Support settlement in areas close to already settled areas
7. Provide social services as part of overall national planning
8. Take into consideration the environmental and health needs of settlers in planning for sustainable settlement and development
9. For the most effective management of natural resources, governments should support the formation of community land management associations that involve hosts, settlers and pastoralists in land use zoning
10. Develop agricultural policies that support more intensive and diversified production systems and take into account the upstream and downstream linkages
11. Design and implement agricultural research and extension systems that respond to the changing needs of settlers over time
12. Promote efficient markets in settlement areas
13. Put in place land tenure regulations that take into account customary tenure systems, but ensure secure land tenure and access to women and youth to land and natural resources
14. Ensure women's rights of access to and control over land are not lost in the settlement process
15. In addition to sustained support for the control of Onchocerciasis and other important diseases, the donor community should support the development of the Onchocerciasis-freed areas.

2.2 The OFZ project

In response to the need for a coordinated regional approach to the development of the OFZ, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) initiated an x-border development programme: the *Socio Economic Development Programme for the Trans-border Onchocerciasis Freed Zone of Burkina Faso and Ghana*. The implementation of this Programme started with a three-year pilot project **(**the OFZ Project) with financial support from Belgium, and technical support from FAO. This project commenced in 2003 and was formally concluded in 2006. Some of the activities were subsequently extended by a year with additional financial support from ECOWAS. By that time a follow up programme had yet to be defined.

Project objectives

The main objective of this programme was to establish a transboundary development approach aimed at enhancing significant socio-economic opportunities, food security and livelihoods of resident and migratory populations in the cross-border OFZ. Its scope was comprehensive, covering natural resources, infrastructure and markets, human resources and income-generating activities.

The programme was expected to provide a learning platform for longer term strengthening of cross-national policy frameworks and institutional capacities to support socio-economic development in a sustainable manner within an integrated regional food security development framework. In this context, the programme was expected to reinforce co-operation modalities between ECOWAS and the OCP/NEPAD countries at all levels.

According to the Project Document, the four immediate objectives addressed:

- local institutional and human capacity building to ensure sustainability;
- sustainable use and management of shared and other natural resources;
- public sector investment proposals for infrastructure development aimed at promoting production and cross-border trade; and
- enabling policies and planning frameworks to enhance livelihoods and food security in cross-border OFZ in a sustainable manner.

At the design stage of the project it was recognised that in order to meet these objectives support would be required from a large number of partners, including local authorities, village groups and civil society organisations, as well as national ministries, ECOWAS and other regional bodies. In this light a decentralised participatory approach was foreseen aimed at responding to local priorities and enhancing the sustainability of the activities to be initiated under the project.

The project area

The area targeted by the Project is located on the border between Burkina Faso and Ghana (see Map 1). Ecologically, this area is located on the transition between the Guinea and Sudan Savanna Zones. It has a hot climate with a single rainy season (June- September). The average annual temperature is 29°C. The mean annual rainfall ranges from 800 to 900 mm, but may vary considerably from one year to the next. The inherent vegetation type is open woodland savanna, with trees up to 20 meters high and tall grasses. The tree cover under natural conditions is around 40 percent. That is: crowns are often touching, but not interlocking.



Map 1. Location of the OFZ Project zone

The soils are intensively leached and have a low inherent fertility (deficient in organic matter, nitrogen, potassium), and often poor physical properties: a poor structurally stability (they compact easily) and impeded drainage. Because of this, these soils require careful management to sustain agricultural production. Research has shown that under the prevailing land use systems, fertility levels have tended to decrease further. This is because agricultural land uses have been intensifying to accommodate the growing rural populations, particularly in areas where most of the land suitable for crop production was already under cultivation. The resulting increasing uptake of nutrients has not or insufficiently been compensated by management practices, such as fallowing, or the application of fertilisers or manure (Windmeyer and Andriessen, 1993; Quansah, 2006).

The project area is located at the cross-roads of two major ancient trade routes: the trans-Sahara route from Mali to Accra and the route from northern Nigeria towards the west. The latter skirting the tsetse infested Guinea Savanna Zone. The project area is densely populated with well over 100 people per km^2. This may be explained, at least in part, by the trade routes and the relatively favourable natural environment (outside the main tsetse zone, but with a relatively high rainfall). Most of the population is rural and depends to a large extent on the natural environment for its food and income. Most households are agro-pastoral, but pastoralist groups also live in the area. Low input rainfed farming is commonly practiced and agricultural productivity is low. Irrigated crop production is restricted to river valleys and involves mainly vegetable production. The zone has a significant stock of cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry. Livestock is grazed

on communal lands by sedentary farmers, but at some locations also by pastoralist groups.

The Project targeted its activities towards 15 selected communities on each side of the border. These communities are scattered over the OFZ and some are located quite far from the border and from other selected communities. In Burkina Faso the selection of the communities was based on their involvement in the national land management programme (PNGT)[1]. In Ghana, the selection was reportedly based upon recommendations of the District Assemblies.

Results

Half-way through its lifetime it had become clear that the Project would face serious difficulties in realising its ambitious objectives. The x-border aspects in particular had not been addressed. The project had embarked on a number of studies mapping out the socio-economic, physical and institutional aspects of the OFZ, community-based planning exercises, as well as a support programme to introduce improved agricultural technologies (use of improved seed material, composting) in selected communities. Probably due to the decision to work with a limited number of communities, activities have been very much channelled to the individual community level.

All these activities were conducted on a country-by-country basis. This was at least partly due to the operational structure of the Project at the time, which comprised two coordinators, one for Ghana and one for Burkina Faso. The steering committee, comprising representatives of key stakeholders on both sides of the border, was apparently insufficiently strong to ensure the x-border integration of activities. Only with the appointment of an overall Project Coordinator in the final project year (2006), did the direction change towards an integrated x-border approach of activities.

The operational structure of the Project also complicated the participatory approach foreseen in the project document. Studies and planning activities were by and large directly conducted by short term consultants, which did not encourage active involvement of local government and non-governmental organisations, which in turn did not create the levels of ownership required.

2.3 The involvement of SNV

The aim of SNV is to reduce poverty. It is an international organisation that provides advisory services to local organisations in 26 developing countries. SNV has worked in Ghana since 1992 and in Burkina Faso since the 1970s.

SNV became involved in the OFZ project at a late stage following a request by the OFZ Project Coordinator for support to consolidate the individual activities and to formulate an integrated follow-up programme. A possible partnership between SNV in Ghana and Burkina Faso and the OFZ project was then discussed during a meeting between the OFZ

[1] *Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs* (see *Chapter 3)*

project, FAO, and SNV in November 2005. It was agreed that SNV would support the project in introducing x-border land-use management along the principles of negotiation and consensus building using the Participatory, Negotiated Territorial Development (PNTD) approach developed by FAO. Because of time and budget limitations it was decided to pilot this process in one cross-border area which encompassed the communities of Feo and Namoo in Ghana, and Bare and Narquia in Burkina Faso.

SNV's interest in supporting the project at this late stage stemmed from the following considerations:

a. The overall objective of the OFZ project was in line with that of SNV, i.e. to contribute to poverty reduction. Improved natural resource management was seen by SNV as one of the key enabling conditions to this effect, together with improved market access to the poor, and responsive and accountable local governance.

b. The piloting process was considered pertinent not just with regard to a successful implementation of the Project and thus for the development of the OFZ, but also within the wider context of regional development. The main arguments were:

   - The proposed approach would provide the cross-border framework required for the implementation of proposed activities within the OFZ , The emphasis on analysis, joint planning and negotiation would allow for the consolidation of the various project components and their integration with other development initiatives both within and between the two countries.

   - The process of establishing a holistic cross-border planning and development framework was expected to generate valuable lessons for the development of OFZs elsewhere, as well as other transborder initiatives by ECOWAS and other organisations.

c. Lastly, it provided SNV with an opportunity to provide joint delivery of advisory services in the border area of Burkina Faso and Ghana in order to position itself as an organisation which could provide seamless and integrated advisory support transcending national boundaries.

2.4 Participatory and Negotiated Territorial Development

FAO proposed to use its PNTD approach (FAO, 2005) as a planning and development model for the OFZ. PNTD provides a framework to structure a development process in which the analysis of local territorial issues, based on the viewpoints of the different actors and on an historical analysis, contributes to a coherent understanding of the territorial system. This, in turn, provides the basis to arrive at collective agreements on development issues based on negotiation. These agreements are referred to as Social Territorial Agreements (see Box 2).

