



The Population Question and Development

The need for a debate in the Netherlands



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
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Report by Andrew Martin Fischer



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Final Report on the 2009 SID-WPF-ISS lecture series

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1. Introduction: The Need for a Debate

In 2009, a line up of leading international experts on the subject of population and development were brought to The Hague for a series of six lectures, held at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS)² of Erasmus University Rotterdam. The lectures were co-organised by the Dutch chapter of the Society for International Development (SID),³ the World Population Foundation (WPF),⁴ and the ISS. The principle speakers invited from abroad were also joined by leading experts from the Netherlands, who provided comments and discussion. Each session privileged questions and debate from the audience, in all cases attended by a wide range of participants from Dutch academic and policy making circles and averaging around 100 people per lecture. Those attending included students and academic staff from various universities and research institutes,⁵ policy makers and civil servants, various Dutch media, and representatives from embassies in The Hague, international organisations, NGOs, and the business community.⁶ Two lectures in particular were reported in the NRC Handelsblad, the leading Dutch newspaper, one of which set off a debate between Tim Dyson, the first speaker, and a Dutch demographer.⁷

The success of this event bore evidence of the public interest in the important subject of population and development. Indeed, the purpose of the lecture series, as conceived by SID, WPF and ISS, was to revive attention to issues of population policy, bringing them back into public debate in Netherlands. The timing was especially pertinent; 15 years had passed since the famous Cairo International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in 1994, which had placed Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHRs) firmly onto the international agenda. Meanwhile, the upcoming climate summit in Copenhagen in December 2009 was bringing much attention to population issues, albeit not always in an accurate or constructive manner. In the Netherlands, a seminal review of Dutch international development assistance was in progress, conducted by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and resulting in the now much-debated report that the WRR presented to the government in January 2010.⁸

Hence, there was a pressing need to stimulate an informed debate on population and development as a means to influence policy deliberations as they were happening and in a manner that would advance a rights-based and scientifically-informed approach to population policy. This need was also laden with responsibility given that the Netherlands has been considered an international leader in the field of SRHRs, both in advocacy and in funding. For instance, the Netherlands is the largest funder of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and SRHRs and HIV/AIDS were named as priorities of Dutch policy in the government's policy paper on development cooperation for 2007-2011.⁹ Yet, despite this role, debate about population issues had been non-existent in the Netherlands and almost taboo in certain Dutch circles. It is precisely for this reason that SID, WPF and ISS decided to join hands in order to re-open the debate after a hiatus of many years.

Of particular concern was to re-centre the commitment to SRHRs within a broader perspective of family planning and population policy, the latter having fallen into much disrepute and dispute over the past decades. It is important to acknowledge that family planning policies have been very sensitive in part because

of abuses in the past, but also in part because they deal with issues that touch upon the most private aspects of peoples' lives, such as sex and sexuality, contraception, childbearing, family relationships, health, sickness, and even death. They also deal with issues that are considered by many to be the preserve of religion and culture. However, despite such sensitivity, the Cairo conference in 1994 managed to bring an unparalleled degree of consensus on population policies among national governments, research communities and civil society organisations. This consensus shifted the focus of population policies from interventions aimed exclusively at slowing population growth towards policies aimed at improving the lives and free choices of individuals and, in particular, women, as a more ethical and effective way of dealing with demographic issues. This was the origin of the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHRs) agenda, at least in terms of being codified into an international agreement.

Nonetheless, tensions remain. For one, population issues are not limited to fertility and reproductive health. Even though thinking has moved towards improving the lives of individuals, there is still too often a focus in policies on only one aspect of population - fertility rates - which in effect limits rather than enlarges women's reproductive freedom. Instead, a holistic approach to population policy should arguably also include, as a minimum, consideration of gender, generation, mortality and migration. Moreover, it should be rights-based, in terms of guaranteeing safe, affordable and good quality choice, made available to the whole population at comparable levels of quality and without discrimination, within a universalistic and well-funded system of public provisioning of common social goods, particularly in the sectors of health and education. This is in contrast to the increasing trend of promoting choice simply through segmented, stratified and marketised forms of social service provisioning, increasingly driven by financial means rather than by human needs.

In relation to this last point, there has been concern that the consensus achieved by Cairo has possibly moved the pendulum too far in the direction of individual choice, at the cost of attention (and funding) to more traditional state-led approaches to population policy, particularly family planning programmes and in areas of the world still experiencing rapid population growth, such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. Similarly, the shift of focus towards rights and HIV has possibly drawn attention (and funding) away from more general, broad-based, and multi-sectoral approaches to both population and health policy. The consequences of this might have been particularly detrimental to countries still dealing with stubbornly high levels of both fertility and mortality, and, as a result, with rapid population growth rates, among other considerations.

Indeed, many of these concerns reflect the fact that the discourse of choice and rights, while certainly well intentioned by many, might have been usurped by a broadly neoliberal agenda of social policy. For instance, reports of intrusive violations of reproductive rights in state-run family planning programmes, most dramatically represented by forced sterilisations and abortions, have reinforced an anti-state mentality with regard to population policy more generally. This is despite the many important achievements that have been made by many (non-coercive) state-led family planning programmes. Moreover, while it is important to acknowledge the abuses of the past, it is also important to reaffirm the centrality of state leadership in most previous cases of successful (as well as unsuccessful)

transitions towards lower fertility and mortality. In other words, despite the travesties that have been perpetrated in the name of family planning, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bath water (no demographic pun intended).

In addition to these concerns, it is also important to note that population issues are not limited to demography. Increasingly, population issues are coming under scrutiny in wider discussions at national and international levels. For instance, population is often mentioned in debates regarding to high-attention issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, food, water and energy scarcities, economic growth, security and failed states, urbanisation, and migration. Rather than relying on evocative caricatures, each of these issues requires an informed response from a scientifically-grounded population perspective.

Among the highest profile debates in this regard have been related to both environmental and anti-poverty campaigns. Unfortunately, such campaigns often rely on simplistic 'neo-Malthusian' ideas of poverty-population-environment interactions. This is known as the 'PPE spiral', as once coined by UNICEF in the 1994; poverty induces higher fertility and higher population growth among poor people because children are seen as providing old age security, extra labour and income, and compensation for higher mortality. This places pressure on the environment and leads to environmental degradation, which in turn worsens poverty. Hence, the poor are doomed to a poverty trap due to their unregulated sexual behaviour and should be shown the way of fertility regulation in order to break the spiral. The argument is based on a simplistic statistical extrapolation that, because poor people have more children than rich people, worsening poverty must therefore cause higher fertility. Whether or not high fertility causes poverty is a different question. Both angles were addressed by several of the speakers in the lecture series.

Among the reactions to such arguments, some people take an opposite position of arguing that overpopulation is a myth, used as a rationalisation for imposing political agendas, alongside questionable ethics related to birth control. Interestingly, The Netherlands often appears in these arguments given that it presents a quintessential case of relatively rapid population growth on a very small piece of (very wet) land, simultaneous with economic improvement over several centuries. However, it is simplistic to compare the historical experience of The Netherlands, when it was at the height of its colonial power, to the experience of poor countries today. Moreover, as noted in the final session of the lecture series, more recently the Dutch have often been criticised for the wide availability of abortion services made available in their country, which would seem to contradict the pro-natalist position. The rejection of simplistic neo-Malthusian arguments should not lead us to the opposite extreme of abandoning family planning altogether, the consequences of which might be severe in poor countries that are currently growing far faster than The Netherlands ever grew. Indeed, many aid-financed family planning programmes already suffered from such a predicament when President George W. Bush re-imposed the Global Gag Rule on the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) population program in 2001.¹⁰ Similar setbacks were suffered in many family planning and HIV/AIDS programmes in Africa from 2003 onwards when Bush cut funding for condoms and insisted that recipient countries of his emergency aid plan for AIDS relief must emphasise abstinence over condoms and must condemn prostitution.

Hence, while acknowledging and addressing past abuses, it is important to demystify family planning and to remove the bad reputation it has earned as an interventionist tool promoted by predominantly male decision makers to control women's fertility and to limit their choice. Of course, a key step in this direction can be taken by firmly rooting family planning within a rights-based approach. Some have called this 'family planning with a human/female face'. It involves planning of the family by the family and with the best interest of the family in mind, with a woman at the centre as an active, informed and empowered decision maker in this process and in her whole life. Such family planning, it is argued, should not be a tool of governments used to regulate the population. Rather, it must be a set of policies, conditions and services provided by the government and the wider society which serve as means to provide women and their partners with a real opportunity to decide on how many children they wish to have and how to space them, and also as prevention of unwanted pregnancies and avoidable infant and maternal mortality.

The question, of course, is how to achieve this goal. The rights-based approach to family planning implies many assumptions about sexuality, fertility, reproduction and mortality. It also implies many assumptions about systems of social service provisioning, gender relations, state society relations, local and global political economy, and so on, all of which are rife with often highly contentious politics. However, the best antidote for political emotions is often known to be an academic lecture, in this case aimed to ground the discussion in a scientifically-informed debate about the core issues of population and development.

1.1. The Lectures

These debates and more were addressed by the six lectures, the results of which are summarised in this report. The lectures were designed with a multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary approach in mind. Given the theme and the venue of the lecture series, an obvious emphasis was on stakeholders engaged in international development cooperation, although certain lectures also aimed to appeal to environment, climate change, and migration specialists as well. In each lecture, a prominent international expert in the field of population and development was invited to present on a particular theme, followed by a reply or, in some cases, an additional presentation by another international or national expert in a population or related field. In some cases, discussants and chairs came from more policy-oriented circles. Each session also privileged a period of open discussions with the audience.

The six lectures followed six sub-themes, each intended to shed light on a different dimension of the interrelated population issues discussed above. These were as follows:

1. The first lecture, on 23 April 2009, introduced the series with a presentation entitled; 'Global Demographic Transition: its consequences and implications for development', by Tim Dyson, Professor of Population Studies at the Development Studies Institute of the London School of Economics. The discussant was Dr Michel Garenne from the Pasteur Institute in Paris. The session was chaired by Professor Louk de la Rive Box, the Rector of ISS.
2. The second lecture, on 14 May 2009, was on the topic of Population, Migration and Urbanisation, presented by Nigel Harris, Emeritus Professor of

Development Planning and Economics of the City, at University College London, UK. The discussant was Mahmood Messkoub, Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at ISS. The chair was Ashwani Saith, Professor of Rural Economics, also at ISS.

3. The third lecture, on 18 June 2009, was on Population and Generation, presented by John Cleland, Professor of Medical Demography at the Centre for Population Studies, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and also the President of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population from 2006-2009. The discussant was Joris Voorhoeve, Professor of International Organisations at Leiden University and of International Security at the Netherlands Defence Academy, member of the Council of State, former Minister of Defence, and former Chair of WPF. The chair was Mr. Jos van Gennip, President of the Netherlands Chapter of SID.
4. The fourth lecture, on 17 September 2009, was on Population and Gender, presented by Dr Mari Simonen, the Deputy Executive Director for External Relations at the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The discussant was Dr Wendy Harcourt, Editor of the quarterly journal *Development* on behalf of SID International and a part-time Professor at the European University Institute. The chair was Sylvia Borren, Co-Chair of Worldconnectors and former CEO of Oxfam/Novib.
5. The fifth lecture, on 22 October 2009, brought a regional focus to the series with a presentation on 'Population Dynamics and its Impacts on China's Development', which included some discussion of the relationship between population and environment. This was presented by Professor Xizhe Peng, Dean of the School of Social Development and Public Policy and Director of the Institute of Population Research, both at Fudan University in Shanghai, China. The discussant was Professor Jeroen van Ginneken, Honorary Fellow at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demography Institute in The Hague and Professor of Demography at the School of Public Health, University of Pretoria, South Africa. The chair was Anke Niehof, Professor of Sociology at Wageningen University, Netherlands.
6. The final concluding lecture, on 12 November 2009, returned to the overarching question; 'Is Population Growth still an issue?' This was presented by Professor Steven W. Sinding, Senior Fellow of the Guttmacher Institute in the USA, former Director General of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), former professor at Columbia University, former Director of the Population Sciences Program at the Rockefeller Foundation, and a member of the United States Delegation to the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) at Cairo in 1994. The discussant was Albert Gerard Koenders, then the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation (up until March 2010). The session was chaired by Jos van Gennip, President of the Netherlands Chapter of SID.

Overall, there was a striking degree of consistency and consensus across all the presentations. This might have been due to a certain selection bias in choosing the presenters. However, it more generally reflects a certain degree of agreement in the field of population studies on the causes of population growth and, thus, on the common public misconceptions that urgently need to be corrected.

The sense of agreement represents, to some degree, certain advances that have been made in the field of demography and population studies since the 1970s, when pessimism about the ability of poor countries and poor people to lower their fertility reigned in both academic and popular perception. There is now a wide recognition of the fact that fertility has been falling rapidly in poor countries, much more rapidly than in earlier European cases, and that this has been taking place largely irrespective of level of income. Indeed, in retrospect, this fact took many demographers by surprise. For instance, back in the 1970s, there was strong scepticism on whether China would ever be able to lower its fertility rates, even while China was lowering these rates at a speed never before witnessed, prior to the introduction of the one-child policy. Similarly, fertility declines were taking place in the 1970s in many other poor countries, such as Egypt, even as prominent demographers were debating whether it would take 15 or even 25 years before fertility would start to decline in these same countries. By around 2000, countries attaining low rates of total fertility per woman at low or fairly low levels of average per capita income included: China (1.8), Sri Lanka (2.0), Thailand (1.7), Indonesia (2.3) and Costa Rica (2.7). These insights – that poor countries and poor people can and do reduce their birth rates – have driven much new thinking in demography. The field has since moved away from older ideas rooted in a ‘modernisation theory’ perspective of population and development, and towards more subtle distinctions between processes of human development on one hand, and processes of economic development, hierarchy and power on the other.

Similar advances have been made in the realm of population policy. Obtrusive and coercive family planning strategies were also at their apex in the 1970s and 1980s, often leading to violations of sexual, reproductive and other rights, and lending a bad name to family planning. However, many of the cases of falling fertility mentioned above, all of which relied on extensive use of family planning, avoided the abuses and violations of family planning that grabbed the headlines. Moreover, there has been increasing recognition, encouraged by Cairo but also supported by demographers, that there is no inherent contradiction between family planning and population policy on one hand, and rights-based approaches on the other. As argued by Tim Dyson, the first speaker in the series, all the evidence shows that – given a real choice, a little time, and an underlying condition of sustained reductions in mortality (particularly infant, child and maternal mortality) – women (even poor and illiterate women) generally choose to reduce (or at least regulate) their fertility. Hence, the means harmonise with the ends; choice-based approaches to family planning might well be the best way to bring down fertility, provided that they are grounded within broad-based and equitable systems of health and other social service provisioning.

Obviously, various ongoing debates still exist on specific issues of causality or technicality. The interconnections between population issues and wider political economy issues are especially contentious, including questions of distributive justice, particularly at the global level, social policy systems, economic and employment policies, gender, or climate change. Many of these points of contention were treated at length by the speakers in the lecture series. The following summary provides a synthesis of each session, highlighting the agreements, debates, contentions and consensuses within the series as a means to draw out the salient points that can potentially contribute to a scientifically-informed Dutch population policy.

