City Diplomacy

The role of local governments in
> conflict prevention
> peace-building
> post-conflict reconstruction

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The editors
City diplomacy / the role of local governments in conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction | Alexandra Sizoo and Arne Musch

Summary

This introductory chapter first sets out to define city diplomacy, or rather to highlight the various interpretations of the term in current use, and then to explain our use of the term in this book. As the title of this chapter suggests, we see it as all activities by local (i.e. sub-national) governments undertaken to contribute to conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. In particular, we focus on how local governments in peaceful areas or countries can help their counterparts in more-troubled regions.

The book is comprised of eight chapters, including this introductory one, all written by experts in their own areas, the overall objective being to produce a volume that provides an introduction to the various facets of city diplomacy and explains the current thinking on this relatively new area of study.

The chapters cover both theoretical analyses, to underpin the activities and provide a legal justification for local authorities to become involved in peace-building outside their own region, and case studies to show what can be achieved in areas as diverse as Colombia, Croatia and the Middle East.

This introductory chapter provides a short summary of the common themes that we see running through the subsequent chapters, it illustrates the various ways that local governments can contribute to peace-building activities and the factors that need to be taken into account before becoming involved in this area. Taking lessons from the various case studies it illustrates how ill-considered or poorly carried out activities can have a negative impact on peace – that is, they can make the situation worse.

Our hope is that this book, with its theoretical analyses and practical cases, inspires many local governments and their leaders to engage in city diplomacy activities and contribute to making this a more peaceful world.
Introduction

This book The term city diplomacy has been applied to many types of international action by local governments. Nevertheless, it has increasingly come to mean the involvement of local governments in peace-building. City diplomacy is a relatively new term and it is not widely known in which ways local governments are involved in conflict situations, nor why they do it. This generates questions. Is diplomacy something carried out only by states? What makes local governments want to become involved in peace-building? What is their justification for doing so? Do they have sufficient capacity to do so? Are we talking about local government involvement in issues at home, or in conflict areas far away?

The purposes of this book are to analyze the current state of affairs in city diplomacy, and to inspire local governments and international organizations. It addresses the questions posed above and others. It identifies achievements and contributions to conflict prevention, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction by local governments within and beyond conflict areas, while weaknesses and pitfalls are also highlighted.

This chapter provides an overview of the debate on city diplomacy and outlines a conceptual framework. It presents both its own story lines and important points made throughout the book. We refer to the subsequent chapters where appropriate. Chapter 2, by Antonio Papisa, is about the legal foundations of city diplomacy and addresses its justification. Chapter 3, by Martijn Klem and Georg Ferks, takes relevant concepts from current scientific thinking on conflict, and analyzes the role of local governments from a social contract perspective. Chapter 4, by Dion van den Berg, focuses on the political dimensions. It presents cases of local governments taking a stance on broad international issues or on specific conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s. In Chapter 5, the contribution by Kenneth Bush, the local impact of city diplomacy is central. He warns that interventions can contribute to peace but also intensify conflict. The remaining chapters are individual case studies. Chapter 6, by Andrés Paz Ramos and Marianne Moor, presents a case in Colombia in which foreign local governments contributed, alongside civil society organizations, to existing local peace processes. Chapter 7, by Martijn Klem, deals with a region of Croatia. Klem analyzes how some local governments there promoted social cohesion, and what certain foreign local governments contributed. Finally, Chapter 8 by Van Hemert is about dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian municipalities and their associations that was fostered by foreign local government associations.

The chapters deal with issues that practitioners have raised with our team of editors and authors on various occasions. There are many issues in the current phase of the development of city diplomacy, and not all the research needs can be addressed in this book. Our choice of perspectives is discussed at the end of this section. There, it is explained among other things why this book has a slight bias towards situations in which local governments try to help in specific conflicts elsewhere.

Through this book, we have tried to provide access to a diverse knowledge base. The single case chapters are about very different parts of the world, and many more short cases and examples feature in the other chapters, so offering a wide diversity. It is, however, impossible to cover all the ways in which local governments are involved in peace-building, and so we have concentrated on certain activities that we consider typical.

1 Musch & Van Veldhuizen (2008)
Section 1 of this chapter explains the purpose and focus of the book, and offers some definitions and concepts. Section 2 deals with what city diplomacy can be, starting with the broad outlines and moving on to specific categories of activities with which foreign local governments help local governments in conflict areas. Many of the other chapters in this book are about this situation: local governments in conflict areas receiving outside help. Issues associated with this are identified throughout the book. We synthesize the most important ones in Section 3 of this chapter. Finally, Section 4 reflects on the lessons learnt and the future.

**Local governments building peace: an international issue** The issue of the involvement of local governments in peace-building is now the subject of much discussion. Local governments engage in international activities and receive increasing recognition for this role. Concrete, and sometimes desperate, demands from local governments in conflict areas proliferate. Partnerships are forged between international actors and local governments, within and beyond conflict areas, in attempts to create political and institutional environments in which reconstruction lasts.

City diplomacy may be a new term, but the phenomenon has a longer history. Local governments seem to feel a responsibility to contribute to dialogue and peace, to create a secure environment for their citizens. They have a history in international engagement, and they also have a history in dealing with conflicts at home. They are the layer of government that often feels the consequences of conflicts most directly, that is, in the streets of the city. Local governments have gained experience in projects and programmes involving international co-operation. They have long-term relationships with partner municipalities outside their own countries, and they work together in international platforms and associations. International actors, such as UN organizations, transitional administrations, peace-keeping forces and NGOs, increasingly recognize this and invite local governments and their national associations to join their peace-building efforts.

The worldwide organization of local governments, United Cities and Local Governments, is an organization that promotes city diplomacy. Its committee on City Diplomacy, Peace-building and Human Rights contributes to the development of city diplomacy within its overall political agenda of fostering democratic local self-government. Another such organization is the Congress of Local Authorities and Regions of the Council of Europe. It recently recommended to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe that it should include city diplomacy in its priority activities. Local governments work through such organizations because they expect international attention to be a positive force in conflict areas, because they value the knowledge and experience of counterparts when local democracies are challenged by violence, and because they need platforms where the demand and supply of city diplomacy can be matched.