BOX 2: The PNTD Process

The PNTD approach is structured loosely along the following phases:

1. Views:	Diagnosis: Understanding the actors and the territory
2. Horizons:	Proposal development (by individual stakeholders / parties)
3. Negotiations:	Mediation and consensus building resulting in the formulation of the social territorial agreement (STA)
4. Implementation:	Implementation of STA

The planning process is often iterative, and social territorial agreements may go through various cycles of refinement and modification as required.



PNTD is:

Territorial based:	Based on the ***social territory*** as spatial units of analysis. This is shaped by the social and historical relations between the actors and the territory
Actor based:	recognition of the heterogeneity of the actors interests and vision of the territory
Dynamic:	Understanding of and learning from the complexity of a changing environment to support positive patterns and mitigate negative patterns
Systemic:	appreciation of the interdependencies within and between territories
Multi-sectoral:	integration of environmental, social, economic, political and cultural aspects
Multi-level:	recognition of different territorial levels and administrative levels
Participatory, negotiated:	Agreements are developed on the basis of consensus and equal representation of all stakeholders.

PNTD differs from other approaches aiming at collective agreements over natural resource management in the emphasis it puts on the linkages between the area itself and its wider physical, socio-economic, administrative and political environment. External support plays a key role in the PNTD approach and to this effect a multidisciplinary planning team is created. The team's main tasks are to help build up a comprehensive understanding of local issues; facilitate the identification and selection of feasible development options; develop linkages between key stakeholders; and find ways to negotiate coordinated efforts. The team may include representatives from government agencies, NGOs and CBOs concerned with the development of the area, but its members should not have a direct stake in the planning and development process, as this could compromise the credibility of the team. The planning team may need to provide a mediator to facilitate the negotiations if consensus cannot be reached between the local stakeholders. The mediator should have a good understanding of the local context, and be trained in conflict management. Most importantly, this person should be seen as neutral by all parties involved.

The main reason for selecting PNTD, with its emphasis on negotiation and consensus building, was that the OFZ along the Ghana-Burkina Faso border do not yet have well defined and generally accepted management structures in place, while resources are often claimed by multiple stakeholders. A situation which is further complicated by the x-border setting which requires agreement and cooperation among development partners from both countries. PNTD offers the structure required to build consensus at various levels, i.e. between individual communities, as well as between communities and government institutions and other development partners on management and development issues.

[1] *Commission Villageoise de Gestion du Terroir*

[2] *Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs* (2nd phase)

3 Natural resource management

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the institutional setting and its implications with respect to natural resource management in the project area. Firstly, the land tenure arrangements in Burkina Faso and Ghana are explained. Subsequently, the institutional environment for natural resource management in both countries is discussed.

Although both countries differ in the way land administration and management is institutionalised, there are also many similarities, particularly in the rural areas. The way natural resource management was conducted in the pilot area was found to be comparable on both sides of the border. This situation may well apply to the entire OFZ.

Both countries have a dual land tenure system in which customary tenure arrangements co-exist with a formal system. In the rural areas, the former is still the dominant force. The customary arrangements in both countries are founded on traditional beliefs, and on the principle of inalienability of the land. Land belongs to the tribal ancestors and therefore, it is not an object to be traded. The traditional tenure arrangements have been seen by some as sets of rules that may be inconsistently applied based on arbitrary decisions that are influenced by personal relationships. Others consider these systems as flexible and adaptable to changing conditions. These systems have evolved differently within the various ethnic groups, but share certain characteristics. Access to resources and to land is assured by social networks and patronage. Land rights are held by families or clans rather than by individuals. Furthermore, a piece of land is generally subject to various intertwined rights: one family may own the land, another may hold the user rights (Lavigne-Delville, *et al*, 2002). Moreover, user rights to land do not automatically extend to trees and water found on the land. Water is seen as a communal resource, and its ownership cannot be claimed by individuals. The same applies to trees located on communal land. Trees on farm land generally belong to the first tillers of the land, which implies that the user rights to the trees and the land may rest with different individuals.

The governments of both countries are also in a process of decentralisation, albeit at different stages of advancement. In practical terms, the situation at the lowest administrative level (dealing directly with communities) will be very similar in terms of NRM once the process is completed in Burkina Faso. The coordination of natural resource based development will be devolved to the local administrative bodies (District Assemblies and *Communes*), while the responsibility for implementation will rest with a range of line departments, each of which will still be primarily answerable to central government (and not to the local administration).

[3] *Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs* (2nd phase)

[4] Matilda Esi Fiadzigbey is the Administrator of Stool Lands in Ghana

[5] Skins and stools represent symbols of authority of traditional leaders. In Northern Ghana, Chiefs usually sit on skins while in state while Chiefs in Southern Ghana mostly sit on stools. Skin and stool, as used here in relation to land therefore, refer to land under the control of Chiefs in the north and south respectively.

A key difference between the two countries is that in Burkina Faso, village land management committees (CVGT)[2] have been established for land resource planning and management, which receive technical and financial support from the National Land Management Programme (PNGT)[3], while in Ghana support to community-level NRM has been left to ad-hoc initiatives of mainly non-governmental, organisations.

3.2 Ghana

Land tenure system

In Ghana a dual land tenure system prevails, comprising land administered by traditional authorities under customary law, and land administered by the state under formal law.

The latter is referred to as public or state land. This is land acquired compulsorily for a public purpose or in the public interest under the State Lands Act of 1962 (Act 125) or other relevant statutes, as well as all land that was transferred to the Presidency after Independence under the state property and contracts Act of 1960 (CA 6). This comprised all land acquired by the colonial authority in the former Cold Coast Colony. Northern Ghana was not part of the Gold Coast Colony. It had a separate status as a British protectorate. Here land had remained under the control of the traditional authorities. After independence, all lands were vested in the President, to be held in trust for the original land holding communities under the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). The allodial rights (ultimate ownership) have thus remained with the traditional land holders.

Land administered under customary law is owned and controlled by ethnic groups, clans or families. This is about eighty percent of all land holdings (DFID, 2003; Fiadzigbey[4], 2006; Kasanga, 2001). In Ghana, customary land institutions are legally recognised by the state and customary land laws are applicable in court.

The role of the State

Several government institutions exist with respect to land management in Ghana. Their mandates are characterised by overlaps and duplication of functions (DFID, 2003). The government agencies dealing with land administration are listed in Table 1. Nearly all are under the Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines, and are top-down in nature with very little representation at the district level. The exception is the Town and Country Planning Department which is under a different ministry and has a wider coverage at district level (DFID, 2003).

To better administrate customary lands, the Government established the office of the Administrator of Stool Lands in 1992. In practice, its main function is reduced to the collection and management of revenues accruing from stool/skin lands[5]. State instruments in respect of customary lands administration are often by-passed by land acquirers. Especially in the north of Ghana, land acquisition is still mainly handled within the traditional land administration setting (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). For example, land title

registration has received low patronage as most land acquirers consider the customary provisions adequate or simply find the formal procedure too cumbersome to follow. Another possible reason that has rendered state mechanisms for land management relatively ineffective is that it is not only bureaucratic but corrupt, leading to fees far above the official rates. Kasanga (ibid.) argues that the impact of state intervention in customary land management has been mainly beneficial to the state, by allowing it to acquire land cheaply, while its impact on customary land management has been mainly negative and has caused much confusion.

Table 1. Institutions involved in land administration in Ghana

Institution	**Mandate**	**Level of representation**
Lands Commission	Advise Government, local authorities and traditional rulers on land policy Regulate the disposition of all stool lands Expropriation of land for public services	All regions
Survey Department	Surveying and mapping land (for the implementation of land title registration)	All regions
Land Valuation Board	Oversight responsibilities over private lands Valuation of land for various purposes such as compensation for state acquisition of land	All regions
Office of the Administrator of Stool lands	Registration customary land allocations Collecting and disbursing rents, royalties, compensation and other payments	Most regions Several districts (only revenue collection
Land Title Registry	Registration of title to interests in land in a parcel-based registration system	Accra, Kumasi and Tema
Town and Country Planning	Land planning and development	All regions 61% of the Districts

Reform of the institutional environment described above, is currently ongoing through the multi-donor supported Land Administration Project (LAP). The ultimate aim of this reform is to develop the institutional framework required to effectively administer land

(rights). This includes the registration of customary rights to land. As far as the latter is concerned, the LAP is initially focusing on urban centres. No substantial changes are foreseen in the rural areas in the short term.