2. Summary of the Lectures

2.1. Session One: Overview on the Global Demographic Transition

The first session opened with Professor Tim Dyson from the London School of Economics. In retrospect, Dyson's lecture framed the themes of the whole series, in the sense that he endeavoured, in his characteristic manner that has brought him fame among generations of LSE students, to sum up the entirety of what is known as the demographic transition and how, in his opinion, this transition explains so much of what we call 'development'. In other words, development in its most essential meaning is the demographic transition, insofar as development should, above all, imply peoples' improved health and control over mortality. From this one remote cause – reduced mortality – most of what we understand as the processes underlying modern population dynamics unfold.

Despite the fact that most people know little about the demographic transition, Dyson described it as perhaps the most important event to occur in human affairs during the last 250 years, since it first started in the countries of north-western Europe towards the end of the 18th century. It explains the unprecedented growth in the size of the world's population since that time, which will probably lead to roughly a nine-fold increase between 1750 and 2050, at which point the global population is predicted to stabilise.

This very complex process in fact encompasses several transitions; mortality transition, fertility transition, epidemiological (or health) transition, and migration transition. Dyson explained that the sequencing of these processes always involves a broadly predictable pattern. First, the death rate comes down before the birth rate, largely due to falls in infectious and parasitic diseases (hence the epidemiological or health transition, leading to mortality transition). As a result, there is a long period when the birth rate is higher than the death rate, which in turn leads to a lengthy period of population growth. Population growth is reflected at the level of individual couples as average family size increases, mainly because fewer children are dying. This eventually leads to a lagged adoption of birth control, which can be regarded as an attempt to maintain family size rather than decrease it. Population ageing takes place because of falling fertility, not because of falling mortality. Finally, the birth rate falls until it is roughly equal to the death rate.

In sum, the transition involves a movement from a quasi-equilibrium of high and roughly equal death and birth rates, to another quasi-equilibrium of low and roughly equal death and birth rates. Quasi-equilibrium implies that, at both ends of the transition, average levels of net fertility per woman are roughly the same, at around replacement in both cases (i.e. parents are replaced by two surviving adult offspring). However, through the course of transition, reproduction becomes much more efficient. Before the transition, women might have six births in order for two of them to survive into adulthood, whereas after the transition, they can achieve the same result with just 2 births – both of which will generally survive. The period of the disequilibrium, when death rates are lower than birth rates, is the transition, which results in population growth and related phenomena such as population ageing and urbanisation. Obviously, equilibrium at the end of this transition is possibly a misnomer given that there is now talk of a second demographic transition,

as fertility and birth rates continue to fall well below replacement levels in most of Europe, Japan and some other parts of the world.

This has been described as a movement from disorder to order. Dyson stressed that truly 'pre-transitional' conditions are hard for us to even imagine. Perhaps 20 to 30 percent of children would have died before reaching their first birthday. Events like epidemics and famines were so frequent that adults could never be very sure that they would survive from one year to the next, while the fact that fertility was high meant that the population was young. Women had, on average, perhaps five to seven births each during the course of their reproductive lives. In short, life was very uncertain in pre-transitional circumstances and women's lives tended to be dominated by childbearing (pregnancy, lactation, etc). In contrast, a post-transitional society is one much like our own. Life is much more secure—indeed, few people die before the age of fifty and the fact that fertility is low means that the age structure of the population is old. Women may have a couple of births (or less) during the course of their reproductive lives.

From this perspective, Dyson argued that the demographic transition is a very good thing. People live much longer and life becomes much more assured. People can increasingly plan ahead. It makes sense for them to save and invest—for example in their children's education. Indeed, many argue that modern economic growth is simply not possible without such changes. And the huge increase in the efficiency of reproduction frees up women from many of their traditional roles.

This transition is now complete in Europe and in a few places like Japan, but it is still ongoing in the rest of the world, given that it started much later. In most developing countries, for instance, the initial decline in mortality generally started in the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, the decline in death rates happened much quicker than previously in Europe given that developing countries had easy and cheap access to the advances in medical research and practice that suddenly became available after the Second World War. They also experienced these health and mortality improvements largely independently of their level of per capita income.

As a result, the more recent demographic transitions in developing countries have involved much faster population growth rates as well. In the Netherlands, England, and Spain, population growth rates rarely exceeded 1.5 percent per year (and then only briefly), while more recent transitions (e.g. those in Taiwan and Egypt) have often involved annual growth rates of 2.5 percent or more, frequently lasting over many decades. Indeed, in some world regions population growth rates of 3 percent per year have been common. For instance, UN estimates suggest that the populations of West Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa grew at about 2.5 percent per year between 1950 and 2010, which implies a population 'doubling time' of about 28 years

Speed of growth determines the population 'growth multiples', i.e. the number of times a population increases over the course of its transition. From start to end of transition, populations in Europe generally increased by factors of about two to three times their starting size, and emigration removed a substantial portion of this increase. Population in China will probably increase by about three or four times. India's population may increase by roughly five or six times. In transitions elsewhere, growth multiples will vary from between five and twenty times, and sometimes even more. For instance, Dyson cited UN estimates suggesting that between 1950 and 2050, East Africa's population will grow eleven times. In all of these latter cases, emigration accounts for a very marginal sliver of the increase.

Dyson illustrated the significance of this in aggregate numbers by comparing Nigeria and Russia. Nigeria's population increased from 37 to 125 million between 1950 and 2000, and is projected to rise to 289 million by 2050. Russia's population, which was in the final stages of transition between 1950 and 2000, increased from about 103 to 147 million, although now it is projected to shrink back to about 116 million by 2050 because of very low fertility. Although projections should always be approached with caution, he noted that this broad relative picture is virtually inevitable.

In both cases, he argued that it is the pace of change involved that is problematic. According to his opinion, after a long period of agnosticism on the subject, the weight of current thinking among economists who study the issue is that rapid population growth has a negative impact on the pace of aggregate economic growth in developing countries and that rapid fertility decline contributes to reducing the incidence and severity of poverty. He added that, insofar as rapid urban growth is often seen as a problem, lowering fertility also lowers the rate of urban growth given that processes of urbanisation are themselves fundamentally the result of demographic transition rather than economic factors (as is commonly assumed).

While all of these points are generally well accepted in the field of population studies, Dyson then explained his somewhat more contentious thesis. He argued that even processes of democratization and the reduction of gender differentiation were ultimately the outcome of the demographic transition as well. In the case of democratization, urbanisation and population ageing result in circumstances where political power is eventually likely to become much more diffused in society. Similarly, the shift to greater gender equality over the course of the transition is underpinned by the fact that women gradually become less tied to concerns of the domestic domain with falling fertility, and their roles in society become much more similar to those of men.

On the relation between population growth and carbon emissions, Dyson reflected that population growth obviously exerts an upward effect on carbon emissions, although this effect is much bigger in rich countries because of their much higher levels of per capita emissions. For instance, calculations using the UN population projections suggest that projected population growth in South-Central Asia between 2000 and 2050 will raise global emissions by about 931 million tons; but projected population growth in North America will raise global carbon emissions by almost 2.5 billion tons, even though the projected population increase is far less.

In conclusion, Dyson repeated his conviction that the demographic transition has indeed been a good thing, but that it also represents a period of destabilization – at both household and national levels – which has been considerable in some developing countries. The provision of safe, effective, and affordable contraception is the main way of minimizing this destabilization. This is because contraception provides people with choice and all the evidence shows that, given the possibility of making the choice to use contraception, women and men eventually decide to take it.

Dyson's presentation was followed by Dr Michele Garenne, who covered much of the same ground, although placing more emphasis on Malthusian perspectives about population and development. Malthus, he argued, was writing his famous treatise on population at the end of the 18th century, following a long period of human history in which the human reproductive norm was to maximize

fertility in order to balance high mortality. There were some sporadic attempts to control fertility through abortion and infanticide, although these seem to have been very marginal in terms of the overall picture. Malthus did not anticipate the modern demographic transition, such as the sustained reduction of mortality and conscious attempts by families to control fertility, with a preference for smaller family sizes.

In this sense, Garenne argued that we have now entered a new paradigm of human reproductive strategies. From this perspective, Malthus had been both right and wrong. He was right in the sense that, up to the time he wrote, population growth was checked by disease, famine, poverty and war. Or else, as he expounded in the second edition of his treatise, population was checked by what he called 'the moral restraints', meaning abstinence and delayed marriage, which were the only methods of fertility control that were culturally acceptable in Europe at that time. However, Malthus was wrong in that he did not anticipate major innovations in agriculture between 1800 and 2000, and he also did not anticipate that people would start changing behaviour by choice (i.e. use of contraception) rather than by physical constraint (i.e. no sex). Garenne argued that this new attitude became morally acceptable in the nineteenth century primarily because of the secularization of societies. In essence, couples in Europe solved the age-old population problem by changing their attitude and behaviour and adopting contraception. Colonization exported this new attitude to the rest of the world by providing a template, which people could imitate after the 1950s through state policies of family planning programmes. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the constraints on population have disappeared; the world is still limited in space and resources.

Garenne also reflected on the replicability of the Dutch case. The Netherlands is often taken to be an ideal model refuting Malthusian ideas given its combination of high population density with high income by increasing arable land through technology, efficiently managing the state and the economy, and developing trade. These permitted population explosion on very small amount of (very wet) land. There is also a political dimension; The Netherlands was a leader in liberalism, economic development, international trade, democracy and permissiveness. However, Garenne clarified that this does not mean the Dutch case is replicable. The Netherlands has an outstanding ecological environment, very different from the world average; very fertile soil, an endless supply of water, no major geographical obstacles (i.e. mountains or deserts). The only problem the Dutch had to deal with was water control, which they did with success. The same would not be possible in the middle of India or in the Southern parts of Africa, where there is little water. Nonetheless, in places with conditions similar to the Netherlands, such as the deltas of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers in Bengal, the Nile delta in Egypt, or the Niger delta in Nigeria, similar developments never happened. So, he also credited the Dutch with incredible innovation and techniques. Obviously, such discussions also need to consider the evolution of capitalism in Europe and colonialism by Europeans, in which the Dutch played a central military, commercial and financial role, although such considerations were beyond the scope of Garenne's presentation.

Regarding food and resource limits, Garenne pointed out that new solutions to these limits are primarily based on pushing these limits forward, not on resolving them. Hence, the limits still exist, particularly in the case of water. The demand for energy is also increasing and land space is limited. He noted that land was relatively abundant a century ago in Africa, but this is no longer the case.

From this perspective, he argued that we are reaching the core of a new relationship between population, development and environment, in which any large change affects the global ecological equilibrium. This global dimension is new. Major issues include: global warming; land degradation and pollution; negative health impacts of pesticides, fertilizers, toxic waste, etc.; and the price of land, which has been increasing very quickly and is likely to increase more in the future. These issues require us to face major trade offs, which necessitate difficult choices, which in turn affect the global ecological equilibrium. For instance, an increase in arable land implies the destruction of rainforests, increases in carbon dioxide emissions, and global warming as well as many other related adverse consequences. Hence, if we consider the basic constraints of human life as mentioned above, Garenne questioned whether we have found any solution compatible with population increases at levels of income defined by a North American way of life.

On the subject of the politics of population control, Garenne commented that the context was much politicised when the population debate started in the 1950s due to decolonisation and the Cold War. This was unfortunate for population issues given that now there are no longer any major conflicting interests, in the sense that attitudes and behaviour towards low fertility have tended to converge in recent years, as mentioned above. However, in a point that was supported by Dyson later in the discussion period, he emphasised that we have been lucky to have had dedicated people in USA who started to address the issue of population control in the early 1950s. Without them, we would be in much worse situation now and world population would not stabilize in 2050, as according to current UN projections. We have also been lucky to have been able to develop modern contraceptive methods that are effective, safe and cheap. If developing contraceptive devices had been as hard as finding a vaccine for malaria or HIV, the fertility transition would have taken much longer, with numerous ecological consequences.

Garenne concluded with a note of optimism regarding the future of fertility transition based on his extensive experience in Africa.¹¹ He reflected that Africa today, like Asia fifty years ago, is undergoing a major demographic transition much faster than would have been anticipated when he started studying demography about 30 years ago, contrary to much popular perception. He explained that, when given the choice, couples all over the world are choosing to have fertility near or below replacement, regardless of circumstances and largely independent of culture and religion. Even the countries considered to be most conservative also have good family planning programmes, such as Iran and Pakistan. Fertility is declining very quickly in virtually all urban areas of the world, and this has been happening within only two generations, versus the two centuries it took in Europe. This was not at all obvious 30 years ago.

The discussion period of this session allowed both speakers to elaborate on several particularly interesting themes. The first was on the causes of fertility change and the extent to which a minimum level of per capita income is required for fertility decline in a population. Dyson responded to a question on this point by re-emphasising that very poor populations can reduce their fertility, refuting the paradigm of 30 or 40 years ago whereby it was thought that increases in per capita income were required in order to reduce fertility. Experience has shown this is not necessarily the case. In South India, for example, fertility has declined to a very low

level. While rising living standards are important in their own right, Dyson believes (along with others such as John Cleland, the third speaker in the series) that the ultimate cause of fertility decline is mortality decline. No human population has reduced its fertility from high to low levels in the absence of a previous and sustained major mortality decline. Similarly, if such mortality decline happens among poor populations, these populations also tend to reduce their fertility, even if they otherwise stay poor.

Garenne supported Dyson on this point. It has been fascinating, he reflected, to see that fertility has been declining almost everywhere for the last 30 years. There are still a few places in Africa where fertility decline has not yet started, such as rural Uganda, rural Congo, rural Nigeria, and Chad. However, there are a number of urban places in Africa where fertility has fallen to almost replacement. Nobody would have predicted this twenty years ago. The UN was predicting in the 1960s and 1970s that the world population would reach 15 billion people in 2050, whereas now it is predicting only around 9.2 to 9.5 billion. This is because fertility decline has been much faster than anticipated.

A question was asked whether this was due to the predictability of income or food rather than the level of income. Garenne replied that predictability is important, but it is about more than only food or income. It is a general question of predictability, the most essential aspect of which is mortality. As discussed by Dyson, this aspect of increased predictability is explained by disease control, especially vaccinations and antibiotics. With disease control, everything becomes more predictable. This explains the success of family planning programmes even in very poor countries where incomes have hardly increased. Garenne gave the example of Senegal, where he had been working for 10 years; there was no growth in real per capita income from 1950 to 2000, although fertility decline had been dramatic in urban areas and is now starting to decline in rural areas as well.

The second theme in the discussion dealt with the related issue of women's education and women's rights to self determination of their body and their health. One woman in the audience pointed out that these issues had not been addressed in the lectures. This allowed for some clarification on these points by the speakers. Dyson specified that, absolutely, the education of women and girls is terribly important. He explained that a lot of demographic research over the last 30 years found that the level of female education tends to be the most important variable associated with variations in the levels of fertility and child mortality within a household. Demographers then came to appreciate that increasing women's education is a crucial way of facilitating fertility and child mortality decline.

However, Dyson qualified this point, reminding us that uneducated women can reduce their fertility as well; it just generally takes them longer. For example, around 60 percent of the reduction in fertility that occurred in India from 1991 and 2001 occurred amongst women with little or no education, as shown by the late great Indian demographer Mari Bhat, who died in 2007. So, while education is terribly important and it does facilitate the adoption of family planning amongst other things, it is also possible for women with little or no education to reduce their fertility as well, if given the opportunity.

Garenne agreed with Dyson, offering Morocco as an additional example. There, half of the population is illiterate because they are living in the mountains and are extremely isolated, while the other half is fairly educated and living at more or

less European standards, yet fertility decline has been basically the same for both groups. Fertility has declined a bit earlier and faster for the educated women, but the magnitude and speed of fertility decline among the illiterate Moroccan women has been impressive as well. The same applies to Bangladesh and many African countries. He also cautioned that we should not look at female education merely for the purpose of limiting family size; it is important in its own right.