Various other international platforms use the city diplomacy concept, or promote the potential contribution of local governments to peace in general. These include Mayors for

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2 http://www.cities-localgovernments.org
3 CPL/BUR(14)1 REC, 13 February 2008, City diplomacy, Onno Van Veldhuizen, Netherlands (L, ILDG), Draft recommendation, Bureau of the Chamber of Local Authorities, adopted on 13 March 2008
4 Speech by former Mayor Deetman, Malaga, 13 March 2008 at the spring session of the Council of Europe.
5 Musch & Van Veldhuizen (2008)
The Center for Innovative Diplomacy, founded in 1982 by Michael Shuman, promoted, among other things, global peace through direct city and citizen participation in international affairs. These terms were thus already in use at that time.

Glocal Forum (2003)

Sizoo (2007) – this is UCLG’s concept paper on city diplomacy

Pluijm (2007) p.11

Recommendation 234 (2008), first article.

Musch & Van Veldhuizen (2008) p.2

City diplomacy as defined by various organizations

The term ‘city diplomacy’ registers an increasing amount of hits on the worldwide web. It is a container concept – used in different ways by various actors, and defined according to need and practice. A short history of definitions illuminates how different the perspectives can be.

Over the years, certain aspects of city diplomacy have been couched in other terms, such as municipal diplomacy, citizens diplomacy, and city-to-city diplomacy.6 One of the first users of the term city diplomacy in conjunction with peace-building was the Glocal Forum, a network of cities. It published its study on ‘glocalization’ in 2003.7 The term glocalization points to the link between the globalization of technology, information and economics on the one hand and local realities on the other. The forum recommends a bottom-up system for the governance of globalization and greater equality, with local governments as the key actors, and decentralization and city-to-city co-operation among the main processes. City diplomacy is a priority, and peace-building is one of the things that city diplomacy can be about.

The Committee on City Diplomacy, Peace-building and Human Rights of United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), established in 2005, defined the concept as ‘the tool of local governments and their associations in promoting social cohesion, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction with the aim to create a stable environment in which the citizens can live together in peace, democracy and prosperity’.8

In 2007, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ issued a research paper on city diplomacy. This paper defines it as ‘the institutions and processes by which cities engage in relations with actors on an international political stage with the aim of representing themselves and their interest to one another’.9 In the paper, there are six things that city diplomacy can be about: security, development, economy, culture, networks and representation. Peace-building is part of the security dimension.

The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe adopted the fairly specific UCLG definition in a recommendation in 2008, and added that city diplomacy can be seen as a natural development in the role of cities as members of the international community, sharing values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.10 The report on which the recommendation is based contains another, narrow definition: ‘for the purposes of this report, city diplomacy is defined as the activity whereby a municipal authority in a conflict area receives support from one or more municipal authorities outside of the area’.

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6 The Center for Innovative Diplomacy, founded in 1982 by Michael Shuman, promoted, among other things, global peace through direct city and citizen participation in international affairs. These terms were thus already in use at that time.
7 Glocal Forum (2003)
8 Sizoo (2007) – this is UCLG’s concept paper on city diplomacy
9 Pluijm (2007) p.11
10 Recommendation 234 (2008), first article.
So, in a relatively short period, various definitions with different implications have surfaced. This is probably because the idea of local governments being involved in peace-building took root in different locations, quite independently of one another. Two areas of differences stand out so far:

- Value-free definitions that stress process as against definitions that include city diplomacy’s purposes (human rights, conflict resolution, social cohesion etc.).
- Definitions with a broad reach (worldwide appeals and/or defence of local interests in the international community) versus narrow definitions which focus on peace-building.

In a field that is developing, such differences are productive: they generate conceptual progress. Now, we have to present and justify the perspectives taken in this chapter and in the rest of the book. This forms the next subsection.

Research needs and choice of perspectives As with the Council of Europe’s report, this book does not intend to adjudicate between definitions, or to legitimize any inclusion or exclusion of activities. However, city diplomacy can mean many things, and this book cannot deal with all of them, so some constraints must be imposed. We therefore base our arguments on a choice of perspectives, and on a judgement as to what is needed at this point in time.

Let us talk about the needs first. These have been identified by our international team of authors and editors, through working with local governments and their associations the world over, while preparing for the first World Conference on City Diplomacy in The Hague (2008), and while attending the preparatory conferences in Perugia (2006) and Barcelona (2007). In this process, we have identified the following needs:

- Local governments in conflict areas need a way to present their case at the international level that maximizes their chances of receiving help. They also need to know which parts of their municipal agendas are best served with outside help from counterparts. Finally, they need to know what their options are if help is not forthcoming.
- Local governments who want to go to conflict areas and help need to know what it takes to be effective alongside other organizations, such as NGOs or the UN, in the conflict area. Also, foreign local governments feel a great need for a sound justification for their engagement.
- Foreign local governments who do not want to go to a conflict area but still become involved have different needs. They need to know what global peace initiatives are out there, how to lobby international platforms and organizations and how to foster a culture of peace in their own cities.
- International organizations, national governments and peace and development agencies, as well as ‘domestic’ civil society organizations in conflict areas, need to know how to work with ‘foreign’ local governments in conflict areas for sustainable results. They may also find it valuable to know how to involve local governments in lobbying and monitoring.

In this book, we prioritize local government issues in conflict areas, and issues that foreign local governments face when they go to conflict areas, over issues of global conflict and of lobbying through international platforms. Nevertheless, the global/international activities

13 All intervening local governments will be called ‘foreign’ local governments from now on, but they can be from the same country or even from the same conflict area.
are extremely valuable and they are part of city diplomacy. Without a favourable international environment, the involvement of local governments in peace-building becomes much harder. Although we do not ignore the global/international issues entirely, we do devote most of this book to the local expression of city diplomacy in conflict areas.

This leads us to the following perspective.

Using the word ‘city’ indicates that we focus on the involvement in peace-building of local governments or, more precisely, sub-national governments. We do not consider local representatives of the central government to be local governments. Furthermore, local government is not the same as local communities. We use the definition by Martijn Klem and Georg Frerks in this book; local governments are: ‘the legitimate and accountable local layer of government – both the elected politicians and the administration – that represents the local community and provides public services to this local community’.

It is important to understand that this book uses the term local governments to cover a vast diversity of situations. The systems and the constituent bodies (council, executive etc.) vary from place to place. The relationships with the citizens are different everywhere, and so are the loyalties to national governments and other actors with power. Decisions to engage in city diplomacy, both at home and abroad, are taken in particular local political environments.