The local government's involvement in natural resource use and management is equally limited in the rural areas. The Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) gives District Assemblies (DA) executive powers to plan for the overall development of districts. The assemblies have legislative powers to control the use and management of natural resources by means of bye laws. However, in reality the DA do not have the capacity to do this and natural resource management is by-and-large left to the traditional authorities. Moreover, government projects aimed at improving the use and management of natural resources are generally implemented through line ministries which are still centrally controlled. These line Ministries include the Ministries of Food and Agriculture and Land and Forestry, Environment, and Water Resources. In consequence, natural resource management issues do not feature directly in the Assembly's development plans as of yet.

The institutional structure with respect to natural resource management is summarised in Table 2.

Table 2. Institutional structure for natural resource management in Ghana

Authority	***Level***	***Number***	***Responsibilities***	***Represented by***
Central Government	National	1	Policy, regulation and direct administration of land with respect to	Line ministries
Regional Coordinating Councils	Regional	10	Land use, administration, and regulation	Regional offices of line ministries
District, Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies	District	110	Land use planning , regulation of land institutions and formulation of bye-laws	Line departments poorly represented

[6] *Tendana* (plural *Tendamba)* literally means landlord (original settlers of the land) and has spiritual connotation as the Tendana is a priest of the earth god

[7] Chiefs usually act as principal witnesses when land is leased.

The role of Traditional Authorities and communities

Different groups of land holders can be identified in Northern Ghana: Individuals and families; Communities, represented by Chiefs or skins; and *Tendamba* (the first settlers) or clans. Land is controlled by the Chief, the *Tendana* or by family heads (see Table 2).

In the Upper East Region control over land is mostly in the hands of *Tendamba* and families. Here traditional authorities have generally a limited role to play as most of the land is owned directly by families and most decisions relating to land management are taken within families. Chiefs may only facilitate access to land by people outside the family and act as witnesses in transactions relating to land. For instance an outsider seeking land in the community may first contact the Chief who then announces to families who have land to lease to do so. Negotiation is strictly between the lessee and the leaser with the Chief acting as a witness. Chiefs also play a judicial function by settling disputes (see Box 3).

Box 3: How to acquire land in the project area (Ghana)

A person looking for land for long term use (agriculture or residential) first makes a request through the chief who, in turn, informs individual families. The role of the Chief, in this case, is essentially to facilitate the link between the lessee and leaser. Traditional protocol, however, demands that such requests are accompanied by gifts (cola nut or a fowl) required to conduct the relevant rituals before the land is put under use. Further transaction, with regard to the price and user rights is left to the families and the potential leaser only. The Chief may, however, serve as a witness to the final transaction.

In the case of communal land the Chief informs the 'Tendana' who does the actual allocation. Here, the leaser negotiates the price with the Chief and the 'Tendana'.

In the case of farmland, one can also request land directly from a family. The family head allocates the land upon the observance of the relevant traditional protocol (presentation of cola and a fowl) for the pacification of the gods. For communal land, a similar protocol is followed through the Chief and the 'Tendana'. Here, the family or the Chief reserves the right to retrieve such lands when they need it. In the past, the first person to clear a piece of land had user rights as long as the land remained under cultivation. Population pressure and the accompanying scarcity of land, however, have changed this practice in the project area. All lands are now virtually under family ownership with the exception of wetlands and a few rocky areas. The role of traditional authorities in allocation of land has therefore become more or less ceremonial.

The above procedures also apply in the case of state acquisition of land.

Source: Chief of Bongo

However, there are a growing number of instances where Chiefs have appropriated more functions of land management. Even in such situations, the 'approval' of the gods must be sought through the 'Tendana' who must pour libation to that effect. The Chief may manage the land but it is the 'Tendana' who gives his approval to a land acquirer to exercise his/her right of ownership. Land management arrangements are to a certain extent specific to a clan. A clan, generally comprising a number of communities, can therefore be regarded as the basic land management unit.

In the project area, the Chief's authority over land is limited to communal lands as most of the land belongs to families. The Chief, as the head of the community, holds communal land in trust for the people in the community and makes management decisions, together with the 'Tendana', family heads and other community leaders such as local political representatives (Assembly persons) in the interest of the entire community. The functions of the Chief, the 'Tendana' and family heads relating to land management in the specific case of the Upper East Region and the project area is summarised in Table 3.

Table 3. Land management responsibilities within the intervention area in Ghana

Responsibility	***Chief***	***Tendana***	***Family head***
Hold land in trust for the rest of the community	X		
Allocation of vacant land to 'outsiders'	X	X	
Allocation of vacant land to family members			X
Dispute/conflict settlement	X	X	X (within family
Protects the community lands against outsiders	X		
Pouring of libation and sanctifying the land		X	
Enforcement of covenants in respect of communal lands		X	
Imposing sanctions against trespassers and for anti-social behaviour		X	

Gender aspects

Generally, in Northern Ghana, inheritance and succession to property follows a partrilineal system where only male members of the family can inherit property. This situation, however, appears not to pertain in the project area as women have similar rights of access and control over land as men. According to the Bongo Chief, female members of the family who have reached marriageable age and are not yet married, or are divorced or widowed without children have the same rights of inheritance as male members of the family.

3.3 Burkina Faso

Land tenure system

The Land Tenure and Agricultural Reform Act (RAF) sets out the land tenure regulations in Burkina Faso. The RAF was passed in 1984 following the 1983 revolution. It transferred all allodial land rights exclusively to the Central State. The RAF aimed at a comprehensive land reform in rural and urban areas to: assure food security for the Burkinabé; restrict rural depopulation and migration; resolve housing problems; promote economic development based on the national resource base.

Through the RAF, the State thus claimed ownership as well over all land that was managed and used under customary arrangements. The revolutionary forces deliberately intended to weaken the customary land tenure system which, according to them, had evolved into a neo-feudal system, and was the main reason for underdevelopment in the country (GRAF, 2007). The adoption of the RAF had two main effects. Firstly, it restricted the rights of the local population over land. Farmers kept the user right to the land, but could no longer own or inherit land. Secondly, it strengthened state control over land use and development, at least from a formal perspective. For reasons explained below, this applied particularly to urban and peri-urban areas. The RAF was perceived by many as an expropriation of land by default in favour of the central state, regardless of its former ownership.

Following the end of the revolutionary period in 1987, Burkina Faso went through a process of structural adjustment. The RAF was modified accordingly in the 1990's. The possibility of private ownership was introduced on both rural and urban land. Moreover, the legal basis was provided for the CVGT that were to control land related issues at local level. In 2000, the CVGT's development responsibilities were further broadened with the management of public funds.

In the rural areas, the state has never been able to fully enforce the RAF. Its regulations were often ignored by the traditional authorities, and land continued to be managed and used in the customary manner. GRAF (*ibid*.) points out that this struggle for control was understandable given that the underlying motive of the RAF had been to weaken the position of the traditional authorities and former land owners. To date, formal and customary land tenure systems co-exist in an unclear relationship. Interviews conducted for this

study confirmed the above, and found that the traditional system of land tenure is still almost exclusively followed in the project area.

The role of the state

Burkina Faso is in a process of decentralisation and local elections were held in 2006. At the time of the pilot, this process had not yet been finalised, which contributed to some institutional confusion, especially regarding NRM. There was overlap between the different agencies at the various administrative levels in mandates and responsibilities, while some of the newly created decentralised structures were not yet fully functional. Local authorities had been created and responsibilities had been transferred, but adequate resources to make these institutions operational were not yet allocated.

Administratively, both the *Province* and the *Département* levels have been directly involved in the project area. As part of the decentralisation process, *Communes* (*Municipalités*) have now been formed, headed by a '*Maire*', which cover the same geographical areas as the *Départements.* The latter have not yet been formally phased out, but almost all their tasks and responsibilities are currently being transferred to municipalities. This includes NRM, which will be the co-responsibility of central government and the municipalities.

