



Title of the evaluation report: Evaluation of DG Echo's Funded Actions in Kenya (2008-2009)
Funding nutrition and livelihood support within drought responses
Final Report

Date of the evaluation: April – June 2010

Name of the consultants: Annemarie Hoogendoorn (Team leader)
Ruud van den Boogaard

Total costs: Costs of the report in Euro
(€ 91,430; 0.19% of the budget evaluated)

Contract number: ECHO/AD/BUD/2010/01201

The logo for the European Commission Humanitarian Aid, featuring the European Union flag (a blue rectangle with twelve yellow stars in a circle) and the text 'EUROPEAN COMMISSION' above it and 'Humanitarian Aid' below it.	<p>The report has been financed by and produced at the request of the European Commission. The comments contained herein reflect the opinions of the consultants only</p>
---	---

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- ABSTRACT3**
- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY4**
- 1. EVALUATION OF DG ECHO FUNDED ACTIONS IN KENYA.....9**
 - 1.1. DG ECHO funded drought response actions in Kenya9**
 - 1.2. Objectives for the evaluation.....10**
 - 1.3. Methodology for the evaluation11**
- 2. DROUGHT DISASTERS IN THE ASALS IN KENYA13**
 - 2.1. Context of the Arid and Semi Arid Lands in Kenya.....13**
 - 2.2. Malnutrition patterns and response15**
 - 2.3. Drought response and drought risk reduction approaches.....16**
 - 2.4. Framework for coordination of humanitarian responses17**
- 3. STRATEGY ASSESSMENT OF FUNDED ACTIONS19**
 - 3.1. Coherence and proportionality19**
 - 3.1.1. Coherence and coordination between donors.....19
 - 3.1.2. Proportionality.....21
 - 3.2. Relevance and appropriateness.....22**
 - 3.2.1. Provision of nutrition treatment support23
 - 3.2.2. Addressing the underlying causes of malnutrition25
 - 3.2.3. Cost-efficiency28
- 4. RESULTS ASSESSMENT OF FUNDED ACTIONS.....30**
 - 4.1. Coordination mechanisms30**
 - 4.1.1. Coordination at national and provincial level30
 - 4.1.2. Field level coordination.....32
 - 4.2. Targeting / coverage.....32**
 - 4.2.1. Geographical coverage.....32
 - 4.2.2. Beneficiary targeting and coverage.....34
 - 4.3. Operational efficiency35**
 - 4.4. Effectiveness.....37**
 - 4.5. Connectedness.....40**
- 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS44**
 - 5.1. DG ECHO support to the nutrition sector.....44**
 - 5.2. DG ECHO Emergency livelihood support.....45**

ABSTRACT

This external evaluation was commissioned in order to judge the success of the DG ECHO funded 2008/09 drought response projects in Kenya, and to draw lessons for future humanitarian responses. The evaluation covered 34 contracts with 30 IPs for a total value of € 47.7 million. The main focus of the evaluation has been on nutrition, food assistance, cash & voucher schemes, and emergency livelihood support interventions.

The funded interventions are coherent with the two main Government of Kenya models for malnutrition and drought response interventions in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands: (a) integrated treatment of acute malnutrition (IMAM) established in 2009; and (b) drought cycle management (DCM) which is a long running approach with core funding from the World Bank. The nutrition support mainly concentrated on five districts with high GAM rates with main focus on the relief phase. The DCM-oriented livelihood support projects had a larger coverage, both geographically and in terms of beneficiary numbers. Effective coordination of the drought response took place at national level (Kenyan Food Security Steering Group, Nutrition Technical Forum, etc.) and at district level (District Steering Groups chaired by Ministry of Arid Lands). However, the nutrition knowledge base is rated to be weak and in need of improvement.

While the DG ECHO funded interventions were seen as relevant and appropriate, it was highlighted during community interviews that within drought responses there should be a greater focus on water provision, animal feed and seed distribution. The projects that were funded by DG ECHO generally achieved good results and contributed to the protection of the lives and good health of malnourished individuals and to the protection of livelihoods of vulnerable households in the ASALs. Nearly all projects were aimed at strengthening of GoK structures. Although there is limited investment in service delivery from the side of GoK, this is particularly important to boost morale and outputs at times of high needs. Community-based drought management is the other mechanism that was deployed in order to increase sustainability, both for nutrition support and for livelihood support.

The main recommendations to DG ECHO on support to the nutrition sector are:

1. To develop a more continuous programme on nutrition support to the ASALs alongside the Regional Drought Decisions with differentiated support packages according to the humanitarian needs of (agro)-pastoralists and the peri-urban population during each phase of the drought cycle, and with a main focus on continuous capacity building for MoPHS staff in line with the IMAM guideline and for community-based nutrition and hygiene education. This could be based on the DG ECHO Sahel Strategy model and should include support for improvement of nutrition surveillance as part of drought preparedness (suggested to focus on the sentinel site system operated by the Ministry of Arid Lands) and support for nutrition surveys.
2. To scale up during new droughts in northern Kenya, and then replicate the major support for multi-sectoral nutrition projects as provided in 2008-09 and possibly also the blanket supplementary feeding programme if coverage of targeted feeding programmes is not yet satisfactory (but then limited to the age group from -9 to +24 months).

The main recommendations to DG ECHO emergency livelihood support are:

1. To continue supporting the DCM during future droughts but to adjust the approaches to the interests and priorities of the different livelihood groups, to put more emphasis on cash responses and market interventions, and to give a more prominent role to the NGOs to act as change agents at community level keeping in mind that there should be a good balance between GoK service delivery and community-based drought responses.
2. To renew efforts between DG ECHO, other EC instruments and other donors that provide a new momentum to LRRD, including advocacy to persuade GoK to commit itself to development of the ASALs.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The main purpose of this evaluation was to judge the success of the DG ECHO funded 2008/09 drought response projects in Kenya, and to draw lessons for future humanitarian responses. Support to IDPs, refugees and to victims of the post-election conflict was not part of this study. The main focus was on nutrition, food assistance, cash & voucher schemes, and emergency livelihood support interventions. Drought preparedness activities were excluded as they were the subject of another recent DG ECHO evaluation. The field mission to Kenya took place from 22 April - 11 May 2010, with visits to 5 drought-affected districts.
2. The evaluation covered 33 contracts with 30 IPs for a total value of € 47.8 million. Many projects were based on an integrated approach which combined malnutrition treatment support with interventions that addressed key underlying causes / aggravating factors for malnutrition. This approach was coherent with the new EC Communication of Humanitarian Food Assistance. The DG ECHO funding was also consistent and complementary with funding through other EC instruments for tackling transient and chronic food insecurity, and coherent with drought relief provided by other donors (the main ones are DFID, USAID and World Bank).
3. The DG ECHO funded interventions were coherent with the two main GoK models for malnutrition and drought response interventions in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL):
 - ⇒ Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM) addresses the need for targeted nutrition support for malnourished individuals, both through health centres and hospitals and community-based approaches. Coordination of the nutrition support is done at national level through the Nutrition Technical Forum and through the DSGs at district level.
 - ⇒ Drought cycle management (DCM) based on a well-functioning early warning system, a set of standard project designs for response activities during each phase of the drought impact (pre-crisis, relief, recovery, and mitigation), availability of contingency funds, and strong coordination at national and district levels. Resource transfer modalities were general food distribution, voucher schemes and cash transfers (mainly through animal destocking). Other interventions comprise agriculture and livestock support.
4. The DG ECHO funded drought response interventions were relevant and appropriate. The support for malnutrition treatment and the blanket supplementary feeding were highly relevant given the high GAM rates and the need to support GoK for the roll-out of the IMAM Guideline. Underlying causes of malnutrition were addressed through a range of integrated projects. However, according to the communities visited by the mission, water provision, provision of animal feed and seed distribution were not given sufficient attention. Health care support was not part of the DG ECHO funded drought response package but is undertaken in three of the most drought-prone districts in longer-term programmes that are co-funded by DFID. Within Kenya, there is a history of increasingly frequent severe droughts, which are serious shocks for the (agro)-pastoralists. This has led to an increasing group of ‘drop outs’ who settle in peri-urban areas where they have difficulty to generate an income.
5. Insufficient information was available for detailed cost-efficiency comparisons.
 - For the nutrition interventions, there were many integrated projects where information on cost of individual activities (including economies of scope as a result of integrated interventions) was generally lacking. Also, in this sector there often were two (DG ECHO) funding streams to IPs, one for the food commodities and concomitant logistics, the other for technical backstopping services. A general problem for cost calculations

was that many agencies only billed their marginal cost to DG ECHO as the core running costs were already covered by one or more development donors. For the Blanket Supplementary Feeding programme it was calculated that the average cost level amounted to € 8.62 per beneficiary per month.

- For the emergency food security interventions, the analysis was limited to the projects where final reports were available with sufficiently disaggregated expenditure data. The one-off costs for animal destocking were € 8.74 to € 12.46 per beneficiary household, while for the voucher schemes the costs per household varied between € 17.29 and € 24.10 per month.

6. Coordination of the 2008/09 Kenya drought response took place at national and district level. For nutrition interventions, the Nutrition Technical Forum has played a key role to coordinate the response. There still is a need to improve the nutrition knowledge base. For the overall drought response, the main national coordinating body was the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG), with a strong role for WFP. DG ECHO provided funding to FAO for technical support to and coordination of the agricultural and livelihood sector. As part of the DCM model, there were monthly meetings of the District Steering Groups (DSGs) attended by all main stakeholders.

7. In terms of targeting and coverage, the DG ECHO funded nutrition support response was mainly targeted at five districts with extremely high GAM rates, while presence and capacity of the IPs and their local partner network led to a larger geographical scope for the livelihood support programmes that were based on DCM. In the DG ECHO funded projects, beneficiary figures were much higher for the livelihood support interventions than for the nutrition support (with exception of the new blanket supplementary feeding programme that was designed to increase coverage of feeding in the districts with highest malnutrition rates). While targeting for the nutrition interventions was based on nutrition status or demographic category, beneficiary selection for livelihood support interventions was done through local committees with main focus on ex-pastoralists and (peri-) urban settlers.

8. In terms of effectiveness, most interventions achieved good results:

- From the focus group discussion it appeared that the general food distribution was generally seen to be effective as targeted households did not have to rely on negative coping mechanisms;
- The targeted feeding schemes were effective for treatment of malnutrition but with limited coverage and as such had limited impact on GAM rates at district level;
- The blanket supplementary feeding programme had a much larger coverage and also served to improve the public health services (EPI, deworming, vitamin A supplementation);
- Voucher schemes were rated very high as they both provide choice and add value to the local economy, but for households that did not receive a food ration the support is considered to be too small to cover existing household needs;
- Destocking was effective to keep a steady flow of animal off-take, to provide meat to the communities and to inject cash;
- Deworming was also rated very highly because of its contribution to recovery of small-stock after droughts.

9. Within the DCM model there is a focus on all phases from preparedness to mitigation (often embedded in longer-term livelihood support programmes), while the integrated nutrition model primarily focuses on immediate treatment of malnutrition. DG ECHO funded nutrition projects were focused on the relief phase but also encompassed medium-term interventions that address

some of the underlying causal factors of malnutrition. There currently is no DG ECHO funding stream for a nutrition component in Kenya which encompasses all phases of the drought cycle as a complement to the RDD which focuses on livelihoods and food security.

10. In terms of connectedness, it was found that both models aim at strengthening of GoK structures which is highly important as it assists and motivates GoK personnel at district level and below whereas there is limited investment from the side of GoK in service delivery. The second approach to strengthen connectedness is through community-based drought management which is a key feature within ALRMP and also in most of the projects funded by the DG ECHO Regional Drought Decision. To some extent this approach is also present in the nutrition sector through the recent establishment of the OTP (Outreach Therapeutic Programme) as a part of the IMAM Guideline through which an enormous scaling-up of therapeutic feeding has been realized.

11. The evaluation has resulted in the following conclusions and recommendations:

A. DG ECHO support to the nutrition sector:

- The DG ECHO support to the ASALs for emergency food and nutrition interventions (the latter mainly through an appropriate multi-sectoral approach that included watsan and food security interventions) was substantial and highly relevant given emergency levels of malnutrition and serious gaps in treatment services. The supported projects have facilitated the roll-out of the new GoK Guideline on Integrated Management of Malnutrition and generally managed to achieve good results in line with Sphere criteria.
- The blanket supplementary feeding programme is also rated to have been appropriate and with good geographical targeting. The effectiveness of this approach will need to be assessed based on the results of the monitoring study.
- Nutrition surveillance is important in the ASALS where high malnutrition is a regular phenomenon. There are plan to revise the nutrition surveillance system that exist in the ASALs. The systems currently operated (by MoPHS and by the Ministry of Arid Lands/ALRMP) both have several flaws and are insufficient basis for targeting of humanitarian support. Nutrition surveys now are filling the existing information gap and as such play an important role.
- Although the conditions for the (agro)-pastoralists have improved with the onset of good rains early 2010 which is expected to bring malnutrition levels down quickly, this is not the case for the peri-urban populations (pastoralist drop-outs). They remain in dire conditions living in an environment with poor hygiene conditions, poor access to health services and high overall poverty and dependency on food aid and other social support.

Key strategic recommendations

- Nutrition is one of the core issues in the vulnerable ASAL areas which deserves more continuous attention from a humanitarian donor like DG ECHO stretching beyond the immediate drought relief phase. It is suggested that DG ECHO develops a programme on nutrition support to the ASALs for each of the phases in the drought cycle. The DG ECHO Sahel strategy could serve as a good model for this that can be replicated in the ASALs or the Greater Horn of Africa, adapted to the needs of the different livelihood groups in the ASALs which have different profiles of seasonal nutrition vulnerability.
- To scale up during new droughts in northern Kenya, and to replicate the multi-sectoral nutrition projects as were funded in 2008-09 and the blanket supplementary feeding programme (but limited to the age group of -9 to +24 month only) if coverage of targeted feeding is not yet satisfactory.

Key operational recommendations

- In line with prevailing needs, DG ECHO should continue to support malnutrition treatment by MoPHS (for further roll-out of the IMAM Guideline) as a relief intervention when and where GAM rates remain close to or above emergency levels (irrespective of rainfall in a given year).
- The main focus should be on mitigation and preparedness through continued capacity building for MoPHS staff at district level and below, and through support for community-based nutrition and hygiene education.
- Until targeted supplementary feeding have achieved good coverage rates, it is suggested to DG ECHO or other humanitarian donors to replicate the blanket supplementary feeding programme during new droughts but then to concentrate the support on pregnant and lactating women and children 6-24 months only as these are most vulnerable from a nutrition perspective.
- It should be considered to continue to fund the Nutrition Technical Forum (through UNICEF) for nutrition surveillance work as part of the DG ECHO support for drought preparedness in the ASALs. Opportunities need to be sought for linkage (LRRD) with the EC funding for nutrition information systems in Kenya through the Food Security Thematic Programme ('Support for Nutrition Strategies in East and West Africa'). It is suggested to provide support for improvement of nutrition data quality within the existing sentinel surveillance system operated by the Arid Lands Ministry and also to continue funding for nutrition surveys as part of project-level M&E systems (also including nutrition programme coverage surveys) and for triangulation of nutrition surveillance results.

B. DG ECHO emergency livelihood support:

- A significant proportion of the DG-ECHO funding was utilised for supporting humanitarian interventions and drought cycle management. This included interventions in the livestock sector and water and sanitation. Coupled with continued marginalisation of the ASALs, droughts have led to increases in vulnerability. Customary coping mechanisms are being lost and people increasingly lose access to resources. Two main groups now inhabiting the ASALs are the (agro)-pastoral group and the peri-urban settler group. During droughts, both groups qualify for short term livelihood support for protection and to alleviate stress. A better understanding is needed on how best to target the two groups which each have their specific requirements.
- The DG ECHO interventions are designed to have a short time-frame with a rapid impact and a clear exit strategy. These interventions are not designed to deal with the chronic food insecurity that now widely exists in the ASAL region.
- DG ECHO funding was reasonably balanced to support livelihoods under stress. While cash based responses were few, food aid took up the main proportion of the DG ECHO budget. A growing body of literature however suggests that cash / voucher based support have important advantages over food-aid (cheaper, more flexibility for households to meet their livelihood protection priorities, added value to local markets).
- The linkage of Relief to Recovery and Development was shaped through (1) the collaboration with GoK institutions and (2) community-based drought cycle management. Both are valid approaches that complement each other. A main challenge however exists how best to link government coordination with the administrative division of several ASAL districts. Government development investments as directed by the ASAL policy are also insignificant, hampering progress in LRRD. The community managed drought management approach is not yet uniformly strong across the ASAL region.

- The recent upsurge in good rainfall has brought positive changes in rangeland conditions, but significant challenges remain. As vulnerability persists, recovery requires speeding up rehabilitation interventions in line with the concepts of DCM and LRRD.

Key strategic recommendations

- It is recommended that DG ECHO continues to contribute funding during future droughts in support to humanitarian and food security interventions utilising the framework of DCM. This support should be most prominent during the alarm / relief and recovery phases of the drought cycle and should be phased out at the end of the recovery phase.
- Approaches in drought management need adjustment so that they strategically serve the interests and priorities of different livelihood groups. Improved analysis of the livelihood groups under stress should determine the type of intervention needed, the targeting and the type of transfer mechanisms and the conditionality attached.
- As food insecurity has become a chronic problem in the ASALs, renewed efforts are necessary between DG ECHO, other EC instruments and other donors (in particular World Bank, USAID and DFID) that provide a new momentum to LRRD. Advocacy is required to persuade GoK to commit itself to a significant volume of investments that are in line with the ASAL development policy instituted since 2004.
- The balance between GoK service delivery support and support to NGOs involved in building community based capacity building on drought response is valid. A more prominent role for IPs to act as change agents at community level is recommended.