Using the word ‘diplomacy’ suggests international relations or careful and astute handling of any issue involving diverging interests. Section 2 starts from the perspective of sub-state diplomacy to locate city diplomacy in relation to more traditional forms. When local governments foster social cohesion, also a subject in the next section, they build bridges, but they do not necessarily engage in international relations. While this book has a bias towards international relations, many local governments consider fostering social cohesion to be part of city diplomacy, like we do.

What is our perspective on conflict and peace-building? Martijn Klem, in this book, says that peace-building consists of all activities that aim to keep the use of violence at bay and to create conditions that make peaceful conflict resolution a more attractive option. This definition distinguishes the absence of violence, called ‘negative peace’, from building the conditions and institutions for peaceful resolution of conflicts of interest, labelled ‘positive peace’.

Kenneth Bush, in a publication on which his chapter in this book is based, points out that this involves ‘un-building the structures of violence’. This takes us into a grey area in our perspective on city diplomacy: how violent must a conflict be to be able to speak of peace-building and of city diplomacy? Do occasional outbursts in poor neighbourhoods of otherwise peaceful countries count? Do potentially violent conflicts count, making early warning a part of city diplomacy? There are certainly local governments with good contacts in potential conflict areas who can, and do, sound the alarm at the international level in a bid to get the conflict onto agendas before it turns violent. What about un-building the structures of violence on a global scale, which is what the Mayors for Peace, for instance, try to do?

14 Martijn Klem and Georg Frerks elaborate such distinctions in their chapter in this book.
Even war zones rarely follow straight paths from warning to conflict to resolution to reconstruction. Long periods of instability are normal, in which fighting occasionally stops but picks up again when political deals collapse. Conflict areas are also not homogenous: not all local institutions have disappeared everywhere, and there may well be areas where the conflict subsides while it rages on around it.\textsuperscript{16} It is, in fact, quite hard to define what constitutes a violent conflict.

Our position is that all these situations, including the global and the potential, fit Martijn Klem’s definition of peace-building and are therefore an element of city diplomacy. The term has a broad reach. This book, however, tends to pay more attention to situations of local violent conflict. Figure 1 visualizes our perspective on city diplomacy.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Our perspective on city diplomacy}
\end{figure}

Aspects of city diplomacy – what can it be?

\textit{Sub-state diplomacy: how city diplomacy and state diplomacy relate}  Local governments may be relative newcomers to diplomacy, but international relations are clearly no longer the exclusive preserve of national governments. On the contrary, we live in a world in which international, national and domestic arenas blur together.\textsuperscript{17} Issues of war and peace are part of these interconnected arenas. Dion van den Berg, in this book, analyses how the city diplomacy campaigns developed in the 1980s were part of the wider process of democratizing foreign and security policy that took place in most western countries. The phenomenon of actors, other than states, engaging in international relations is called sub-state diplomacy here. Antonio Papisca, in this book, calls the driving force behind this trend, in the context of today’s globalization, de-territorialization: local governments and other non-state actors disregarding borders and appealing to, working with, and holding to account international platforms and organizations. The converse is also true; international organizations and platforms increasingly work with local governments and other non-state actors.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{16} Hilhorst (2007)
\item\textsuperscript{17} Pluijm (2007)
\end{itemize}
That said, there is a worldwide issue of identity and the autonomy of local governments in their relationship with central governments. The many debates about decentralization reflect this. More specifically, with respect to city diplomacy, the issue is whether a local government’s initiatives need to be aligned with its own central government’s foreign policies. We will see that the practice varies.

Let us deal with the relationship between international organizations and local governments first. The former clearly see the benefit of working with the latter, and their associations, as evidenced in their projects and programmes. They involve foreign local governments to assist them in international capacity building programmes with peer-to-peer activities and decentralized co-operation. International organizations sometimes explicitly express their interest in working with local governments and their national associations. Examples are the Cardoso report (June 2004) which identifies local governments as a constituency of the UN with a growing role in global governance, and the UN General Assembly, in its 60th session (September 2005), stating that local authorities play an important role in attaining the millennium development goals, just as earlier UN conferences had expressed in Local Agenda 21, the Habitat Agenda and elsewhere. An example of fully-fledged formal involvement is the Committee of the Regions of the European Union, one of the bodies of this supranational organization. Antonio Papisca extensively elaborates on these developments in his chapter.

There is a growing view that international organizations should engage with local actors on conflict management. This means, for example, that the United Nations Development Programme supports local government peace-building efforts. Chris van Hemert describes just such a case in this book. International organizations engage with local governments in conflict areas and appeal to foreign local governments to come and help. Rogier van der Pluijm, in a publication of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, has identified some reasons why cities tend to play a diplomatic role: they tend to know local-level problems well, they are disinclined to see them as security problems and they are often perceived as more neutral than states.

The converse, local governments engaging with international organizations, also happens. For instance, United Cities and Local Governments has signed memoranda of understanding with UN Habitat and with the Alliance of Civilizations.

Turning to the issue of local governments’ relationships with national governments, we see that some national governments regularly involve local governments and their associations in the implementation of foreign policy, mainly in capacity building and reform programmes in developing countries. An issue is the degree of freedom that local governments have to act in this way. The strongest view on this yet found is in the treaty

18 Antonio Papisca lists many UN programmes which do work with local governments, and many EU programmes, bilateral donors and international NGOs do likewise. The European Union is especially active in contracting associations of municipalities to carry out programmes in decentralization and municipal services.
19 Panel of Eminent Persons on UN–Civil Society Relations (2004)
20 See Cravero & Kumar (2005) for an example. Such literature is a specific part of a broader movement of local government involvement that started with the UN conference in Rio de Janeiro that launched the local Agenda 21 in 1992, which later resulted in the creation of UN Habitat.
21 Pluijm (2007) p.20
22 This is the case, for example, in Canada, France, the Netherlands and Sweden.
entitled the European Charter of Local Self-Government. Its Article 10.3 states that ‘local authorities shall be entitled, under such conditions as may be provided for by the law, to co-operate with their counterparts in other states’. Additionally, Recommendation 234 of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe invites the representatives of national governments to support city diplomacy ‘in the general framework of their foreign policies’.