The third major theme discussed pertained to climate change, particularly with regard to issues of North-South distributive justice and the possibility of reducing economic growth. Dyson offered extensive clarification and recommendations on this theme. To start with, carbon emissions basically result from modern economic growth. The whole basis of rising living standards is more or less entirely predicated on the use of fossil fuels; oil, coal, and natural gas. If we would take out the products based on fossil fuels from our regular modern consumption now, virtually all material products would disappear. Modern European populations do not recognize how dependent they are upon fossil fuels (plus nuclear power in the case of France), the energies of which sustain the material living standard we enjoy. Carbon emissions per person per year in the USA are over twenty tons per year. This very high level is partly because of the dispersed nature of North American society, but those emissions nonetheless have global effects. In contrast, poor countries basically do not use fossil fuels very much (per person). From this perspective, Dyson said he would like to see a rise in per capita fossil fuel use in countries like India because this is precisely what is needed if people are going to be lifted out of poverty. This point is often not recognised.

Dyson suggested that the way forward was through the proposed mechanism of contraction and convergence. In very crude terms, a level of per capita emission that can be emitted should be determined, according to the need to stabilise emissions in the future. Those countries such as India that are below the agreed global level can rise to that level, while those countries above the level must come down to that level. He emphasised that this approach essentially injects a very important moral dimension into the issue of climate change and carbon emissions.

2.2.Session Two: Population, Migration and Urbanisation

For the second lecture, Professor Nigel Harris from University College London was invited to present on the topic of Population, Migration and Urbanisation. This was because of his long standing expertise and renown in working and writing on immigration issues. In particular, Harris became known as an advocate and defender of immigration in such works as *Thinking the Unthinkable: the Immigration Myth Exposed* (2001) and through his ongoing involvement in immigration issues on various commissions and organisations.

Given the population focus of the lecture series, it was expected that Harris would ground the discussion of migration and urbanisation in an informed discussion of population dynamics, continuing along the path already cleared by Dyson and Garenne. Indeed, Dyson's own sweeping presentation on demographic transition already introduced several aspects of these topics. For example, he explained urbanisation as a process that is essentially caused by falling mortality

rather than economics. Similarly, he noted that despite much more rapid rates of population growth, levels of emigration from developing countries today are relatively far less than what Europe had experienced when it was going through its phase of rapid population growth in the 19th century. During the 1970s, emigration from Asia amounted to about 0.5 percent of the natural population increase in Asia. In Africa it amounted to 0.3 percent, and in Latin America emigration amounted to 2.5 percent of natural increase. In contrast, from 1881 to 1910, emigration from Europe amounted to about 19.5 percent of the natural population increase in Europe at that time. Indeed, this is one of the often-ignored benefits of colonialism, in the sense that Europe profited from an important migration safety valve that siphoned off much of its natural population increase at a time when its demographic transition was potentially most destabilising. Despite perceptions of mass migration from South to North today, this safety valve simply does not exist in any comparable way for contemporary developing countries. Hence, returning to Dyson's concluding point above, there is a very important moral dimension also underlying the issue of migration at the global level. Some leading demographers, such as Paul Demeny, have also pointed out the political dimensions of rapid population growth in some parts of the world versus population shrinking in other parts, as illustrated by Dyson's comparison of Nigeria and Russia.

However, Harris chose to take a very different tangent in his presentation. He focused instead on the contradiction between the immobile bounded and territorial state versus the mobile global economy, and how migration brings to light the tension between the requirements of national political control versus the requirements of economic growth and development. The central contradiction, he argued, is between politics and economics, or between the state and the market. We are now in a period of transition, in which a single global economy is undermining the state and causing a considerable conceptual crisis in terms of how the state should approach this new reality. While there has been an immense wealth of economic studies on migration over the last three decades, he contended that the politics of migration are most decisive, not the economic and social impacts.

Harris laid out three components of this argument; the control of internal migration within states, international migration, and the integration of migrants. In terms of internal migration, he argued that, historically, a central preoccupation of states had been to identify and control their populations, in order to prevent or regulate mobility and also to supply armies with soldiers. For instance, we saw very tight forms of internal population control in Tsarist Russia, in Frederick's Prussia, in Tokugawa Japan, and in the feudal systems of Europe. This aspect became more and more important with the rise of modern nation-states and the drawing of boundaries, and it was only limited by administrative capacity and other preoccupations. Modern examples include Soviet Russia and Maoist China, both of which used strict internal controls over the movement of their populations. He explained that these cases show how illegal migration was an internal phenomenon before it became an external phenomenon. In essence, the state sacrifices the formation of a national labour market based on the free mobility of people for the sake of controlling the population. It sacrifices the economics and the welfare of the population to the politics of power.

In particular, every time any form of economic development begins to take place, Harris argued that the state has a crisis in its attempts to track its population

and control them. For instance, he recalled how a number of newly independent countries in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to control their populations. This was in the heady days of planning, when it was deemed that people should be moved according to the dictates of the plan, even if by force, including brief cases in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Tanzania. Planners determined where populations ought to be in the light of the interests of the state rather than allowing people to respond to economic incentives. Two well known cases include the past apartheid system in South Africa, in which the majority of the population were classified as foreigners, and Israeli-occupied Palestine, where similar mechanisms are still in place. He also spent some time describing the system of *hukou* (household registration) in China, started by Mao from the 1950s onwards and continued in post-Mao China after 1978 up to the present. He argued that the central concern of all these mechanisms is control.

Harris suggested that migration is possibly the biggest single factor in the world for redistributing income from rich areas to poor areas. The cost of political control over migration can be seen as a reduction of such redistribution. Hence, immigration control in Europe and the United States sustains the poverty of developing countries. Conversely, if we would allow free movements of people, we could raise the income of developing countries far more rapidly than any other programme. Despite this immense potential for radical world poverty reduction, immigration debates in Europe and North America are not about the economics, but about political sovereignty. Harris contended that this constitutes an existential crisis for the state.

In terms of international migration, Harris argued that economic globalisation has already produced an immense increase in the mobility of capital and, to a lesser extent, labour. While various governments, such as in the UK or the Netherlands, have attempted to prevent immigration, the other side of the coin is the emigration of businesses to places where cheaper labour is located. These two go together; governments have to make a choice between allowing immigration and allowing businesses to go elsewhere. In the first case, the movement of labour has been happening throughout the history of capitalism, first through slavery, then indentured workers, and then through the free migration of Europeans. He cited a UN estimate that perhaps 150 million people immigrated between 1970 and 2000, although he thought that this was a wild underestimate given that it is based on the number of people living outside their country of birth.

The process today is exaggerated in the developed countries given the potential end of what Harris called national self-sufficiency in labour due to low fertility; no developed country now produces an adequate labour force to run its own economy. This point becomes particularly poignant as governments aim to increase the skill-intensity of their workforces. Developed countries have faced this goal by increasingly importing skills. The US census in 2000 showed that 47 percent of scientists and engineers with PhDs were foreign-born. In other words, a larger and larger component of the skilled labour force in the United States is immigrant. Hence, the whole drive to become a skill-intensive economy exaggerates this dependence on imported labour. It also has effects on developing countries, causing them to specialise in the supply of such skilled labour. For instance, the Philippines government had a deliberate policy of overproducing nurses and merchant seamen in order to supply the rest of the world with these skilled workers. Similarly, India is

aiming to capture world engineering. This movement of highly skilled people from the developing to the developed countries simultaneously prevents developing countries from being able to emulate the developed, although outsourcing to developing countries compensates for this. Harris thought that governments' responses to the financial crisis were major reaffirmations of the priority of national political power against these compensating aspects of the mobile economy. He did not think that such protectionism could win.

On the subject of integration, Harris reflected that the trouble with the migration debate is that it is still being framed in terms of people having places of belonging and migration being a disturbance to this belonging. He claimed that the debate on integration arises because all migrants are treated as actual or potential settlers rather than as circulating workers. He then framed this in terms of economic globalisation and asked; why does it matter where people belong to? Governments, he claimed, are resisting the fact that economics is washing away nationality, although they are also making all sorts of adjustments to this reality, particularly with regard to satisfying their need for circulating skilled workers. In this sense, the integration debate is not about people responding to work opportunities and circulating, but about joining the club of the 'nation', which is supposed to be a privilege. Hence, it becomes a political question rather than an economic question about labour requirements. However, a problem arises when we realise that nations are formed in an arbitrary manner and people become members of nations often by accident. Using nationality as a criterion to define membership to a 'nation' then becomes difficult, he argued, similar to defining national values, which becomes an exercise in vanity and prejudice.

Although Harris presented a provoking argument, it could have benefited from more factual substantiation, given that the point of the lecture series was to refocus attention towards a scientifically-informed debate about the *population* dimensions of these issues, particularly with respect to family planning and sexual and reproductive health and rights. Unfortunately, this dimension was absent in Harris' presentation, although the subsequent debate with the audience made up for some of the slack.

Dr Mahmood Messkoub, the discussant, first reviewed Harris' overall argument, highlighting that migration had always been an important part of both nation building and labour supply to rapidly growing urban areas and industries in 19th century Britain and Europe. However, migrants have always been looked upon with apprehension; their labour is wanted but not them. He argued that, despite this separation between labour and labourer, in reality, labour is embedded in people, and these people migrate and they have cultural heritage.

Messkoub then brought the focus back to the demographics by discussing population ageing in richer developed countries. Migration, he noted, is a very important response to this. Migrants provide care for the elderly and for other parts of the labour-intensive care sector. If they are legal, they pay taxes. Even if they are not legal, they contribute to higher business profits. This is also the case in richer developing countries, such as rich oil exporting countries, where a lot of the care and construction work is done by immigrants from poor developing countries. Many migrants work in the 3D sectors; dirty, dangerous and/or demanding, but they are

demanded for many other trades as well, from carpentry to information technology. Hence, the rich countries gain from a lot of brain gain, and developing countries lose from brain drain. Even if we talk about unskilled immigrants, poor countries are still deprived of the labour, especially considering that the age of most migrants is concentrated in the most economically-active cohort, i.e. 25-40 years old.

Having said that, Messkoub agreed with Harris' point that remittances provide considerable compensation and many countries are taking advantage of immigration in order to cultivate remittances, as in the case of Philippines. Studies have shown that 10 to 15 percent of brain drain can be managed internally in developing countries, partly through reorganizing the labour force and partly through ongoing capacity training. Obviously, countries like India have more capacity to adjust in this respect than countries like Ghana, but the possibility still exists, he argued. Nonetheless, brain drain amounts to a form of effective subsidy to rich countries given that the costs of educating and training the émigré are borne by the poor country. Messkoub suggested that there should be some international transfer of resources from receiving countries to sending countries in order to compensate for such deskilling.

Following this last point, Messkoub commented on the difference between immigration control and immigration management. He argued that, in fact, the EU does not have a migration policy, although it definitely has migration control because each country retains the prerogative to decide who to accept and who to refuse. As a result, the EU has a problem as a unit because it has freedom of capital and goods, although freedom of labour is more problematic. Even with the removal of borders, population control takes place through the institutionalized channels of education, health, employment, etc. The Italian government is now proposing to fine people who rent rooms to illegal migrants, bringing the imposition of control from borders into peoples' daily lives. Similarly, the Netherlands has ID cards, which are used to control migrants.

The creation of the EU, Messkoub suggested, has not solved this balance between management and control. Indeed, he argued that there is a tendency to criminalise migrants. In most countries, migration is seen as a matter of the ministry of justice or interior, rather than as a labour market issue. In this regard, he concluded that it is important to distinguish between the short-term and long-term sides of migration policy making. In the short term, legalization and regulation of status is important, along with access to welfare and education. These are basic human rights and you cannot deny them, especially to the children of migrants. In the medium and long term, issues of family reunion, political rights, social security rights, and linking immigration to labour market needs should be on the agenda.

In what turned out to be the most contentious of the six sessions, the two presentations stirred considerable debate from the audience. Part of the contention came from the fact that Harris had simply not addressed urbanisation, one of the topics of the session. To this he answered that he was talking about the dynamic change in the use of territories, which is what urbanization is, i.e. the sudden emergence of high productivity areas, pulling in labour from all over the place, which starts within countries. Labour is moving around because of the instable and dynamic character of territorial economy. Interestingly, in this response, Harris chose to ignore a well-established body of thought regarding urbanisation among

prominent demographers such as Jan De Vries and Samuel Preston, which attributes urbanisation primarily to falling mortality rather than economic factors. Indeed, this helps to understand why many poor countries have continued to experience rapid urban growth and urbanisation even in the midst of urban economic crisis, such as during the debt crisis in the 1980s in Latin America and Africa. For similar reasons, it would also help to explain international migration, albeit the precise direction of international flows is obviously guided by the enormous disparities between remuneration in poor and rich countries.

Harris was also further queried on his position regarding what the optimal policy of regulating immigration to the EU should be, including one such question from the chair of the session, Professor Ashwani Saith. Harris responded by returning to his argument that the whole discussion is dominated by the interests of states, not of people. He suggested that people are capable of enormous flexibility, but states are not. Hence, the existential crisis of the state is a crisis of political power rather than of populations. He explained that he has doubts about the scheme of compensating developing countries because it suggests that states own their populations and can therefore be compensated for them; we would be moving towards a kind of slavery with that system. He did not think it could be achieved politically in any case, nor is it ethically or morally right. Instead, peoples' right to move should be defended. Because many refugees are desperate to go home, protecting their rights to move would also allow them to do so, whereas the current system discourages them from doing so. Regarding ideal policy, he argued that it is important to recognise the overwhelming and growing dependence on foreign labour in places like the UK, and how states protect the native born population. When the native born have bad jobs, this is addressed in terms of inequality, not in terms of belonging, even though many native-born also do not feel that they belong anywhere. Thus, he would like the UK to move towards a much more flexible system in which employers could recruit directly. There are schemes emerging, but they are enormously unwieldy, bureaucratic and slow, and the unwieldiness of the bureaucratic machine makes it impossible to fill the changing labour market demands. This is why he thought we must move towards an idea of circulating labour rather than immigration. People will go home if they have the right to come back again.

While many aspects of Harris' argument are appealing, we must nonetheless query whether the ability of people to be flexible is not itself supported by many state functions, in which case, removing state regulation might undermine the very sustenance of the economic system. This idea was beyond the dichotomies that Harris relied on to make his argument which, ironically, was quite neoliberal in undertone given that it relied on a liberal rhetoric in order to justify a strong anti-statist attitude. Similar to family planning, while we might decry the abuses, inequities and discrimination embodied in current immigration policies, this does not mean that we should throw out the baby with the bath water and abandon regulation all together, for regulation is the primary mechanism by which states can effect progressive as well as regressive social change. However, Harris' dismissive attitude towards states was equally dismissive of the enormous contribution that state-directed redistributive policies have made to the welfare of their populations, particularly since the emergence of welfare states in the 20th century, particularly in education and health. Indeed, Harris' recognition of the huge leaps that many poor

countries have taken in the realm of education, thereby enabling them to supply highly-skilled labour to rich countries, contradicts the logic of his anti-statist posturing given that much of these achievements have been heavily subsidised by states, particularly at tertiary levels of education. Similarly, his dismissal of compensation through a seductive liberal logic overlooks the fact that the idea of compensation is simply yet another attempt to justify some form of redistribution at the global level.