Operational recommendations

- DG ECHO should proportionally widen its scope and coverage on interventions that are focussed on the survival of the pastoral productivity potential. These include the activities that have been supported under the recent programme but would also include a wider range of non food-based interventions.
- Peri-urban groups in the ASALs find themselves in conditions of severe economic hardship, and this situation is worsened during droughts. Cash-for-work and food-for-assets are proven suitable modalities for these groups.
- Food based and cash based responses are complementary to each other during drought, but it is recommended that DG ECHO supports an increase in the shift towards cash based responses. This can be done through encouraging IPs to follow this trend, and to provide technical advice in this area. Cash and voucher schemes have significant impacts on stabilising purchasing power among the two target groups, and it is recommended that gradually these modalities are expanded during future droughts. IPs should seek orientation and rebuild capacity in order to make this shift possible. Financial institutions and markets need strengthening to minimise risks.
- Operational research is recommended in support of some recommendations made above. Two main themes should be: (1) how to link the two LRRD approaches for achieving improved sustainability and; (2) how best to target needy livelihood groups with appropriate transfer modalities.

1. EVALUATION OF DG ECHO FUNDED ACTIONS IN KENYA

1.1. DG ECHO funded drought response actions in Kenya

12. In line with the Terms of Reference and as further clarified during the briefing in Brussels the scope of this evaluation consists of all DG ECHO funded drought response projects in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) in Kenya for which contracts were signed with Implementing Partners (IPs) during 2008 and 2009. The evaluation does not include DG ECHO support to IDPs, refugees and post-election conflict victims in Kenya. Also, the evaluation does not cover drought preparedness activities; these were studied in two other recent ECHO evaluations¹.

13. Table 1 provides an overview of the decisions and actions covered by this evaluation. The evaluation covers 12 contracts signed in 2008 (11 IPs) and 21 contracts signed in 2009 (19 IPs). Next to the Kenya drought support, DG ECHO also provided funding in 2008-2009 for assistance to refugees and victims of the post-election violence in Kenya (in total € 12.6 million in 2008 and € 7 million in 2009).

Table 1: ECHO decisions covered by this evaluation

Code	Title	Total Budget	Kenya drought response	# projects
Food Aid budget line				
ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01000, 1 January '08 – 30 June '09	Short-term food aid/food security/nutrition/livelihood support	€ 220.0 mio	€ 6.9 mio	5
ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/03000, 1 July '08 – 30 June '09	Food and nutrition support Greater Horn of Africa	€ 40.6 mio	€ 4.0 mio	1
ECHO/-FA/BUD/2009/01000, 1 March '09 – 31 May '10	Food aid Horn of Africa	€ 22.0 mio	€ 5.0 mio	5
ECHO/-FA/BUD/2009/06000, 1 July '09 – 31 December '09	Emergency response to drought in Kenya	€ 8.0 mio	€ 8.0 mio	2
	Sub-total		€ 23.9 mio	13
Additional drought response decisions Greater Horn of Africa / Kenya²				
ECHO/KEN/EDF/2009/01000, 1 July '09 – 31 October '10	Humanitarian Aid Kenya (watsan, destocking, animal health)	€ 8.0 mio	€ 4.0 mio	5
	Sub-total		€ 4 mio	5
Regional Drought Decisions Greater Horn of Africa				
ECHO/-HF/BUD/2008/01000, 1 January '08 – 30 June '09	Regional Drought Decision Greater Horn of Africa*	€ 30.0 mio	€ 13.8 mio	7
ECHO/-HF/BUD/2009/01000, 1 July '09 – 30 June '10	Regional Drought Decision Greater Horn of Africa*	€ 10.0 mio	€ 6.0 mio	9
	Sub-total		€ 19.8 mio	16
	Grand total		€ 47.7 mio	34

* This includes all support from the Regional Drought Decisions including some projects executed in Kenya and neighbouring countries.

14. Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the types of drought response actions that were funded by DG ECHO in Kenya in 2008-2009, many in the form of multi-sectoral integrated projects. During the briefing it was agreed that the main focus of the evaluation would be on nutrition, food assistance, cash & voucher schemes, and emergency livelihood support

¹ AGE (2007), MTE DG ECHO financed actions in the Greater Horn of Africa, Kirchheim/Teck;

AGE (2009), MTE DG ECHO's Regional Drought Decision in the Greater Horn of Africa, Kirchheim/Teck

² At the time of the field mission, another € 13 million (ECHO/-HF/BUD/2009/02000, 1 Nov. '09 - 31 January '11) was in the process of being allocated to IP(s) which also formed part of the Kenya drought response but is not covered by this evaluation.

interventions. Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) activities do not form part of the core body of activities to be evaluated and were only covered in a more general way.

Table 2: Drought response actions funded by DG ECHO in Kenya

	Relief	Recovery	Cross cutting in time (mitigation, preparedness)
Food, nutrition, food security	- General food distribution - Destocking / meat distribution - SFP, TFP - Emergency livelihood support - Cluster coordination	- FFW, CFW - SFP, TFP - Agric / livestock support - Income Generating Activities - Cash & voucher schemes	- Drought contingency planning - Early warning systems - Nutrition surveillance - Cluster coordination - Community preparedness - Risk reduction
Watsan	Water trucking Hygiene promotion	Rehab water systems Hygiene promotion	

Table 3: All drought-related actions in Kenya supported by DG ECHO in 2008 – 2009

IP	Funding Decision			District(s)	Nutrition	GFD / FFW	Cash & Voucher schemes	Emergency livelihood support (incl. destocking)	Watsan
ACF		FA		Mandera, Garissa	X			X	X
CARE-UK	RDD			Moyale, Mandera				X	
Concern		FA		Moyale	X		X		X
COOPI	RDD			Wajir, Mandera				X	X
Cordaid	RDD		EDF	Marsabit, Samburu				X	X
Croix-Rouge Dnk	RDD			Isiolo					X
DanChurchAid	RDD			North Pokot				X	X
FAO	RDD			nationwide					X
GAA	RDD		EDF	Kajiado, Kitui					X
IFRC	RDD			nationwide					
Islamic Relief		FA		Mandera	X				X
Merlin		FA		Wajir	X				
OXFAM-UK	RDD			Wajir, Turkana, nationwide				X	X
SCF-UK		FA		Mandera, Wajir	X		X	X	
UNICEF		FA		Nationwide	X				
VSF-Suisse, VSF-Germany, VSF-Belgium			EDF	Garissa, Marsabit, Isiolo, Wajir, Mandera				X	
WFP		FA		(many districts)	X	X			

1.2. Objectives for the evaluation

15. As specified in the ToR, the main purposes of the evaluation are *`to judge the success of DG ECHO funded projects in alleviating the humanitarian suffering`*, and *`to draw lessons from experience with a view to improving response for future humanitarian crises in Kenya`*.

16. The specific purposes of the evaluation have been defined as follows:

- To establish whether financed activities were successful in alleviating human suffering;
- To compile evidence of best practices;
- To provide operational and strategic recommendations for DG ECHO's future support to humanitarian crises in Kenya.

17. In line with the ToR, the evaluation was based on the regular OECD/DAC evaluation criteria (relevance/ appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness and impact) and the 3Cs criteria adopted in the EU Maastricht Treaty

(complementarity, coordination, coherence). Specific attention was paid to the following key evaluation issues:

Relevance:

- In how far can short-term responses address longer term problems? (Including for nutrition interventions, in how far short-term interventions can address underlying causes of malnutrition, ref. UNICEF conceptual framework?)

Coverage:

- Quality of targeting (geographical targeting; household selection within the community)? How can the coverage be increased?

Effectiveness:

- What is the effectiveness and achievement of the objectives of each relevant funding decision (including comparison of targeted vs. blanket feeding and the different transfer modalities; and cost effectiveness)
- How to maximise the impact for nutrition and other drought response interventions?

Connectedness:

- What is the link between humanitarian response and local system and capacity?

Coordination:

- Coordination between the various decisions, with other donors, etc. Strengths and weaknesses of the Technical Nutrition Forum?

1.3. Methodology for the evaluation

18. The evaluation team consisted of two international consultants and a Kenyan research assistant. The team leader is an experienced evaluator with expertise in emergency food aid, nutrition and household food security. The second team member is a drought management expert with vast experience in Northern Kenya.

19. The briefing in Brussels was held 15-16 April 2010, and field work in Kenya was undertaken from 22 April to 11 May 2010.

20. At Nairobi level, the team met with DG ECHO³, the EC Delegation, DFID and USAID/OFDA and with representatives of 14 IPs for DG ECHO's drought response in Kenya in 2008-2009. The last day of the mission was used for a Debriefing Workshop which served for further validation of findings and for discussion on the various options for future drought relief interventions. The workshop was attended by some DG ECHO representatives and 18 staff from the IPs.

21. Visits to project sites⁴ and 17 focus group discussions (FGDs) with men, women and youth groups on their needs and the impact of the humanitarian interventions on their livelihoods formed the core of the mission. IP field staff was actively involved in the facilitation of the FGDs. This arrangement was aimed at creating ownership of the collected information and also at providing an opportunity for learning.

22. As security constraints impeded visits to sites in North Eastern Province, it was decided to visit Eastern and Rift Valley Province instead. Within the rather limited timeframe for the

³ Meetings with the Technical Assistant for Kenya and some people from the Regional Support Office

⁴ Project visits were paid to: two sites with voucher scheme / watsan activities by Concern-CIFA in Moyale; two health dispensaries with targeted feeding programmes supported by WFP-WVI in Moyale; food-for-assets site supported by WFP-WVI in Moyale; IDP settlement supported by Cordaid-PISP in Marsabit; livestock deworming supported by VSF-Suisse in Isiolo; two general food distribution sites by WFP-Ramati in Samburu; the District Hospital supported by WFP-Ramati and UNICEF in Samburu; destocking and voucher scheme by Cordaid-Codes in Samburu; food-for-work site supported by GAA in Kajiado.

mission, the team managed to visit a good range of project locations in Moyale, Marsabit, Isiolo, Samburu and Kajiado districts. Unfortunately the heavy rainy season across Kenya affected the mission somewhat; flash floods blocked certain roads in the ASALs which resulted in increased travel time and obstructed field visits to some of the planned locations.

23. This report has been structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a short overview of the specific conditions in the arid and semi-arid lands, the pattern of malnutrition in Kenya, and the main GoK responses. Chapter 3 focuses on strategy-related planning and programming issues like coherence, proportionality and relevance/appropriateness of the DG ECHO Kenya drought response. The next chapter focuses on the results obtained through implementation of the DG ECHO (co)-funded actions, with assessment of quality of coordination mechanisms that were supported, and the targeting/coverage, operational efficiency, effectiveness and connectedness of the funded projects (as per Sphere definitions). In these chapters, specific issues are placed in boxes with a green background, lessons learned and best practices are presented in boxes with blue respectively yellow background. The final chapter then gives the main conclusions and recommendations based on the findings in this evaluation.

2. DROUGHT DISASTERS IN THE ASALS IN KENYA

2.1. Context of the Arid and Semi Arid Lands in Kenya

24. DG ECHO drought response actions have largely focused on Arid and Semi Arid Lands in Kenya (ASAL). These are mainly lowland areas, which occupy 80% of Kenya's entire landmass and which have a population of approximately 10 million, compared to the 36 million of Kenya's overall population.

25. Government sources quote high levels of poverty within the ASAL regions as it is estimated that about 60 - 70% of the population live below the poverty line, while 40% of the population are even considered extremely food insecure. The economy of the ASALs is dominated by livestock production, managed through pastoralism. This is especially true for the arid regions; the ecology within the semi-arid districts allows for agro-pastoralism. Within the combined ASAL region there are smaller subsistence groups that depend on fishing, hunting and gathering for their livelihood. The population within towns and settlements is growing. This population is largely disconnected from pastoralism and has different needs and aspirations.⁵

26. The figure below shows how seasonality affects food security in the ASALs. Pastoralist diets include the intake of grains and cereals grown in the highlands. Dependency on grains is highest at the end of the dry season, normally in February/March when consumption of pastoral products, especially of milk is lowest.




Figure 1: Seasonal calendar ASAL region in Kenya⁶

27. Over the past centuries, drought scenarios have been common phenomena in the ASAL regions. Drought remains the main factor in triggering the onset of livelihood failure, but since the early nineties, factors such as rising food prices, increased insecurity, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, a growing population pressure and a general trend of political and economic marginalisation have made the impact more severe and more complex to deal with⁷. Service

⁵ <http://www.fews.net/Pages/country.aspx?gb=ke&l=en>

GoK (2008), Review and analysis of existing drought risk policies and programmes in Kenya, Ministry of State for Special Programmes; GoK (2009), Vision 2030: Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands, Office of the Prime Minister

⁶ Source: FEWSNET/WFP, Kenya Food Security Outlook, October 2008 – March 2009

⁷ <http://www.fao.org/emergencies/home0/hazard-and-emergency-types/complex-emergencies/en/>
Raleigh C (2010), Political Marginalisation, Climate Change and Conflict in African Sahel States

delivery and infrastructure in ASALs are of poor quality and generally under developed. For example, access to health and education services provided by the Government of Kenya (GoK) is lower than in other parts of the country. The livestock and agricultural sectors are poorly developed and government departments are running on low budgets. Endemic livestock diseases generally remain unchallenged due to the lack of committed funding by government⁸. To illustrate the latter: During 2009 the Ministry of Livestock Development was affected by a severe budget cut of Ksh 5.08bn, with drastic consequences for the ASAL regions. A budget cut of this magnitude means a serious setback for any development strategy undertaken by the ministry as well as the service level undertaken^{9,10}. Despite the above, the ASALs in Kenya have a significant potential for development and economic growth¹¹.

28. While the extreme post-election violence in 2008 largely stayed away from the ASALs, the area did suffer from its effects on food security. Food production in Kenya's main agricultural production areas was severely affected resulting into pressures on food commodity markets within the ASAL districts as well. The figure below shows the magnitude of the combined impact of the 2007/08 drought and the post-election violence.




Figure 2: Kenya Food Security Phase Classification - March 2008¹²

29. The Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) produces two reports per year (the Long Rains and Short Rains Assessments – LRA and SRA) that form the basis for allocation of

⁸ OXFAM (2006), Delivering the agenda: Addressing chronic under development in Kenya's Arid Lands. Republic of Kenya (2004) Draft national policy for the sustainable development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands

⁹ <http://allafrica.com/stories/200907201328.html>

¹⁰ In a recent budget speech the minister of finance committed 16 billion Kenya Shillings for the construction of hospitals and 'low cost' schools in ASAL areas and Ksh 200 million for watering holes. This is out of a total budget of Ksh 977bn of which a proportion of Ksh 321bn is reserved for development expenditures at national scale. See: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201006101009.html>

¹¹ Special reference is made to: GoK (2009), Vision 2030: Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands, Office of the Prime Minister. This document outlines a future approach to economic growth and development and, in turn, contains several references to studies that underwrite the economic and development potential in the ASALs.

¹² Source: UN (2008), Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan - Revision, March 2008 (see: <http://ochaonline.un.org/humanitarianappeal/webpage.asp?MenuID=12162&Page=1662>)

general food distribution and other interventions to address short-term and medium to longer term needs. Table 4 below provides an overview of the food sector recommendations over the past years. The sectors that are covered include food, agriculture and livestock, health and nutrition, water, and education. Without exception, in the assessment reports the food sector is the largest part by far in terms of required humanitarian support. For example the LRA of 2009 indicated a need for food aid worth US\$ 353 million against a total required budget of US\$ 521 million. The required budget for identified livestock sector needs was second largest (US\$ 72.7 million)¹³.

Table 4: Number of people requiring general food assistance

Province	SRA '07/'08	LRA '08	SRA '08/'09	LRA ,09	SRA '09/'10
	Mrch – Aug '08	Sept '08 – Feb. '09	Mrch – Aug '09	Sept '09 – Feb. '10	Mrch – Aug `10
Rift Valley	266,349	395,282	671,000	1,055,000	549,000
Eastern	158,950	174,188	1,141,000	1,614,000	417,000
North Eastern	301,687	292,506	413,000	665,000	404,000
Coast	160,407	200,355	357,000	446,000	220,000
Central	-	-	12,000	14,000	-
Total¹⁴	887,393	1,062,331	2,594,000	3,794,000	1,590,000

2.2. Malnutrition patterns and response

30. Like in most developing countries, the system of Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) which are repeated every five years is the most steady and reliable source of information on trends and actual status of the main public health and nutrition indicators in Kenya. Sampling frames are geared towards obtaining reliable estimates of national and province-level averages. DHS data is not meant to provide information as basis for identification of nutrition support needs. The system of district-level nutrition surveys is a more appropriate information source for this purpose (see further under section 3.2). The table below presents the results for the last three DHS surveys.