There are two possible interpretations here. The first is that national governments should make it a matter of policy to support city diplomacy. The second is that national governments can use the law (charter) and their policies (recommendation) to set limits on city diplomacy. The practice varies. Some countries leave it up to the local governments to develop their own international policy, and local governments are allowed to use their own budgets and to take political positions with regard to international affairs that may not be in line with the national position (e.g. France, Italy, Spain). Other countries only want their local governments to engage in international co-operation if it involves funding from the central level, and therefore comes with conditions (e.g. Sweden). Some countries take a midway position: local governments are allowed to engage in international politics, but their central governments prefer it to be in line with national policies (e.g. Canada, the Netherlands). Dion van den Berg’s chapter on city diplomacy campaigns further elaborates on the relationship between national governments and local governments in international policy.

In publications by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, city diplomacy is analyzed in a way that is relatively unconcerned with the division of responsibilities or discussions on who should prevail. It describes the relationship between local and central governments as one of ‘competitive co-operation’ in which there may be instances when city and state actors work for mutually exclusive policy outcomes, and instances when city and state actors work for identical or complementary policy outcomes.23

Our position is that there is value in both the analysis of practice and the establishment of norms. In other words, we need both the researchers and the activists if we are to advance the field of city diplomacy. Both central states and local governments should act in accordance with their responsibilities and expertise. Overarching ideas of human rights and building trust at grassroots level exist that apply to the agendas of both levels of government when they address issues of war and peace.24 Under these conditions, we consider the fear that representing the interests of states is incompatible with representing the interests of local governments to be unfounded.

City diplomacy and global issues The term diplomacy in its classical meaning involves the representation of interests at the international level. Discussions on global interests are part of this. Local governments unite in organizations and platforms to address the international community on their perception of international developments.

Mayors for Peace is one such organization. It was established following the Mayor of Hiroshima proposing, in 1982, a new programme ‘to promote the solidarity of cities toward the total abolition of nuclear weapons’.25 Today, member mayors lobby the international

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25 www.mayorsforpeace.org
community with campaigns such as ‘Cities Are Not Targets’.\textsuperscript{26} In the 1980s and 1990s, numerous European municipalities got involved in peace campaigns, often in alliance with peace movements. Dion van den Berg’s chapter elaborates on examples such as the nuclear-free local authorities, the twinning with Nicaragua, the municipal anti-apartheid policies and the East-West municipal twinning contacts.\textsuperscript{27}

The Alliance of Civilizations is a UN body that sets out to support projects and initiatives aimed at building bridges among a diversity of cultures and communities.\textsuperscript{28} Local governments gain access to local groups of different cultures, can foster dialogue and work on a culture of peace which makes people identify with the global issues. Through United Cities and Local Governments, local governments contribute to the discussion by adding a local perspective.\textsuperscript{29}

**Peace-building at home: local governments promoting social cohesion**

Local governments can deal with issues of global interest, but also with issues that are felt important by its own local community. This element of city diplomacy is referred to as the promotion of social cohesion in the city.\textsuperscript{30} The argument is that mayors, councillors and officials are responsible for the creation of free and just societies for their citizens. This implies that local leaders sometimes have to overcome problems caused by nascent divisions, playing a stabilizing role among different ethnic, religious or otherwise antagonistic groups. The problems to overcome may have a mainly local character but, more often than not, they are caused by conflicts that originate elsewhere, or that play a role on a much broader international scale, but that are reflected and felt within the local community.

Martijn Klem’s chapter on Croatia in this book provides illustrations and cases where social cohesion was important. He describes efforts of local authorities, after the war in former Yugoslavia, to intervene in ethnic disputes in their own communities, and to stimulate citizens’ participation in peace-building efforts. He also identifies interesting feats of cooperation between mayors of various ethnic backgrounds. Of the many local leaders in the conflict area, only a few took initiatives to build positive peace in their own cities. Although few in number, they were able to illustrate the potentially stabilizing role that local governments can play in post-conflict reconstruction.

In their chapter, Andrés Paz Ramos and Marianne Moor present examples of local governments in the northern part of Cauca, Colombia, creating their own ways to protect

\textsuperscript{26} http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/english/campaign/2020vision.htm. Through this programme, Mayors for Peace seeks to encourage and assist cities and municipal associations in demanding assurances from nuclear-weapon states that cities are not and will not be targeted for nuclear attack.

\textsuperscript{27} Chapter van den Berg

\textsuperscript{28} The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) aims to improve understanding and cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures and religions and, in the process, to help counter the forces that fuel polarization and extremism (mission statement of the Alliance of Civilizations: http://www.unaoc.org).

\textsuperscript{29} A co-operation agreement was signed between UCLG and the Alliance of Civilizations on 15 January 2008, whereby the Alliance recognized the importance of cities in the promotion of dialogue between cultures: http://www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/index.asp?page=newsD.asp&L=EN&ID=218.

\textsuperscript{30} The Committee on City Diplomacy, Peace-building and Human Rights of United Cities and Local Governments noted ‘[...] the definition of city diplomacy [should include] internal conflicts within municipalities, between ethnic groups for example, not being at war [...]’. As a result of this proposal, the term social cohesion was added to the definition of city diplomacy.
their citizens in struggles between different ethnic groups and problems with armed movements. Their case study focuses on the international dimension, but one can also read how ethnic tensions within communities were handled.

The potential of local governments in this area seems great. Local governments can tell central governments what is happening on the ground and can develop early warning systems. However, local governments should not claim to be the only level that can stimulate inter-ethnic dialogue. Moreover, while they can play a positive role, they can also play a destabilizing role, for example when local governments, in line with the practices of central government, oppress some of their citizens or discriminate against them.

Quite apart from social cohesion in areas of actual or potential violent conflict, there is the issue of social cohesion in cities, towns and villages which are unlikely to see any such conflict (although this does not mean it cannot happen). In such cases, local governments can work on the prevention of conflict, developing a culture of peace, solidarity and identification with global peace issues at home. Activities in this area include peace campaigns and festivals, youth forums and peace education in schools. The international day of peace, 21st September, is a popular day for such activities and we would include them within city diplomacy, even though this book does not pay much attention to them.

**Intervention by foreign local governments** The preceding subsections dealt with the types of city diplomacy that fit the broad perspective: campaigns for global issues with no link to a particular conflict area, and working on social cohesion without any implication for international relations. One can also take a narrow view of city diplomacy in which it is about foreign local governments helping their counterparts in areas of violent conflict. This subsection is about such situations.