Messkoub and Saith both returned to this issue of compensation. Messkoub reiterated that it comes down to a question of compensating for the public resources used to educate and train migrants before they leave, which the government does not necessarily recover. Hence, there is definitely a rationale for compensation, just like taxation within a national system. Saith added that there are many things states do for their people which should not be underestimated. Moreover, in places like India, it is often the case that the general population subsidises the university education of the elite, who are the ones involved in high skilled migration. Saith argued that it is normal that the rest of the people would expect something in return.

Much of the contention was related to confusion between immigration and integration issues. The most interesting intervention on this point came from Dr Rachel Kurian, a senior lecturer in international labour economics at ISS. She noted that the concept of the 'migrant', as it is conceived in Europe, the UK, or the US, is often used to describe people who are not necessarily first generation migrants at all, but who are the second or third generations of earlier migrants, and thus no longer migrants given that they have been born and raised in these countries. At which generation will we stop calling them migrants? Kurian argued that this is a fundamental problem with the integration debate because it is not about migration; it is about citizenship concerns.

Kurian and others also took issue with several other ideas presented by the speakers. Regarding circulatory migration, Kurian fully disagreed with the ideas presented given that these could be used to justify reducing the security and protection of migrant workers. She noted that all anthropological work on this issue shows that circulatory migrant workers, particularly low skilled workers, prefer stability and want the same security that is provided to non-migrant workers. Similarly, with regard to the caricature that states are blocking the migration of high-skill workers, she pointed out that the World Trade Organisation actually privileges the migration of skilled workers between (multinational) firms. Thanh-Dam Truong, an associate professor of Women, Gender and Development at ISS, supported this point, noting that states have been very clearly aligning their administration of migration in function of the vision of the WTO since the 1990s. In this light, states have been very capable and she doubted whether there has been any existential crisis of the state.

The debate on these issues ended in a stalemate. Messkoub explained that his conception of circulatory migration is simply that migrants should have the right to return home without losing their ability to come back again. He said that such systems operate in the US with Mexican migrants (although it was unclear how he perceived these to be non-discriminatory, non-segregationist and/or solving issues of labour protection). Harris withdrew from his ethical position on the issue of compensation in higher education, although he nonetheless questioned whether such a system would be politically possible. He also agreed that problems of integration

are not necessarily migration problems, although he stuck to his thesis on the existential crisis of the state.

2.3.Session Three: Population and Generation

The third session returned solidly back into the field of population studies. The main lecture was by John Cleland, one of the foremost international scholars in the field of population studies with longstanding research interests concerning fertility, family planning and child health in developing countries. The theme of his session was on generation, including issues of ageing in rich countries and the youth-population bulge in poor countries.

The first part of his presentation involved a revision of population trends over the last 60 years, more or less along the lines presented by Dyson in the first session. He further clarified that, in the context of the current demographic transition, the biggest component of future population growth is population momentum, which is the effect of age structure on birth rates. In other words, when there are a lot of people in a population between the ages of 20 and 40 years old, the birth rate tends to be elevated even if these people have small families because there are, in effect, many people having babies as a share of the total population. That keeps population growth going even in the face of fertility decline. The two other causes of future population growth are unwanted fertility (i.e. children that mothers declared they did not really want) and the continued desire of families to have more than two children (on average) in some world regions (Africa and South Asia in particular). Anything above two children tends to lead to population growth in the future. The mandate of family planning programmes, he clarified, is to address these second and third causes of population growth.

Cleland discussed the huge importance of age structure on human development, using the Republic of Korea as his example to sketch out three broad scenarios in the world today. In 1960, mortality had declined steeply in Korea, but average fertility was still above 6 births per woman, resulting in a rapidly growing population structure, similar to Africa today; 45 percent of Korea's population in 1960 was under 15 years old and only a tiny fraction were 65 and older. From 1960 onwards, a steady fertility decline ensued, falling to well below replacement at about 1.5 births per women by 2000. By this time, the working age population of Korea was at a maximum relative to the total population, which is known as the 'demographic dividend (or bonus)'. This is considered very favourable for economic development because you have an exceptionally high ratio of potential workers to dependent young and old. In other words, between 1960 and 2000, the number of workers per dependents doubled in Korea. However, this situation will not last. By 2040, the swollen mid-range of the population will have aged and the ratio of workers to dependents will return to the level it was at in 1960, except this time older people will be much more numerous than young people, with 20-30 percent of the population aged 65 and older. Cleland emphasised that this is the destination of humanity; there is no escape.

Europe is already at the point where Korea will be in 2040. As it stands now, fertility in Europe is at roughly 1.5 births per women, ranging from two in France to a little over one in Russia and the Mediterranean countries. Under such conditions,

the proportion of people aged over 65 and over 80 is bound to increase in Europe for the next 45 years. Inversely, the number of people aged 15-64 compared to the number of elderly is going to diminish, from eight-to-one in 1950 to two-to-one. If these fertility rates do not change, the population pyramid will become inverted, with each younger age group getting smaller in size than the last. At the current rate, the European population will halve every 65 years if not sustained by immigration. This is a prospect that delights environmentalists but horrifies economists and politicians, given that the ever-decreasing labour force that will have to support a giant number of old people. It also alarms politicians because Europe's role in world affairs is almost bound to diminish if it does halve in size every 65 years.

The immigration implications are useful to put into perspective. It is thought, Cleland explained, that immigration to Europe was about a million a year in the late 1990s. This number would need to double in order to keep the population from declining. The number of migrants would need to triple in order to keep the population aged 15-64 constant in size. The number of immigrants per year would need to quadruple in order to keep the ratio of people aged 15-64 to those aged over 65 above three-to-one. It is obvious, he argued, that immigration has a positive role to play in Europe's development, although even at a large scale, it would not be able to make a serious impact on population ageing. In other words, Europe has to seriously adapt to the greying of its population. To do this, Cleland suggested that we need to reform pension systems; we need to increase labour force participation; and, above all, we need to raise the retirement age. Countries with very low fertility should also try to raise fertility by making childbearing and parenthood more compatible with work. He pointed out that the countries in Europe with the highest rates of female labour force participation also have the highest fertility. He suggested that crisis could be averted if fertility edges up towards replacement levels.

The group of countries that are similar to Korea now basically includes most of Asia and Latin America, where fertility has generally declined from six to three. This gives rise to an age structure that looks like Korea. The priority in these countries is to increase employment, which can lead to economic strength given the very favourable age structure for rapid social and economic development. On the other hand, Cleland argued that the demographic bonus could turn sour if other conditions are not fulfilled. For instance, if employment perspectives are poor, the youth bulge (i.e. the growing population aged 15-24) could lead to a situation prone to civil unrest and extremism. The other priority for Asia and Latin America is to reduce the very large differences in child bearing between rich and poor, particularly that the large fertility differentials tend to entrench income inequalities.

The group of countries with high rates of population growth and fertility, like Korea in 1960, are mostly in Africa. Cleland explained that these characteristics are disadvantageous for economic and social development. Half the population in this sort of structure is under the age of fifteen, which is unfavourable for increasing human capital and for generating the savings to invest in increasing physical capital per worker. Instead, huge resources have to be devoted merely to educating, feeding, clothing and housing this massive section of the population that consumes more than it produces. For instance, it is challenging for governments when the school-aged population is doubling every 25 years, which is currently the case in Africa. The problem, he suggested, is not that Africa is overpopulated but that it is more difficult

to accumulate the human and physical capital necessary to escape from poverty with a population growth rate of 2 to 3 percent per year.

However, painting Africa with the same brush is a mistake, Cleland noted, given that regional fertility trends in Africa are very diverse. For instance, South Africa and Zimbabwe already have very low fertility. East Africa, West Africa and Central Africa are very different. Fertility decline had tentatively begun in these regions in the 1980s but seems to have petered out in some countries and slowed down in many others. Like Dyson and Garenne, Cleland attributed this to very low levels of contraception use. Moreover, desired family size remains much higher in these regions, typically in the range of four, five, or possibly six children. This is a quite different reproductive culture from Asia or Latin America fifty years ago, where desired family sizes were in the range of two, three or possibly four. In other words, we are dealing with a pro-natalist part of the world where, for whatever reason, the value attached to children is much greater than elsewhere.

This situation is hostile to development, which he demonstrated through the example of Niger, a Sahelian country that has lost half of its arable land to the Sahara Desert and has recently suffered from famine and food shortage. The indicators for Niger were as follows: the population in 2009 was about 16 million people; its total fertility rate was eight births per woman; and the percentage of couples using modern contraception was four percent. If these traits continue, the population will reach 80 million by 2050, bigger than any European country. Even if fertility declines to 3.6, as the UN expects, the population will still reach 50 million by 2050. Cleland suggested that the consequences are very predictable. Niger will continue to be unable to feed its population and to depend on food aid; its fragile ecosystem will be depleted by cropping and overgrazing; and the population will continue to experience mass poverty and mass underemployment. He suggested that Niger is a severe case, although it is not totally exceptional. Cleland admitted that he might be shouting catastrophe and discounting human ingenuity over the next few decades. But he also questioned what the alternatives might be. Does Niger have uranium? Could it mass migrate to neighbouring countries? Could it survive on remittances? He remained convinced that the future of Niger will be a disaster unless it achieves a much sharper fertility reduction.

On a more positive note, Cleland discussed Kenya in Africa as an example of how a population can be galvanized and mobilized to achieve huge reproductive changes in a short period of time given the political will. In the late 1970s, a fertility survey done in Kenya showed very high desired family size (7.7). Nobody was using contraception and the average fertility rate was 8 births per women. The government then began a mobilisation campaign and a vast expansion of family planning services, including social marketing of condoms and pills and the introduction of family planning in every health centre, hospital and community. The country achieved a reproductive miracle: the desired family size dropped dramatically; the percentage using contraception rose steeply from 7 percent in 1978 to 33 percent in 1993; and the fertility rate dropped from 8 to 5.4 births per woman. Unfortunately, the success soured in Kenya when money, energy and will, and vehicles and staff, were diverted from family planning to HIV. As a result, fertility decline stagnated at just above 5 births per woman. Indeed, the UN had to shift their 2050 population prediction for Kenya from 44 to 83 million as a result.

In conclusion, Cleland set out the case for renewed investment in family planning. He argued that there need not be a clash between reproductive rights and demographic or economic imperatives because the countries where demography causes severe problems are also the countries where the self-declared need for contraception tends to be greatest. He suggested that economic and social development and demography should set the priority for population stabilization, which needs to become a priority for Africa again, whereas human rights should be important in determining how to actually implement policies to reach population stabilization. Rights have a role to play, although they are not a satisfactory way of establishing priorities. We have just lost the plot, he contended, by delinking family planning from development, after which funding simply fell away given that ministries of finance and the World Bank are not interested in reproductive rights; they are interested in poverty and hunger alleviation. Unless we make that link again, investment in family planning will continue to decline and African governments will be given no encouragement to do anything about it.

Following this impassioned appeal for family planning, Professor Joris Voorhoeve led the discussion with some reflections on Cleland's lecture. In particular, he placed emphasis on the role of increasing female autonomy and also on the crucial importance of contraception in reducing fertility, which he thought should be advocated at the highest level in international organizations and in Dutch development cooperation. He drew a conclusion from Cleland's lecture that it would be wise for the EU to allow Turkey to join the Union given the severe labour shortages that the region will face. He also spent some time discussing Cleland's suggestion for a flexible retirement policy and the need to adjust to lower energy consumption per capita.

The issues raised in the subsequent discussion with the audience centred on the question of how to reinvigorate a family planning agenda, on Cleland's suggestions for adaptation and immigration in Europe, or else on various aspects of his somewhat Malthusian outlook for Africa. On the first point, the director of WPF asked about research on the cost effectiveness of family planning. Cleland answered that such research has been done by the Futures Group. This looked at how much it would save to meet the unmet need for contraception based on savings from the reduced number of unwanted children in terms of costs of immunization, obstetric services, clean water, impregnated bed nets, reduced primary education cost, etc. The benefit-cost ratio for 17 African countries was 3 or 4 to 1, i.e. if you spend 1000 dollars to meet the unmet need of family planning, you save 3000 to 4000 dollars on the cost of meeting other MDG indicators. Cleland thought it was pretty good research. However, in replying to another question from a participant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cleland also recognised that foreigners cannot do much to change attitudes in Africa; this is a matter of political will and requires that political leaders are on board. For instance, he would like to see Yuweri Museveni, the President of Uganda, replaced by a 'saner' president who takes seriously the trebling of the Ugandan population from 35 million today to about 120 million by 2050, as is currently projected for Uganda. Notably, Uganda has one of the highest levels of unmet need in Africa, which means that the population could also respond very quickly to some serious policy interventions.

Several ISS staff also added additional perspective to these issues in the discussion period. Messkoub (the discussant of the previous session) emphasised the importance of social policy, particularly universal social policy, in bringing about these changes given their central role in supporting mortality reduction, among other considerations. Loes Keysers, Lecturer in Women and Development Studies at ISS, clarified that the main shift that happened in the preparation for the Cairo conference with regard to development was that we no longer talked about population being a problem but about people having a problem. She suggested that Cleland's lecture was dominated by an older technical or social engineering perspective on fertility, based on making contraception available for the huge unmet need. Cleland replied that he supported the marriage between rights and development, but felt that rights cannot set the agenda. He also added that it is important not to assume that all family planning programmes in the 1970s and 1980s were coercive. The idea, he argued, that old-fashioned family planning or population stabilization programmes were by their very nature coercive is travesty of history.

Regarding the questions and comments on mortality decline and its relation to fertility, Cleland answered that this is very complex and he did not think many people understand it. Fertility is reduced in a wide range of mortality situations. There is no mechanical relationship between mortality decline and fertility decline, although in the long run it is true that once mortality declines, fertility will eventually decline as well because the alternative is endless growth. However, in the short term, people generally do not have a good idea of what is happening to mortality. This is one reason why there is not an automatic response between falling mortality and fertility. The link is so varied and contingent in the short term because it depends on other factors. Policies and education can make a huge difference in reducing that gap between mortality decline and fertility response. He agreed that obvious health and other considerations are also important, but the problem is that family planning has almost dropped out of the picture in comparison to these other concerns. Family planning should be a priority of human development and, in any case, he could not think of any country that has pressed ahead with family planning while ignoring other dimensions of human welfare. The two have usually gone together.

2.4. Session Four: Population and Gender

The 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo was already brought to attention and contention in the lecture of Cleland. It was subsequently brought centre stage in the session on population and gender led by Mari Simonen. She reminded us that it has been the fifteenth year of implementation since the Cairo conference, which produced a 20-year action plan. Thus, it is high time we revisit and evaluate the vision that was formulated in Cairo, as well as what has been since achieved and what still needs to be done, particularly in light of all of the other overlapping crises happening today.

Simonen argued that we still need a strengthened commitment to the implementation of the Cairo Programme of Action, i.e. of women's health and rights. This is not an issue of charity; it is a very central responsibility in terms of ensuring a better future for everybody. Her logic was that the struggle for women's rights and

gender equality is at the heart of the struggle for human rights in general and for global progress in all aspects of our societies.

Revisiting Cairo, she recalled that 179 countries were involved in Cairo and that the participation of women and women's groups was very important in the preparations and also in the conference outcome itself. This was based on several understandings. First, the biological and social roles that are imposed on women have a big impact on population trends and dynamics, including fertility levels and migration. Moreover, women's reproductive roles are too often emphasized over their productive roles in society, even though their reproductive roles are not always given the value and support that is needed. Therefore, women are not supported in making choices and in being able to control their own destinies. They are not even supported in their caregiver roles. It was also understood that the low status of women contributes to high mortality for women and children and to the spread of HIV. Given these understandings, gender equality and women's empowerment were placed at the center of the international agenda for population and development for the first time at the Cairo Conference.