Table 5: Comparison of DHS results on acute child malnutrition¹⁵

Province	DHS 2008-09		DHS 2003		DHS 1998	
	GAM ¹⁶	SAM ¹⁷	GAM	SAM	GAM	SAM
Nairobi	3.8%	1.5%	4.5%	1.2%	7.1%	3.6%
Central	4.9%	1.1%	4.4%	1.1%	5.6%	1.7%
Coast	10.8%	3.0%	5.7%	0.0%	4.3%	1.0%
Eastern	7.3%	1.4%	4.2%	0.9%	4.7%	0.9%
Nyanza	3.9%	1.5%	2.3%	0.1%	7.0%	1.2%
Rift Valley	8.9%	2.1	7.7%	1.6%	7.4%	1.8%
Western	2.3%	1.0%	4.5%	1.2%	4.6%	0.9%
North Eastern	19.5%	8.3%	26.5%	10.9%	N/A	N/A
National average	6.7%	1.9%	5.6%	1.2%	6.1%	1.4%

31. The Kenyan DHS data indicate that, despite considerable improvement since 2003, for 2008-09 the average global acute malnutrition (GAM) in North Eastern Province (which only consists of districts classified as ASAL) has remained unacceptably high (close to 20%)¹⁸. In Coast, Eastern and to some extent Rift Valley province average acute malnutrition levels have stayed much lower than in North Eastern province but show a gradual increasing trend that is very worrisome. Coast Province is part of the ASAL and in the 2008-2009 DHS survey ranked

¹³ GoK (2009), *The 2009 Long Rains Assessment report*, KFSSG

¹⁴ The calculated totals slightly differ from the totals in the SRA/LRA reports.

¹⁵ Ref: http://www.measuredhs.com/aboutsurveys/search/search_survey_main.cfm?SrvyTp=country

¹⁶ Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM): proportion of children 0-59 months with a Weight-for-Height < -2 Z-score.

¹⁷ Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM): proportion of children 0-59 months with a Weight-for-Height < -3 Z-score.

¹⁸ In most developing countries, the Demographic Health Survey reports are the most reliable source of information on trends and actual status of the main public health and nutrition indicators. Sampling frames are geared towards obtaining reliable estimates of national and province-level averages and do not allow disaggregation at district level.

second in terms of GAM prevalence. It needs to be realized here that the other two provinces with increasing GAM rates both extend from the drought-prone ASAL belt in northern Kenya to the more food secure highlands in the centre and south of the country so even with acceptable average GAM rates at province level there might be pockets where malnutrition is much higher.

32. In all three provinces covered by the DG ECHO financed projects, chronic malnutrition prevalence (which relates to the issue of dietary quality) has remained more or less static since 1998 and stayed close to the national average (not shown in the table)¹⁹.

33. Treatment of acute malnutrition has been strengthened in the most affected ASAL districts as part of the partnership between MoH, UNICEF and WFP for the roll-out of the new Guideline for Integrated Management of Malnutrition (IMAM) adopted mid-2009^{20, 21}. GoK has committed itself to provision of treatment for severe and acute malnutrition through services at district and sub-district hospitals, health dispensaries and through community-based approaches. Under the partnership, UNICEF provides therapeutic foods for treatment of severe acute malnutrition (SAM), non-food commodities and technical assistance while WFP provides the supplies of fortified blended foods for treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM).




Figure 3: District level structures required for IMAM

2.3. Drought response and drought risk reduction approaches

34. Over the past two decades, responses to drought and risk reduction strategies in Kenya have evolved and now are more varied. Drought management is widely practiced in the ASALs

¹⁹ An average level of 35.3% moderate and 14.2% severe stunting in 2008/09 indicates that there is a nation-wide problem in terms of quality of the diet (limited dietary diversity and insufficient consumption of more nutrient-rich commodities).
²⁰ MoMS / MoPHS (2009), National Guideline for Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition, Nairobi, June 2009.
²¹ The MoU was signed mid- 2007. Districts covered are Turkana, Marsabit, Moyale, Isiolo, Samburu, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Tana River and Ijara. In the course of 2009, the partnership has been extended to the southern parts of Eastern Province while discussions are currently on-going about inclusion of Coast Province as well.

through coping strategies employed by indigenous groups. Also there is a range of interventions implemented by a variety of actors and institutions coordinated by GoK.

35. GoK's policy for the ASAL region was developed in 2004 as a practical long-term framework for development which focuses on: (a) diversifying livelihoods; (b) stimulating broad stakeholder participation in identification, planning, implementation and evaluation processes; (c) building institutional and organisational capital; and (d) reducing vulnerability to natural hazards and conflicts through EWS linked response systems with contingency planning and funding to all ASAL districts²².

36. The Drought Cycle Model (DCM) was introduced during the 1990s as a tool to manage drought-related impacts in arid districts of Kenya. The model distinguishes different phases of drought impact, inclusive of the pre-crisis period (alert/alarm phase) and a post-drought recovery phase. Mitigation and preparedness to minimise impact are important in the approach as well as reconstruction and restoring resources. District-level up-to-date early warning systems operated by ALRMP²³ are collecting environmental and socio-economic information that is based on the DCM model. In the ASAL districts, District Steering Groups (DSGs) are charged with reviewing the information and coordinating responses. Community-based targeting is integrated in the model for delivery of services and implementation of response interventions²⁴.




Figure 4: Drought Cycle Management model

2.4. Framework for coordination of humanitarian responses

37. The Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) / Kenya Food Security Meeting (KFSSM)²⁵ is the national body that takes care of coordination of food aid and food security²⁶. The KFSSG also acts as an advisory body to all relevant stakeholders on issues linked to

²² Republic of Kenya (2004), National Policy for the sustainable development of Arid and Semi Arid Lands in Kenya.

²³ Arid Lands Resource Management Project, funded by the World Bank.

²⁴ Acacia, CORDAID, IIRR (2004), Drought Cycle Management: A toolkit for the Greater Horn

²⁵ Ref: <http://www.kenyafoodsecurity.org/mod.php?topic=7>

²⁶ OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) chairs the Kenya Humanitarian Stakeholders Forum which serves as the overarching coordination body for all humanitarian and development partners. OCHA provides support to the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Country Team for the transition of the cluster approach to national working groups or sectors.

drought management. It supports a multi-agency approach to drought management which involves key ministries, UN agencies, donors and NGOs with meetings on a monthly basis²⁷. The mandate focuses on the following main areas: (1) planning and coordination of rapid crisis responses; (2) capacity building of government and national NGO/CBO structures in terms of disaster management; (3) contingency planning and preparedness, (4) promotion of long term food security; and (5) early warning information collection and analysis. There are various sectoral working groups ('clusters') under the KFSSG: water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock, health and nutrition. More details on the coordination mechanisms co-funded by DG ECHO are given in section 4.1.

38. With funding from USAID, FEWSNET, WFP/VAM, ALRMP and the Ministry of Agriculture produce bi-annual Food Security Outlook bulletins²⁸ which integrates the Integrated Food Security & Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC) methodology²⁹.

²⁷ <http://www.kenyafoodsecurity.org/inside.php?articleid=49>

²⁸ Ref: <http://www.kenyafoodsecurity.org/mod.php?topic=38>

²⁹ The IPC methodology development and current roll-out are also supported by DG ECHO; this does not form part of the current evaluation.

3. STRATEGY ASSESSMENT OF FUNDED ACTIONS

39. This chapter reviews the strategies that have been adopted by DG ECHO in its Kenya drought response. The main emphasis is on the coherence and proportionality of the DG ECHO funding in comparison with the support provided by GoK and the other main donors involved in the ASALs, and on the relevance of the funded actions in terms of short-term and longer-term needs in the ASALs.

3.1. Coherence and proportionality

*ALNAP definition: **Coherence** is the need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human-rights considerations.*

3.1.1. Coherence and coordination between donors

40. The new EC Communication on Humanitarian Food Assistance^{30,31} (HFA) forms the core policy base for assessment of the internal coherence of EC funded emergency food security interventions, building on the overall principles for EC humanitarian assistance (see EC Regulation 1257/96³²). As stated in the Communication, in principle, HFA should fall within the limits of the humanitarian mandates and regulations and can be provided in situations (a) where emergency rates of mortality or acute malnutrition are reached or exceeded as a result of inadequate food consumption, and (b) where compromised livelihoods or extreme coping strategies arising from or leading to inadequate food consumption pose a severe threat to life or a risk of extreme suffering. EC humanitarian instruments are not seen to have a comparative advantage for addressing chronic food insecurity, apart from some specific situations of immediate risk where other more appropriate actors are absent or unable/unwilling to act, and where positive impact can be expected within a limited timeframe (clear exit strategy). As mentioned in the HFA, disaster risk reduction (DRR) should be mainstreamed within HFA interventions, e.g. for preparedness, mitigation and prevention.

41. One of the main findings in this evaluation is that the DG ECHO Kenya drought response is fully coherent with the new HFA:

- A substantial part of the DG ECHO funded drought response actions in Kenya in 2008/09 was focused on food and nutrition interventions through NGOs and UNICEF³³ (€ 10.4 million) and on provision of general food distribution together with targeted/blanket supplementary feeding through WFP (€ 13.5 million). Many of the NGO projects were of an integrated multi-sectoral nature with a package of interventions both for treatment of malnutrition and for addressing (some) of the underlying causes (food vouchers, nutrition education, income generating activities, livestock support, agricultural inputs, watsan). Together, the funding for food aid and integrated nutrition projects forms 50% of the DG ECHO Kenyan drought response funding for which contracts have been signed with IPs³⁴.

³⁰ EC (2010), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Humanitarian Food Assistance, COM(2010)126, Brussels, 31 March 2010; http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/foodaid/HFA_Communication_220310.pdf

³¹ While logically this particularly refers to the actions funded by DG ECHO Food Aid Decisions, other DG ECHO funded interventions on humanitarian food assistance should also adhere to the same policy framework.

³² <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996R1257:EN:HTML>

³³ Funding to ACF, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, Merlin, SCF-UK, UNICEF, and WFP

³⁴ This overview does not include the remaining € 13 million of the 2008/09 DG ECHO decisions on Kenyan drought response that currently is being allocated.

The nutrition component within these projects focused on support during the relief phase for treatment of malnutrition as a result of drought plus support for nutrition surveillance. In line with the EC Communication on HFA, the main focus for these activities was on districts with emergency levels of acute malnutrition³⁵. DG ECHO also provided funds to UNICEF and WFP for provision of therapeutic/supplementary foods to treat malnutrition through health facilities in a much larger geographical area.

- The various resource transfer modalities (food, cash, vouchers, services) funded by DG ECHO all match well with the EC HFA policy. The Communication indicates that emergency food assistance may utilise a wider set of tools. Next to direct provision of food, these may include *‘the transfer or provision of relevant services, inputs or commodities, cash or vouchers, skills or knowledge’*. The policy supports the protection and strengthening of livelihoods under threat due to reverse negative coping mechanisms with negative short-term or longer-term livelihood consequences. It is recognised that there is a need for timely, early interventions and that the response cannot wait until malnutrition rates rise significantly.

42. It is found that the evaluated DG ECHO programmes on nutrition and livelihood support are coherent (consistent and complementary) with other EC instruments that are tackling transient and chronic food insecurity in Kenya. The most relevant programmes for the ASAL areas that are funded by the other EC instruments are:

- The European Development Fund (the plan for 2006-2010 includes € 17.7 million for the Drought Management Initiative (DMI³⁶) aimed at the ASAL areas which includes € 8.5 million for the Drought Contingency Fund (DCF³⁷) and € 4 million for LRRD activities³⁸).
- The Food Facility (in total € 31 million for two years, various programmes to support agriculture and livestock keeping in arid and semi-arid areas)
- The Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP; various projects on improvement of livestock farming systems in Kenya across the various drought cycle phases; € 21 million for ‘Support for Nutrition Strategy in West & East Africa’ that includes support to Kenya for nutrition information systems).

43. There is good coherence between the DG ECHO assistance and the drought response support from non-EC donors. Most of this other support was also focused on a combination of nutrition and (emergency) livelihood support in the ASAL areas. DG ECHO was a main donor in the 2008/09 Kenya drought response, second in size only to USAID (which provided a combination of contributions to WFP and OFDA humanitarian assistance). DFID was the third humanitarian donor to Kenya (food aid for Somali refugees, nutrition, watsan and EPI in Turkana) while the World Bank through its ALRMP project is the main donor for food security and livelihoods in the ASALs. These other donors are also involved in medium-term projects in the ASALs³⁹.

³⁵ Some NGO nutrition support projects (treatment of malnutrition combined with emergency food security and watsan components) were funded in districts with non-emergency GAM rates (Moyale, Garissa).

³⁶ The DMI funding was contributing to the National Drought Contingency Fund. This is a ‘multi-donor’ fund where GoK and development partners channel their funding for rapid onset interventions linked to DCM.

³⁷ The drought contingency fund which is channelled through the ALRMP provides support to the DSGs and for initiating timely responses linked to the DCM model. It is used for a wide range of interventions: (1) Emergency livestock purchase, animal slaughter and meat distribution; (2) Food and cash for work programmes; (3) Veterinary interventions; (4) Human health interventions; (5) Water supplies; (6) Education (keeping children at school); (7) Rapid response interventions to conflict; (8) Protection of national parks and reserves for grazing; (9) Seed distribution; (10) Stockpiling cereals; (11) Supplementary feeding of livestock; (11) Tree planting and (12) Rapid needs assessments.

³⁸ Source: GoK / EC (2008), Annual review of the ACP – EC partnership agreement and other cooperation activities

³⁹ 3-year USAID-funded food security programme in North Eastern and Eastern provinces; 4-year DFID-funded Hunger Safety Net Programme in Mandera, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir.

44. Next to the official coordination through the KFSSG / KFSM and its working groups, USAID, DFID and DG ECHO come together on a regular basis for an informal meeting to exchange information e.g. which agencies, sectors and geographical areas are supported by each donor.

45. The Kenyan drought response support provided by DG ECHO is also fully coherent with the two main GoK policies in relation to drought and malnutrition in the country (see chapter 2): (a) Integrated Management of Acute Malnutrition (IMAM); (b) Drought Cycle Management (DCM).

3.1.2. Proportionality

46. Unfortunately, the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) documents for Kenya for 2008 – 2009 do not allow disaggregation of funding requirements for support to refugees, to post-election violence victims and for drought relief in the ASALs. Nevertheless, analysis of the CAP provides a good general background to assess the proportionality of the DG ECHO Kenya drought response.

Table 6: Funding requirements Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response 2008 & 2009⁴⁰

CAP sector	2008 – revised (US \$)	2009 (US\$)
Food	84.4 million	255.9 million
<i>(of which for UN: WFP)</i>	<i>(84.4 million)</i>	<i>(255.9 million)</i>
Nutrition	5.1 million	16.2 million
<i>(of which for UN: UNICEF, WHO)</i>	<i>(4.8 million)</i>	<i>(5.7 million)</i>
<i>(of which for NGOs)</i>	<i>(0.3 million)</i>	<i>(10.5 million)</i>
Early Recovery & Food Security	32.5 million	26.8 million
<i>(of which for UN - FAO, UNDP, ILO, IOM, UNIDO)</i>	<i>(17.4 million)</i>	<i>(12.4 million)</i>
<i>(of which for NGOs)</i>	<i>(15.1 million)</i>	<i>(14.4 million)</i>
WASH	10.4 million	15.4 million
<i>(of which for UN - UNICEF)</i>	<i>(4.0 million)</i>	<i>(3.3 million)</i>
<i>(of which for NGOs)</i>	<i>(6.4 million)</i>	<i>(12.1 million)</i>
Other sectors and overall coordination	56.6 million	261.5 million
TOTAL FUNDING REQUESTED	189.0 million	575.8 million
TOTAL FUNDING OBTAINED	184.1 million (97.4%)	534.5 million (92.8%)

Notes on the Kenya CAPs 2008 and 2009

- The Kenya appeals have been very well funded⁴¹
- In 2009, total humanitarian funding request was threefold that of 2008.
- In the two CAPs, food aid by far is the largest sector, representing 45% of funds required for 2008 and for 2009.
- Requested funds for nutrition have increased substantially from US\$ 5.1 million in 2008 to US\$ 16.2 in 2009. In relative terms however, for both years the nutrition sector stayed at 2.8% of the total appeal. The increase in requirements for 2009 was mainly caused by NGO nutrition projects; amounts requested by UNICEF largely stayed the same.
- Surprisingly, the funding requests for early recovery and food security decreased from US\$ 32.5 million in 2008 to US\$ 26.8 million in 2009. This means a relative decrease in CAP funding requirement for this sector, from 17% of the total appeal in 2008 to a mere 4.7% of the total appeal in 2009.
- Water, sanitation and hygiene funding requirements slightly increased, mainly due to higher funding needs for NGO projects in this sector. In relative terms, the funding requirement for the WASH sector decreased from 5.5% of the total appeal in 2008 to 2.7% of the total appeal in 2009.

⁴⁰ See: UN (2008), *Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan – Revision*, March 2008; UN (2009), *Kenya Emergency Humanitarian Response Plan – Revision*, July 2009

⁴¹ Further scrutiny of the Reliefweb page on Appeals and Funding reveals that the food aid sector in 2008 and 2009 was very well funded (86% of the requested budget in 2008, 100% in 2009) while the nutrition and WASH sector both reached about 65% funding in each of the two years. Early recovery and food security was not well funded, amounting to around 30% -35%.

47. The Reliefweb page on appeals and funding for Kenya indicates that both in 2008 and 2009, the EC (13% in 2008, 7.7% in 2009) ranked second after the US (29.2% in 2008, 35.9% in 2009)⁴².

48. In total for the years 2008 and 2009, the DG ECHO Kenya drought response amounted to 6.3%⁴³ of the funding requirements as stated in the two CAPs. However, the meaning of this figure is limited as the CAPs are also including support to refugees and victims of the post-election violence in Kenya. If the DG ECHO assistance for these target groups in Kenya and the remaining € 13 million for emergency food assistance are added, DG ECHO provided 10.5% of the total budget requested in the two CAPs.