We will categorize the activities of foreign local governments into three types:

- Lobbying
- Projects
- Dialogue activities

The word lobby here denotes any type of political engagement with a specific actual, potential or past conflict. This fits a wide range of activities, such as campaigns to alert the public to the plight of people in the area, lobbying to get the conflict on the agenda of international organizations or onto a court roll, expressions of solidarity and moral support, visits to the oppressed or the imprisoned, human rights monitoring and election monitoring.\(^{31}\) This type of city diplomacy is the most varied and the most prevalent. Lobbying even occurs where the conflict area is so violent that a physical presence is not an option for foreign local governments. In such situations, local governments can contribute to halting the violence by working with international organizations and platforms, peace movements etcetera.

Lobby-type city diplomacy can set out to help officials, such as mayors, who are threatened. Andrés Paz Ramos and Marianne Moor describe just such a case in their chapter. The attention or presence of foreign local governments can be of great significance, especially if parties to the conflict want to be seen playing according to the rules.

\(^{31}\) For instance, the European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East organizes several lobby activities, including the observation of local elections.
Lobby-type city diplomacy amounts to early warning and conflict prevention when it takes place before the conflict becomes militarized. There is great potential in this type of activity: foreign local governments with twinning relations can be among the first outsiders to notice that a violent conflict is brewing in an area.

Projects are the second type of activity undertaken by foreign local governments in conflict areas. Improving a municipal service or a planning process of a partner local government is a common aim. Supporting peace-minded local government leaders in a conflict area, so that they can actually improve services, is a way of strengthening their position. Issues of access and user/citizen participation introduce a political dimension which is discussed in several chapters of this book, such as in the Croatia case study by Martijn Klem.

Dion van den Berg, in his chapter on city diplomacy campaigns, identifies a common sequence of city diplomacy activities. They often start with lobby activities, followed by expressions of solidarity, which in turn lead to projects. The promotion of dialogue is mainstreamed throughout the entire programme of activities.

Here, the term dialogue includes all activities that aim to (re-)create trust, to (re-)establish non-violent ways of resolving conflicts and indeed to strengthen social cohesion in the conflict area. Some activities are relatively straightforward. For example, the city diplomacy report to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe notes ‘Sport events and cultural events are favourites for foreign local governments (and for many other intervening actors). This is understandable; they are relatively easy to organize, often wildly popular, and access can be regimented from outside. The youth football team of mixed ethnic origin is one of the mainstays of local governments building peace. Another is the concert by artists with general appeal over factions. Rarely do football matches or concerts address the root causes of conflict. The aim is to contribute to a change of atmosphere and to make former enemies become human again. Careless selection of participants and teams may result in a conflict impact rather than a peace impact.’

Such, relatively straightforward, ‘change of atmosphere’ dialogue activities are much practiced. Conversely, dialogue activities that address the heart of political disagreements are not so common (Chris van Hemert’s chapter does, however, describe such a case.) It is also the most difficult type, demanding great knowledge of the conflict area and the people in it by the foreign local government.

Finally, mediation, as a subcategory of dialogue activities, such as talking to armed groups or negotiating to get someone released from captivity, is a very specific action, requiring a certain authority which is accepted by both parties to the conflict, and maybe even beyond. Mediation seems to be a city diplomacy activity that is most likely to be undertaken by local governments in the conflict area itself, for example in the promotion of social cohesion in the Colombia case, than by foreign local governments. Foreign local governments can however be useful in creating conditions that can favour and facilitate mediation initiatives by others.

This section ends with Figure 2 which provides an overview of some activities that fit the narrow perspective of foreign local governments trying to help in a particular situation. They are ordered along the categories used in this subsection, and roughly according to the level of intervention (international and local). Please note that while the types encourage analytical distinctions, in practice, activities can combine characteristics. Technical projects on service delivery, for instance, will require dialogue-type actions as soon as aspects of access to the services arise, something which often occurs.
Figure 2 Types of city diplomacy activities related to a particular conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What foreign local governments can do in an international setting</th>
<th>What foreign local governments can do in the conflict area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lobby-type activities</strong></td>
<td>Lobby for the respect of human rights, peace accords and rule of law, human rights monitoring, election monitoring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby for international attention on the plight of local governments in the conflict area, join early warning systems.</td>
<td>Create legitimacy with existing partner cities in the conflict area through frequent activities and meetings, expressions of solidarity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project-type activities</strong></td>
<td>Send municipal experts to civil affairs units of peace-keeping forces, transitional administrations and humanitarian aid organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support municipal service departments directly or in reconstruction projects.</td>
<td>Facilitate local dialogue initiatives and give them moral support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dialogue-type activities</strong></td>
<td>Organize cultural and sports events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connect partner cities in forums for exchange.</td>
<td>Join mediation and reconciliation teams and forums.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Issues in city diplomacy**

So far, in this chapter, we have proposed definitions and categories, and looked at what city diplomacy can be. This section is mainly about issues to be addressed if city diplomacy is to realize its potential in practice. Throughout the research efforts and the interactions of the authors and editors of this book, certain needs and conclusions regularly surface. This section deals with a couple of the most important ones, once again with a bias towards activities in conflict areas. For further details and a wider range of issues, readers should naturally turn to the chapters referred to.

**Legitimacy for local governments in acting internationally** As was referred to in the subsection on sub-state diplomacy, the legitimacy of local governments to act internationally is both disputed and defended. The chapter by Antonio Papisca elaborates extensively on this issue and can be regarded as a far-reaching analysis of the legal position of local governments in the international community.
Antonio Papisca identifies two sources of legitimacy for local governments to act beyond state borders. The first comes from their ‘responsibility to protect’ all human beings, who have internationally recognized fundamental rights. While this may immediately be seen as applying within one’s own municipality, local governments are also partners in safeguarding human rights the world over. The second source of legitimacy comes from their increasing participation in a global governance agenda of human development and human security. According to Papisca, local government, in representing the interest of the global citizen, is an important government layer in guaranteeing development, security and rights.

The responsibility to protect is more than a theoretical argument. This book contains an excellent example that illustrates the practice. Andrés Paz and Marianne Moor describe the establishment of indigenous guards in the northern part of Cauca, Colombia, by indigenous municipal councils as a reaction to the constant threat of armed groups to their people. In this example, the local leaders were recognizing their ‘responsibility to protect’ the human rights of their citizens.

The notion of local governments having a responsibility to protect combines well with the idea of local governments working on social cohesion. Once local governments have legally become international actors, they cannot be left outside the international system. Further, local governments’ responsibilities in safeguarding human rights give them a degree of freedom from the foreign policy of their national government.