This constituted a radical shift in thinking. Simonen explained that it was a policy shift away from a demographic approach of thinking in terms of numbers, to a more balanced approach of thinking in terms of human beings, individuals, and human rights. Issues that were considered private were put into the public domain for the first time. In particular, the fourth principle of the Cairo Programme addressed gender equality and the empowerment of women, and then went further by placing emphasis on concrete actions, policies, programmes and laws. Four areas include: the elimination of discrimination and violence against women; improving women's access to secure livelihoods and economic resources; the removal of impediments to women's participation in public life; and the balancing of responsibilities in work and family.

As a result, the Cairo Programme is a very comprehensive and forward-looking agenda. The fact that the leaders who were gathered were able to agree on these issues for the first time bears testimony to this revolutionary moment. Moreover, they were able to agree despite the fact that the 179 countries represented all regions, all countries, all kinds of cultures, all religions, and all beliefs. The conference was not without controversy, but Simonen pointed out that these leaders did manage to come together and agree nonetheless, and it is an international consensus. Luckily, these objectives and targets were reinforced and reaffirmed in other conferences, such as the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing the year after, and they have been incorporated into the Millennium Development Goals.

The agreed meaning of reproductive health was; a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing in all matters that relate to the reproductive system and to its functioning and processes. Simonen explained that this was visionary because health was conceived not only in physical terms but also in terms of mental and social wellbeing. It implies that people should be able to have a satisfying and safe sex life and that they should have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so, as a very basic principle of human rights, free of violence, coercion and discrimination. Therefore, reproductive health includes the right of men and women to have access to methods of family planning of their choice, and other methods of fertility regulation, so long as these are not against the law. Reproductive health also includes the right of access to appropriate health care

that enables women to have a safe pregnancy and child birth, and that enables couples and individuals to have a healthy infant. Moreover, it includes sexual health, not only with respect to sexually transmitted infections, but also with respect to enhancing life and personal relations.

Despite this progress, Simonen highlighted three issues that require our attention today. These are: girls' education; sexual and reproductive health; and gender based violence. Regarding the first, there has been progress in getting girls into educational programmes. Worldwide, more children are in primary school than ever before, including girls. For example, in developing countries as a whole, the number of girls enrolled for every 100 boys rose from 91 in 1999 to 95 in 2007. However, the ratio also varies very much by country, especially at the secondary level. In Chad, less than four girls attended high school for every 10 boys in 2005, with little progress since 1990. On the other hand, girls in Bangladesh actually have gained equality with boys at the high school level during the past fifteen years. She noted that such education is a good thing in itself and it also has a beneficial impact on many other factors that determine the lives of people and especially girls, such as lower risk of death and disease, fewer and healthier children, and better income and wages. She warned that our challenge now, in the face of economic troubles, is to make sure that the progress is not taken for granted and that we continue to make the case for investing in education and education of girls.

In terms of access to sexual and reproductive health, Simonen said that we can also see progress. For example, today there are more births that are attended by skilled health personnel. In East Asia, nearly every birth is now assisted by skilled health workers and substantial improvements have been registered in Latin America and North Africa. In the area of family planning we also see that more women and couples are choosing to actually plan their families, including spacing and determining the number of children they are having. More women and men are using modern contraception and birth rates have declined in all regions. Maternal health outcomes have improved, particularly with regard to ending obstetric fistula, a preventable and/or treatable childbirth injury.

However, she also cautioned that every year more than half a million women continue to die during pregnancy and/or childbirth from problems that are largely preventable. Maternal mortality, she claimed, remains the largest health inequity in the world and it is the Millennium Development Goal that is lagging the furthest behind. Of all the health indicators, maternal mortality displays the biggest gaps between rich and poor both within countries and between countries. The risk of a woman dying as a result of pregnancy and child birth in the Netherlands is one in 10,000, a very rare event. In Niger, it is one in seven. Yet despite being a huge issue, it is not given the attention it requires, albeit the Dutch government has taken a very important initiative on this front.

In particular, Simonen noted three interventions that we know work for better maternal health. First, voluntary family planning enables those who do not want to fall pregnant to delay or avoid pregnancy. Second is the provision of skilled care during delivery for those who are pregnant, which in most places involves midwives, as in the Netherlands. Third is the availability of transportation to emergency care for those who actually experience a complication during delivery. In sum, it is estimated that ensuring access to family planning could reduce maternal death by 25 to 40 percent and child death by as much as 20 percent. It is very

important to recall that making family planning available is not just about choice but also about avoiding deaths.

Regarding the use of modern contraception, the percentage of women worldwide using contraception rose from 47 percent to 56 percent over the last 15 years, although Simonen noted that this again varies greatly across regions. The use is highest in Asia, followed by Latin America, the Caribbean, South Asia and then Sub-Saharan Africa. Her elaboration on this point was more or less a reiteration of similar points made by Cleland in the previous lecture, particularly with regard to unmet need. She cautioned that, despite the progress, there remains a high level of unmet need for family planning, which is exacerbated by the reduction in funding for family planning, both in amount and as a percentage of the total population funding. Much of the funding has been diverted to HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections. While funding for HIV is a good thing, she cautioned that it should not be increased at the cost of family planning funding.

On the third issue of ending gender based violence and harmful practices, she argued that it is essential to work in partnership with as many groups as possible. The good news is that today there is a rising tide of public opinion in all countries against violence directed towards women, which is often supported by laws. There is also some progress in abandoning the practice of female genital mutilation, based on partnerships of reaching out to different kinds of people in communities and working with men, particularly male leaders. At UNFPA, they have found that understanding cultural realities often reveals very good ways to change harmful practices and to advance human rights.

Women activists, Simonen concluded, cannot do all of this work alone. They need to reach out. It is not a matter of women, but a matter of societies, including men and women, and together we are stronger. She suggested some ways of moving the agenda forward through fast and concrete action, and by looking at the many innovative activities that are being done everywhere and bringing them together on a larger scale to reach more people. This includes reaching out to NGOs, civil society groups and particularly young people, who have lots of good ideas. Funding is also needed, both from community budgets and international development assistance. She ended by stressing that each one of us can do something to advance the vision of Cairo by collecting and sharing information and challenging pessimism, which she argued is a very easy way of not doing anything. Instead, we can be a generation and a movement that help to finally put an end to violence and discrimination against girls and women.

The discussant, Wendy Harcourt, agreed with much of Simonen's talk, although she also offered some very interesting critical reflections on the Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHRs) agenda, as referred to in the introduction of this report. Much of this was based on her recent book; *Body Politics in Development*, which itself is based on 20 years of dialogue with organizations like UNFPA. She clarified that she is very positive about the achievements of the Cairo conference and particularly the role of UNFPA. However, in her role as discussant, she raised some issues that she sees as problematic and challenging. These related to questions of what the progress really represents, who is counting the progress, and where are we going to stand in this context.

In this respect, Harcourt maintained that her views on the successes of Cairo were somewhat different from Simonen's, particularly with respect to the MDGs. She clarified that she was at Cairo on the other side of the fence as one of the advocates. The event, she reflected, mobilized many thousands of women's health and rights movements. It was a very fascinating political process that was not just about 179 government representatives, but also about advocacy and about negotiations that went into the night. Even within the women's movement, there were differences between different countries and different regions. There were very different types of women groups, as well as very different types of bureaucrats. There was no mutual context of women advocacy groups, and yet all of these differences had to be worked out and the various groups had to work together. Harcourt absolutely agreed with Simonen that the process really set the agenda for population and development policy. It did bring in women's rights, it did bring in gender equality, and it certainly brought in once-very taboo topics of sexuality and sexual health, or the moving of private to public as Simonen called it. For Harcourt, this sense that women had a lot more autonomy and empowerment, and were really trying to talk about cultural difference, was the huge successes of Cairo.

Harcourt's disappointments, however, included issues that were both on and off the agenda. To start with, the Cairo Programme was not a legally binding convention. Thus, follow-up was particularly problematic, especially with regard to funding. In other words, there was a problem of pushing a democratic human rights framework without discussing the economic framework of the agreement. This problem becomes particularly acute now, in the face of economic crisis.

Another hitch, according to Harcourt, was about how to make change happen on the ground. How do we get the medical establishment talking about the choices of women? How do we bring about self-esteem and knowledge? How do you talk about your own body? How do you talk about choice within different cultures? What are the types of appropriate technologies that allow women at different life stages to talk about those choices? These are very big issues which she thought the whole agenda still needs to deal with and they take a lot of time; fifteen years is a very short time when you are talking about these types of social changes. The issues are extremely complex, difficult issues and unfortunately there will not be one blueprint, as was argued in Cairo, which is going to help everybody.

Broaching more controversial topics, Harcourt argued that a more fundamental problem with Cairo is that there are important systemic inequalities in health systems which Cairo could not help to deal with. The global economic order is not concurrent with the Cairo agenda, she contended, particularly in terms of market-oriented approaches within health systems or other economic issues. Moreover, the priorities of Cairo were not the priorities of the overall neoliberal development agenda, which helps to explain why there was less funding for family planning and reproductive health, while funding for HIV/AIDS went up. Several prominent people wrote about this, such as Rosalind Petchesky, a well-known sexual rights and reproductive health activist, or Mohan Rao, a doctor in India.

Again moving to even more controversial horizons, Harcourt shifted her gaze onto the diversion of the Cairo agenda into the MDG agenda. While she totally agreed that maternal, infant and child mortality are crucial issues, she was concerned that the way these issues were put up front in the MDG agenda lost the feminist lens of the sexual and reproductive rights agenda. It shifted away from sexual and

reproductive rights and towards ensuring women's wellbeing and health. This was political as much as anything else, she argued, and it was a very sad shift. Cairo was a negotiated document while the MDGs were far less so. Indeed, reproductive health was added to the eight MDG indicators almost as an afterthought. Hence, the way that the MDGs have taken up population and gender issues has moved towards a much more technical and medical approach, while neglecting political issues, the need for systemic change, or the understanding that health systems are not just about delivery but about core social institutions at the heart of equity, social exclusion, and gender biases.

From this perspective, she suggested that the essential problem with the Cairo agenda was that it put sexual and reproductive health and rights on the agenda, but at a difficult time when neoliberal economic discourses did not allow for some of the more systemic issues to be taken up in any substantive way. At the same time, the very big focus on women-centered issues actually deflected attention away from the political context in which Cairo was taking place. This is one of the reasons Cairo has not worked, she suggested, because there is a central dilemma at the heart of it. This needs to be reopened and discussed now, particularly given the current financial and economic crisis, and of course the environmental and care crises as well.

Harcourt concluded her talk by reflecting on the shift of funding priorities towards HIV/AIDS, which has become very much accepted. However, this focus on HIV does not refer to males' sexual and reproductive responsibility for children, only to males' sexual pleasure. It is almost the opposite of Cairo, which had talked about women's reproductive responsibility, not women's sexual pleasure. There are many cultural reasons for this, but it is nonetheless interesting how the discussion of danger and pleasure with regard to HIV could occur because it was about male pleasure. Yet, at the same time, reproductive health and rights are not just women's issues; in many cultures it is the men who decide. Indeed, it is quite ironic, she pointed out, that the reproductive health and population lobby fail to talk about men's responsibility for fathering children and yet they are seen as the providers of the children, often legally 'owning' the children.

In this light, one challenge is to try to reconstruct parenthood so that women have rights over their own children, which in many contexts is not possible. Harcourt suggested that it is really important that we stop seeing reproductive rights as simply concerning female bodies and women's rights only. She argued that men need to take up their responsibilities. The other challenge is also to talk about women's own pleasure. Indeed, there is little discussion in the HIV discourse about women's own pleasure and there is little discussion in the population discourse about sexual rights, as opposed to reproductive rights. Harcourt was concerned with the discussion of unmet needs because she wondered what sort of unmet needs we are talking about; unmet needs for contraception or unmet needs for women to enjoy their own bodies and their own pleasure. She thought that these points have been missed in the debate over HIV/AIDS versus reproductive health and rights.

Following Harcourt's lead, the subsequent discussion opened the contention even further. Several people referred back to the previous lectures, particularly the sense of urgency expressed by both Dyson and Cleland about the need for population control and whether this had been lost in the SRHRs agenda. Some questioned the relevance of Cairo now, 15 years later, particularly given the lack of

financial commitment, as noted by Harcourt. Others raised the issue of fundamentalist religious groups, whether Christian or Islamic, how they should be approached from a sexual and reproductive health and rights perspective, and whether cultural sensitivity should be applied.

Simonen replied to the first volley of such questions by reiterating that a lot has been done since Cairo and that there is political commitment. However, as pointed out by Harcourt, these things also take time, particularly when there are so many other competing issues and crises in the world. The agenda is still relevant, she asserted, and we are doing things but we need to do more to complete it. We can do more by generating more support for implementation. In reply to a question on funding priorities, she suggested that HIV advocacy has been much more successful in setting agendas because it is an immediate life and death issue that touches men and women much more clearly, and it has been supported by urgent political mobilization. Regarding the debate between the so-called 'population controllers' and the so-called 'freedom and choice, human rights based approach,' she argued that these should not be seen as opposites, nor can we afford to be divided. The goal is the same; improved lives for individuals, families and nations. The means are largely agreed upon as well, in the sense that people need to be able to do family planning themselves, rather than being dictated through coercive means, which is actually counterproductive. Ultimately, she agreed that we want to reduce the size of the population, but we want to do it in such a way that enables every person to exercise their rights.

In contrast, Harcourt took a more provocative approach to the question of population control. She thought that, in many ways, this concern about population has very difficult implications. For instance, there is an argument, which environmentalists are well aware of, that we have enough wealth and the problem is consumption and environmental degradation by the North, not the South. This position questions the constant scapegoating of the poor, which places the onus on them to change, rather than focusing on Northern greed, particularly in relation to environmental or financial crises. It is not about reducing the number of people; it is about quality of life and wellbeing, but that also implies possibly reducing a lot of consumption in the richer parts of the North and South. That is a very complex political economy issue, not just a demographic issue.

Following from this point, Harcourt also questioned; where is the debate now? Why don't we have strong advocacy debates and strong women's movements pushing forward ideas? Where are the ideas and where are the changes? She speculated that this is because people have fallen into a mood of fear, particularly fear of the other; there are too many people out there, so we need to hold on to our own wellbeing. It is a sense of insecurity and fear that is linked to racism and is also related to the way that the media whips up a lot of issues.

The second round of questions focused more on implementation issues, particularly with regard to the mandate of UNFPA for 2014 and the positions that NGOs should take. One person addressed Harcourt, asking; what should be the most fundamental political reforms for allowing a better chance at meaningful implementation? Another asked about the connection between women and economics. Harcourt responded to the last question first, arguing that we have to shift the way we understand gender relations economically. Feminist economists these days are counting the hours and trying to understand the values of women's

work, but we need to start shifting the way we think of economics and to start valuing things differently, away from the old fashioned line focused on livelihoods and towards perspectives that consider, for example, care or community. She suggested that generational issues should be seen in the same light, re-examined in much more innovative ways that do not view ageing as something negative and young people as problematic, but both as times in life. Things can be valued beyond the problems.