At the time of the intervention, technical support for the implementation of natural resource based developments in the OFZ project area, as well as elsewhere, was mainly provided through the technical departments (environment, agriculture, and livestock). These are now placed at *Commune* level, but still report to the central government. Technically, these services have thus not been decentralised, but have become deconcentrated local branches of the central government (*services déconcentrés*). The institutional setting is summarised in table 4.

Table 4. Institutional structure for natural resources management in Burkina Faso

Authority	Level	Number	Responsibilities	Represented by:
Central Government	National	1	Regulates use and control of natural resources and urban planning at national level Roles and responsibilities laid out in the *Schéma National d'aménagement de Territoire (SNAT)*	Line ministries (Agriculture, Livestock, Environment)
Regional governments (*Gouvernorats*)	Regional	13	Regulates use and control of natural resources within *gouvernorats*. Roles and responsibilities laid out in *Schéma Régional d'aménagement de Territoire (SRAT)*	Technical Services line ministries
Provincial Governments *(haut commissariat)*	Provincial	45	Regulates use and control of natural resources within provinces. Roles and responsibilities laid out in *Schéma Provincial d'aménagement de Territoire (SPAT)*	Same
Rural Municipalities	*Commune*	302	Direct responsibility for land management with respect to: • Rural planning and sanitation • Livestock and crop production • reserves and protected areas Indirect responsibility (right to be involved and give advice) over decisions made over NR at national, regional or provincial level that influences their territory.	Same, but without budget from Central Government (CG)
Urban Municipalities	Towns	49	Direct responsibility for urban planning and sanitation	

The role of traditional authorities

In the pilot area, land is managed almost exclusively by customary law. Even the central state now addresses its demand to traditional authorities when requiring land for public services, such as hospitals and schools. In such cases, Chiefs will decide on the location and ensure that the appropriate rituals are performed for the transfer of the land.

In Narquia and Barre, land is allocated by the Chiefs or obtained directly through the owners (families) (see also Box 4). Disputes over land access or use are solved internally by the Chief, who will call all concerned and negotiate a common agreement. Relationships between the neighbouring communities are said to be good. When interviewed, women suggested that there are problems but that they were not in the position to speak freely on land related matters.

Box 4: How to acquire land in the Project area (Burkina Faso)

Only a man (foreigner or local) can acquire land in the Burkinabé part of the intervention zone. He has to make a request to the traditional land chief, accompanied by some symbolic gifts. He needs to explain the intended use of the land as this affects the duration of the agreement. User rights to farm land are generally temporary and can change hands frequently, while residential land for building a home is allocated on a more permanent basis. Once the land chief has performed the traditional rituals, the land is granted to the man and he can start using it. According to the local community members and chiefs interviewed, no further formal procedure involving governmental agencies is required after the customary process is completed.

In cases of unused land, the one that clears the land is seen as the first owner, and can claim the property rights. His rights to the land are therefore far more secure, than that of persons obtaining mere user rights from first tillers of the land.

The role of communities

Government promotes community based natural resource management through the CVGT. The CVGT receive support on NRM through the National Land Management Programme (PNGT). This programme was established in 1992 by the Ministry of Agriculture with support from the World Bank, UNDP and DANIDA. A follow-up phase (PNGT-2) of 5 years started in 2002. The PNGT project aims at (a) developing organisational and management capacities of local communities; (b) realising productive investments and building socio-economic infrastructure in rural areas; and (c) natural resources restoration and preservation. The programme has been implemented in 26 provinces, including Nahouri, covering nearly 3,000 out of the 8.000 villages in Burkina Faso, including the Barre and Narquia communities in the project area (Ziou, 2007; SG/PNGT2, 2006).

Under the current decentralisation process, the CVGT will be turned into *Commission Villageoise de Développement* (CVD) that will become linked to the newly established local governments.

Gender Aspects

Land access and control for women stems from the complex division of roles culturally allocated to men and women in Burkina Faso, which varies along ethnic lines. In the project area, men are expected to grow cereals to assure the food security for the family, while women are expected to grow vegetables, collect firewood and water, and take care of the children.

Land can only be owned by men. Women cannot inherit family lands. The argument used by the traditional authorities to justify this is that intermarrying between different ethnic groups is common. If land ownership were not restricted to the male line, community and family lands would break up into small plots and would be controlled by different ethnic groups. This also implies that women are expected to leave their family house and lands when they marry, while the men will continue to live and work on their family lands. The position of women after a divorce or the death of their husbands is also uncertain, as they cannot lay claim to the land. One interviewee (man) put the impermanent position of women in a graphic metaphor: "Women bend down while men sit".

Women have access to land only through their husbands or the (male) owner of the land. The user rights are, however, not secure, the land can be claimed back any time. Women do decide on how to use the land, but the harvest (fruits, field crops) is shared with the owner to a certain degree.

4 Piloting x-border planning

4.1 The purpose

The purpose of the pilot process was to test the applicability of the PNTD approach within the x-border context of the target area of the OFZP, and to generate lessons for similar development programmes elsewhere. More implicitly, the pilot process also aimed to generate realistic x-border development proposals for the communities involved.

4.2 The Pilot area

The piloting was conducted in a single x-border area made up of four communities over a period of about one year, starting July 2006. The area selected was situated north of the town of Bolgatanga. It includes the communities of Feo and Namoo in the Bongo District in the Upper East Region of Ghana, and the communities of Barre in the Ziou *Département* (*Municipalité*), and Narquia in the *Département* (*Municipalité*) of Zecco in the Nahouri *Province* of Burkina Faso.



Most of the people in the pilot area belong to the Gruni (Frafra) ethnic group. They thus share a common language, culture and ancestry, but are divided on the basis of nationality. All four communities have their own Chief. In the past the whole pilot area used to be part of the Bongo traditional area, and all local chiefs were answerable to the Bongo Paramount Chief. Nowadays, the Bongo Traditional Area ends at the international border, and the Bongo Chief no longer has formal authority over the Narquia and Barre Chiefs. The latter, however, still pay respect to the Bongo Chief. The Feo and Narquia communities appeared to be particularly close. Intermarriages are common, and natural resources as well as basic services are shared. For instance, children of Narquia attend school in Feo.

Based on the latest census data (see Table 5), the population of the four communities combined is close to 10,000 (assuming growth rates similar to the national averages over that period). The population in the whole pilot area was larger because of the occurrence of a number of smaller settlements located in between the project communities, which are similar to the project communities in culture and land use and management. The census data also suggest that all communities had considerably more female than male residents.

Table 5: Population in the pilot communities

Community	*Population*	*Male/Female Ratio*	*Households*	*Household size*	*Year*
Feo	4,048	0.84	637	6.5	2000
Namoo	2,355	0.92	314	7.5	2000
Barre	774	0.86	102	7.6	1998
Narquia	1,593	0.89	267	6.0	1998

Source: Dilema (2004); Ghana Statistical Service (2000)

Contrary to the general perception, the eradication of the Onchocerciasis has not led to reclaiming of 'abandoned' lands in the pilot area. The OFZ were already in use and all land within the area was already claimed prior to this eradication. This is in-line with Hervouet's (1977) conclusions on the limited impact of the Onchocerciasis on settlement patterns and trends along the upper reaches of the Red and White Volta in Burkina Faso (see section 2.1). What has changed in the pilot area is that the OFZ is now utilised on a more permanent basis with settlement patterns evolving spontaneously.

Most of the land in the communities is now under cultivation, with the exception of the poorly drained valleys which are used for grazing. Three of the communities claim shortage of arable land, which is resulting in a reduction in farm size and soil depletion because of the reduced fallowing. Crop production is by-and-large rainfed and irrigation is very limited. The main crops grown are sorghum, groundnut, and millet. The earth dam at Feo, which was recently upgraded[9], is used for livestock watering and would offer some potential for irrigation. Feo authorities claim that because of considerable water losses due to seepage, insufficient water is available for irrigation. Irrigation development is complicated further by the fact that the irrigable area is entirely located across the border in Narquia.

Natural woodland has virtually disappeared in the pilot area. The remaining trees occur singly or in small clusters. These are mainly trees with a direct economic value for specific households. Some woodlots have been established to provide wood for fuel and construction.

Cattle are generally herded by Fulani, who refer to themselves as Fulbe[10]. The Fulani that herd the local cattle are sedentary, but tend to live separately outside the villages.