Champions and local leadership Good leadership is one of the preconditions for successful conflict management. The cases in this book all show it to be a vital ingredient of city diplomacy. Nevertheless, the cases are mostly about the positive scenario. It is probably fair to say that it is both dangerous and rare for local leaders to stand up against ethnic, religious and other structures at the source of the violence. Local leaders are often part of these structures, in which case local peace-building becomes very difficult.

Local leadership is a key concept in the case study by Martijn Klem on eastern Croatia. It is identified as one of the three conditions that must be locally met if municipal peace-building activities are to take off and be sustainable. The case study by Chris van Hemert on the Municipal Alliance for Peace shows that leadership and commitment were essential for the success of the initiative, and notes the courageous leaderships of the Israeli and the Palestinian local government associations.

City diplomacy actions need the commitment of municipal leaders and their officials. Top-down imposed activities are less likely to work; the commitment must be felt by the local leaders. This is true both in conflict areas and in the activities of foreign local governments.

The importance of partnerships As with actors in international co-operation in general, local governments in city diplomacy need to enter into partnerships with other
organizations. They need to work together with central governments, international organizations and, most importantly, with each other. This subsection will focus on partnerships with civil society organizations.

The chapter on the history of local government involvement in peace-building by Van den Berg provides useful information. It shows that local peace movements were able to challenge local governments to take up a political position and to take action on various international issues in the 1980s and 1990s, such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the apartheid regime in South Africa. Local governments did enter the front line through their stands but, in getting to this position, they were backed by civil society peace organizations.

The case studies of both eastern Croatia and Colombia show that the involvement of non-governmental peace organizations was a condition for the municipal actions to have impact. The organizations IKV and Pax Christi can be seen as the engines behind the activities that local governments became involved in. These cases show that peace organizations, with their specific approaches, experience and drive, can create synergies with local governments.

In other situations, as in Chris van Hemert’s chapter, local governments sometimes prefer to act alone. The partnering of Israeli, Palestinian and foreign local government associations did not involve civil society organizations in the first and second phases of the process. The leaders of the associations involved opted to maintain a low profile by involving only local governments. Involving too many partners in the early phase of the process, they feared, would only endanger the dialogue in what was a highly political process.

The fragility of city diplomacy. Section 1 of this chapter established our perspective on city diplomacy. In our view, the concept has a broad reach and many activities of local governments in the fields of peace and social cohesion fit within it. Nevertheless, we feel that the greatest current research needs concern situations in which foreign local governments help their counterparts in actual, former or potential war zones; and processes in war zones are fragile. Martijn Klem and Georg Frerks, in the main theoretical contribution of this book, explain why this is so. Violent conflicts are characterized by broken ‘social contracts’. This means that people feel that institutions such as central and local governments behave in unpredictable ways, and no longer trust them to come up with balanced policies. People then resort to violence to settle conflicts of interest. Klem and Frerks do not see much scope for local governments in stopping the violence (the absence of violence being what we call ‘negative peace’). However, once this has somehow been achieved, they do see an important role for local government in re-establishing structures for peaceful conflict resolution (‘positive peace’).

Local governments in conflict areas need the trust of their citizens to play this role. They can create trust through good performance, typically by delivering services in a peace-sensitive way. They can also create trust by handling issues of representation well, maybe through local elections, or through participatory approaches or by linking with traditional forms of representation. Gaining trust is always a complex matter, and it takes time. It may well be

However, in the subsection on interventions, we have identified some ways in which one may contribute to negative peace. Dion van den Berg’s chapter elaborates on this. He analyzes lobbies with a political impact that indirectly help to create conditions to stop the violence.
easier for local governments in ethnically homogenous areas; it will probably be harder for local governments entangled in the overall conflict. The list of influences is long and progress is easily reversed, and hence the processes must be seen as fragile.

What foreign local governments can and cannot do under these circumstances is an important issue.

Within the subsequent chapters of this book, several ways in which city diplomacy can help to recreate local trust are described. Technical assistance by municipal experts can boost performance legitimacy; lobbying can keep local governments in the conflict area on the right track and support peace-minded forces. If foreign local governments are seen as neutral parties, they can lend some of their own legitimacy to peace processes, and so on.

However, success does not come automatically. Foreign local governments are constantly reminded of the fragility of city diplomacy processes in several ways. First, they are often only called upon to do things that are complementary to the efforts of others. Second, as Dion van den Berg in his chapter on city diplomacy campaigns urges, foreign local governments need to stay engaged at the political level, even if they present their activities as technical projects. Losing the political touch puts the entire result at risk. Third, Kenneth Bush, in this book and elsewhere, admonishes foreign local governments for not always carefully analyzing what the peace impact and the conflict impact of their activities are (see also the next subsection).

The case study on the Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East by Chris van Hemert illustrates how the inherent fragility in city diplomacy can play out in practice. It is a detailed review of hurdles and favourable factors in a process of dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian municipalities, mediated by foreign counterparts. Bottlenecks are ever present at the practical level, with roadblocks and travel restrictions, at the level of the politics of local government associations and at the level of the overall conflict in which no one, and certainly not the mayors, can be seen to yield too much. There are favourable factors such as the constant willingness of local leaders to bridge divides. Van Hemert describes a city diplomacy process that resulted in successful dialogue, but with so many twists and turns that concrete results have yet to be attained after five years. The chapter is a vivid reminder of the patience and diplomatic stamina that foreign local governments and their associations need to bring to the table.

The view we wish to put across in this chapter is that city diplomacy processes are fragile and that gains are easily reversed. Foreign local governments should take into account the perspectives of the whole community of citizens, should work on the issue of trust, should be there for the long haul, should work with others and should remain politically engaged even if they try to minimize the visibility of the political dimension of their involvement in their project activities. Most importantly, foreign local governments cannot allow their activities to add to the conflict impact, for this will destroy their legitimacy in intervening. This is the subject of the next subsection.

**Peace impact or conflict impact: city diplomacy does not always work**

An appealing line of reasoning goes like this. ‘Poor people are angry about their lot, which may lead them to join armed movements who pretend fighting will improve the situation. We need to deliver services to poor people so that they have less to complain about.’ In this view, municipal services are an investment in peace.
Kenneth Bush, in his chapter in this book and elsewhere, says that reality is nowhere near that simple. A development success may boost the conflict, while development failures may have a positive peace impact. The city diplomacy report to the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe is also quite clear about this: contexts and processes in conflict areas are so complex that foreign municipalities can get it wrong. An example of a development project boosting conflict would be one that gave access to donor-financed new homes by people who did not lose their houses, so antagonizing people living in tents.