49. DG ECHO funding for the 2008-2009 Kenya drought response (€ 47.8 million) was considerably higher than the funds provided by the other EC instruments for northern Kenya.

50. The evaluation did not manage to assess the proportionality of the DG ECHO Kenya drought support vis-à-vis government budgets for the ASALs. The CAP appeals did not include any GoK funding requests and the evaluation team did not manage to get hold of information on GoK budgets for the ASALS. Both for assessment of proportionality of the DG ECHO Kenya drought response and for identification of LRRD opportunities (see section 4.5) it would be highly useful to have access to information on trends in GoK's own funding for nutrition (roll-out of IMAM) and for drought cycle management.

3.2. Relevance and appropriateness

*ALNAP definition: **Relevance** is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local needs and priorities⁴⁴. **Appropriateness** is the tailoring of humanitarian activities to local needs, increasing ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness accordingly.*

51. Over the past decade, northern Kenya has been affected by very frequent droughts that were severe in nature (1999/2000, 2003/04, 2005/06, 2008/09⁴⁵). Obviously this has led to an erosion of coping strategies in the (agro-) pastoralist populations that used to be extremely resilient. However, in the ASALs, poverty and vulnerability affect livelihoods differently. In the Kenya context, pastoralism is practiced in all of the ASAL districts, and a more pro-active role of stakeholders at the national level has ensured that the economics of pastoralism in Kenya are better understood than before. It is also recognised that the diversity between the malnutrition patterns⁴⁶ and livelihood support needs of pastoral and peri-urban population requires a disaggregated policy response⁴⁷:

- While (agro)-pastoral groups run into problems during extended drought periods, this is largely the result of a falling 'terms of trade' when animal production fails, animal mortality increases⁴⁸ and animal prices and –markets collapse. The resulting food insecurity can be

⁴² See: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fts.nsf/doc105?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=ken&yr=2008>

⁴³ 8.0% if the remaining € 13 million of the 2008/2009 DG ECHO decisions for the Kenya drought response is also included in the calculation.

⁴⁴ The original ALNAP definition also includes a reference to the relevance of the project from the perspective of donor policies. However, as it seems more logical, this issue has been taken up under coherence (section 3.1).

⁴⁵ In January 2009, GoK declared that Kenya was suffering from a national disaster.

⁴⁶ The ACF nutrition surveillance in Mandera identified that acute malnutrition was very high throughout the year among the riverine population groups while there was more seasonal variation for the pastoralists and overall somewhat better conditions among the urban population. See: ACF (2009), Food Security and Nutrition Surveillance in NEP, Key Results and Recommendations

<http://ochaonline.un.org/kenya/kenya/SectoralWorkingGroups/NutritionWG/tabid/4444/language/en-US/Default.aspx>

⁴⁷ OXFAM (2006), Delivering the agenda: Addressing chronic under development in Kenya's Arid Lands. OXFAM briefing paper; GoK (2009), Vision 2030: Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands, Office of the Prime Minister

⁴⁸ Although a certain caution is needed as the figures are mostly subjective and not free of error, very high livestock mortality rates were reported in Samburu Central and Laikipia North Districts resulting from the 2008-2009 drought. These high rates (57-

very severe leading to high peaks in need for support and high peaks of malnutrition. The falling terms of trade mostly affect pastoral groups that have less diversified livelihoods and depend almost entirely on livestock production⁴⁹. But pure pastoralists with animals are generally better off than those who have settled around towns. Food security conditions generally improve again with the onset of rains, the return of pastures and the restoration of markets. Malnutrition usually stays at elevated (although not necessarily emergency) levels, which is related to limited access to health services (especially for the mobile population groups), insufficient environmental health (water, sanitation and hygiene) leading to frequent illness, the heavy burden on pastoralist women, and child feeding practices (including lack of exclusive breastfeeding)^{50, 51}.

- The peri-urban population mainly consists of those who left pastoralism ('drop outs'). Almost any larger settlement or town in the Kenya ASALs has a significant proportion of these ex-pastoralists which forms the major and economically most vulnerable proportion of settlement population. They usually depend on food aid, casual employment, petty trade and begging for food. Throughout the seasons and both in years of good and bad rainfall, many of these people suffer from a scarcity of economic opportunities. Poverty and vulnerability here is associated with high unemployment and a general lack of access to resources. As such, livelihood support for urban settlers requires longer-term interventions which generally are beyond the scope of humanitarian aid as the DG ECHO mandate only allows for immediate and intermediate interventions⁵². The settlers are of particular concern from a nutrition point of view. Many former pastoralists have limited access to milk and meat but have not been able to adapt their diets and now mainly subsist on cereals and sugar⁵³. Data from Turkana indicate that severe acute malnutrition is strongly associated with crowded settled areas (e.g. the central division) and poor hygiene and sanitation⁵⁴. Also the settled population suffers from inadequate access to health services, as even in and around towns there are few qualified health personnel in the ASAL areas and drugs supply systems often do not function well. *'The contribution of poor public health on the rates is clear. Without sufficient investments and capacity, longer terms efforts to integrate treatment of acute malnutrition into the existing primary health care system will be challenging'*⁵⁵.

3.2.1. Provision of nutrition treatment support

52. There is an on-going discussion on the appropriateness of nutrition treatment support in the ASALs. While it is sometimes argued that 'chronically' high levels of wasting should be seen as 'normal' in some protracted crises in the Horn of Africa (including in the ASAL areas in Kenya), the prevailing opinion is that GAM rates above 15% indicate a need for humanitarian assistance and that this threshold can and should serve as the norm to determine the severity of

65% for cattle, 62-65% for sheep, lower rates for goats and camels) represent a significant economical loss to the communities affected. Ref. ILRI, (2010).

⁴⁹ In the Kenya context, these groups are particularly found in the more arid regions of the ASALs including parts of Turkana, Marsabit, Isiolo, Samburu, Mandera, Wajir and Garissa.

⁵⁰ Grobler-Tanner C (2006), Understanding nutrition data and the causes of malnutrition in Kenya, FEWSNET, Nairobi, September 2006 (<http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/1001144.pdf>)

⁵¹ Grobler-Tanner states that other causal factors are; (a) the practice at times of drought to restrict food consumption for women in favor of the children; (b) the believe that if pregnant women eat too much this will result in a large baby and make delivery complicated; (c) sub-optimal child care due to the very heavy work burden of most women who engage in pastoral care of animals, acquiring food, collecting water and firewood, as well as income generating activities; and (d) the practice of early marriage of girls leading to early first delivery.

⁵² The 2009 RDD evaluation stresses the need for DG AIDCO and DG DEV to focus more on diversification of livelihoods out of pastoralism through micro-finance schemes and support to agro-pastoralism. Currently, DG AIDCO funding is focussed on the DMI as it's budget contributed €22M to the DMI and €10M to the Drought Contingency Fund.

⁵³ SC-UK & VSF-Suisse (2009), Nutrition, Food Security and Livelihoods integrated support for vulnerable households in the North Eastern Province and the Rift Valley Province of Kenya, Final Report to DG ECHO (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01044).

⁵⁴ Grobler-Tanner (2006), see above.

⁵⁵ Grobler-Tanner (2006), p. 12.

the situation⁵⁶. It is true that within the ASALs, in the past years malnutrition in some of the districts has remained at a very high level (Global Acute Malnutrition – GAM⁵⁷ – from 20% to 30%). As shown in Table 7 below, GAM rates were above 15% in over half of the districts where DG ECHO funded drought response actions were implemented. As can be seen in table 7, the geographical pattern of malnutrition prevalence in 2008 – 2009 is in line with findings of surveys undertaken in 2000, another year with a major drought peak in Kenya⁵⁸. However, the very extreme malnutrition levels that were encountered in 2000 (GAM rates up to around 45% in some of the districts) did not occur in 2008 and 2009.

Table 7: Malnutrition rates in districts with DG ECHO funded drought response programmes

Province	District	2000 ⁵⁹		2008 ⁶⁰		2009	
		GAM	SAM	GAM	SAM	GAM	SAM
Rift Valley	Turkana	21.3% - 46.8%	4.6% - 19.5%	22.5%	3.5%	20.0%	N/A
	Samburu	18.3% - 27.6%	1.9% - 3.7%	14.7%	1.5%	22.2%	5.6%
	Pokot	N/A	N/A	15%*	1.5%*	12.7%	3.7%
Eastern	Kajiado	19.6%	7.9%	10%*	1%*	11.5%	1.8%
	Marsabit	25.1% - 43.5%	3.4% - 6.7%	16%	2.2%	20.0%	3.7%
	Moyale	8.1% - 18.7%	1.5% - 5.8%	9.3%	1.5%	N/A	N/A
	Isiolo	N/A	N/A	14.9%	1.7%	N/A	N/A
	Kitui	N/A	N/A	6%	0.5%	8.9%	1.5%
North Eastern	Mandera	17.2% - 39.6%	2.1% - 12.1%	20.3% - 27.9%	1.0% - 2.0%	19.8% - 32.3%	1.1% - 7.2%
	Wajir	21.2% - 32.6%	3.5% - 7.6%	17.3%	1.5%	19.1% - 25.3%	2.8% - 4.6%
	Garissa	20.7% - 27.2%	6.6% - 10.0%	13.9%	1.5%	N/A	N/A

*Estimates

53. The Blanket Supplementary Feeding programme (BSFP) is an interesting approach that is rather new in Kenya. The programme was established in response to strong advocacy from some key nutrition partners in Kenya, and fully funded by DG ECHO. Based on a short literature review, the following remarks can be made on the relevance of the programme:

- As stated in the MSF Nutrition Guidelines, '*the objective of blanket feeding (coverage of all members of specified vulnerable groups regardless of their nutritional status) is to act as a temporary means of covering for inadequate general food distributions thereby preventing immediate deterioration in nutritional status*⁶¹. This was indeed the case in northern Kenya where the GFD only provides 75% rations with recurrent breaks in the food pipeline. Another factor that justifies the choice for a blanket approach is that in the ASALs targeted supplementary feeding programmes are not reaching sufficient coverage rates.
- The Sphere standard on general nutrition support for at-risk groups mentions the following potential target groups: children aged 6-24 months, pregnant and lactating women, adolescent girls, the elderly, and families with chronically ill members⁶². The BSFP is not fully in line with Sphere as it targets children below five years of age. The programme could be made more relevant and cost-efficient by a more targeted approach on children below two years of age only⁶³. The other target group of pregnant and lactating women is in line with

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ GAM is measured as <-2 Z-score Weight-for-Height. As stated in the most recent review of nutrition indicators, weight-for-Height based on the WHO classification still is the most widely accepted nutritional indicator for emergencies. The Weight-for-Height reflects severe recent or current events like acute food insecurity or famine and/or outbreaks of diseases like diarrhoea or measles. Ref: Young H & S Jaspars (2009), Review of Nutrition and Mortality Indicators for the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC): Reference Levels and Decision-making, UNSCN/IPC, September 2009.

⁵⁸ In 2000, Kenya experienced a very serious drought and in December of that year, 4 million people received food assistance.

⁵⁹ Information retrieved from pfeda.univ-lille1.fr/Ethiop/Docs01/0130unicef.doc

⁶⁰ Information on 2008 provided by UNICEF Kenya (Nutrition Technical Forum Preparedness & Planning Matrix)

⁶¹ Kam, S van der (2000), 'Revised MSG Nutrition Guidelines II', Field Exchange 11, December 2000 (<http://fex.ennonline.net/11/revised.aspx>)

⁶² The Sphere Project (2004), Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, Geneva, 2004, p. 140-4

⁶³ The new WFP Nutrition Improvement Approach also emphasizes that preventive nutrition interventions should focus on the short but critical period from conception to two years
<http://home.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp214222.pdf>.

Sphere and nutritional vulnerability. *'The critical periods of pregnancy and lactation and the first two years of life pose special nutritional challenges because these are when nutrition requirements are greatest and when these population subgroups, in many parts of the world, are most vulnerable to inadequate caring behaviours, inadequate access to health services, and inappropriate feeding practices.'*⁶⁴

3.2.2. Addressing the underlying causes of malnutrition

54. Past experience has made it clear that food aid and nutrition support for malnourished individuals is highly relevant in the immediate relief phase but often not sufficient to bring malnutrition levels down below emergency levels. As favoured by Sphere minimum nutrition standards⁶⁵ there is a need for an integrated multi-sectoral approach⁶⁶ that should build on a contextual analysis of trends in nutritional status, underlying causes / aggravating factors and seasonal influences. For a real impact on nutrition conditions, relief and recovery interventions should also aim to (a) address food security / livelihood bottlenecks; (b) ensure access to safe water supply and sanitation; (c) ensure access to basic health care for mothers and young children; and (d) promote appropriate complementary feeding, hygiene and overall child care.

Within the given limits of short-term funding, most of the NGO IPs for the 2008/09 DG ECHO drought response⁶⁷ indeed followed an integrated approach with multi-sectoral packages⁶⁸ of interventions that encompassed (a) treatment of malnutrition; (b) watsan components (ACF, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief); (c) voucher schemes (ACF, Concern Worldwide, CARE, Islamic Relief, CORDAID, SCF-UK); (d) cash transfers (mainly through animal destocking; VSFs, CORDAID, OXFAM)⁶⁹; and (e) support to animal production systems– inclusive of deworming of animals, subsidies on vet drugs (VSFs, CORDAID). A comparison with the listing in the previous paragraph reveals that all funded activities are very relevant for addressing existing needs and that health care was not part of the funded drought response package. Two IPs for DG ECHO in the ASALs were engaged in longer programmes for support to primary health care systems in the ASALs (SC-UK in Mandera and Wajir; OXFAM GB in Turkana). In terms of scale, most of these interventions were much smaller in coverage compared to the combined food assistance responses. In the Kenya context, cash/voucher schemes have been used earlier in slow-onset emergencies such as drought, and in particular to facilitate early recovery, smoothing the transition from 'relief' to 'recovery'. OXFAM GB and SC-UK have been involved in the delivery of unconditional cash transfers. CRS have promoted voucher schemes. Also cash has been used in social protection programmes in government managed, donor sponsored schemes.

55. The focus group discussions revealed that the most important area of need is water provision and that this was not sufficiently addressed in the Kenya drought response (in terms of coverage and/or scale)⁷⁰. The main emphasis was on water trucking and provision of fuel subsidies to

⁶⁴ World Bank (2006), Repositioning Nutrition as Central to Development: A Strategy for Large-Scale Action, Washington, 2006, p. 56

⁶⁵ The Sphere Project (2004), Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, Geneva, 2004

⁶⁶ Grobler-Tanner C (2006), Understanding nutrition data and the causes of malnutrition in Kenya, FEWSNET, Nairobi, September 2006; see: <http://www.fews.net/docs/Publications/1001144.pdf>

⁶⁷ This refers to the total body of projects funded under the RDD, the food aid budget line and the additional DG ECHO drought response decisions.

⁶⁸ Or support packages that were complementary with other support provided in the ASALs.

⁶⁹ Another form of cash-based support not supported by DG ECHO is implemented by WFP in their Food-for-Assets programme.

⁷⁰ The FGD feedback indicated that water needs had ranked highest.

reduce or temporarily scrap water access fees to vulnerable groups utilising borehole systems⁷¹. Especially the watering of animals benefitted from this exercise. FGD feedback indicated that despite the high costs of water tankering, the economic gains by keeping breeding stock alive at grazing lands are well worth the effort^{72,73}.

56. Other areas of need that were highlighted in the FGDs were supply of animal feed and seeds distribution. In the discussions in the communities that were visited it was stressed that there is a need for grass seeds and seeds for food crops (one of the respondents said that *‘four years of drought in row has killed all the seeds’*). During the 2008/09 drought, there were no DG ECHO sponsored animal feed interventions but a GoK scheme implemented by the Ministry of Livestock Development (MoLD) distributed hay and animal supplementary feeding during two successive phases (July–September ‘09, October–December ‘09). Findings of a recent ILRI study indicate a low success rate of this action due to mainly logistical and targeting bottlenecks of the project, which appeared to have a top-down approach during implementation. Nevertheless the provision of supplementary feeding is highly significant to protect breeding stock during droughts and it would be worth to pilot the intervention in areas where these can be community managed⁷⁴.

57. Some examples of specific best practices in terms of relevance and appropriateness of the different nutrition and livelihood support activities are presented here:

Best practice: Targeted supplementary feeding tailored to local needs

In Moyale, Concern operated a well-designed integrated nutrition response package. The nutrition component in the project had a strong focus on capacity building of staff from 18 health facilities (hospitals and dispensaries run by MoPHS and the Diocese of Marsabit) for roll-out of the new IMAM guideline. WFP and UNICEF and their IPs provided the health facilities with food commodities and other supplies for treatment of malnutrition treatment. This meant that Concern could fully focus on technical backstopping which was the area of work where the agency had a comparative advantage because of its active involvement in the Nutrition Technical Forum working group at national level for development of the IMAM Guideline. All of the covered health facilities were also supported by WFP and UNICEF. The project did not only focus on facility-based services but also incorporated out-patient therapeutic treatment in the communities (9 outreach sites for severely malnourished children and 12 sites for community-based treatment of moderate malnutrition). Although the project duration was not long enough to ensure longer-term improvement in the MoPHS services, the intensive training has boosted the morale and motivation of the health staff. Also the nutrition component in the project has helped to sensitize the communities about malnutrition which has resulted in high demand for nutrition services.