[9] It has been furnished with an outlet pipe and a supply canal.
[10] The Fulani are an ethnic group of people spread over many countries across West and Central Africa. They are known as Peul in the Francophone part of Western Africa.

Herds often comprise animals from various owners, including the Fulani themselves. It is common for herds to cross the border in search of grazing opportunities and water, but often such movements are restricted to short distances. According to the communities, nomadic Fulani and their herds also pass by. These herds are often described as large, but there is no reliable information on the numbers of cattle involved and frequency of movement. The Fulani are commonly blamed for crop damage caused by cattle and for cattle rustling, but, again, no data exist to substantiate the extent to which this occurs. This is seen as problem in Ghana as well as in Burkina Faso. The communities in both countries agree that such issues are particularly difficult to resolve when it involves Fulani (and cattle) from across the border.

4.3 The Planning Team

The planning process was facilitated by a small team of local government and NGO experts (the 'planning team'). SNV acted as process manager and provided technical support to the OFZ Project, as well as to BADECC, the local NGO that was tasked to train the planning team and provide on-the-job support.

The tasks and responsibilities of the planning team were agreed in the stakeholder meeting. These included:

- Facilitation of the planning process
- Provision of technical expertise
- Liaison with relevant institutions

Because of its pivotal role in the process, the composition of the team was considered a critical issue**.** Representation of relevant line departments (agriculture, livestock, forestry) and technical expertise were defined by the meeting as the main selection criteria. Because the pilot area was located in two *Départements* and one District, it was agreed to include five members from Burkina Faso and four from Ghana in the team. In order to internalise the process and keep the team to a manageable size, it was also decided to exclude the OFZP project coordinators. The inclusion of a representative of the traditional authorities was against the recommendations of the facilitator. This was because the traditional authorities were considered stakeholders in the process, and therefore could not be considered 'neutral' (see also the discussion on Team composition in Section 1.4).

The members recommended and appointed by their organisations are listed in Table 6.

Table 6. PNTD team composition

Burkina Faso	***Ghana***
Agricultural Service, Ziou – Technical officer	Bongo District - District planning officer
Agricultural Service, Zecco – Technical officer	Ministry of Agriculture: Gender Development Officer
Livestock Service, Tiebele – Technical officer	BEWDA (local NGO): field officer
Forestry Service, Ziou – Technical officer	Bongo Traditional Council, representative of the paramount Chief
Naturama (local NGO) involved in community-based natural resource management – Natural resource management expert	

During the deliberations it became clear that the Bongo Paramount Chief intended to take up the position in the team himself. His interest in the process was highly appreciated, but raised practical concerns. The Bongo District Assembly and OFZP Coordinator convinced the Chief that it would be more appropriate for him to be represented. The Chief agreed to this, but was invited to the team trainings, in order to allow him to get a full understanding of the process and to make his contributions. In the end he delegated his representative on such occasions. The involvement of the traditional structure at this level worked out well, as it opened up a direct line of communication, and generated a high level of local support to the piloting process (see also next Section).

Table 7. Overview of the PNTD piloting process

Phase	Step	Activity	Results	Key actors
Preparation	1	Stakeholder meeting	PNTD concept Introduced Planning team nominated Pilot area selected Work plan agreed	(local) Governments; traditional authorities; NGOs
	2	Methodological development workshop	PNTD process consolidated with existing planning processes Tools selected and adapted to local conditions	Local governments; NGOs, OFZP
Application	3	Training	Planning team trained on diagnostic tools and methods Field activities planned	Planning team; OFZP
	4	Diagnosis	Opportunities and constraints for development pilot areas assessed	Planning team; OFZP; communities
	5	Training	Planning team trained on proposal development and negotiation, and participatory M&E approaches Field activities planned	Planning team; OFZP
	6	Proposal development; negotiation	Development priorities individual communities formulated Joint development proposals negotiated and agreed	Planning team; OFZP; communities
	(7)	X-border meeting local governments	Local governments updated on process and progress achieved Role of local government in development process established Commitments to support development proposals not concluded	Local governments; traditional authorities
	(8)	Social territorial agreements drawn up	Joint development proposals agreed amongst communities	Planning team; communities
Reflection & follow up	9	Joint Evaluation of piloting process	Applicability approach for x-border planning and development assessed. Strengths and weaknesses identified	SNV, OFZP, Planning Team
	10	Reporting	End-of-assignment report to Project Management prepared	SNV / BADECC
	11	Planning follow up activities	Follow-up activities identified and planned	OFZP

4.4 Implementing the process

The piloting process was structured into three phases: preparation; application; and reflection and follow-up. Each off these phases included a number of steps. The pilot ended with the formulation of joint development plans by the communities involved. A schematic overview of the activities and results is provided in Table 7**.** The various steps are discussed in more detail below.

Preparations

*Stakeholder meeting***.** The piloting process took off with a stakeholder meeting. In this meeting, the PNTD process was introduced to, and discussed extensively by representatives of relevant government institutions, traditional authorities, and NGOs of both countries. Agreements were reached on the location of the pilot area, the composition and tasks of the PNTD team, as well as on the programme of work.

Consultative meeting – methods and tools. It was agreed that the piloting process should build on existing planning procedures rather than new ones. A consultative meeting was organised to map out existing plans and procedures, and to agree on the approach and planning tools. This meeting was attended by practitioners of relevant government agencies and NGOs.

It was found that a development plan for Namoo prepared by the OFZP, as well as natural resource management plans for Barre and Narquia prepared under the PNGT2 Programme already existed. These plans were all limited in coverage to the individual communities. The meeting further highlighted the institutional and procedural differences that existed between the two countries with respect to natural resource management (see also Chapter 3).

It was concluded that PNTD would be applied to link these existing community-based plans (horizontal linking), and to integrate these into higher level development plans covering the larger OFZ (vertical linking), and to fill the gaps. There was, for instance, no community-level plan developed for Feo.

Many of the tools proposed in the PNTD manual are standard PRA tools, and had already be used earlier by some of organisations present in the meeting. Based on the collective knowledge and experience, an initial sub-set of tools was selected which was thought to be most appropriate Key criteria were applicability within the OFZ context, and level of practical experience with the individual tools within the PNTD team (see Table 8).

Table 8. Tools selected for application in the various phases of PNTD

Diagnosis	Proposal develop-	Negotiation	Implementation
Community social map Land use resource map Transect walk Stakeholder analysis Venn diagrams 3-R / 4-R analysis Linkage flows Conflict map Conflict timeline Problem analysis tree /	Root cause analysis SWOT Strategy identification	Quality criteria Pair-wise ranking Stakeholder conflict and partnership matrix Group decision making	Agreement Participatory M&E

Application

Field level application of the proposed planning method followed an active learning approach in which short workshops alternated with field level application. The workshops were intended for training purposes as well as to share field level experiences, and to adapt the approach if required. The workshops were attended by the whole team, with venues alternating between Ghana and Burkina Faso. In the field, the team operated at first as a single unit covering all four communities, but was split later on into two. Care was taken that the teams always comprised members of both nationalities, and that each team worked on both sides of the border.

BOX 5: PNGT and OFZP: Complementary or parallel development initiatives?

In the selection of beneficiary communities, the OFZP intended to make use of the availability of land management plans prepared earlier under the second phase of the PNGT, in order to build on the work done and avoid duplication of planning efforts.

During a field visit to the village of Kolinia it appeared, however, that a new committee had been established for the OFZP next to the existing CVGT, despite the fact that OFZP was to build on the PNGT efforts. The villagers explained that to them these were separate programmes and they had simply complied with the requests by the OFZP to form a committee. Upon further discussion they agreed that it would be more appropriate to have the CVGT dealing with both activities to ensure compatibility.

OFZP clearly should have made more effort to ensure that these activities were aligned at community level. But this experience also suggests a highly reactive attitude by the communities towards such development initiatives. Their apparent lack of ownership, possibly in combination with an inadequate understanding of the purposes of both interventions is worrying and questions the level of actual participation in the participatory planning exercises routinely conducted at village level in support of development programmes.