Why do such things happen? Firstly, when projects are designed, there may be little attention paid to fairness, even-handedness and transparency. As Martijn Klem and Georg Frerks might put it: there may be little attention to things that make people respect ‘social contracts’. Secondly, while projects are being executed, the lines of communication with groups in the conflict zone and their leaders may weaken. This leads to a lack of knowledge about what is going on in the conflict area, and about the impacts of the project.

Throughout this book, it is repeatedly said that city diplomacy takes time. Throughout that time, any foreign local government with activities in a conflict area must know the people and the context. This is difficult: political and military leaders may change, displaced people may arrive and leave, etcetera. Kenneth Bush argues that conflict areas are so dynamic that project designs should be no more than a rough guideline – flexibility and dedicated long-term commitment to peace by foreign local governments count for much more. Foreign local governments can team up with others on the ground to improve their information flows.

Such warnings are justified but, at the same time, they should not detract from the essential value of city diplomacy. Foreign local governments know about institutional aspects of municipal service delivery. At home, they deal with the technical processes of planning access to services and the political processes of distributing access to services on a daily basis. To avoid problems, they should combine their technical knowledge with a detailed knowledge of the politics. With this background, they can add great value to peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

No one should be fooled into thinking this is an easy job. In city diplomacy projects, detailed knowledge of the service to be provided should go hand-in-hand with detailed knowledge of the conflict area. Users who seem more-or-less equal in terms of a municipal service, such as drinking water provision, may be very different in terms of security and vulnerability. Foreign local governments cannot afford to be unaware of such things.

In conclusion, what does this book tell us?

Local governments, their associations and their platforms engage in conflict issues in many ways. They do so at the international level, in conflict areas and at home. This book identifies

36 Musch & Van Veldhuizen (2008), Section 2 of the report
38 It is common to pay a lot of attention to their participation at the start of a project, but this seems to often weaken over time.
40 Women and ethnic minority groups can be in this position, and many more such issues are at play.
the great potential that foreign local governments have in this regard. It is also about what local governments in conflict areas do, and how all this links with issues of global peace, peace-building and reconstruction, and social cohesion. Theoretical and legal foundations are explored, and the last half of the book is made up of case studies where this potential was realized in practice. This chapter and this book aim to spur on and to caution in equal measure, for this potential is only realized under certain conditions.

**The capacity for city diplomacy** Local governments in conflict areas, or in situations of tension between groups, are regularly involved in city diplomacy in the sense of working on social cohesion. Local governments, their associations and forums also regularly prove their value in working for peace at the global level and in international organizations. In a world in which states are no longer the exclusive international actors, international work has become the norm. Nevertheless, when foreign local governments find themselves in actual or potential zones of violent conflict, their capacity to act is rightly questioned. This book therefore pays considerable attention to such situations.

So are foreign local governments equipped to go out and help their counterparts? Our view is that local governments possess unique knowledge of a combination of technical and political processes, and that peace-building and reconstruction are well served by their involvement. There are just too many demonstrations of their added value to deny it. That is why actors such as peacekeeping forces, peace NGOs, transitional administrations and development agencies invite local governments to join their efforts. Local governments should join these other actors to be effective and to counter the very real threat of lack of knowledge of the conflict area. The quality of city diplomacy depends heavily on the quality of partners.

‘But what can we do?’ is a regular question from municipal officials. Figure 2 of this chapter indicates that there are plenty of options, even if foreign local government officials do not fancy going to conflict areas themselves. It would seem, from a capacity viewpoint, that the real question is, ‘What prevents us from taking up the opportunities to contribute to peace?’ Hiring experienced staff, investing in long-term relationships and forging links to the ministry responsible for overseas affairs, international organizations and peace movements can all help to move from ideas to action.

**Preconditions for successful peace-building by local governments** Local governments have the right to act internationally whenever they feel it is in their interest to do so. When they do, considerations of peace and moral support may mix with motives of city marketing and politics at home. When a conflict is too violent to allow visits to the area, lobbies and indirect action are options. However, in the case of helping counterparts in conflict areas, there are extra concerns. City diplomacy processes are fragile and activities can contribute to peace or intensify a conflict. Foreign local governments should do everything in their power to prevent the latter.

This begs the question as to whether there is a point at which the city diplomacy process is so fragile that foreign local governments ought to consider withdrawing. Conversely, one could ask what the preconditions for continuing are. From our own experiences, and those of the other authors of this book, we can derive some of these preconditions. First, foreign local governments must know the conflict area and the politics within it sufficiently well. Second, there need to be local leaders who are willing to bridge divides. Third, the violence needs to be brought under some level of control. Fourth, a sufficient number of the people
involved must want to be seen to play according to the rules (human rights, representation and so on). Fifth, there needs to be a genuine opportunity for local governments to peacefully resolve conflicts and peacefully deliver services. Finally, in particular situations involving large foreign interventions, a legal framework and the direction of the reconstruction process must be widely accepted.

The primacy of local processes over the intervention by foreign local governments is evident in various instances in this book. Foreign local governments need to adopt approaches based on long-term commitment and modest contributions to make the most of their influence. Foreign local governments need to know many things about conflict areas, work with the right international partners, pick the right local partners, use the right approaches, and so on. In city diplomacy, you have to hit the bull’s-eye many times over.

Concluding remarks The understanding on how local governments can potentially contribute to peace-building is growing. Many local government organizations are already working on the issue in practice, and platforms have been established. It is up to local governments worldwide to continue working with the existing practices and to explore further possibilities. This book identifies many such possibilities.

Local governments that are newcomers in this area are invited to step in and prove the theory right, while always taking into account what it requires to work effectively in conflict areas and to constantly monitor the peace impact of their actions. In other words, a larger quantity of city diplomacy is called for, but the quality must also be sufficient. Our hope is that this book, with its conceptual analyses and practical cases, inspires many local governments and their leaders to engage in city diplomacy activities and contribute to making this a more peaceful world.
International law and human rights as a legal basis for the international involvement of local governments | Antonio Papisca

Summary

This chapter examines the legal basis for an enlarged international role for local governments beyond that which is generally current. It argues that this basis can be found in international human rights law.