On the subject of ageing, Simonen clarified that it is within the mandate of the UNFPA to help countries with ageing issues. She noted that there is an international consensus of action on ageing called the Madrid Plan. She also offered some details on the issues of funding and supported the idea of bringing in men into programmes as stakeholders. She wrapped up by returning to her main argument that both population policy and a rights-based approach to family planning need to ensure the availability of a wide choice of good quality and safe contraception, without side effects and responsive to the needs of users, including young people (boys and girls), and women and men.

2.5. Session Five: China's population dynamics and its impact on China's Development

The fifth lecture, given by Professor Xizhe Peng from Fudan University in Shanghai, was the first to offer an exclusively regional focus. It was greeted with very strong interest from the audience and many were particularly delighted by the candidness of Peng's discussion of contemporary population debates in China. Indeed, in addition to being one of the leading demographers in China, another reason for inviting Peng to present on this theme, which was originally scheduled to be about the environment and livelihoods, was because of his role as the first demographer in China to conduct an extensive and rigorous study of the famine of the Great Leap Forward (1959-61) in the 1980s. In other words, Peng has been no stranger to controversial and politically-sensitive subjects in China.

To start with, Peng gave a brief introduction to China's population and population policy today. By the end of last year, China's population had reached 1.33 billion, up from one billion in 1980. China is still the most populated country in the world. Every year there are about 16 million births and 9 million deaths, giving a natural increase of about 7 million annually, with some fluctuation over the years. Currently, 45 percent of people are classified as urban residents while 54 percent are rural residents, although this is subject to changing definitions of rural and urban. China's population is also rapidly ageing. Currently, 20 percent of the population is under the age of fifteen, while the elderly (65+) constitute approximately 7.5 percent. Compared to the Netherlands, this population is still young, but its speed of ageing is much faster. In terms of spatial distribution, the overwhelming majority of the population is concentrated in coastal China, particularly in the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta and in the Beijing and Tianjin regions.

Peng then explained the population dynamics of China over the last sixty years, illustrating the processes of demographic transition as discussed previously by Dyson and Cleland. In particular, he noted the high mortality and the fluctuation in birth and death rates during the great famine period between 1959 and 1961, the

causes of which are still a big topic of academic debate. When he did his research on this in 1984, he estimated that there were roughly 20 million excess deaths in those three years. After this, mortality fell sharply and life expectancy at birth has been continuously increasing, currently reaching 72 years, albeit with large regional differences between coastal and inland areas.

On the other hand, fertility remained high in the 1950s and 1960s. Regardless of whether urban or rural, the average Chinese family in the 1950s had about six children. There was a decline in fertility during the famine, and then a rapid decline in the urban areas over the 1960s. Higher fertility was maintained in the rural areas up to the early 1970s and then dropped rapidly over the 1970s, leading to a continuous decline in the birth rate in that decade. The birth rate fluctuated in the 1980s and then has declined continuously over the last 20 years. The rapid reductions in fertility in the 1970s were related to the nation-wide family planning programme, which was implemented in the early 1970s. However, the urban fertility decline happened much earlier than these family planning programmes.

Currently, the official data on the total fertility rate in China ranges between 1.7 and 1.8, i.e. below replacement, although, like with mortality, this rate is not homogeneous across the whole China. For example, the total fertility rate in Shanghai has been as low as 0.7 over the past 10 years, whereas in Tibet it remains at around 3.5 [note from the author: this rate for Tibet is out-of-date. The TFR in Tibet was actually below replacement in the 2000 census].¹² In reality, the national rate might even be as low as 1.5, although the government and many scholars do not believe this. Debate is still going on about the exact rate, which is affecting the government's decision whether or not it should change its population policy.

Although China's family planning programme is usually called the 'one-child policy', Peng clarified that, in reality, China never actually implemented a pure one-child policy. The current population policy was shaped in 1984 and the main principles have remained unchanged for the last 25 years. Generally speaking, we can divide the policy into different categories. The first is the one-child policy, which basically covers all urban residents, as well as rural couples in a few coastal provinces like Jiangsu. These are called the one-child policy areas, which covered about 36 percent of the total population of China in 2006. The majority of rural residents can have two children if the first one is a girl. For minority people, there is a general policy that allows them to have two or three children on average. Peng explained that there is a highly decentralized system of policy formation and implementation in China, which complicates matters even more, hence making the idea of a one-child policy oversimplified and misleading.

Estimating China's future population depends on assumptions about future fertility. If total fertility remains at the official level of 1.8, China's total population will continue to increase up to a peak of 1.47 billion in 2035, or an additional 120 million more Chinese. If the population policy is relaxed and average fertility rises to two, the population will reach a peak of about 1.6 billion by 2050. However, if we assume that fertility rates are 1.5, then the Chinese population will peak at 1.4 billion by 2025. In all cases, the population starts to decline after the peak. If we assume a total fertility rate of 1.5, the total Chinese population will reach 75 million in 300 years from now.

In addition to size and growth, Peng explained that the age structure of China's population has changed very rapidly over the last half century as well. In the

1950s, China's age structure was pyramid-like, very typical of a rapidly growing population (as Cleland described in the third lecture with regard to Korea in the 1950s and Africa now). The Chinese population then became older and older, particularly once fertility started falling in the 1970s. In the 1970s, about 40 percent of Chinese were younger than fifteen years old, whereas now this proportion is less than 20 percent. On the other hand, the elderly population is rapidly increasing. Currently, there are more than 100 million elderly people (aged 65 and above). There are 160 million Chinese who are more than 60 years old, which is more than the total population of Japan (128 million in 2008). Peng noted that the elderly population is expected to increase to more than 350 million by 2050. By that time, India will have the largest population in the world, but China will have the largest elderly population in the world. In terms of share, the Chinese population is currently much younger than the US population, but it will become much older by 2035, given that the US has a fertility rate of 2.1 – the highest among all the OECD countries.

The spatial distribution of China's population will also change rapidly. By the end of 2008, more than 600 million Chinese were classified as urban residents. The urbanisation rate was 36 percent of the total population in the 2000 census, although each year since then the urbanisation rate has increased by one percentage point, which is very rapid. Roughly speaking, about 13 million Chinese farmers become urban residents every year. However, Peng again cautioned that we have to be careful about the definition of urban and rural because much of it depends on administrative classifications, which often exclude temporary migrants. China's urbanisation rate has probably been increasing even faster than the official data suggest if temporary migrants are included.

This rapid urban growth, Peng explained, has been in part caused by China's rapid economic development, but also in part by the government's development strategy to urbanize China, after years of purposefully restricting urbanisation. In addition, for many years the government also restricted the development of the biggest cities like Shanghai and Beijing, and encouraged the development of small or medium-sized cities, but this policy has been abandoned over the last 20 years. Instead, the government treats rapid urbanization as an efficient means of poverty alleviation. As a result, the big cities have become even bigger. For instance, the population of Shanghai was recently estimated to be about 20 million, including six million migrants. Some economists have suggested that Shanghai can accommodate 50 million people, but Peng and other demographers and development specialists question how this would be possible to handle. He thought that it would be impossible to have sustainable development in such a context.

Also, with such rapid urbanization, the urban-rural gap has widened over the last thirty years, reinforcing the dual separation of the Chinese economy and society. Peng noted that the difference between urban and rural household incomes is currently around 3.1 to 1, meaning that urban residents earn over three times more than rural residents. If we include all the privileges and subsidies in housing, education, medical care and social welfare systems received by urban residents, the ratio between urban and rural income would be more than 4 to 1. This is becoming a big issue in China.

Migration is one means to correct this gap. Peng explained that rural to urban migrants currently number at least 140 million, although, again, this statistic must be treated with caution. Some estimate that it is about 200 million. Even with the

economic downturn, these migrants tend to remain in the urban and coastal areas. The integration of these rural migrants into the urban mainstream society is becoming a big social issue in China. Migrants work in urban areas, but they do not enjoy the same social welfare, education, or other entitlements as urban residents. Hence, Chinese cities are divided.

Another major issue that Peng delved into was the sex ratio at birth, which has become a very serious problem in China. The sex ratio at birth was at a normal range before 1982, i.e. slightly more boys than girls at birth. Then it increased year after year, and now it is 120, meaning that for every 100 baby girls there are 120 baby boys. At first the government and scholars thought this was due to misreporting, but now we realise more and more that it is a real situation. According to projections, by 2025 there will be 30 million more men than women in the population age group between 24 and 40 years old. He suggested that a situation of 30 million young men who want wives but cannot find them could be a nightmare, leading to all sorts of social problems that are already starting to appear, such as the trafficking of wives.

China faces a certain dilemma of policy choices. Peng explained that, on one hand, fertility is already very low and there is very little room for further reduction. Yet the Chinese population continues to grow, which creates ever greater environmental pressure. In particular, if the sea levels rise in the future, this will impact most of the coastal cities where more and more Chinese are moving, as discussed above. It is clear that China is environmentally fragile, which is further rationale for a rigid population policy. On the other hand, there is rapid population ageing. Slightly higher fertility would be required to slow down the ageing process, but this would make the total Chinese population grow even larger. So, do we tighten or loosen the rigid population policy?

There are two groups in this internal debate in China. One is the environmentalist group, which includes some government people and some economists who focus on the environmental impact of population growth, such as global warming and carbon emissions. They argue that, for the sake of the environment, China would be better to maintain a rigid population policy. Another group of people, in which Peng included himself, regard the rigid policy as unkind and that the government has already done enough. They argue that people should have a basic right to choose how many children they want and, accordingly, the policy should be relaxed. People in this group refer to rapid population ageing in support of their argument, particularly with regard to labour supply or the pension system. Indeed, only urban residents currently have government-sponsored pensions. The government has tried to establish a rural pension system since 2008, but it will still take a long time to establish an efficiently functioning pension system with good coverage, especially in the context of rapid population ageing. Peng noted that the debate is still ongoing in China and concluded that the government may create a modification to the current rigid one-child policy system in the urban and coastal areas while maintaining the two-child policy for China's rural population.

The discussion was led with some brief comments by Professor Jeroen van Ginneken from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demography Institute in The Hague. He first offered a summary of the general meaning of the population factor, arguing that in general there should be a balance between the number of people served by social subsystems and the capacities of those subsystems. Situations may

arise where there is a shortage of people relative to the capacity of a subsystems, or else situations where there are too many people to be served by those subsystems. Both types of problems cause stresses and strains in the ability of a system to meet material and other needs. In his view, one of the tasks of demography is to assist in describing and quantifying these stresses and strains that are likely to operate in a subsystem as a result of population changes.

His second point was about the challenges faced by China as a result of population changes. In particular, he contemplated the implications of raising the living standards of 600 to 700 million Chinese rural dwellers. The meaning of this is hard to imagine in terms of food supply, water, gas, electricity and so on. Enormous efforts will be required to increase production within a very short time frame. China is working very hard to solve its pressing material needs of energy and water, including mega projects to be implemented on a scale never before witnessed anywhere else in the world. He gave the examples of large scale projects in wind and solar; efforts to acquire raw materials not only in China but also from many other countries in the world; and the ambitious schemes of diverting water from the south to the north of China, which has regional implications beyond China given that the rivers in question also supply India and Bangladesh. Van Ginneken noted that the negative consequences of rapid industrialization and economic growth in China must be considered alongside the negative consequences of population growth. He concluded that the sheer size of China makes these issues particularly important, with a potentially global impact.

As noted above, the subsequent discussion was animated and inspired by the frankness with which Peng elaborated on many points. For instance, there was much interest in the fact that the fertility rate in China had fallen prior to the official one-child policy, which was a surprise for many in the audience. Peng explained that rapid fertility decline actually happened in the 1970s, from a total fertility rate of 5.8 in 1970 to 2.8 in 1979, which was the most rapid decline to occur in China. In the 1980s, the total fertility rate was actually fluctuating; it took almost ten years before it started to decline further despite the first implementation of the one child policy in 1979. This was partly due to population momentum from the baby boomers of the 1960s who were starting to have children in the 1980s. The one-child policy was made much more rigid in 1983, which is when many of the coercive practices happened, although the policy was not well accepted by rural people. He clarified that the coercive measures included disincentives and punishments, which were mostly applicable to middle class professional employees in government or other forms of formal urban employment. Therefore, the disincentives did not have much effect on the poor and/or rural, nor on rich people who could pay fines. So, a new directive was issued in 1984 to implement a one-child policy in urban areas and a two-child policy in rural areas, after which the coercive practices lessened.

He explained further that there were two kinds of fertility transition in China. The first was in the 1970s and it did not involve any coercive measures. Instead, policy encouraged late marriage, late child bearing, long birth intervals, and having only a few healthy children (known as the later, longer, and fewer policy). This was supported by education and the provision of family planning contraception services. Hence, they achieved a slow down of population growth without much violation of basic reproductive rights. Peng did not mention the fact that this was in large part

possible because the society and economy were entirely collectivised at the time, allowing for a command system that supported these achievements. Some might argue that the lack of violation of basic reproductive rights, as well as progress in social and economic rights more generally, was achieved at the cost of broader civil and political rights. However, in the Maoist context of China at the time, this was a moot point.

Other questions were raised regarding the policy that a rural family could have two children if the first is a girl, which Peng mentioned in his presentation. Considerable concern regarding the gender implications of this was expressed. Peng agreed that this policy is definitely not good from a gender viewpoint. He had actually written an article on this, arguing that the son preference reflected through this policy institutionalises and legitimizes the gender inequality. However, he admitted that this is also current Chinese reality, especially in the rural areas, due to the marriage pattern whereby daughters marry out and daughter-in-laws marry in. Given the lack of government sponsored pensions in the rural areas, the parents still rely on their married sons to support them in their old age. Therefore, if there is no son in the family, it means the older parents will lose their old age security. So, the policy is a compromise between the ideology of equality and this Chinese reality. If the first child is a girl you can try another time. If you have a boy you solve the problem of old age security, but if both children are girls, you have to stop.

Peng noted that the policy also encourages pre-birth sex selection through abortion if the second child is a girl. For instance, the sex ratio of first children is generally almost normal; the problem appears in the second or higher-order births. The sex ratio at birth for second children can be as high as 140, and as high as 200 for third children. The minimal condition of having at least one son seems to determine the desired family size in China.

However, the sex selection problem is more generalised than simply this specific policy of allowing a second child if the first is a girl. Peng explained that it is more generally due to the easy availability of ultrasound machines, which are widely available through maternal care units and are now found in every Chinese village. As a result, it is relatively easy for parents to sex select if they desperately want a boy child in their family. Partially to compensate for this problem, the Chinese government launched a program called 'care for the baby girls', which includes various incentives to encourage having more girl children. Other countermeasures include efforts over the last five years to launch social security programmes for Chinese farmers. In response to another question regarding legislation on this problem, Peng also noted that the policy approach of the last ten years has aimed to give very harsh punishment to medical professionals involved in conducting the sex identification and abortion, such as being dismissed from medical practice forever. However, despite this approach, the problem still continues to increase. People even resort to the use of traditional Chinese doctors to identify sex.

Peng agreed that these cultural ideologies are rooted in patriarchy, as suggested by Sathyamala, a medical doctor from India and a PhD student at ISS, although he also suggested that attitudes are changing. For instance, urban residents prefer girls to boys because, it is said, daughters provide much better care than sons. So it is quite different from India, in the sense that sex ratios are normal in the big coastal cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing, where people treat boys and girls equally. In the western part of China, where family planning policy is relaxed, sex

ratios are also normal. The major problem is happening in the central part of China where the urbanization rate is low, economic development is low, and yet a strict 1.5 child policy is still implemented, as in the coastal areas.