A more formal meeting among decision-makers of the local government institutions from both sides of the border was included later on in the programme. This was to stimulate ownership of the process at local government level, as the participation of the government institutions in the planning process was found to be less than anticipated and the PNTD team members had not been able to create the linkages required. This meeting was intended to:

- Confirm roles and responsibilities of the invited local government institutions relating to x-border natural resource based development;
- Identify opportunities and challenges for cross-border collaboration on planning and implementation of x-border natural resource management programmes

The field programme was concluded with the drawing up of preliminary social territorial agreements. These agreements document the consensus reached among the communities on their shared development priorities relating to natural resource management, and outline proposed strategies for implementation.

Reflection and follow-up

Following the completion of the field application exercise, a joint evaluation was conducted by the Planning Team, the OFZP, BADECC and SNV (facilitators) on the applicability of the planning approach for x-border development of the OFZ. With this the involvement of SNV and BADECC formally ended.

Follow-up activities that have been planned by the OFZP include reporting back to ECOWAS, experience sharing, and securing funds for implementation of the proposals and up-scaling. ECOWAS has been invited by OFZP for a field visit to the pilot area to demonstrate the progress achieved, and to explore options to continue and expand development process in the OFZ.

4.5 Findings

The main experiences from the pilot process are highlighted in this section. Firstly, the applicability of the planning approach within the x-border development context of the OFZ is discussed. This is followed by an assessment of the opportunities and challenges for up-scaling and internalisation of this approach. Specific attention is paid to practical considerations in creating the institutional environment to support this type of planning.

Applicability of the planning approach for X-border natural resource management and development

Need to go beyond community-level planning and development

As discussed earlier, the planning approach set out to build on existing community-based initiatives, by incorporating these into wider (x-border) geographic and institutional development frameworks. The piloting exercise confirmed the need for this. The community-based plans that already existed for part of the pilot area, had not been integrated into higher level development plans ('vertical' linking), such as medium-term development planning carried out at District-level in Ghana, nor for that matter had plans of adjoining communities been linked to each other, neither across the border, nor within the two countries or even within their administrative units (horizontal linkages).

Such linkages were however found to be important. This was for two main reasons. Firstly, the sharing of (natural) resources is common practice among neighbouring communities, both within and across the border. Households at Feo, for instance, have been using land in Narquia for farming. The latter community, on the other hand, is a potential beneficiary of the dam that was recently rehabilitated at Feo, because most of the irrigable land is located there. It also emerged that such resource sharing increasingly results in conflicts and disagreements, creating distrust between people and institutions across the border. Available information suggested very similar situations are occurring in the larger OFZP. Secondly, joint agreement on resource development can increase the cost effectiveness of investments, which can make it easier to attract funding, particularly for expensive infrastructure, such as dams, irrigation systems, and feeder roads.

The need for x-border and x-community agreement on the use and management of natural resources is thus evident. This perception was clearly shared by the traditional structure and community representatives, who appreciated the planning approach for this reason in particular. It managed to bring communities together on natural resource management related issues, and contributed to a better understanding of x-border dynamics in the use of these resources. For the communities, the role of the planning process in bridging the gap between them that had been created by institutional rather than traditional conditions was significant. For the first time, communities were able to meet and deliberate on issues of common concerns reminiscent of the past, before they were divided by the international border. It is interesting that the local communities and their leaders also saw the process in a much wider context, i.e. beyond natural resource management. In the words of the Bongo Chief: 'it brings people with the same ancestry back together'. The Feo Chief echoed this view: 'We were thinking of ourselves as Burkinabe and Ghanaian. Now we are closer and share more in common'.

Need for formalised agreements

It also became clear during the process that there is a need to document the agreements reached between the communities and other stakeholders on resource use. This could be done by means of, for instance, land use plans or written agreements. It is particularly interesting that the need for documentation was primarily voiced and advocated by the traditional authorities, who claimed that the existing, customary management

structures are no longer adequate to deal with the increasing pressure on the natural resource base.

The planning approach

The process was characterised by a high level of active participation by community-members and their leaders. The novelty of the approach and the opportunity to see how things were done by other communities and in another country may have played a role, but the attention to negotiation and consensus building certainly appealed to the local population. Because the process was structured as a series of meetings within and between communities, it allowed issues to sink in, relationships to be established, and other people to join in the process later. This, in turn, resulted in development proposals that were jointly prepared and widely supported (see also Box 6).

Box 6: Difference between PNTD and other NRM planning approaches.

"You need to lift the pot to your knee before you call someone else to help you carry it. PNTD has helped us lift the pot to our knee ourselves (diagnosed our problems) and we are now looking for someone to help us carry (implement our proposals). Other approaches simply carried the pot without allowing us to position it on our knee"

A community member's view.

Planning Team

The facilitation by an external planning team has been central to the approach followed. The decision to work with multi-national teams operating on both sides of the border, worked well in that it contributed substantially to a better understanding by the parties involved of the institutional setting on the other side of the border. This applied both at a government level, as it forced government experts to jointly operate with their counterparts from across the border, as well as at a field level, as it allowed team members to actually engage with communities of a different nationality. It did, however, complicate the operational efficiency due the language gap and differences in work culture and approach (see Box 7). Recommendations to overcome this are discussed in Chapter 5.

As stated earlier, considerable importance was attached to proper representation of key institutions in the planning team (see section 4.3). This was to ensure their active involvement in the various stages of the process. This expectation, however, did not fully materialise and is discussed further in the following section. The emphasis on representation did result in a fairly large team of eight members. This was more than the number recommended by FAO based on their experiences elsewhere.

At first the team was working as one single unit, which resulted in high operational costs (daily allowances, transport), and compounded the operational complications referred to above. Later on the team was split into two (again with mixed nationality). This worked far more efficiently. A further reduction in team size (less than four) was found to be impractical, as members could not always participate due to other duties. At the same time, it was considered important that teams consisted of nationals of both countries in their x-border activities. This was to avoid a situation where planning activities in specific locations were entirely facilitated by foreign nationals. This would have been undesirable with respect to the participatory approach, but also because it could have created formal problems. However, during the planning process a situation occurred in which two Ghanaian team members facilitated a planning session in Burkina Faso and it is interesting to note that this was not seen as a problem by the communities involved.

BOX 7: The Planning Team: Operational Efficiency

The team composition, however desirable from a planning perspective, did create operational complications. This was particularly noticeable with respect to:

Decision making: The team found it difficult to come to joint decisions on functional and technical issues. The language gap and differences in work culture, the team size, as well as the unfamiliarity with the approach resulted in very time consuming preparations for their field activities. The decision-making capacity within the team did, however, improve considerably with time.

Communication: (Perceived) costs of international calls, made team members very reluctant to directly contact their counterparts across the border. All x-border communication within the team went through the two OFZP coordinators, which frequently led to delays and misunderstandings.

Reporting: Joint reporting by the team as was foreseen following completion of field activities proved problematic. Eventually the reporting duties were taken up by individual team members.

Up-scaling

Key issues that surfaced with respect to internalisation and up-scaling of the planning process, i.e. the opportunities to mainstream the approach within the existing institutional setting, included concerns over the level of ownership from the side of local government, and operational complications.

Ownership

The sense of ownership of local government organisations and NGOs to the OFZP appeared to be low at the start of the piloting process. In order to understand their position, it is useful to consider that prior to the PNTD piloting, the local NGOs and government institutions had not been actively involved in the implementation of the OFZP. Ac-

tivities were by-and-large carried out directly by the Project through consultants, rather than by involving local organisations. The Project indicated if support from government officials was required, and carried their operational costs (transport, allowances). It is therefore not surprising that the PNTD piloting process was initially seen in the same light.

By actively involving staff of local government and NGOs in the planning process through their membership of the planning team, it was anticipated that these organisations would gradually become more involved and take over the planning process as well as responsibility for sourcing and securing future technical and financial support. This has not happened. With hindsight, it can be concluded that this was not a realistic expectation. Team members were largely appointed on the basis of their field experience, and not on their decision making powers within their organisation (see also section 4.3).

Moreover, insufficient attention has been paid to ensure the active involvement of 'decision makers' in the piloting process. The 'project' environment with its strong emphasis on timely delivery of physical outputs (the plans rather than the process) has not helped in this respect, but it was also found that perceptions of the OFZP were difficult to change.

The institutional setting was further complicated by the changes in the local government structure in Burkina Faso. *Communes* were created to replace the existing *Départements.* At the completion of the pilot, this process had not been completed fully. This resulted in a situation in which both structures co-exist with overlapping responsibilities and mandates.