⁷¹ These only work well if there are strong and transparent community management structures that can handle the subsidies well and avoid fraudulent practices (ILRI 2010).

⁷² . See also: Akilu, Y and Wekesa, M (2002). Drought livestock and livelihoods: Lessons for the 1999 – 2001 emergency response in Kenya. Humanitarian practice network paper 40. ODI London

⁷³ ILRI (2010) suggests that water tankering primarily benefits people, but is difficult to distinguish if humans or livestock are the main consumers of these interventions. Especially in Marsabit this intervention was considered effective, though at the same time controversially considered to get out of hand proportionally, due to the significant increase in settlements that had insufficient / unreliable permanent water sources in the first place.

⁷⁴ ILRI (2010), An assessment of the response to the 2008 – 2009 drought in Kenya. A report to the European Union Delegation to the Republic of Kenya

Best practice: Support to development of national guidelines on malnutrition treatment

The DG ECHO funding has been very relevant support to assist the roll-out of the IMAM Guideline on treatment of malnutrition. More specifically, DG ECHO has contributed to the implementation of the IMAM guideline in a threefold way: (a) through funding of UNICEF technical support to MoH, both in the form of deployment of field nutritionists⁷⁵ and through NGO partners; (b) through funding for the 2008 WFP EMOP which included targeted supplementary feeding through MoH structures; and (c) through direct funding to NGO partners for technical support to the District Nutrition Officer and the health dispensaries in the district for the targeted supplementary feeding programmes and for work with community mother care groups and community health volunteers⁷⁶.

Best practice: Voucher schemes

Feedback received from the IPs and from beneficiary communities as part of the focus group discussions indicates that the voucher schemes have some significant advantages over general food distribution in terms of relevance and appropriateness including: (1) choice (including the option to buy locally produced meat and milk in some projects) and priority setting matching individual household needs, (2) a more cost-effective way of distributing commodities (The evaluation found that monthly expenditures per beneficiary household of voucher schemes were between € 17 – 24)⁷⁷ (3) relatively low costs involved in the distribution process, (4) multiplier effects as local markets and trade benefit from funding spent locally. Another advantage of cash-based support that was mentioned is that surpluses can be invested on longer term livelihood security strategies. These signals are backed up by an increasing volume of literature^{78, 79}.

Best practice: Emergency destocking

‘Humanitarian-driven animal destocking’ - the type of destocking done under the DG ECHO response programme – by nature can only be a limited intervention that is usually implemented late in the drought cycle when animals are already under severe stress⁸⁰. Destocking is generally done as a ‘last resort’ intervention to obtain at least some returns from animals that have declined in health and economic value due to a continued drought scenario and are unlikely to survive the drought. Where animals are traded under subsidised market conditions⁸¹ like in most destocking schemes, they provide an immediate return to the seller. A secondary objective for destocking is provision of a food source for institutional feeding or for distribution in the community (from the meat of the animals that had been exchanged). During the focus group discussions in the visited communities and from discussions with the staff of the IPs that were visited it became clear that destocking is widely seen as relevant and appropriate to meet the needs of the pastoralist communities at the peak of drought. Sometimes it was remarked however that the impact could have been bigger if more animals would have been bought per household. In most of the projects funded by DG ECHO, small stock was purchased for slaughtering and the meat was then distributed to vulnerable households. Some destocking schemes were based on commercial purchase of animals by traders under a subsidiary scheme that mainly focussed on covering transportation costs. They were then sold on to markets outside the drought affected area^{82,83}.

⁷⁵ GoK intends to employ nutritionists in all districts, eventually at division level as well. In ‘08 and ‘09 UNICEF provided funding to MoH to deploy 30 field nutritionists in ASAL districts, to support delivery of essential nutrition services in rural areas. Intention was for GoK to take over from January ‘10. Unfortunately this hasn’t happened and the posts were discontinued.

⁷⁶ In order to achieve good outreach / case finding, various nutrition partners decided to provide incentive payments to the Community Health Volunteers. These payments however can only be limited to the timeframe of the project. Once the incentive is discontinued, it can negatively affect the motivation to serve the community.

⁷⁷ See also cost efficiency analysis of voucher schemes on p. 30.

⁷⁸ SCUK (2010), Delivering money: Cash transfer mechanisms in emergencies / ECHO (2009), The use of cash and vouchers in humanitarian crises. DG ECHO funding guidelines / Horn Relief (2007), A practical guide to cash based response in emergency Nicholson, N. (2009), Lessons learned from the post election violence early recovery programme in Kenya 2008-2009. / European Commission Humanitarian Aid / WFP (2006), Cash and voucher transfers for food security and nutrition: Emerging insights and knowledge gaps from WFP’s experience / UNICEF (2007), A review of UNICEF’s role in cash transfers to emergency affected populations / Harvey (2007), Cash based responses in emergencies. HPG report 24. Pearson, UNICEF Kenya (2006) The evolution of the government of Kenya cash transfer programme for vulnerable children between 2002 to 2006 and prospects for nationwide scale-up. Farrington J, P Harvey & R Slater (2005), Cash transfers in the context of pro-poor growth. ODI, London.

⁷⁹ The increased volume of literature significantly underline the role of cash transfers in the timely protection of livelihoods and analysis shows that the ratio of value for money in terms of costs versus impact is highest for cash based responses in most cases researched so far.

⁸⁰ In non-pastoralist economies (so called ‘equilibrium’ systems of ranching), destocking is standard herd management in a drought. When pasture is not sufficient for the whole of the herd, the most important animals (breeding females, needed for recovery) are protected by keeping the pasture only for them. Long before grazing problems are felt and the animal condition deteriorates, livestock farmers progressively get rid of all other animals.

⁸¹ This happens when the prices that are paid for the animals are higher than the prevailing market prices.

⁸² It is argued that commercial destocking during drought conditions, whereby animals are bought with the intention for onward trading, can only be done if there is a reasonable market infrastructure in place (ILRI 2010). In the ASAL districts, especially

3.2.3. Cost-efficiency

58. Comparison of cost-efficiency figures across the various NGO projects funded by DG ECHO is not very straightforward as there are many integrated approaches that all differ from each other in terms of their package of interventions. Furthermore, only some project proposals (Single Forms) provide a breakdown of costs and number of beneficiaries for each of the project components. In most cases, only a total overall cost per beneficiary is given. Detailed analysis then is not possible, especially as the number of beneficiaries for the livelihood support interventions (households reaches x average household size) generally is much higher than the number of individuals reached for treatment of malnutrition. Some details are given here:

- For the Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme, WFP contracts nutrition partners that undertake the distribution together with health and nutrition education and logistics partners that arrange transport of the food up to the final delivery points. The total cost amounts to US\$ 8.62 per beneficiary per month⁸⁴. UNICEF provides therapeutic foods⁸⁵ to MoPHS at central level and also has started to contract nutrition partners for technical backstopping at district level. These costs need to be added to the actual food procurement costs and overheads incurred by the UN agencies.
- For the targeted feeding programmes for malnourished individuals the funding structure is very complex which hinders a straightforward analysis of cost levels.

Lesson learned: Complicated funding structure targeted feeding programmes

Assessment of the cost-efficiency for therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes would need to be based on a comparison of the overall cost level per beneficiary per month which takes into account all funding streams. First of all, there are costs borne by GoK as part of the budget for provision of mother and child health services in the ASAL. Another element is direct DG ECHO funding to the IPs that provide technical backstopping to MoPHS at district level⁸⁶, in some cases building on 'core funding' to the agency as part of a longer-term project funded by one or more development donors⁸⁷. Other funding streams are direct funding by DG ECHO and other donors to UNICEF and WFP for purchase, international and national logistics and coordination of food-based support (both for the UN agencies and their collaborating partners) and for technical backstopping to MoPHS and other health services providers in the ASAL that are provided by the two UN agencies.

- Animal destocking⁸⁸: Average cost for the OXFAM project in Wajir was € 12.46 per beneficiary household, which was lower than estimated in the proposal as many more households were served than planned. VSF reported a cost per beneficiary household of € 8.74⁸⁹, again with many more households served than originally planned.

those in the north this is rarely the case. During 2009 most drought related destocking was done utilizing the slaughter/meat distribution variant.

⁸³ It is worth to mention that with the establishment of mobile network transfer mechanisms operated by the main networks in Kenya and a recent increase in the banking establishment network in the ASALs the opening up of livestock markets beyond the ASALs is already underway. In addition, the rolling out of a pilot livestock insurance scheme, a joint initiative between Equity Bank, ILRI and the UAP insurance company is highly encouraging.

Source: http://www.equitybank.co.ke/News/Equity_Bank_ILRI_and_UAP_launch_a_livestock_Insurance_Scheme.pdf

⁸⁴ According to information provided by WFP the nutrition partners are paid on average US\$ 150 per MT (lowest US\$ 114, highest US\$ 363 per MT) and the logistics partners on average US\$ 40 per MT (lowest US\$ 24, highest US\$ 71 per MT). The food procurement costs (FCA) are US\$ 800 per MT of CSB++ and US\$ 1400 for vegetable oil. For a ration of 7.5 kg of CSB++ and 0.75 kg of vegetable oil this works out as a total average cost of US\$ 8.62 per person per month, of which 82% are food procurement costs. This does not include the costs for the M&E study undertaken by SC-UK.

⁸⁵ F-75, F-100, PlumpyNut, ReSoMal

⁸⁶ Where a real cost per beneficiary is not easy to calculate as in most projects nutrition support is part of an integrated package and there is no systemized activity-based costing approach.

⁸⁷ Concern Worldwide in Moyale with funding from Irish Aid, SC-UK in Mandera with funding from DFID

⁸⁸ Analysis has been limited to projects for which final reports were available with sufficiently disaggregated expenditure data.

⁸⁹ These costs compare well with the findings of an earlier assessment (ILRI 2010) which concluded that the per capita mean costs of animal destocking was Ksh 8,652 among the destocking schemes examined.

Lesson learned: Destocking is an expensive transfer mechanism

It is important to note that destocking schemes are costly affairs given the operational costs involving significant demand in terms of coordination, logistics, staffing and other overhead⁹⁰ and the fact that animal value is usually set at a higher rate than the market value. Cost effectiveness should be seen in the light to what degree the transactions have an impact on strengthening purchasing power of vulnerable groups. In this regard less costly cash transfers should be considered as a viable alternative option, especially in case of larger target coverage.

- Voucher schemes⁹¹: the SC-UK scheme in Mandera had a monthly cost of € 17.29 per household, which included the costs for the food vouchers and for nutrition education (cooking demonstrations). Concern's voucher scheme in Moyale district had a monthly unit cost of € 24.10⁹². The cost factors of agencies involved in cash transfers or voucher schemes normally involve direct internal costs (staff, transport, and training) and external costs (bank charges, security, contracting traders and suppliers). If during implementation agency staff can be used that are already under employment with the agency, this will help to lower the cost⁹³. In case of concern and SC-UK this was the case.

⁹⁰ These can reach between 10-40% of the overall costs. See also: Akilu, Y and Wekesa, M (2002). Drought livestock and livelihoods: Lessons for the 1999 – 2001 emergency response in Kenya. Humanitarian Practice Network paper 40. ODI London

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² In comparison the costs of a variety of voucher schemes implemented during the PEV early recovery programme were: GAA Ksh 13,173 - SCUK Ksh 13,963 – SCF Ksh 20, 280 – WV Ksh 21,551 and CARE Ksh 22,803. These are overall costs per beneficiary. More specific costs of voucher delivery can be calculated by taking the overall budget of the action that includes all overheads and subtract the overall value of the voucher transfer and other unrelated costs (Nicholson 2009). This could however not be done during the evaluation due to the lack of disaggregated information.

⁹³ Sources: Nicholson (2009), SCUK (2010)

4. RESULTS ASSESSMENT OF FUNDED ACTIONS

59. In this chapter the focus is on the results that were achieved by the projects funded by DG ECHO for the Kenya drought response. After a reflection on the issue of coordination of humanitarian interventions at various geographical levels, the chapter looks into targeting and achieved coverage, operational and cost-efficiency, and effectiveness. The last section finally is on how well the funded projects link up with GoK structures and with the target communities.

4.1. Coordination mechanisms

4.1.1. Coordination at national and provincial level

60. The UN cluster coordination approach was introduced in Kenya during 2008, but abandoned during the same due to the fact that the sectoral working groups under the KFSSG were already functional (see section 2.4) and did not need duplication. In the context of this evaluation, the most important sectoral working groups include water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock, health and nutrition. While these sectoral working groups are active at national level their function at district level is taken over by the interdisciplinary DSGs (see below section 4.1.2). This is also the main level where the different sectors meet to exchange information and for joint planning of interventions.

61. In the 2008/09 Kenyan drought, the coordination of nutrition support interventions at national level was well organized. A large number of technical agencies involved in nutrition responses to emergencies⁹⁴ regularly met at the Nutrition Technical Forum. The Forum is chaired by UNICEF and MoPHS and has been the main coordinating body for all nutrition activities within Kenya, with good attendance from a wide variety of agencies. Part of the DG ECHO funding to UNICEF in 2009 was to support its coordinating role in the field of nutrition. The Forum was set up early 2008 as the 'nutrition working group' which meets monthly to discuss the responses to the post-election violence and evolved from the long-standing Health and Nutrition Working Group under the KFSM which primarily focused on nutrition issues in the ASALs. There are three thematic working groups under the Forum: (a) nutrition information systems; (b) urban nutrition; and (c) capacity development.

62. The Forum has been an excellent venue for coordination of geographical coverage in line with existing needs. The Forum has produced regular updates of a nutrition response matrix with information per district on the nutrition situation outlook, the coverage (who, what, where) by the partners⁹⁵, and a priority ranking of the gaps that still exist. The Forum has also served as a technical reference group for development of the GoK IMAM Guideline.

63. The Kenya Nutrition Update is a quarterly bulletin published by the Nutrition Technical Forum that summarizes the findings of nutrition surveys undertaken by NGOs and also presents the district-level trends in the MUAC screening as part of the ALRMP surveillance system (covering 28 districts). Also, the bulletin contains collated admission statistics for the selected feeding programmes (OTP and SFP) in Kenya, plus other relevant nutrition information. It is planned by the Nutrition Technical Forum to make this information accessible through a website; this was not yet realized at the time of the field mission to Kenya in April/May 2010.

⁹⁴ The two Ministries of Health, UNICEF, WFP and the main NGOs involved in the health sector in Kenya.

⁹⁵ UNICEF Kenya is thinking about ways how to add more detailed information to the matrix, e.g. on the funding behind the response actions and the quality of the services provided.

64. As part of the appeal co-funded by DG ECHO, UNICEF is currently supporting the allocation of a full-time data expert to MoPHS and supports the development of a national nutrition M&E framework based on the Community Health Information System (CHIS)⁹⁶. This builds on the results of the NIPHORN project on improvement of the quality of nutrition survey data for the Horn of Africa⁹⁷. Although there is a working group on nutrition information systems under the Nutrition Technical Forum, overall the nutrition information system in Kenya has not advanced very much. Apart from the regular health management data collected through MoH channels (key information source on coverage for TFP/OTP and SFP but weak for growth monitoring data⁹⁸), the information base still doesn't reach much beyond the level of annual (sub)-district level NGO survey data⁹⁹. These surveys are particularly useful for M&E at project level. The survey information also helps to fill the existing information gap with respect to the geographical pattern of malnutrition in the ASALs. However, in the ASALs where malnutrition is such a core problem there evidently is a need for a more developed system of information collection that adequately covers the whole region.

Lesson learned: Need to improve the nutrition knowledge base

The information from nutrition surveys is particularly useful for M&E at project level but leaves gaps in the information base on malnutrition patterns in the ASAL districts. Some new ideas are currently emerging for linking up nutritional surveillance (based on Weight-for-Height and MUAC) with the monthly ALRMP data collection system undertaken by the DSGs. ACF is currently developing a proposal to assist the DSGs for this. Such an approach seems very promising, also to gain better insight in the seasonality aspects and the causal factors behind malnutrition disaggregated for the main livelihood categories in the ASALs¹⁰⁰.

65. In terms of coordination of emergency livelihood support the role of WFP has been crucial in the formation of the KFSSG of which it was a founding member, alongside the GoK¹⁰¹, in its effort to develop a systematic, comprehensive and multi agency EWS/food security status monitoring and assessment / coordination system in Kenya. The joint initiative to create a single food pipeline (including the use of the GoK Strategic Grain Reserve) has harmonized food aid programming. The arrangement was the result of KFSSG mediation which not only reduced duplication but also reduced manipulation of GoK food distributions. WFP's current coordination role in the KFSSG / KFSSM focuses on food aid estimates and operational relief and rehabilitation programmes. At field level, WFP's coordination and support role is well embedded in the district systems. During the field work, the evaluation observed that good and active collaboration exists between WFP regional coordination staff, the contracted lead agencies in the districts and the DSGs. The evaluation observed that WFP was in preparation of

⁹⁶ However, various challenges are being faced, including for newly created districts where there are no adequate reporting systems and structures.