In response to another question by Sathyamala, he noted that the female suicide rate in rural China is much higher than in other parts of the world. Moreover, it is higher for women than for men, which is the opposite of most other countries. The rural suicide rate is also higher than the urban rate, again in contrast to most other countries. He and others are trying to study why female Chinese farmers have such high suicide rates, but he admitted that they do not yet have a concrete answer. However, he thought that health reform in China will definitely help to solve these kinds of problems, although such reforms still have a long way to go.

Following a question by an ISS student from Shanghai, Peng also made some comments on the new generation of single children. Currently there are already 100 million single children in China's urban areas, i.e. seven percent of Chinese children are single children. He and others have been researching how these single children are reshaping China's future society. They usually say that these single children are individualistic, self-centered, and have less family responsibility. On the other hand, in 2008 we saw many of these single children volunteering in the Sichuan earthquake relief effort. So, what will happen when they get power? Peng thought that the future implications are huge. He joked that maybe China will become democratic when this generation reaches their 30s or 40s because they do not believe in any authority, hence they will have to vote to solve their quarrels and disputes.

Amidst various questions on economics, migration and livelihoods, Peng explained that China's labour force will peak in 2016 at around one billion. China's labour force will then decline. He suggested that there are two options to solve the problem. One is that China has to adapt by restructuring its economy and gradually shifting away from labour intensive exports and towards capital or knowledge intensive sectors. The second option is to delay the retirement age, which harkened back to some of the discussion following Cleland's lecture in the third session. He noted that some of these various policy options might be good, but they need to be implemented at the right time.

Andrew Fischer (the current author), questioned whether loosening the family planning policy would lead to a rise in fertility, particularly in light of the fact that very proactive efforts in Europe and Canada to raise fertility rates have been largely futile, as noted by Paul Demeny, among others. He wondered whether there is any indication that relaxing control in China would actually change the fertility trends. Peng explained that this is precisely another debate among scholars in China. The government worries that fertility would rebound if controls are loosened, although we have lots of evidence from other East Asian countries, such as Japan, Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong, that once fertility reaches such a low level, it is impossible to make women have two children. One Japanese sociologist suggested that this is the revenge of Japanese women to the male dominated patriarchal society in Japan. Peng and other scholars in China have been arguing along these lines, that there is no need to worry about loosening the policy. Indeed, he noted that in Shanghai, the fertility rate has been around 0.7 for the last ten years, whereas the rate that policy would allow, given the structure and characteristics of the population, is 1.1. In other words, even though the population policy is very rigid there, people still

have lower fertility than allowed by that policy. The problem in the future will be about how to ask couples to have more children, not less.

2.6. Session Six: Population Growth – is it still an issue?

The last lecture was crowned by the presence of Steven Sinding, who, like Cleland and Dyson, is one of the eminent international figures in the field of population and development. His role was to sum up the series by asking the question; is rapid population growth still an important global issue? If so, what interventions and approaches are compatible with today's development thinking? He especially liked the second part of this question because, he explained, so much of the debate continues to be about yesterday's development thinking.

Like other speakers, Sinding first went over some historical background. He reflected that the world is very different today than it was in 1973, when Robert McNamara, the President of the World Bank, called population growth the second most pressing and complex problem facing mankind, only surpassed by the threat of thermonuclear war. No one in such a position would utter those words today. Yet McNamara was reflecting the liberal development consensus of that time, upon which a very large cooperative effort among industrialized countries was undertaken to export a commitment to reducing high fertility rates throughout the developing world, primarily through family planning programmes.

Most development economists of that era, which lasted from the 1950s until the mid 1980s, concurred with the view that rapid population growth represented a serious barrier to economic growth. This view had its origin, Sinding thought, in the writings of Reverend Malthus over a century and half earlier, but its modern manifestation was most famously expressed in the 1958 book by Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover, entitled *Population Growth and Economic development in Low Income Countries*. They argued that rapid population growth was the primary cause of the chronic poverty and the low economic growth rates of low income countries, and that strenuous efforts to lower fertility rates were a precondition for economic development.

This view quickly gained favour among much of the political leadership in the West as well as political elites in many parts of the developing world, particularly in Asia. The population crisis consensus, as Sinding suggested it might be called, was not restricted to concerns about economic development; issues of international stability and national security were also evoked. As today, there were concerns about population pressure giving rise to unmanageable international migration, threats to various natural systems, food security and the environment.

The consensus was not shared by countries of the Soviet bloc or by socialist developing countries. Indeed throughout the 1960s and 1970s it was impossible to achieve consensus within the United Nations on the priorities that population policies and programmes should receive. Yet a major industry was established in 1950s and continued through the 1960s. It was comprised initially of The Population Council think tank and international NGOs like the International Planned Parenthood Federation. Then bilateral development agencies joined, led by the Swedish International Development Agency and USAID, and eventually the multilaterals such as UNFPA and the World Bank. This industry spent hundreds of

millions of dollars annually to promote population policies and to support family planning programmes throughout the developing world. The Netherlands was part of that consensus although not among the original leaders of the advocacy effort. International population conferences were convened, from Teheran in the 1950s, to Rome in the 1960s, to a series of three UN-sponsored global political meetings running from Bucharest through Mexico City to Cairo. In the decade between the Bucharest conference in 1974 and the Mexico City conference in 1984, Sinding thought that something like a consensus emerged regarding an urgent perception of the population problem on a worldwide basis and the appropriateness of family planning programmes to address it.

However, he argued that the global population crisis consensus started to disintegrate in the mid 1980s as a result of two major interrelated factors. First, the Reagan administration reversed decades-old US policy and declared in 1984 at the Mexico City International Conference on population that population growth was no longer to be considered a negative factor in development. This signalled a serious downgrading of the priority given to population programme assistance, especially considering that the US had been the principal driver and funder of the population crisis consensus up to that time. Second, by the mid to late 1980s, we started to see significant declines in population growth rates in every major region of the world except Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as fertility rates approaching replacement levels in many of the countries that had mounted aggressive population policies, such as Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Tunisia, Colombia and Mexico. Others that started their programmes somewhat later were also showing major fertility decline, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, China, Morocco, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Iran and Vietnam.

Hence, many people started to feel that the crisis had passed. Fertility decline over the second half of the 20th century was clearly enough established throughout most cases in Asia, the Middle East, Central and South America, whether primarily due to strong policies and programmes or to more natural responses of improving living standards. Crisis no longer seemed to be the right framework to think about population issues but, at the same time, the Cairo Conference was approaching. It is no wonder that, in the ensuing political struggle between demographers and reproductive rights advocates at Cairo, the latter emerged victorious. The demographers simply had a less compelling case to convince political leaders that the trade offs between strong population control and reproductive rights were still required.

The years since Cairo have been very difficult for the worldwide population movement. Sinding clarified that he used this term cautiously because, although a version of that movement still exists, it can no longer be called by that name. The famous paradigm shift of Cairo thoroughly changed the rules of the game as well as the shape of the arena. We are now compelled to refer to the movement in terms of sexual and reproductive health and rights. What had been an international movement to promote a particular set of policies and programmes to reduce population growth became, after 1994, a movement to promote sexual and reproductive health and rights as an end in itself. Without passing judgement on this, Sinding saw the change as the natural consequence of a series of changes in the global environment, some of them political, some demographic, others social and cultural. However, he did argue that the virtual disappearance of the demographic

rational took with it the very strong sense of urgency and even imperative to action that the population crisis mentality inspired.

Sinding also recognized that the change which occurred in Cairo resulted in much lower priority for reproductive and sexual health programmes than the more narrowly-defined family planning predecessors had enjoyed. Since 1995, funding for population activities as defined in the Cairo programme of action has fallen considerably. Funding for family planning has fallen by some 30 percent, according to Sinding's estimates. Several extra reasons for this include: first, changing priorities in the health sector including the HIV/AIDS pandemic; second, the failure to include any reference to the Cairo goals in the MDGs; third, the changing architectures of international development cooperation with its strong emphasis on budget and sector support and country ownership; and finally, confusion and, to some degree, controversy surrounding the term sexual and reproductive health and rights. As a consequence of these multiple and somewhat interrelated factors, the simple truth is that in many countries today individuals and women in particular have less help and less power to exercise or control their own reproduction and reproductive health than they did a decade ago. In other words, the decline in funding, Sinding claimed, is making a mockery of the Cairo commitment to universal access to reproductive health. He argued that this retreat is highly regrettable, for both macro and individual and family welfare concerns.

Returning to the question of the lecture, he clarified his position on rapid population growth, meaning rates of natural population increase over 2 percent per year and fertility rates over 3 children per women. According to his opinion, countries experiencing rapid population growth would be better off if growth rates would be moderated. Individuals, particularly poor people, who have high fertility as a result of unplanned or unintended pregnancies would also be better off if their fertility would be lower. Generally speaking, countries with rates of natural increase over two percent have considerable difficulty keeping pace with the demand for jobs, the need to build class rooms and train teachers, the need for health facilities, the ability to produce sufficient food to meet domestic calorie and nutritional requirements, and the ability to invest resources in ways that promote economic growth. He also referred to the demographic bonus, when falling fertility rates raise the proportion of working aged people in the population to a one-off historical high, as discussed in previous lectures. He noted that this is a potential, and that if countries invest wisely and appropriately as did the Asian tigers during the 1960s and 1970s, they can take advantage of this one-time bonus to bring themselves up to considerably higher levels of productivity and growth. On the other hand, he was not aware of any country experiencing rapid population growth, as he defined it, that has also enjoyed rapid and sustained economic growth, except a handful of oil exporting states. In other words, Sinding argued that reducing fertility is by no means a sufficient condition for economic growth, but it may be a necessary one.

There was not always academic consensus on the relationship between population growth and economic development, he admitted, and there may not even be one today, although recent research supports his position and is well accepted by development economists. There is also increasing agreement that high rates of population growth can have significantly negative consequences for the environment, such as fresh water supplies, deforestation, soil erosion and depletion, biological diversity and species extinction, air and water pollution. Other things

equal, he argued that rapid population growth clearly makes it harder for countries to protect and preserve their natural environment and habitats. Other potential impacts at the societal level include civil unrest and disruption. A rapidly growing population of poorly fed, poorly educated and unemployed young people, especially young men, is a recipe for civil disorder born out of frustration and despair, he argued. Such young people are natural and willing recruits to radical political movements, as suggested by the experience of the high fertility regions of the Middle East and much of East, Central and West Africa. He thought that it is naïve to think that high fertility and youthful age structure have nothing to do with political violence and social upheaval.

He nonetheless steered clear from Malthusian thinking on this matter, i.e. the idea that high fertility is a natural response to poverty. As discussed in the first session with Dyson and Garenne, it is now known that a great deal of child bearing by poor people, especially women, is unintended and unwanted, and that poor families that successfully reduce fertility also do considerably better economically on average than families that do not. In other words, looking at the impact of fertility on poverty, rather than the impact of poverty on fertility, leads to quite different conclusions. This is important for poverty reduction, which he noted is at the heart of the MDGs. High fertility makes it harder for families to send all their children to school, to get them immunized, or to properly care for them when they are sick and in need of medicine. A child born into a family of three or more children, especially if the birth comes within less than 24 months after the last child was born, is much more likely to die before the age of five than a child born to a smaller family, three or more years after the last one. In other words, the number and spacing of children is critical to child survival. Fewer the births also lower the chances of pre-mature death; a mother who delays childbearing until her late twenties and who stops before her forties is far more likely to survive to old age than a mother who starts sooner or ends later. Women who marry latter, delay child bearing, and have fewer children are also far more likely to find work outside the home, to get a decent education, and to participate on more equal terms in family decision-making. And, he claimed that no other factor is more important than female education when it comes to reducing fertility (although, interestingly, this point was qualified in the first session by both Dyson and Garenne). Female education and fertility reduction, he suggested, may be the best example of mutually-reinforcing outcomes in the entire literature of development.

In conclusion, Sinding made the case that, no matter how you look at it, it is hard to escape the conclusion that lower fertility helps to reduce poverty and contributes to the achievement of every Millennium Development Goal. He did not think that reducing rapid population growth and high fertility are panaceas; there are few short cuts and no easy answers in development. However, he firmly believed that in places where population is growing very rapidly and where fertility is especially high, it would be far easier to improve living standards and to stimulate environmentally sustainable and sustained economic growth if we could at least satisfy the unmet need for contraception and the other simple and relatively inexpensive services that comprise reproductive health. We know how to do this and we have shown in many countries around the world how relatively simple and inexpensive high quality reproductive health can be. Simply by restoring reproductive health to a position of high priority within our efforts to expand basic

health services and strengthening primary care systems, we can make giant strides to realize the MDGs and our collective dream of a world free of extreme poverty.

On that galvanising note, Bert Koenders, the discussant, took the audience back to Malthus, who he claimed was the elephant in the room. He then fast forwarded to 1972, when technology in agriculture and in birth control had developed to a point that Malthus could not have foreseen. However, the Club of Rome, a think tank of scientists from various disciplines, nonetheless published the famous *Limits to Growth*, a landmark publication which concluded that economic growth could not continue indefinitely because of the limited availability of natural resources, particularly oil. He skipped again to the present, on the eve of the UN advocacy conference in Copenhagen on global warming and global environmental change. He contextualised the issues surrounding the Copenhagen summit, noting that the world's richest half billion people, or 7 percent of the world population, account for 50 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, while the poorest 50 percent are responsible for just 7 percent of the emissions. Indeed, this was a very refreshing perspective to bring the audience back to the much broader context shaping world poverty today, in contrast to the narrow albeit important focus on fertility and poverty provided by Sinding.

World population in 2050 will nonetheless range from 7.9 to 10.4 billion, depending on different scenarios. Together with Western patterns of consumption, Koenders suggested that this is a major reason why it will become increasingly difficult to achieve sustainable development for all. Moreover, the time from now until 2050 is critical. After 2050, the consequences of low fertility might make life easier, but not before. He then questioned what this means for economic growth, development and the poor, noting that the debate touches on many issues including ethics and equity. Simple population control is neither a solution nor feasible, he argued, because the question is much broader, dealing with the balance between development versus the right to live in a healthy and safe environment, and between the rights of future generations versus what is important for politicians. How do we make this intergenerational and interplanetary relationship politically relevant in the consumer society we live in?

He argued that climate change is far more sensitive to consumption patterns than to demographic considerations and that the distributive equity question should be at the core of the debate. Scarcity and growth are essentially social phenomena, he contended, which is a crucial link missing in population and environment debates. Moreover, he noted that the move to replacement-level fertility has already been dramatic in many cases around the world. So, while population growth is now starting to receive a little more attention in Copenhagen and by magazines such as *The Economist*, he thought that those of us with a more balanced approach need to take a stand, particularly with regard to correctly apportioning the blame for consumption levels in the developed countries. He detailed the various ways he would do this including by adding the issue of demographic development to the mandate of the Ambassador for Sustainable Development and also provided a variety of reflections on many of the themes covered in the lecture series.

Perhaps as a critical reflection, Koenders also noted that Sinding and others were preaching in a very sophisticated way to the converted because he and many others share their sense of urgency. For instance, here in the Netherlands, the

advisory counsel on international affairs recently published a report on demographic change in development cooperation, focusing especially on the balance between different age groups in a society and the demographic dividend. Koenders argued that in order to fully benefit from this temporary phenomenon, economic growth and good governance are important conditions. Turning to the youth bulge into a true demographic dividend requires investments in health, education, vocational training, and in stimulating the private sector and creating jobs. Indeed, the youth bulge is a phenomenon faced almost in all post-conflict aid interventions. Similarly, he argued that ageing might solve some problems but cause many others, such as pensions. Meanwhile, HIV/AIDS in Africa has eliminated a whole group of parents and professionals, leaving the very young and the very old exposed and vulnerable. These issues require a broadening vision and that equity is taken as a firm starting point.