Operational complications

The piloting process was conducted within the context of an externally funded and implemented project. A key question in the up-scaling of x-border planning and realisation of joint development is thus to what extent such processes will be expected to continue to rely on external support? Heads of Department and local political leaders from both countries concurred that any agreement on joint implementation of x-border development initiatives could be formalised by drawing up a Memorandum of Understanding between the government agencies and other organisations involved. The actual implementation of such activities by local government agencies was seen as considerably more challenging. The main operational difficulties that were identified by the organisations involved, and confirmed by the experiences of the pilot, included:

- High operational costs. X-border cooperation proved to be expensive because of the international travel allowances that government staff are entitled to for any activities undertaken across the border;
- Administrative complications. Civil servants require authorisation from central government to cross the border on official duty. Obtaining such permission was found to be time consuming, particularly in Burkina Faso.

- NGOs are geographically limited in their operations to the country and administrative units they are licensed for. This makes it particularly difficult for them to operate across the border.

- The language gap. This proved to be a major complication at both institutional and project levels, as it required translation during discussions in meetings, as well as the preparation of documentations in both official languages. This makes integrated x-border activities time consuming, which in turn adds to the operational costs.

- Border control measures. Border crossings are time consuming, and the closing hours of the border proved restrictive to formal meetings and workshops.

Strengthening of the planning capacity

Capacity development of the planning team comprised two joint training sessions of three days each, scheduled at the start and halfway through the process. In addition, on-the-job support during field level implementation was provided. The alternation between joint training sessions and field level application and support generally worked well. The capacity of the PNTD team to facilitate inclusive planning processes improved significantly. Not as much in the diagnostic stage (many team members had used the PRA tools before), but in giving meaning to these findings in order to facilitate proposal development, negotiation and consensus building, and in placing the findings in a larger geographical context (linkages between communities) .

Both training sessions required significantly more time than the tree days budgeted for. This was compensated by more intensive support from BADECC and SNV to the team in the field, particularly in the early part of the process. This was mainly for two reasons:

- *Conceptual challenges.* It was found that it took time for the team members to grasp the conceptual approach. All team members were used to working within individual communities. Those who had been involved in planning had mostly done so at a diagnostic level. Looking beyond community boundaries, negotiation and consensus building were new aspects.

- *Language gap.* Language problems required almost continuous translation, and thus effectively doubled the time required.

5 Institutionalising x-border planning and development

5.1 Introduction

The overall aim of this pilot planning exercise was to learn lessons on how x-border planning and development could be institutionalised in the OCP areas. The pilot focused on natural resource based interventions.

This chapter discusses in more detail the institutional implications of the main findings outlined in the previous chapter. In this discussion it is useful to recall the development approach preferred by the OCP countries, as laid out in the guiding principles for sustainable settlement and development (see Box 1). Principles with a direct bearing on the role of government and the supporting institutional environment include:

- *Assisted spontaneous settlement approach* is considered the most appropriate for the OCP areas given the volume of migration and considering the financial and managerial capabilities of the governments. With a policy of assisted spontaneous settlement, governments, donor agencies and NGOs should play a supporting role in a process that is already occurring.

- *Regional consultation and coordination* processes are to resolve regional issues and should be put in place by the governments of the OCP area.

- *National coordination* regarding all development activities in settlement areas should be instituted at a national level. Settlement programmes typically involve a range of ministries, and thus require a coordinated set of national policies and administrative structures. Concerted government action at a national level is critical for successful development of the OFZ, because of the complexity of the settlement process.

- *Local implementation* responsibility for projects in settlement areas should rest with the line departments, which appears to be the most effective in the longer term. Experiences in the OCP with previous projects show that parastatal agencies created specifically for this purpose are expensive and experience difficulties in handing over their responsibilities to line departments after the development projects have been completed. Moreover, line departments often fail to provide the level of service and support the settlers have become used to from the parastatal.

- *Donor support* is required for the development of the Onchocerciasis-freed areas in addition to sustained support for the control of Onchocerciasis. Substantial financial and technical inputs are needed to complement and reinforce the efforts of the countries involved.

- *Community-centred natural resource management* and locally agreed zoning was seen as the most effective method for protecting natural resources and resolving natural resource related conflicts. Governments should support the formation of community land management structures (e.g. committees, associations) that involve hosts, settlers and pastoralists in land use zoning

- *Build on customary tenure systems* is required for land tenure reforms. Customary tenure arrangements often allow settlers access to land, but do not provide long-term security, making it unattractive to invest in these lands. In addition, conflicts may arise with the "owners" as the pressure on land increases.

These guidelines clearly lay the responsibility and ownership of the development of the OCP areas with the national governments. The coordination and implementation of OFZ development programmes is placed within the domain of government agencies with strong roles for communities and traditional structures in so far as natural resource management is concerned. In doing so, these guidelines put emphasis on longer term sustainability rather than short-term efficiency issues. Donor assistance would be required, but not in an implementing capacity.

The need for x-border consultation and coordination is recognised, but to address specific issues only. The guidelines are not explicit on the need for a fully integrated x-border development approach (including x-border planning and implementation).

5.2 Current institutional environment for natural resource management

With respect to the actual situation on the ground, the following observations can be made:

a. Natural resource management is at present firmly within the domain of the traditional authorities and by-and-large community based. The traditional authorities realise, however, that the customary management system can no longer address all challenges.

b. There is a clear need to embed the community-based natural resource management structures into wider planning and development frameworks. This is because the natural resource base is shared to a certain extent between communities. Moreover, changes in use or management instigated by one community may well affect a much larger area. Such effects and relationships could extend even across the border. Dam construction is a clear example of how an intervention in one community can affect other communities further downstream. That this effect is not necessarily negative is illustrated by the Feo dam which has created opportunities for irrigation development in the adjacent community (across the border). Another example is the changing rights of access to grazing lands for transhumant herders. The conse-

quences this could have are well illustrated by recent developments in the Red Volta valley in Ghana[11] (where communities have denied Fulani access to their lands). This decision has effectively blocked transhumance and resulted in increased pressure on grazing lands further upstream along the Red Volta in Burkina Faso. The latter may also have affected the wildlife distribution, as it is seen as an explanation for the diminished elephant migration observed along the Red Volta (Barnes *et al*., 2006), which, according to the community, in turn has badly affected ecotourism development efforts at Widnaba.

c. There are no apparent links between customary community-based natural resource management and higher level governmental natural resource management strategies and plans. Moreover, in Ghana, no District and Regional level natural resource management plans and strategies exist that are relevant for the pilot area. In Burkina Faso this gap clearly exists as well, but the institutional situation is somewhat different due to the activities of PNGT (see Chapter 3). PNGT is executed by the Ministry of Agriculture and coordinated at a provincial level, as well as at a national level (SG/PNGT-2, 2006). Still, despite these vertical linkages, the community level plans appear to have been developed in isolation, and do not seem to be supported by, or incorporated into, development plans for the wider areas.

The OFZP, is seen as external by both government, non-government institutions and traditional authorities. It has not been adequately incorporated in to national development efforts. This lack of ownership has resulted in a situation in which local government institutions and communities involved are expecting the now defunct OFZP and ECOWAS to take the initiative to start follow up programmes and activities.

5.3 Key considerations for a coordinated approach

The above shows that the current institutional environment in the pilot area (and the OFZ) is not fully in line with the OCP guidelines, particularly in terms of the roles of both governments in the development process. There is a clear need for the two governments to take up a more prominent role to ensure that efforts to develop the OFZ become more sustained and coordinated. From the initial experiences gained in the pilot exercise, two interrelated considerations emerge in this respect:

[11] This is part of the OFZ but outside the pilot area.

- The need for mainstreaming versus the limited institutional capacity
- The added value of x-border cooperation versus the additional expense

Mainstreaming and institutional capacity

The key argument used by the OCP countries to work through national government structures is that it would be more sustainable in the longer term. This is also the key principle of the partnership commitment outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (March 2005), which has been ratified by both governments[12]. The experiences with the OFZP underline this. It has become clear that the operational structure employed by the OFZP, in which the implementing international agency strongly relied on the inputs of consultants to carry out project activities rather than involving local organisations, and operating on an external budget, has not been conducive to the creation of ownership and capacity development.