⁹⁷ UNICEF is the lead agency for NIPHORN and aims at improvement of nutrition data quality in the Greater Horn of Africa (Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda). NIPHORN I (2007-2008) analyzed the nutrition information systems from the 1990s onwards and found great inconsistencies and errors in nutrition survey data. NIPHORN I was co-funded by DG ECHO (€ 400,000 out of a total budget of € 965,000). NIPHORN builds on the SMART methodology based on standardized reporting of key indicators and standard quality checks and the IPC/FSAU Somalia country guidelines. In the course of 2008/09, the NIPHORN II project (DFID allocation to Kenya was £ 200,000 for the period 1 July 2008 – 1 March 2009) enabled the development of a GoK Nutrition Assessment guideline for standardization of nutrition survey methodology, establishment of a database within MoPHS for programme monitoring and central storage of nutrition survey results (co-managed by UNICEF), and the establishment of a system of quarterly nutrition bulletins.

⁹⁸ The information produced by the MoPHS as part of the new Community Health Information System is based on facility-based growth monitoring data which means there is no random sampling. Especially in a context where service delivery is weak and there is insufficient coverage of the more remote areas, facility-based data cannot be assumed to be representative for the population at large.

⁹⁹ UNICEF reports that 26 nutrition surveys were conducted in the course of 2009.

¹⁰⁰ End 2008, ACF started a system of nutritional surveillance in North Eastern Province which was based on quarterly sentinel site surveillance in Mandera and Garissa districts (in both districts there are three sites: pastoral, riverine and urban populations), and an annual integrated SMART survey. The system had to be discontinued after ACF's withdrawal from North Eastern Province due to kidnapping incidents.

¹⁰¹ See: http://www.kenyafoodsecurity.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=53

deploying support / coordination staff to the DSGs for provision of operational support to the upcoming WFP supported Food-for-Assets programme.

66. During the implementation period FAO contributed to coordination in the agricultural and livelihood sector. The FAO aim was to: (1) collect actor-specific programme relevant information; (2) undertake monitoring and documentation; (3) provide an information flow on disaster risk reduction and to develop best practice models; and (4) to provide technical standards and technical support to ECHO supported programmes. The evaluation observed that FAO's role in terms of provision of technical support was less pronounced than the one of coordination. The FAO developed website contains a data base on programme relevant information regarding drought decision projects, which is highly accessible and useful. Relevant material stored in the databases includes project technical data, maps and context specific information. Especially the mapping is of high quality. Field support is provided especially in the NRM sector. The field team however is relatively small and coverage of visits is modest in scale.

4.1.2. Field level coordination

67. At field level, coordination is taking place through the District Steering Groups (DSGs), where most relevant government departments and agencies meet on a monthly basis. They form part of the World Bank ALRMP framework under the Kenya Government that is also supported by the EC through the Drought Management Initiative (DMI; see I). This is the main level where the activities within the different humanitarian and development-oriented programmes are being discussed in order to avoid overlap and to maximise coverage and synergies.

- For nutrition interventions, most of the coordination is done at national level through the Nutrition Technical Forum and the DSG meetings mainly serve to inform other stakeholders about who is doing what and where.
- Regarding the implementation of resource transfers most of the coordination is done at district level directly between agencies and the DSGs.

Lesson learned: Coordination of nutrition is needed at various administrative levels

Next to the well-functioning Nutrition Technical Forum which operates at national level, there is a need for local-level coordination. According to an evaluation report of the Merlin project in Wajir¹⁰² it would be a good idea to organize for additional separate exchange at district level (on top of the DSG meetings) so that all nutrition agencies that work in the district can discuss more technical issues and feed them back to the Nutrition Technical Forum at national level. Provincial-level coordination is one of the plans put forward by UNICEF (but not yet implemented) and would be helpful to avail of coordination mechanism that is fully in line with the GoK administrative set-up.

4.2. Targeting / coverage

ALNAP definition: Coverage is the need to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are.

4.2.1. Geographical coverage

68. Logically, the overall pattern in the spatial distribution of food insecurity and malnutrition should form the basis for geographical targeting of humanitarian assistance. It is to be noted in this respect that some of the local partners reported a certain level of political manipulation at national and district levels¹⁰³. The tables below provide an overview of the geographical

¹⁰² Jäntti R (2009), Mid-Term Evaluation of Merlin Nutrition and Emergency Response and Preparedness Programme for vulnerable populations in Greater Wajir District, North Eastern Province, Kenya, March 2009. (project number ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01036)

¹⁰³ This form of manipulation is not new, as pressures towards political and ethnical bias in distributions have been common over time. Main consequence is that vulnerability criteria are replaced by self-interest criteria and most needy groups are

targeting that has taken place including beneficiary figures for all livelihood support and targeted nutrition programmes as part of the DG ECHO funded Kenya drought response in 2008-2009.

69. The two DG ECHO allocations (in total € 6 million) to the WFP EMOP 10745¹⁰⁴ (General Food Distribution and Targeted Supplementary Feeding) covered the period 1 Oct. '08 – 31 Jan. '09 and thus relate to the drought response needs as projected by the Long Rains Assessment '08. The allocations per district for the GFD were based on the recommendations of the Kenya Food Security Meeting – KFSM. The DSGs were responsible for decision-making on the allocations per division.

70. As can be gathered from table 8, the various targeted nutrition support actions implemented by NGOs with (co)-funding from DG ECHO were mainly concentrated in the North Eastern province (Mandera, Wajir and Garissa); there also was one programme in Eastern Province (Moyale). The targeted districts in North Eastern Province all showed emergency levels of malnutrition but this was not the case for Moyale district (see table 4). In other districts with high malnutrition rates (Turkana, Samburu and Marsabit) DG ECHO did not provide assistance for targeted nutrition programmes but did fund various livelihood support programmes. The DG ECHO support to UNICEF for roll-out of the essential nutrition package¹⁰⁵ and the TFP had a larger geographical coverage (Rift Valley, Eastern, North Eastern and Coast Province) but logically is targeted at severely malnourished individuals only.

Table 8: Coverage figures targeted malnutrition treatment programmes funded by DG ECHO

	Districts	Point-prevalence for the whole district(s) ¹⁰⁶		2008 Decisions		2009 Decisions	
		GAM	SAM	SFP	TFP / OTP	SFP	TFP / OTP
ACF	Mandera, Garissa	24,457	4,035	-	1,403	-	-
Concern Worldwide	Moyale	1,166	188	-	-	4,810***	1,166***
Islamic Relief	Mandera	18,062	3,345	3,412	-	2,861**	-
Merlin	Wajir	26,036	4,142	13,168	698	-	-
SC-UK	Mandera, Wajir	44,098	7,487	1,660	303	11,931*	-
UNICEF	(4 provinces)	n.a.	n.a.	-	-	-	16,458** ¹⁰⁷
WFP	5 – 15 districts	n.a.	n.a.	± 60,000	-	- ****	-

*Planning figure, actual figures not yet available at the time of the evaluation mission

** Figures from the interim report, no final report available yet

*** Figures provided by IP to the evaluation team

**** Blanket supplementary feeding programme not included here as it is not specifically targeted to malnourished individuals

overlooked. Improved and transparent coordination structures are crucial to mitigate these negative trends. Compared to the situation before 2000, when distributions were mainly coordinated through district administration, manipulation of this kind has been reduced as result of the more transparent DSG structures.

¹⁰⁴ It should be noted here that for this 11-month EMOP (1 July '08 – 31 May '09), DG ECHO contributions only formed 5.1% of the funds that were resourced and that the EMOP covered populations affected by drought and post-election violence.

¹⁰⁵ This DG ECHO-funded action encompasses a contribution to UNICEF for deployment of 18 nutrition support officers to assist the District Nutrition Officers, and for contracting 11 NGOs in 9 districts for strengthening of nutrition services through MoH. From among the NGOs also receiving funding from DG ECHO in 2008 / 2009, this includes Merlin for Wajir and Turkana and Islamic Relief for Mandera. DG ECHO funds amount to € 1 million, which is 18% of the total required budget.

¹⁰⁶ Based on point-prevalence figures for malnutrition at district level which taken from the Nutrition Sector Preparedness & Planning Matrix (April 2009).

¹⁰⁷ The UNICEF interim report for project ECHO/-FA/BUD/2009/01002 states that in the period October-December 2009 8,247 new TFP admissions were registered. This is a much higher figure than for the same Quarter in 2008 when there were 2,003 new admissions. New TFP admissions started to rise from April 2009 onwards. In 2009, UNICEF support for TFP reached 16,458 children. DG ECHO funding for the TFP (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2009/06001) covers supplies for treatment of about 8,000 SAM cases.

71. A Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (BSFP) is justified in areas with high food insecurity and malnutrition where food-based support interventions are not functioning properly. The geographical targeting of the programme is rated to be good as the programme covered all of the five districts with GAM rates higher than 15% (Turkana, Marsabit, Samburu, Mandera and Wajir, see table 7) while the whole of northern Kenya was affected by recurrent breaks in the GFD pipeline and in the ASALs the coverage of targeted supplementary feeding programmes is known to be rather low.

72. The evaluation team observed that geographical coverage for the livelihood support programmes to a large extent was determined by the presence and capacity of the IPs and their local partner network and had a larger geographical scope including the northern parts of Rift Valley and Eastern provinces. As can be seen in table 9, there is a limitation to compare coverage figures to the scale of overall need as most of the reported figures were not disaggregated by area but clustered by what the different agencies could manage in terms of coverage within their combined areas of operation. A disaggregated model of beneficiary calculation would be useful in future reporting mechanisms.

Table 9: Coverage figures livelihood support programmes funded by DG ECHO

	Districts	2008 Decisions		2009 Decisions	
		Watsan/WASH	Short term food security / livelihood support	Watsan/WASH	Short term food security / livelihood support
CARE	Mandera, Moyale	-	58,271***	-	-
COOPI	Mandera, Wajir	175,000***	-	-	-
Concern Worldwide	Moyale	-	-	8,000*	8,100*
CORDAID	Isiolo, Marsabit, Moyale,, Samburu	(a)137,254***	(a)164,970***	104,251**	64,735**
Danish Red Cross	Isiolo	34,460***	-	-	-
DCA		(b)326,560***	(b)37,900***	-	-
GAA	Kitui, Kajiado	80,236***	-	12,500*	24,500*
OXFAM GB	Wajir, Turkana	195,000***	32,632***	-	-
SCUK	Wajir,	-	18,172***	-	-
VSF B	Garissa	-	-	-	62,125*
VSF CH	Wajir, Isiolo,	-	-	-	72,000**
VSF G	Marsabit	-	-	-	20,340**

*Planning figure, actual figures not yet available at the time of the evaluation mission

** Figures from the interim report, no final report available yet

*** Figures from final report

(a) Covers both Kenya and Ethiopia (no breakdown given)

(b) Covers both Kenya and Uganda (no breakdown given)

4.2.2. Beneficiary targeting and coverage

73. Beneficiary selection approaches for the food and nutrition support components within the DG ECHO Kenya drought response were quite straightforward:

- For the WFP General Food Distribution, the DSGs are responsible for development of guidelines how to target vulnerable households. Feedback from the focus group discussions held as part of this evaluation indicated that generally the food aid reaches the right people.
- The WFP Blanket Supplementary Feeding Programme (Dec '09 – May '10)) targeted all children under five and pregnant and lactating women regardless of their nutritional status. As mentioned in section 3.2, it could be argued that limiting eligibility for the programme to the age group from minus 9 to plus 24 months would be more appropriate and cost-efficient.
- The targeted nutrition support actions funded by DG ECHO (for the NGOs mostly as part of multi-sectoral programmes, for WFP as part of the EMOP) are all focusing on malnourished

underfives and malnourished pregnant and lactating women¹⁰⁸. The roll out of the IMAM Guideline which includes the new WHO Growth Standards and a scale-up of nutrition programme coverage has led to increased coverage for the therapeutic and supplementary feeding programmes. Although a firm information base is lacking as partners did not undertake coverage surveys¹⁰⁹, this evaluation found that low coverage is still a persistent problem in the ASAL region (see table 9). In total, the SFP programmes (co)-supported by DG ECHO in 2008 and 2009 reached nearly 100,000 moderately malnourished individuals (out of whom 60,000 through WFP supported programmes) and 20,000 severely malnourished individuals (out of whom 16,458 through UNICEF supported programmes which were quickly scaled up in the course of 2009¹¹⁰).

74. For the livelihood protection interventions, the DCM framework allows for differentiated beneficiary targeting during specific phases within the drought cycle. Most interventions were aimed at the ex-pastoralists and other ‘peri-urban’ settlers. The poverty of these groups is more visible and they are more accessible as they live in less isolated locations and are less mobile. The targeting of pastoral groups is more difficult, especially when drought hits and herds are far away, including in cross-border locations. Targeting mechanisms were different for the various transfer modalities. From an overall perspective it was observed that the most vulnerable groups, including the socio economically weakest groups, largely represented by ex-pastoralists, were well represented among the beneficiaries, especially for the food distribution interventions and the voucher schemes:

- For most of the voucher schemes, targeting was done by local committees at the community level. Usually, the voucher recipients also were benefitting from the GFD. But in some projects the vouchers were given to ‘most vulnerable’ households who then were not eligible to receive rations through the GFD. In all communities that were visited by the evaluation team it was said that the targeting was transparent and that the most vulnerable community members were covered although it was generally felt that the proportion of households per community that were included in the scheme was too low.
- Animal destocking targeted small groups of pastoralists, and particularly focussed on areas where animal stress had been observed. Local committees selected the households for the meat distribution.

4.3. Operational efficiency

ALNAP definition: Efficiency measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – achieved as a result of inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving an output, to see whether the most efficient approach has been used.

75. As various DG ECHO funded actions were still on-going at the time of this evaluation, full assessment of the operational efficiency is not possible. Based on the impressions obtained during the field visits and the information that has been provided to DG ECHO in the form of interim and final reports the following drivers of operational efficiency have been identified:

¹⁰⁸ In areas where there is no GFD (the central divisions of the districts), the WFP PRRO also includes the provision of a protection ration to households with malnourished children. However, this component is not implemented uniformly and across the board. E.g., a DG ECHO monitoring mission found it to be happening in Wajir but not in Turkana.

¹⁰⁹ In future, it would be useful if partners incorporate coverage in the logframe as one of the indicators that needs to be reported on.

¹¹⁰ To give some indication of coverage, it is useful to mention that UNICEF reports that the estimated caseload of acute malnutrition in Kenya is about 281,000 children below five years old, out of whom around 39,000 children are estimated to be severely malnourished (point-prevalence figures taken from interim report on UNICEF project on therapeutic feeding (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2009/06001).

Factors influencing the efficiency of implementation

- The outputs than could be achieved were highly dependent on the security conditions and the humanitarian space that is available. In case of ACF in Mandera and Garissa, the project was heavily affected by the kidnapping by 'El Shabaab' of some expat staff which ultimately led to the closure of the project. Also CARE withdrew from parts of Mandera district due to security concerns. In North Eastern Province, a 'Security Information Group' was formed by all INGOs to share security updates per email and mobile / sat phones. SC-UK adopted a 'conflict sensitive approach' whereby beneficiary selection was used to strengthen the reconciliation process between displaced and non-displaced communities across ethnic lines. For the UN, all ASAL districts are under Phase III which requires some standard security measures.
- The WFP pipeline is vulnerable as a result of the adopted 'just-in-time' logistics approach where there is no buffer stock. In practice this meant that some monthly food rations were skipped. Also, in some cases the operational efficiency was affected by heavy rainfall during the long rainy season (March – May). E.g., this occurred in Mandera in 2008 and in most parts of the country in 2010. The WFP programme saw various pipeline breaks due to transport problems on the road through Wajir as a result of heavy rains¹¹¹, together with some delays in customs clearance in Mombasa. The
- The late start-up of the BSFP programme (ideally the programme should have started when the crisis was at its peak after the failure of the 2009 long rains) was caused by slow DG ECHO decision-making¹¹² and some operational problems for WFP at the start-up phase which resulted in a one month delay for the first round of distribution which also reached considerably less beneficiaries than planned¹¹³. The programme now was implemented when good rains at last had come to Kenya which resulted in better pasture and higher (though still below normal) availability of milk which relieved the most immediate food needs among the pastoralist communities especially.
- Quality problems with Corn Soy Blend (CSB) and cereals in the last quarter of 2009. One batch of CSB appeared to be over-fortified and was declared unfit for human consumption. The problem resulted in a serious pipeline break that particularly affected the targeted supplementary feeding programme (1 – 3 months pipeline break end 2009 / early 2010). Also there was a large consignment of maize that was detected to have an excessive concentration of aflatoxin and which needed to be destroyed resulting in a serious pipeline break for the GFD towards the end of 2009.
- While the development of a national drought contingency fund is seen as the main resource for timely implementation of drought response action in Kenya (a.o. supported by the EC through the DMI), the funding through the 2008 DG ECHO Regional Drought Decision served as a flexible budget that allowed quick responses to the new drought. As part of the RDD funded projects, some IP projects had some in-built capacity to quickly scale up in times of crisis (contingency planning). This resulted in good operational efficiency at the time of the highest needs (e.g. the project of SC-UK together with VSF-Suisse in Mandera and Wajir where the proposal states that in case of persisting serious drought more funds would be shifted to direct nutrition activities (SFP and OTP) and destocking activities). In line with the DCM approach, immediate relief actions that were funded included water supply, animal health and emergency food security activities¹¹⁴. However, across the board there is a need for more 'shelf projects' that can be started rapidly when a new drought arrives¹¹⁵.
- Some livelihood support projects were plagued by delays which resulted in a timing that was not in line with the seasonal calendar. This happened e.g. in case of the FFW project in Kitui run by GAA which finally was implemented when planting of crops had started and for some destocking projects which led to further economic losses for the households and sometimes a need to cancel commercial off-take support as the livestock conditions had already worsened.
- The implementation of destocking schemes was generally done in a very controlled way, not exceeding expectations, but focussing realistically on the main output criteria. The animal trading through the commercial schemes were more difficult to implement, as the commercial interests of the traders were under significant challenge due to the continued drought conditions. For this reason, VSF had to call off the exercise in North Horr, despite the subsidiary scheme offered to the animal traders, and in Isiolo District the commercial scheme was replaced by the animal destocking intervention for similar reasons. However in parts of Moyale and Mandera the subsidised animal trading implemented through CARE was continued with a fair success rate.