Koenders suggested that population policy is no longer a hotly debated issue in The Netherlands because of the specific Dutch approach to sexual and reproductive health and rights. The Dutch experience shows how access to reproductive health information, services and commodities works better than a quantitative population policy. We have been called the champion of the rights-based approach, although he thought this was a bit exaggerated given all the work that has been done around the world. However, he reminded the audience that it nonetheless took intense debate and long battles over the last hundred years to reach this situation in The Netherlands today. For instance, The Netherlands has often been attacked for the wide availability of abortion, although Koenders had evidence that abortion is not used as a family planning tool and the country's abortion rate is very low compared to other countries. The Dutch approach has been based on an understanding that banning does not reduce the number of abortions, but that it does affect the conditions under which women have abortions.

Sexual and reproductive health and rights are touchy subjects, Koenders reflected, given that they relate to very personal decisions on family relationships and sexuality. But he insisted that he is prepared to defend the Dutch policy at any time, and he was also convinced that these sensitive issues have to be raised by politicians in international circles given that they are crucial for the achievement of the MDGs. In his view, MDG Five (the reduction of maternal mortality) is the mother of all MDGs. However, the case for sexual and reproductive health and rights has to be made over and over again and it is seriously lagging behind. He questioned why this is and made a strong appeal to change the situation given that we know what to do, if only we would invest in it. He also argued for recognizing the key role of young people in this debate and that they should have access to sexual and reproductive health information, education, services and commodities, as a universal right, with no exception. In particular, the unmet need for contraception must be addressed, he argued, alongside the right for education, for the reasons explained several times in this lecture series.

There are success stories. He highlighted Bangladesh's success in fertility decline, which is interesting for a number of reasons. It is debated whether the decline is attributable to reduced poverty and increased women empowerment, or to family planning in the country, although both seem to have played a role. Similar results are starting to happen in Pakistan. Generally, family planning in Asia seems to have been an important factor in such successes and the Dutch government is

aiming to boost investment in family planning, which has fallen dramatically in recent decades. Koenders then explained how the government is planning to do this within a liberal perspective of respect for individual rights. Koenders concluded by suggesting that three measures are required; family planning needs to be prioritised, adolescence needs to become a priority, and health systems need to be strengthened, with sexual and reproductive health as a priority. He called on everybody to work towards population policies that are founded on human rights and that look at population from a rights-based point of view, not in terms of vague ideology but in terms of things that can be practically implemented, particularly with regard to the unmet need of so many women for contraception.

The questions in this session tended to focus on two themes. One regarded Sinding's arguments on funding and support for family planning since Cairo, and the other regarded questions of sustainability, growth and poverty, and their relation to fertility and family planning. In response, both speakers reiterated many of the points from their presentations, Sinding on the achievements but also continuing need for family planning, and Koenders on the challenges of sustainable development and the need for international negotiations. Koenders also encouraged the trend of private sector involvement in the sustainability movement. In the second round of questions, he also supported the idea that, in a very general sense, higher levels of economic growth bring a decline in fertility rates. This does not mean that fertility cannot be brought down or education improved in the absence of growth, but that growth definitely helps. He thought that growth played a role in the success of Bangladesh (although this response ignored a question specifically regarding the fact that poverty rates had not fallen in Bangladesh). He also supported the idea that education is enormously important, particularly girls' education. Finally, he clarified that he was not arguing that there are too many people in the world, but that the present level of population growth at present levels of consumption, production and unequal distribution is unsustainable.

Similarly, Sinding clarified that he is very careful not to say that reducing population growth is the way to economic development, but that he feels equally strongly that countries which succeed in reducing rapid rates of population growth stand a better chance of achieving sustained economic growth than those which do not. He also thinks that there is virtuous circular relationship between the two, in the sense that fertility tends to decline in countries that grow more prosperous and declining fertility also improves opportunities for economic growth (albeit, Sinding did not qualify that the inverse of this logic leads to Malthusianism, i.e. the idea that poverty drives high fertility). He suggested that it almost does not matter when one intervenes in this cycle; once the process begins, it tends to sustain itself.

In response to certain questions on the backtracking on women's rights, Sinding agreed but also noted that this backlash is a consequence of enormous progress. It is a symptom of success rather than a cause for alarm. Sinding thought that the international women's movement is unstoppable and will continue to make progress in the years going forward.

Regarding Cairo, Sinding argued that it has taken almost two decades to bring the two sides (demographers and SRHR advocates) together to a point where we can talk about our mutual interest as opposed to our mutual hostility. We have reached the point in which a rights-based approach is seen as absolutely the right way to go

and, at the same time, it is considered alright to talk about population issues again, when they are real and meaningful. The latter was not possible in Cairo. We are in a much better place than 20 years ago with respect to that particular battle. He argued that Cairo was nonetheless important for establishing a much higher moral ground and ethical basis for population programmes, but this came with a price.

With regard to fertility change, Sinding clarified that he was trying to argue that, when given the choice between having five children or ten children, or the choice between having a child every year or every two or three years, women tend to choose the former, even in the context of a subsistence rural economy. Hence, the argument that poor people need more children completely overlooks the fact that many women in these circumstances are desperate not to have so many children so close together. So, with family planning programmes, people are starting to have five children instead of eight. Sinding pointed out that this is precisely the beginning of demographic transition. With urbanization, children then start to become much more costly, reinforcing the transition. This appears to happen regardless of whether or not poverty improves, as demonstrated by the case of Bangladesh.

3. Conclusion: New Consensuses and Ways Forward

Whether intended or not, the sum of the six lectures offered a fascinating retrospective, often self-reflective, on the evolution of thinking about population and development since Cairo, if not since the end of the Second World War. Major points of tension and contention were revisited, particularly by Cleland, Simonen, Harcourt and Sinding. Positions were taken and yet, somehow, a sense of consensus transpired across the lectures besides some notable differences.

Without detailing all of the points and arguments summarised in this report, it is roughly accurate to say that the consensus formed around an understanding that past debates were in large part based on the tension between choice and control as two mutually-exclusive means of implementing family planning programmes. In contrast, now there is a common understanding that rights-based means of choice are not necessarily in tension with the ends of population control. This latter meaning of control does not refer to the sense used by Harris, i.e. governments coercively controlling the movement and/or behaviour of populations. Rather, it refers, in a broad macro sense, of deciphering the complex ways in which the growth of the world's population might be kept within limits that are deemed sustainable. The new consensus in the field of population and development, as represented by these lectures, suggests that free choice and protection of rights might indeed be the best way to achieve this desired end, by inducing a broad macro-structural 'paradigm' shift towards greater contraception use, lower fertility and smaller families, albeit with the qualification that this is based on the wide scale universalistic provisioning of family planning of other social services.

This latter consensus was evident in all of the lectures besides that of Harris, despite otherwise often contrasting postures in the so called demography-versus-rights debate. For instance, Dyson and Garenne, both demographers, repeatedly asserted that fertility decline is, to a large extent, driven by structural processes and that the best way to facilitate these processes is by offering choice of safe, effective and affordable contraception. As argued by Dyson, contraception provides people with choice and all the evidence shows that given the possibility of making this choice, eventually men and women (even poor and illiterate men and women) always decide to take it and reduce (or at least regulate) their fertility. Hence, the means harmonise with the ends, provided that these are supported by an underlying condition of sustained reductions in mortality.

Similarly, despite his own reservations with the rights-based agenda, Cleland made many similar points, albeit with the qualification that demography should set the agenda while rights should only guide the means. Peng also pointed out, to the surprise of many, that China's fastest period of fertility decline was not under the coercive one-child policy, but a decade earlier, through more voluntary programmes of family planning. Sinding discussed the effect of fertility on poverty and explicitly evoked this new consensus, recognising the role of rights albeit embedded within a reinvigorated return of family planning programmes. He argued that trying to satisfy the unmet need for contraception and the other simple and relatively

inexpensive services that comprise reproductive health would be more than sufficient to support a virtuous cycle of declining fertility. Simonen more or less supported Sinding's position from a gender perspective, with particular emphasis on the negative impacts of unmet need for contraception. Although Harcourt was suspicious of arguments for population control, this was not because of her disagreement on issues of demography, but rather, because of political economy and distributive justice concerns. Many of speakers agreed with the general gist of her criticisms, including as Dyson, Garenne, Cleland and Koenders.

This consensus might appear to support a fairly liberal perspective on society, i.e. that rights protecting freedom of choice and behaviour, within the limits of law, are the most effective way of achieving a rational equilibrium and efficiency. However, such a liberal perspective is limited in the sense that the consensus is also implicitly predicated on the crucial role of strong provisioning of public goods by states, particularly in health care, education and other social services. Indeed, many of the factors that help societies to manage and adapt to the huge disequilibria caused by demographic transition include state welfare and planning. For instance, we cannot understand China's success in reducing fertility through more voluntary forms of family planning in the 1970s without understanding the entirely state-collectivised context at the time, as well as the near universalistic provisioning of primary health care and basic education in both rural and urban areas, at least to a level that allowed for the rapid dissemination of new practices and socially-transformative messages. As discussed by both Cleland and Peng, even in those countries that are now very advanced in the demographic transition (i.e. Europe), strong state support for women's reproductive and productive labour has been crucial in efforts to keep fertility rates close to replacement levels (in those countries that have managed to do this). Similarly, in those countries in the middle stages of the transition, such as most of Asia and Latin America, successful tapping of the so-called 'demographic bonus' requires employment-focused development strategies. The countries that have been most successful at this, such as South Korea or Taiwan, have generally had fairly illiberal development policies, supported by large amounts of aid, strong bouts of redistribution, and fairly universalistic social policy regimes, despite being considerably poor in the earlier stages of their transitions. This is quite contrary to the standard neoliberal 'Washington Consensus' policies that have reigned in mainstream development institutions such as the World Bank over the last 30 years.

In other words, while the contemporary consensus in demography and population policy might appear as fairly liberal, insofar as it pertains to matters of choice at the individual or family level about whether or how to use contraception and to reproduce, the interaction of this with wider political economy perspectives offers a more complex and subtle picture of the development of populations within their societies and economies, at local, national and global levels. This picture would seem to invoke the need for a definite shift back to strong forms of developmentalism in the Global South and universalistic and equalising welfare interventions in the Global North if we are to have any hope of both equitable and sustainable development in the future. Hopefully, the lecture series and this report have provided one scientifically-informed step in that direction.

Notes

¹ I am indebted to the excellent research assistance of Selamawit Abebe Kelbisow and also for the editorial and logistical support of Gordana Stanković in the writing of this report.

² The **Institute of Social Studies** (ISS; www.iss.nl) in The Hague is one of the foremost centres of teaching and research in development studies in Europe and the world. Established in 1952, it brings together students and teachers from the Global South and the North in a European environment, carrying out research, teaching and public service in the field of development studies and international cooperation. In July 2009, ISS integrated with the Erasmus University of Rotterdam but remained in the Hague as an autonomous university institute.

³ **Society for International Development, Netherlands' Chapter** (SID NL; www.sid-nl.org) is one of the 45 local and national chapters of SID International, which is an international non-governmental association of individuals and organisation founded in 1957 to promote social justice and foster democratic participation (see www.sidint.org). SID NL is an independent platform organisation that aims to contribute to a sustainable and peaceful world through stimulating, renewing and broadening debates on the international cooperation in the Netherlands, thereby subsequently influencing policy discussions. The philosophy of SID NL is that development and social change can only occur if multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholder and multi-track approach is applied. SID NL is one of a few organisations in the Netherlands which applies this approach by creating strategic partnerships with other relevant initiatives and organisations. Over last 20 years, SID NL has organized the most prestigious annual series of public lectures about development issues in the Netherlands, attracting top international speakers and audiences comprising the Dutch development intellectual elite.

⁴ **World Population Foundation** (WPF; www.wpf.org) is the only Dutch NGO that focuses exclusively on Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR) in developing countries. It has a 20-year track record of successful advocacy – pushing the Netherlands to become a leader in this field – and a programme of interventions in Africa and Asia. Its main speciality is sexuality education, building on the experience and credibility of the Netherlands in SRHR matters. It has developed effective cooperation with major Dutch development NGO's. Through its MYBODY label (with slogan: My Life, My Choice, My Body), it enhances the awareness of Dutch society in general for the importance of SRHR worldwide. An explicit part of its mission is to explain the intricate relationship between population issues and SRHR.

⁵ Students attending came from ISS, Wageningen and other universities. Academic staff attended from ISS, Universities of Amsterdam, Groningen, Wageningen, and Erasmus Rotterdam, and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Attendance from research institutes included Clingendael Institute, Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and the Environmental Security Institute.

⁶ Policy makers and civil servants attending were mainly from different departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also from the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Embassies represented included Chile, Hungary, Iraq, Morocco, Norway, Palestine, Romania, and Republic of Sudan. International organisations represented included the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the European Patent Office. NGOs represented included Save the Children, Stop Aids Now, Oxfam-Novib, Netherlands Red Cross, and obviously SID and WPF. Businesses represented included Shell International and the association of Dutch Water Companies.

⁷ The first article appeared on 9 May 2009 after the first lecture by Tim Dyson in the NRC Handelsblad, written by Dirk Vlasboom and based on an interview with Tim Dyson; 'Voorbij grote bij sterven'. A rebuttal was written by Richard Paping from Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. The second article also appeared in the NRC Handelsblad on 19 November after the last lecture Steve Sinding and Bert Koenders, written by Mark Schenkel, 'Rem bevolkingsgroei Afrika af, anders gaat het mis' ('Slow down population growth, otherwise disaster looms').

⁸ Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR). *Minder pretentie, meer ambitie: ontwikkelingschulp die verschil maakt* (Less pretension, more ambition: development aid that makes a difference). Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010. See <http://www.wrr.nl/dsc?c=getobject&s=obj&!M9xXGAuyBPegM35UuYCWVRV1DyOvsfxaqys3h54uVxzYXp1K38HdWziQW2w&objectid=5213&!dsname=default&isapidir=/gvisapi/> and for the proceedings of national and international debates, see <http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/en/regulars/blogs/Less-pretension-more-ambition>

⁹ 'Een zaak van iedereen: investeren in ontwikkeling in een veranderende wereld', Beleidsbrief aan de Tweede Kamer, 16 Oktober 2007. www.politiek2015.nl/cms/upload/downloads/beleidsbrief.pdf

¹⁰ This rule restricted foreign NGOs that receive USAID family planning funds from using their own, non-U.S. funds to provide legal abortion services, lobby their own governments for abortion law reform, or even provide accurate medical counselling or referrals regarding abortion.

¹¹ For instance, see M. Michel Garenne and Eneas Gakusi (2005), 'Under-Five Mortality Trends in Africa: reconstruction of demographic sample surveys,' DHS Working Paper No. 26, Calverton, Maryland, USA: Macro International Inc; and M. Michel Garenne, (2008), 'Fertility Changes in Sub-Saharan Africa', DHS Comparative Reports No. 18, Calverton, Maryland, USA: Macro International Inc.

¹² See Geoff Childs, *Tibetan Transitions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Fertility, Family Planning, and Demographic Change*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008.



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SID

Society for International Development

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