On the other hand, the capacities of governments to coordinate and implement such activities need to be realistically considered when developing an approach. The situation with respect to natural resource management is particularly complex. In both countries the responsibilities for planning and coordination have been devolved to the lowest administrative levels (District Assembly, *Commune*), while the responsibilities for implementation lie with a number of line departments which are effectively controlled by the central governments. Effective implementation would thus require horizontal coordination between the government agencies at each administrative level, as well as vertical coordination within the individual government agencies in order to enable consolidated development efforts at field level.

The institutional capacity to ensure this level of coordination is not yet in place (see chapter 3), and direct efforts to strengthen them need to be made. In the case of Ghana, the Country Environmental Analysis found an overall weak institutional capacity for dealing with land issues at all levels including planning/participatory planning, policy development, overall strategic thinking, data collection, and technical issues (World Bank / AFdD/RNE, 2006).

It is interesting to note in this respect that the semi-autonomous status of the OCP has been seen as instrumental in its effective and successful efforts to control river blindness. This status allowed the OCP to operate outside the bureaucracies of the WHO and national governments. At the same time, this operational structure has raised considerable concerns regarding the capacity of the national governments to take over the OCP responsibilities following its completion (Norgbey, 1997). Hence, working through government structures is probably more sustainable, but also likely to be less effective, at least on the short-term.

[12] Ownership (1): 'Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development policies and strategies and co-ordinate development actions'

The added value and costs of x-border cooperation

The need for a cross-border approach has been discussed in chapter 2. A regional approach to the eradication of the disease has been essential, due to the range of the black fly, the vector transmitting River Blindness. A coherent regional approach to the economic development of the OFZ is therefore also necessary in order to avoid the risk of re-infestation resulting from uncontrolled settlement (Norgbey, 1997)[13]. Moreover, a regional approach would be required to address the x-border implications of the proposed development interventions which can be substantial, as many of the OFZ occur near international borders (World Bank, 1995). The OFZP was designed to address these issues and to recommend a suitable approach for x-border development (see Chapter 1).

In the pilot planning process a fully integrated x-border approach was followed in which communities on both sides of the border worked jointly towards agreement on development objectives, strategies and proposals, supported by teams comprising experts from governments and NGOs from both countries. This level of collaboration went much further than the guidelines adopted by the OCP countries, which refer to the establishment of coordination and consultation mechanisms between governments for specific cross-border issues.

The integrated bi-national support structure (the PNTD team) was set up deliberately to facilitate the development of a joint planning approach. It had the additional advantage that it allowed the team members and agencies that were involved to develop a good understanding of the situation on the other side of the border. It also helped to identify practical problems associated with cross-border interventions discussed in the previous chapter (logistical complications, high costs).

Scale

The experiences from the pilot underline that natural resource management issues are scale specific and will have to be addressed at the appropriate level(s). That also implies that natural resource related planning in the OFZ may not necessarily always have x-border implications. This would depend on the location, scale and issues at hand. For instance:

- Neighbouring communities were found to interact on natural resource management within a distance of about 5 km. This related mainly to resources that are shared to a certain extent between such communities, located either on the same side of the border, or across the border. That in turn implies that in the larger part of the OFZ, such interrelationships are likely to occur between communities within the same country. The need for the facilitation of joint planning and management of natural resources between communities across the border is thus fairly limited.

[13] Onchocerciasis has not been fully eradicated, and still occurs in pockets in the OCP areas. Uncontrolled settlement may create the type of conditions required to trigger serious levels of re-infestation.

- Interventions pertaining to natural resources may also have an impact beyond this scale. As discussed earlier, that applies, for instance, to the indirect effects of interventions with respect to water, transhumance, and wildlife. Such interventions in the OFZ are likely to have implications extending beyond the border (see previous section). The planning and management of such interventions therefore need to be addressed at higher administrative levels and within a cross-border context.

Experiences with river basin management show that x-border natural resource management may not be easy to institutionalise. Lautze et al. (2005) noted that international agreements on water management (including that for the Volta Basin) have been mainly externally driven.

5.4 Next steps

From the above, it can be concluded that x-border agreement and cooperation would be required for development of the OFZ, and that it would also be desirable to apply an approach along the lines of PNTD, in order to facilitate consensus-based natural resource use and management as a basis for further development.

It has also become clear that the project approach, as applied by the OFZP, is unlikely to result in a sustained development effort. Both Governments will need to take a more prominent role in the coordination, facilitation and implementation of development programmes in the OFZ. It is therefore proposed to build on the approach initiated with the PNTD piloting in which activities were implemented through local government and NGOs. External support would still be required, but in a different form. Considering this, as well as practical and financial implications, the following approach is proposed.

Government's role in x-border planning and natural resource management:

Government involvement should shift from full engagement in integrated cross-border planning processes to cross-border coordination. There is no need to continue the fully integrated cross-border planning applied in the pilot area, provided the activities on both sides of the border are well coordinated, and the traditional structures are properly engaged and supported. In practical terms that would mean that x-border planning would be supported by two field teams, one in each country, rather than the single bi-national PNTD field team employed in the piloting. This would significantly reduce the need for 'international travel' and thus the costs and logistical complications.

- X-border coordination should be conducted at the appropriate administrative levels. That is Regional - *Gouvernorat* / *Province* level to ensure agreement on overall development objectives for the OFZ, and District - *Commune* level to align planning processes and implementation of development projects (see table 8).

- Local government, together with NGOs, should facilitate negotiated planning processes between communities. Its main tasks would be to provide the traditional structures and communities with the technical and administrative support required.

Governments will require technical and financial assistance to build up their capacity at the right administrative levels. Operational budget support can probably not entirely be avoided, but should be limited as much as possible and phased out over a realistic period.

Role of traditional authorities

The traditional authorities will need to become more prominent in local level planning. They are best positioned to effect (cross-border) collaboration between communities on natural resource management.

The required technical support could be provided by PNTD teams from both sides of the border, this would include support for actual planning activities, but also for advocacy to ensure adequate service delivery from government and NGOs

Role of local NGOs

Local NGOs will have to be included, and become more actively engaged, in the OFZ planning and development process. Together with local government, the NGOs should facilitate consensus based planning and implementation by (groups of) communities. This would include technical support as well as developing proposals for resource mobilisation. Moreover, local NGOs could play an important role as 'watch dogs' to ensure that governments are delivering the services required.

Local NGOs in the OFZ generally have a limited technical capacity and depend by-and-large on project funding for their operations, and will require technical and financial support to play these roles, particularly on the short term.

External support structure

It is clear that external support will continue to be required to build the supportive institutional structures outlined above, both in financial and technical terms. This could be channelled through a second phase of the OFZP, but not necessarily so. This support should focus on building an enabling environment for coordinated and consensus based planning and development, and to that effect, will need to be directed at multiple administrative levels, rather than at community level implementation as has been the case with the OFZP. This would include building the capacities of the government agencies as well as local NGOs to deliver the services required to communities and traditional structures. See Table 8 for an overview of roles and responsibilities.

Assistance to local organisations in the sourcing of funds should be a key component of the technical assistance. Coordinated planning for improved natural resource manage-

ment at community level is a key requirement for the development of the OFZ, but should be embarked on only if there is a realistic possibility for actual implementation.

Table 9. Administrative levels, key institutions and tasks

Level	Ghana	Burkina Faso	Key tasks
National	Country	Country	– Ensure incorporation of OFZ development objectives in relevant sector strategies
Regional	Regions	*Gouvernorats* *Provinces*	– Facilitate x-border agreement on broad development objectives for the OFZ (linkages to national strategies and policies) – Facilitate district-commune, district-district, and commune-commune co-ordination planning and implementation
Local	Districts; NGOs	*Communes* (*Départements*); NGOs	– Coordinate inter-community / x-border planning and implementation – Facilitate participatory and negotiated natural resource planning and management processes
Community	traditional authorities CBOs	Traditional authorities CBOs	– Implement consensus-based planning and management of the natural resource base

The incapacity of the OFZP to implement development proposals has led to considerable discouragement from within the communities, and traditional authorities.

The proposed approach with its emphasis on transfer of ownership and institutional development would also require a long term commitment. Indications are that this could well be less effective than direct project-based support, particularly in the short term. However, given the difficulties encountered in the OFZ with sustaining project-based implementation, it may well be worth the investment.

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