¹¹¹ Also once for UNICEF Plumpy Nut supplies to Eastern Province in 2010.

¹¹² The two March 2009 mission reports by the DG ECHO A/1 Desk Officer for Kenya and the DG ECHO A/4 and A/1 Desk Officers together with staff from the RSO in Nairobi both indicated that a real crisis situation was imminent and that malnutrition and food insecurity were on the rise in the marginal pastoral areas in Kenya.

¹¹³ The target for the BSFP was to reach 441,466 beneficiaries. In the first distribution round, the programme managed to cover 337,509 beneficiaries (estimated coverage of 76%).

¹¹⁴ AGE (2007), MTE DG ECHO financed actions in the Greater Horn of Africa, Kirchheim/Teck

¹¹⁵ Identification and formulation of shelf plans form an intrinsic part of contingency planning. Such plans need to be district-specific and should be updated regularly however to make them useful for implementation once necessary.

- To a varying degree, capacity problems among the IPs and their local partner networks were noted to have an impact on efficiency. This included lack of appropriate and timely availability of staff at field level and inability to adequately monitor and backstop local partner networks. Some partners did not have sufficient capacity to provide timely work plans and reports.
- In some cases projects were based on collaboration with a local CBO or with another IP for DG ECHO. Such arrangements contribute to the operational efficiency when they are based on: (a) making best use of comparative advantages in terms of skills sets / technical capacity, esp. for multi-sectoral approaches and on management aspects (e.g. in Mandera where ACF provided technical support to Islamic Relief); (b) local knowledge, e.g. through a history of presence in the district (e.g. in Moyale district where Concern and Cordaid both collaborated with CIFA); and (c) access to the terrain in case of restrictive security conditions like in the North Eastern province (in Mandera district where Islamic Relief can stay despite the insecurity while ACF withdrew).

4.4. Effectiveness

ALNAP definition: Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness.

76. Obviously, in the context of the protracted crisis in the ASALs in Kenya, short-term humanitarian assistance can only have a limited effect. The food and nutrition problems among (agro)-pastoralists and peri-urban settlers are persistent and require longer-term (development-oriented) approaches in order to have real and lasting impact.

77. Assessment of the effectiveness of the DG ECHO funded actions has mainly been limited to the projects for which interim/final reports were available, combined with observations during the field visits. All available reports were in the Single Form format and contained measurements of success indicators on outputs and outcomes as per the log frames. An overall finding was that the effectiveness was modest in case of the group of pastoralists as targeting these groups was more difficult than for the sedentary population¹¹⁶.

- a. For the general food distribution, WFP reported for the period August 2008 – January 2009 to have been able to distribute a 75% ration (as planned, providing 1,728 kCal per person per day) to an average of 62% of the planned beneficiaries. The food deliveries differed from the plan because of pipeline breaks due to the rains, defaulting transport contractors, some funding gaps, etc. The WFP support had the widest coverage in 12 districts. About 80% of the community members who participated in the FGDs that were held as part of the project site visits stated to be satisfied with these food distributions.
- b. Although the final report that will include the results of the monitoring study still has to be awaited, the blanket supplementary feeding programme clearly has been an innovative approach which is expected to have additional positive effects like a boost to EPI and deworming coverage for children below five year. UNICEF reported that through the screening of all beneficiaries as part of the BSFP, in December '09 / January '10 many children were referred to targeted feeding programmes which is another major positive outcome of the BSFP. Also, the programme filled a gap in the household's access to food when there was a break in the pipeline for GFD¹¹⁷.

¹¹⁶ The evaluation observed that with exception of the destocking interventions, the targeting mechanisms employed were more suitable for selecting beneficiary groups around settlements and sedentary population groups than those fitting the mobile patterns of pastoralist groups.

¹¹⁷ Obviously, the negative side is that such sharing reduces the impact of the BSFP for the intended target groups although a certain level of sharing was planned for. The BSFP ration is 7.5 kg CSB and 0.75 kg of vegetable oil per person per month. This provides 1171 kCal per beneficiary per day, which is in line with the recommendation for targeted SFP for moderately malnourished children in the WFP Food & Nutrition Handbook for take-home rations (on-site SFP programmes normally provides 500 kCal per child per day only).

- c. For the targeted supplementary feeding programmes and the OTPs (in most cases part of multi-sectoral intervention packages) the overall impression is that they were very successful:
- The programmes achieved high recovery rates well beyond the minimum standards as per Sphere^{118, 119, 120} but for some districts where the SFP was implemented as part of the WFP EMOP the performance was less good¹²¹.

Lesson learned: Limited impact of nutrition interventions at district level

In the Kenya drought response, the impact of the OTPs/SFPs on reducing GAM rates in the ASAL districts was found to be smaller than anticipated. In various cases the GAM rate actually increased during the course of the project period, which to a large extent was due to the increasing impact of the continuing drought. Overall, it is not realistic to expect that a short-term nutrition project with rather small coverage will be able to have an impact on district-level indicators. Although the various DG ECHO supported projects that address the underlying causes of malnutrition (livelihood support, watsan) are very relevant and with good effects, for a real impact on nutrition, there also should be more attention for preventive approaches within health service delivery. Evidently, this area of work is beyond the mandate of DG ECHO.

- However, the limited service delivery capacity of MoPHS remains a serious bottleneck for targeted feeding programmes. The team came across various dispensaries that were closed because there was no nurse and also understood that in various ASAL districts there still is no nutrition officer. Currently, it is not well known where exactly these gaps in service delivery occur. The Nutrition Technical Forum intends to develop an overview of actual nutrition service delivery (not yet functional at the time of the field mission for this evaluation) which will be important to identify the areas where more assistance is needed.
- It also needs to be noted that the programmes provided a good supply-line for PlumpyNut and CSB to the health facilities supported by UNICEF, WFP and NGOs but that these commodities (the basis of treatment of severe and moderate acute malnutrition) are not available through regular MoH supply lines and thus will stop as soon as external support is over.
- Various projects concentrated on (on-the-job) capacity building of MoPHS health facility staff in the district, a.o. as part of the IMAM roll out. There was a clear need for this because of the high staff turnover in the more remote districts. ACF, Concern Worldwide and Merlin participated in the capacity building working group under the Nutrition Technical forum and contributed to the comprehensive strategy document for the roll-out of the national guideline.

Best practice: Collaboration with MoPHS and the community

As all targeted nutrition projects required collaboration with MoH¹²², for all of these projects the number of malnourished children identified and treated to a large extent was determined by the pace and capacity of MoH rather than the efficiency of the IPs. For instance, the delayed adoption of the new IMAM guideline by MoH at national level meant that various planned training courses for district and

¹¹⁸ Achievement of >75% cure rate, death rate <3%, defaulter rate <15%. Sources: final reports for the Merlin project in Wajir (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01036), the Islamic Relief project in Mandera (ECHO/-FA/BUD-2008/01053), and the SC-UK project in Mandera (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01044)

¹¹⁹ Achievement of >75% cure rate, death rate <10%, defaulter rate <15%. Sources: final reports for the ACF project in Mandera and Garissa (ECHO/-FA/Bud/2008/01029), the Merlin project in Wajir (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01036), and the SC-UK project in Mandera (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01044).

¹²⁰ In its final report, SC-UK remarks that the OTP/TFP performance should be seen in the light of substantial sharing of the PlumpyNut within the household, which within the local culture is necessary to avoid the 'evil eye'.

¹²¹ The final report by WFP to DG ECHO mentions that recovery rates were lower than 75% in Garissa, Marsabit and Tana River, while defaulter rates were above 15% in Garissa, Tana River and Samburu.

¹²² Merlin is the only IP that based its nutrition programme on a mobile clinic approach but after the mid-term evaluation this was replaced by a MoH centre-based approach.

facility-level staff had to be rescheduled. The ease with which the IPs were able to link up with MoH at district level and below not only depended on the IP but also on the availability, job motivation and turnover of human resources which often is the main bottleneck for improvement of health services delivery. In most cases the IP was able to collaborate very well with the District Nutrition Officer and other MoPHS staff at district-level (including the hospitals) and in the health dispensaries. Another factor that contributed to the effectiveness of the targeted feeding programmes is the commitment and actual performance of the volunteer Community Health Workers (CHWs) in terms of case finding in the community. The CHWs play an important role to boost community outreach and are a major factor that can make or break the coverage of targeted supplementary feeding programmes¹²³.

Lesson learned: Variety in effectiveness of nutrition rehabilitation programmes

The targeted supplementary feeding programme of one of the implementing partners had a cure rate of 50% only. The reasons given for this result refer to the difficulties of providing services to (semi-) mobile pastoralist populations and the fact that the supplementary ration is usually shared with other household members. However, apparently the other IPs were better able to counter these constraints that are common in the ASALs as they managed to be in line with Sphere standards (recovery rates above 75%). In the final report for the Concern project the effect on the behaviour of the mothers that attended the education sessions was rated as quite significant, with about 50% adoption rate of the practices taught. This is a remarkable result given the rather short duration of the project. The effects of the nutrition education appeared to be rather small at community level, with a majority of households not showing any change in attitudes or practices.

- d. Voucher schemes under DG ECHO funding were implemented in 5 districts, mainly targeting selected rural and peri-urban vulnerable households. Voucher schemes are usually implemented in environments with operational commodity markets. Because they are based on networks of private shops and traders there is less pressure in terms of programme managed logistics and complicated commodity shipments. The above conditions existed in the areas where the voucher schemes were implemented. For this reason, they are easier to phase in and phase out¹²⁴. The effect of the vouchers on preventing food security failure varied across the region. Where the voucher schemes were implemented in supplement of the general food distribution the effectiveness was significant in terms of continued access to food and non-food items. This was less so when the beneficiaries of the schemes were excluded from the GFD. Where voucher schemes were implemented, this resulted in a positive effect on the trading community involved, as they could keep their shops well stocked at a time when of low demand resulting from plummeting purchasing power levels.

Lesson learned: Complementarity voucher schemes and general food distribution

The vouchers schemes were rated very high by the communities interviewed as they provided choice instead of a standard food ration and added value to the local economy through involvement of local traders and shops. On the other hand they were seen as being too small to cover existing food needs, especially if the household did not get a general food ration. In Wajir SC-UK utilised an innovative approach by supplementing WFP food rations with milk vouchers which according to the final report for the project to DG ECHO benefitted households with children considerably.

- e. Destocking / animal marketing assistance was undertaken in four districts and was effective to maintain a steady flow of animal off-take even during drought conditions. It formed the main approach to inject cash in the communities. The effect of this was that a much needed cash injection could finance a variety of urgent household priorities in support of protecting livelihoods. These priorities varied by household, thus the cash fitted in well in each of these priority needs. As such cash injections resulting from the destocking transaction filled a

¹²³ Some of the DG ECHO funded Kenya drought response interventions included paying incentives to the CHWs for their involvement in hygiene promotion as part of watsan activities during the duration of the project. The negative side-effect of such approaches might be that CHWs afterwards are less willing to resume voluntary work in the community.

¹²⁴ Harvey (2007), Cash based responses in emergencies. HPG report 24.

significant gap in purchasing power, and at least had a temporary ('cushioning effect')¹²⁵. The destocking also served to provide meat to vulnerable households (elderly, pregnant and lactating women, poor households with young children)¹²⁶. However, the one-off nature of especially the slaughter schemes meant that combination with other transfer schemes was necessary to meet support needs all through the 2008/09 drought.

Best practice: The two advantages of slaughter destocking

The main advantages of the slaughter destocking was the twin outcome of the immediate cash return to the seller, and the distributed meat to selected vulnerable households. (These should always be the prime outcome of slaughter destocking, it would be unrealistic to expect that the off-take element would have a significant impact on reducing pressure on grazing lands, given the relatively small proportion of animal numbers that are traded in this way). A second advantage was the fact that the schemes could be successfully implemented by local NGOs, and the key of this success was the local knowledge of the areas and the linkages to the community structures who were fully involved in the targeting and selection process¹²⁷.

- f. Animal deworming has been implemented on a larger scale than planned - in one case as a result of reallocation of funding, in another case due to a shift to a cheaper anti-worming drug. During the field visits to Isiolo and Samburu project sites the communities said that the deworming contributed significantly to the recovery of small stock, especially when the rains returned and the rates of worm infestation is normally on the increase. In addition the effectiveness of the de-worming intervention was highly rated by the ILRI assessment. This study recommends that a proportionally much higher coverage would be appropriate during future droughts.

4.5. Connectedness

*ALNAP definition: **Connectedness** refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account.*

78. In line with the EC Humanitarian Food Assistance communication, a considerable part of the Kenya drought response budget for 2008-2009 was spent on actions with a strong relief focus aimed at meeting immediate needs (e.g. the general food distribution, blanket supplementary feeding programme, some voucher schemes). But many of the NGO projects that were funded by DG ECHO combined short-term with longer-term objectives, mainly through integrated multi-sectoral approaches to malnutrition (projects funded by the food aid budget line) and/or through disaster risk reduction approaches (projects funded by the RDD and the projects supported by the EDF B-envelope¹²⁸).

79. Various IPs were able to embed the (DG ECHO funded) emergency projects in a framework of longer-term livelihood support programmes which is conducive for LRRD¹²⁹ purposes, e.g. in

¹²⁵ The final project report from OXFAM-GB for Wajir indicates that in some areas about 75% of the cash was used to buy food while the other 25% was used for non-food items (including payment of medical bills and school fees) and for some investments in small businesses and re-purchase of animals. During a community meeting on the destocking project by CORDAID-Codes in Samburu it was said that the cash injections were used for food purchases, vet medicine, school fees and medical bills.

¹²⁶ In Samburu, the ration of meat was on average 14 kg. See: Abdi and Jirma (2010), Emergency Drought Response Programme. Review Workshops Synthesis Report. Cordaid and Partners

¹²⁷ This was in contrast with the implementation of a larger Government destocking activity undertaken by the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC), which had to deal with many challenges arising from poor communication, top down coordination and unrealistic expectations. See also: ILRI (2010) An assessment of the response to the 2008 – 2009 drought in Kenya. A report to the European Union Delegation to the Republic of Kenya

¹²⁸ These included a variety of interventions in water development, natural resource / range management, infrastructure and livestock development capacity building, preparedness and planning implemented by Agencies such as COOPI (N.East), GAA (Kajiado), DCA (W.Pokot), VSF B (N.East), OXFAM GB (Wajir, Turkana), Cordaid (E.Rift valley) and CARE (N. Eastern).

¹²⁹ EC policy for Linking Relief, Recovery & Development, see http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/COM_LRRD_en.pdf

the case of Concern Worldwide in Moyale district, OXFAM-GB in Turkana and Wajir, SC-UK in Mandera and Wajir, Cordaid in Marsabit, Samburu and Moyale, and, until recently, ACF in Mandera and Garissa¹³⁰. Through their longer-term presence, these agencies are able to assist the beneficiary communities throughout all phases of the drought cycle, including for mitigation and preparedness. Next to the funding from bilateral donors, most of these agencies also are supported through the DG ECHO Regional Drought Decisions¹³¹.

80. In line with the DCM approach, the early warning and livelihood support interventions funded by the RDD will continue during the recovery phase. However, nutrition-oriented interventions are not part of the drought management package funded by the RDD. DG ECHO assistance for nutrition support in the ASALs in Kenya so far has been focused on the relief phase only. This contrasts with the DG ECHO strategy in the Sahel where the central focus is on nutrition support beyond the acute relief phase. The DG ECHO Sahel Strategy was developed after the major drought in 2006 and has a clear focus on integrated approaches to reduce malnutrition based on LRRD¹³². The three-legged strategy provides continued support for (a) improvement of the knowledge base on food security and nutrition, (b) direct actions (interventions for nutrition treatment and that address underlying causes of malnutrition, e.g. watsan, health care, food security coping mechanisms etc.), and (c) outreach activities for awareness raising and advocacy work in the nutrition sector¹³³.

81. Although the sectoral focus has been different, in essence the package of actions funded under the Sahel Strategy is not too different from that funded under the Regional Drought Decisions for the Greater Horn of Africa. With incorporation of the lessons learned in West Africa, the Sahel Strategy could very well serve as a model to be replicated in the ASALs or the Greater Horn of Africa in order to establish a nutrition complement next to the RDD. This could possibly include replication of the funding structure. The Sahel Strategy combines funding from the DG ECHO Food Aid budget for nutrition treatment programmes and short-term emergency food security interventions with funding through a DG ECHO Global Plan for humanitarian operations in the Sahel for support to nutritionally vulnerable populations (children below five years and pregnant and lactating women) who are affected by longer-lasting crises¹³⁴.

82. Analysis of the portfolio of DG ECHO funded actions shows that basically, two mechanisms have been deployed for ensuring that the short-term relief interventions are connected with longer-term recovery and development (LRRD): (a) through an emphasis on collaboration with and strengthening of GoK structures (Ministry of Arid Lands, MoPHS, Ministry of Livestock, etc.), and (b) through a focus on community-based drought management where communities are supported to take responsibility for early warning, contingency planning, infrastructure

¹³⁰ Concern Worldwide is involved in longer term support to livestock health interventions, marketing of livestock products, seed-banking, diversifying livelihoods and risk reduction at community level.(source: Concern Worldwide 2008). OXFAM GB is a long-term development partner that started operations during the 1960s in some parts of the ASALs. In Turkana long-term programming has focused on livelihoods and rights of communities, education support, developing capacities of local partners. Also in Wajir OXFAM GB is a long-term development partner focusing on water source development, livestock health, diversifying incomes and education through the Wajir Pastoral Development Programme. SCUK has a main focus on long term livelihood programming, child protection, education and health in both Wajir and Mandera, while CORDAID focuses on a broad spectrum of long term development initiatives through their long term commitment to community managed disaster risk approach in the districts of Moyale, Marsabit and Samburu) Sources: <http://fex.enonline.net/103/8-6-1.aspx>, CORDAID 2009 http://www.penkenya.org/pages/Capacity_Building_for_Oxfam_GB_Partners_in_Turkana.vrt, http://www.oxfam.org.uk/oxfam_in_action/direct/pgs_projects/kenya09/assets/project_kenya09.pdf,

¹³¹ In various cases for cross-border projects for pastoralist areas in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya.

¹³² The Sahel Strategy was based on a call for interest for submitting proposals, which is a very innovative approach for DG ECHO.

¹³³ Poulsen L & L Rossi (2008), Real-Time Evaluation of DG ECHO financed actions in the Sahel West Africa Region, TW Welch & Partners LTD 2008.

¹³⁴ For the period May 2007 – December 2008, total DG ECHO budgets for the Sahel Strategy were € 10 million from the Food Aid budgetline and € 15 million in the form of a Global Plan.

development (roads, dams, boreholes), and adoption of more drought-resistant livelihood strategies. Both approaches carry weight and are complementary to each other.

A. Strengthening of GoK structures

83. While poverty reduction in the ASAL areas has been on the national government agenda since 2001, there are concerns that marginalisation of the ASALs continues given the absence of significant investments that move the agenda forward¹³⁵. Respondents during interviews stressed a severe lack of appropriate GoK investments and support to key sectors in the ASALs. This was also observed by the team, e.g. various health dispensaries without staff. Although structures and policies are in place, across the board these are not sufficiently translated in practice - infrastructure, education, economic marginalisation, conflict (tribe/clan based), land ownership, insecurity and good governance. While data and figures on the government investments were not available to the evaluation team, the Oxfam and Dadacha studies (see references in footnotes) provide numerous examples and detail on the marginalisation in the ASAL areas that contributes to the significant level of vulnerability and deprivation¹³⁶.

84. UNICEF states that overall in recent years there has been low interest from the side of GoK and development partners for addressing nutrition and the key underlying factors in a sustainable manner. During the 2008-2009 Kenya drought, the response to emergency nutrition however has been very positive, including DG-ECHO funded support through UNICEF to strengthen MoPHS capacity, and funds to WFP and NGO partners for targeted supplementary feeding programmes in collaboration with MoPHS. Currently, there is a growing interest among key development partners for strengthening of GoK nutrition structures. Both the EC and USAID have included a nutrition component in their health programme support which is due to comment late 2010¹³⁷. Kenya is also covered under the regional component of the new EC/UNICEF programme on support for nutrition strategies in West and East Africa (which includes the NIPHORN initiative on nutrition data improvement). Also ACF mentioned to the evaluation team that among donor agencies there currently is more interest in nutrition than before.

Best practice: Linking up with local systems and strengthening capacity

A good example of how connectedness could be shaped is the pilot project on strengthening emergency nutrition training (pre-service and in-service) that is currently being established in Kenya with financial support from USAID/OFDA. The focus is on how emergency nutrition can be incorporated into existing curricula. Another initiative is the UNICEF, WFP and MoH collaboration on roll-out of the new Guideline for Integrated Management of Malnutrition (IMAM) in the most affected ASAL districts (see 2.2)..

Lesson learned: Connecting to local systems, a learning curve

The Merlin intervention in Wajir district (ECHO/-FA/BUD/2008/01036) originally was based on a mobile clinics approach. This was first abandoned in favour of a mentorship programme where MoH staff oversaw the implementation of the nutrition programme through the mobile clinics. Later, a decision was made to work through existing health dispensaries only with increased emphasis on community-based mobilization efforts. The shift in approach was in response to criticism, including from DG ECHO, on earlier projects where the mobile clinics operated independently from existing MoH facilities which caused a certain 'duplication' of services.

85. While there is an obvious problem with the structural development of ASAL regions and to deal with the underlying factors of poverty and marginalisation (see also section 2.4), there has been significant GoK involvement in terms of strengthening structures that focus on livelihood

¹³⁵ OXFAM (2006) Delivering the agenda: Addressing chronic under development in Kenya's Arid Lands. OXFAM briefing paper

¹³⁶ Dadacha (2009), Kenya: The politics of deprivation and separation: The case of northern Kenya. Gaada.com

¹³⁷ UNICEF (2010), Accelerating Nutrition Recovery and Increasing Resilience in Kenya, revised Single Form proposal, June 2010

support. GoK supported and coordinated livelihood support got underway during 1996 with the creation of the ASAL programme. Coordination structures such as KFSSG and KFSSM were instituted later in 1998 as a technical / coordination consortium in which GoK, NGOs and UN agencies participate. The role of the GoK is significant as the president, government sectors and administration take central positions. In the ASAL districts the EC- and WB-supported ALRMP and its DSGs are the most effective and crucial government district coordination institutions in terms of strengthening livelihood security and vulnerability reduction. At national level, the ALRMP is currently housed in the office of the Prime Minister challenges remain however. The evaluation team observed that weaknesses evolve around the technical collection of livelihood security information (mainly EWS information¹³⁸) and the pressure to expand ALRM branches and DSGs to the many newly created district units within the arid and semi arid regions¹³⁹. Another significant GoK involvement that has contributed to strengthening livelihood support has been focusing on policy development for the ASALs. Poverty reduction, livelihood diversification and support have become important policy themes developed since the 2004¹⁴⁰.

86. In terms of coordinating larger scale interventions, GoK has a poorer track record as exposed by the Kenyan Meat Commission (KMC) and MoLD interventions on animal destocking and animal feed distribution. It is argued that these centrally coordinated actions from Nairobi had very little impact and even were harmful to some of the target communities (ILRI 2010). Here, coordination and implementation would have been safer at the helm of the DSG.

B. Community-based drought management (CBDM)

87. CBDM is recognised as an important feature in the DCM approach as adopted by ALRMP. It promotes the central role of decision-making by communities in all stages of the process. Responses thus are based on needs identified by the communities, their assessment of levels of vulnerability and their priorities in terms of risks that have to be addressed. The approach promotes integration and linkages of community plans with organisations and government departments so that they form part of an overall strategy protection of livelihoods and vulnerability reduction. There is a need to streamline this concept of CBDM and to expand it further, e.g. based on the community-managed CORDAID model (see box below). IPs currently active in the ASAL districts could act as change agents in this respect.

88. Community consultation and involvement are strong features in the DG ECHO funded responses through the NGOs. Most of the IPs have been present in the ASALs for a considerable length of time and have built up strong linkages with the communities, either directly or through the interface of a local partner agency and in collaboration with the private sector.

Best practice: CORDAID approach to disaster risk reduction

The strongest focus on community-based approaches is found in the case of CORDAID which has adopted an approach of community managed disaster risk reduction. This encompasses community promotion of (1) risk awareness and assessments including hazard, vulnerability and capacity analysis; (2) knowledge development; (3) building public commitment and developing policy legislation and community action; (4) environmental management, land use, application of science and technology, partnerships and financial instruments and; (5) EWS for forecasting, preparedness and reaction.

¹³⁸ ILRI (2010) Suggests that EWS information as published in EWS bulletins at district level does not sufficiently reflect the condition of rangeland on which to determine the timely implementation of livestock interventions. To improve the system there is a considerable need to streamline data collection systems between districts, to harmonize / standardize the classification of warning decisions and to reduce the time-lag between EWS publications.

¹³⁹ This observation coincides with ILRI (2010) findings.

¹⁴⁰ See also: GoK (2008), Review and analysis of existing drought risk policies and programmes in Kenya, Ministry of State for Special Programmes

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. DG ECHO support to the nutrition sector

89. During the 2008-09 drought in Kenya, the EC was a key donor (second to USAID only) for emergency food and nutrition interventions in the ASALs, on which about half of all DG ECHO 2008-09 drought response funding for Kenya (€ 47.7 million) was spent.

90. The DG ECHO support for food and nutrition interventions has been highly relevant as a response to the emergency malnutrition levels in many ASAL districts while there was a serious gap in malnutrition treatment services. With DG ECHO funding, malnutrition treatment services was considerably expanded. Most of the supported projects were successful and achieved good impacts in terms of recovery rates and other Sphere indicators. The substantial DG ECHO funding for the nutrition sector in 2008-09 has greatly facilitated the roll-out of the new GoK Integrated Management of Malnutrition Guideline. The multi-sectoral approach that was adopted in all nutrition projects through NGO IPs was very appropriate as it meant that the interventions addressed some key underlying factors behind malnutrition (watsan, food insecurity) with impact at household and community level.

91. Although the results of the monitoring study still are being awaited, in this evaluation the blanket supplementary feeding programme is also rated to have been appropriate and with good geographical targeting. The programme served well to reduce the gap in access to food caused by pipeline breaks for the general food distribution and insufficient coverage of targeted feeding programmes.

92. In a context like the ASALs there is a need for a good nutrition information system which collects information at various times of the year and with sufficient coverage of the different agro-ecological zones / population groups. Nutrition surveillance is undertaken by two GoK bodies (Ministry of Arid Lands/ALRMP and MoPHS) but the systems have several flaws and do not provide a strong basis for geographical targeting of humanitarian support. The working group on nutrition information systems under the Nutrition Technical Forum is currently developing plans for a revised system, which forms part of the NIPHORN II project (co-funded by the EC Food Security Thematic Programme). The system of nutrition surveys (many are funded by DG ECHO) is very important to fill the existing information gap but the surveys are only done once per year and the information is primarily collected in the areas where the nutrition-oriented NGOs are already working.

93. With the onset of good rains early 2010, the acute relief phase for the (agro)-pastoralists in northern Kenya now is over. Conditions for the peri-urban populations however remain dire with high poverty and vulnerability. In many crowded settled areas, access to health services and hygiene conditions are poor. Although precise information is lacking, it can be expected that even at times of good rainfall GAM rates for the peri-urban population are not coming down to a level below the emergency threshold of 15%.

Strategic recommendations

- For new droughts in northern Kenya, it is justified that DG ECHO provides support along the same lines as has happened in 2008-09.
- Nutrition is one of the core issues in the vulnerable ASAL areas which deserves more continuous attention from a humanitarian donor like DG ECHO stretching beyond the immediate drought relief phase. It is also found that the relief phase can be different for different livelihood groups in the ASALs (the difference between (agro)-pastoralists and the peri-urban population). It is suggested that DG ECHO develops a programme on nutrition support to the ASALs for each of the phases in the drought cycle, in line with the drought cycle approach of the DG ECHO regional drought decisions that support mitigation and preparedness for the next drought through livestock and watsan activities.

Operational recommendations

- It is recommended to DG ECHO to continue during the coming 2-3 years, to provide funds to IPs for support to MoPHS on malnutrition treatment in the ASALs in Kenya, based on further roll-out of the IMAM Guideline. Focus should be on areas and population groups where malnutrition rates are remaining high (GAM close to or above 15%) despite the good rainfall in 2010.
- The nutrition support programme should include a focus on mitigation and preparedness through continued capacity building for MoPHS staff at district level and below, and through support for community-based nutrition and hygiene education. In line with prevailing needs, DG ECHO should continue to support malnutrition treatment by MoPHS as a relief intervention in selected peri-urban areas where GAM rates remain close to or above emergency levels irrespective of whether it is a year of good or bad rainfall.
- Until targeted supplementary feeding have achieved good coverage rates, it is suggested to DG ECHO or other humanitarian donors to replicate the blanket supplementary feeding programme during new droughts but then to concentrate the support on pregnant and lactating women and children 6-24 months only as these are most vulnerable from a nutrition perspective.
- Within the framework of overall DG ECHO support for drought preparedness, it should be considered to continue to fund the Nutrition Technical Forum (through UNICEF) for such work and to seek opportunities for linkage (LRRD) with the EC funding for nutrition information systems in Kenya through the Food Security Thematic Programme ('Support for Nutrition Strategies in East and West Africa'). The more promising approach would be to support improvement of nutrition data quality within the existing sentinel surveillance system operated by the Arid Lands Ministry. It is suggested to continue to fund nutrition surveys as part of the project-level M&E system which also can be used for triangulation of the findings of the nutrition surveillance system.

5.2. DG ECHO Emergency livelihood support

94. A significant proportion of 50% of the DG-ECHO funding, channelled through the Regional Drought Decisions, was utilised for supporting humanitarian interventions and drought cycle management which included interventions in the livestock sector and water and sanitation. Coupled with continued marginalisation of the ASALs, the increased droughts frequency has led to increases in vulnerability. Customary coping mechanisms are being lost, people loose access to resources, and a larger proportion of the population drops out of pastoralism and loose their productivity. The two main groups that now exist in the ASALs are the (agro)-pastoral group,

and the peri-urban settler group. During droughts, both groups qualify for short term livelihood support for protection and to alleviate stress. A better understanding is needed on the targeting of both groups.

95. The interventions under the DG ECHO humanitarian mandate are designed to have a rapid impact, have a short time-frame and a clear exit strategy. These interventions are not designed to deal with chronic food security that now widely exists in the ASAL region.

96. With the DG ECHO funding, reasonably balanced support to livelihoods under stress was provided through a variety of different interventions, involving direct support to households under stress and interventions focussed on supporting local economies. While cash based responses were few, food aid took up a main proportion of the DG ECHO budget, despite the fact a growing body of literature evidence (also referred to in this report) suggests that cash / voucher based support have important advantages over food-aid as they are cheaper, better support the different livelihood protection priorities of different households and add value to local markets and therefore also add value to LRRD.

97. The linkage of Relief to Recovery and Development has been approached through the collaboration with GOK institutions and community based drought cycle management. This was a valid approach as they complement each other. However a main challenge exists in terms of government coordination with the administrative division of several ASAL districts, and the lack of government development investments as directed by the ASAL policy. Community managed drought management is a valid approach as it adopts the central role of decision making by communities and provides for the linkages with government and IP partners. The approach is however not uniformly strong across the ASAL region.

98. The recent upsurge in good rainfall have brought positive changes in rangeland conditions and but significant challenges remain to deal with the aftermath of prolonged drought conditions that have eroded resources and assets of affected population in the ASALs. As vulnerability remains, recovery requires speeding up of rehabilitation interventions that are in line with the concept of DCM and LRRD.

Strategic recommendations

- It is recommended that DG ECHO continues to contribute funding during future droughts in support to humanitarian and food security interventions utilising the framework of DCM. This support should be most prominent during the alarm / relief / and recovery phases of the drought cycle and should be phased out at the end of the recovery phase.
- It is important that future approaches in drought management are updated / adjusted that strategically serve the interests and priorities of the different livelihood groups in the ASALs better, during periods of drought related stress. In order to do so improved analysis of the livelihood group under stress should determine the type intervention, the targeting and the type of transfer mechanisms and the conditionality attached. (see also the final operational recommendation below)
- As food insecurity has become a chronic problem that cannot be addressed by DG ECHO, it is recommended that renewed efforts between DG ECHO, other EC instruments and other donors are explored (in particular World Bank, USAID and DFID) in order to provide a new momentum to LRRD. A higher level of advocacy is required to persuade GoK to commit itself to a significant volume of investments that are in line with the ASAL development policy instituted since 2004.

- From a strategic perspective it is worth recommending that the balance between GOK service delivery support and support to NGOs involved in building community based capacity building on drought response is maintained. A more prominent role among IPs to act as change agents regarding the latter approach is recommended. The evaluation recommends the CORDAID approach to disaster risk reduction in this regard.

Operational recommendations

- In the targeting of short term support to pastoralists during future droughts, DG ECHO should proportionally widen its scope and coverage on interventions that are focussed on the survival of the pastoral productivity potential. These include the activities that have been supported under the recent programme (animal health, water, animal destocking) and other non food-based responses and market interventions.
- Peri-urban groups in the ASALs find themselves at severe economic hardship and this situation is worsened during drought conditions. Cash-for-work and food-for-assets are proven suitable modalities for these groups.
- As transfers such as cash and voucher schemes have significant impacts on stabilising purchasing power among the two groups, it is recommended that these modalities are expanded during future droughts. IPs should seek orientation and rebuild capacity in order to make this shift. Financial institutions and markets need strengthening to minimise risks.
- With the recognition that during droughts, food-based and cash-based responses are complementary to each other, it is recommended that DG ECHO supports a shift towards more cash-based responses as a drought management tool in preventing livelihood failure. This can be done through encouraging IPs to follow this trend, and to provide technical advice in this field. A more prominent and innovative role would suit DG ECHO well in this regard, as within Kenya, food based responses are largely covered by USAID funding.
- During the recovery phase (now well underway), and the ‘normal’ period following small-scale operational research is recommended with full involvement of IPs, government at district level and target communities. The research would be in support of recommendations made above. The research should be participatory and focus on two main themes: (1) how to link the two LRRD approaches for achieving improved sustainability and; (2) how best to target livelihood groups and transfer modalities.