The main argument of the chapter is that local governments’ legitimacy to act beyond state borders is justified by two principal sources. First, from their ‘responsibility to protect’ the internationally recognized fundamental rights of all those living in a municipality; and secondly from their increasing participation, legally argued, in a global governance agenda of human development and human security. The latter is derived from the human right to peace as defined by Article 28 of the Universal Declaration: ‘everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration can be fully realized’.

The chapter divides the international agenda of local governments into two parts, one related to international co-operation (from city twinning to more sophisticated programmes of development co-operation, environmental protection, and joint management of parts of the world heritage), the other dealing with extraordinary tasks like peace-building and humanitarian aid. These activities are recognized and reflected in several UN programmes as well as in international NGO and civil society projects. The author also examines the European Charter of Local Self Government and the European Charter for Human Rights in the City as the most advanced expression of the compatibility of local governments and international human rights law.

The chapter concludes that to further their international role, local governments, in their city diplomacy agenda, should commit themselves to and implement initiatives that enhance the Right to Peace, the Right to Development, the Right to a Safe and Sustainable Environment, and other rights derived from international law in force, as well as new forms of territorial co-operation beyond state borders like the ‘European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation’ established by an EU Regulation of 2006.
Introduction

This chapter focuses on a growth process in international law. It enquires into the international role of local governments within the perspective of the 'new' universal law rooted in the United Nations (UN) Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Strictly speaking local governments do not have a legal international personality. However, the international law that is developing offers a suitable ground and a vast range of opportunities that legitimize the international role of local governments.

Local governments’ legitimacy to act beyond state borders comes firstly from their ‘responsibility to protect’ the internationally recognized fundamental rights of those living in a municipality; and secondly from their increasing participation in a global governance agenda of human development and human security. ‘Protection’ primarily regards the life of people, and cities are closer than other public institutions to people’s life, and their vital needs. They are becoming indispensable for pursuing goals of positive peace, including the genuine democratization of international politics and institutions. In this perspective, they provide a momentous help to a more humane, thus more sustainable, statehood in the era of globalization and transnationalization.

Human security and human development Human security and human development are both anchored to the paradigm of human rights. They are the new frontiers of global multi-level governance. Both hold the human being as their primary subject. "In broad terms, human security shifts our focus from traditional territorial security to that of the person. Human security recognizes that an individual’s personal protection and preservation comes not just from the safeguarding of the state as a political unit, but also from access to individual welfare and quality". Being at the centre of development, the human being should participate in development policies. Security policies of states should be instrumental to the objectives of human security and human development. Human development and human security are pursued where citizens actually live, thus the importance and role of urban centres. Fundamental rights of citizens allow them to call on the institutions of local government to protect them. It can thus be argued that the municipality’s ‘responsibility to protect’ is even stronger than that of national states. Local governments, that stand closest to citizens, are the guarantors of the international law of human rights.

Right to the city, right to peace The international legitimation of local governments also derives from the ‘right to the city’ of its inhabitants. That is to say the comprehensive right to exercise all rights that are recognized by the international law in force, and that establish universal citizenship, the mother of all individual citizenships (national, local, and European). Article 1 of the European Charter for the Safeguarding of Human Rights in the City, approved in St Denis on the 18th May 2000 and so far signed by 354 Cities, under the heading ‘Right to the City’ reads as follows: '1. The city is a collective space belonging to all who live in it. These have the right to conditions which allow their own political, social and ecological development but at the same time accepting a commitment to solidarity. 2. The municipal authorities encourage, by all available means, respect for the dignity of all and quality of life of the inhabitants’. Article 2 specifies that ‘the rights contained in this Charter apply to all persons who inhabit the signatory cities, irrespective of their nationality’.

2 Mitchell (2003)
The ‘European Charter’, although not a legal instrument in the strict sense of the word, should be considered as the faithful translation into the living context of cities, of principles and norms set forth by the international law of human rights.

International law also includes the human right to ‘a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be fully realized’. This is the right to positive peace, proclaimed by article 28 of that Declaration. The assumption of this provision is that peace within the city and international peace are two faces of the same coin. This is challenging, especially in urban areas marked by multicultural environments, needs for social cohesion and plural citizenship. The city is legitimized to act to build positive peace as defined by article 28 starting at the local community level and extending to include the worldwide sphere and solidarity with other local governments of the world.

**Sovereignty, citizenship, democracy** States have borders. This involves an exclusionist territorial rationale of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction. Local governments on the contrary run territories not surrounded by borders, but they do minister to people in them. Local governments are closer to the source of sovereignty – people – than the state. Sovereignty belongs to the people because each of its members has inherent rights, and fundamental rights should be respected and protected where people live. The city’s vocation of inclusion corresponds to the philosophy of international law: equality of all humans and the prohibition of all forms of discrimination.

National citizenship, based on the principle of exclusion, is consistent with the philosophy of states. Universal citizenship, based on the principle of inclusion, is consistent with the natural identity of local government. The international legal recognition of human rights obliges us to re-construct citizenship starting not from state institutions (traditional top-down citizenship), but from its original holder, the human being with his/her inherent rights internationally recognized (bottom-up citizenship).

Sovereignty based on the nation-state has proven to be insufficient to protect the true elements of democracy. Nation-states were the fertile kindergarten of democracy, but they do not suffice today when faced with worldwide interdependence and globalization. The practice of democracy, in its twofold articulation of representative and participatory democracy, should be extended and deepened: upward for international and cosmopolitan democracy and downward in local direct democracy. By extending democratic practice beyond its historical territorial space, the local territory becomes a new frontier.

Being so close to and involved with democracy, local governments are the primary stakeholders in good global multi-level governance.

A relatively recent and promising perspective regarding the legal development of the role of local governments in international politics is the European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation (EGTC). The EGTC as established in 2006 by the EU can be considered not only an advanced achievement but also a good starting ground for further formal and substantive
progress in recognizing the international role of local governments. It could hopefully be envisaged that, within the framework of the UN, an international framework convention be adopted to establish the ‘International’ Grouping of Territorial Co-operation.

This chapter enquires into international law and human rights as legal basis for an enlarged international role for local governments. The above mentioned relatively recent historical developments are described and explained in more detail and extended with further examples. Legal (and political science) arguments for an enhanced role of local governments in global affairs are put forward.

The city in the context of worldwide interdependence

**De-territorialization of politics** In today’s globalized world, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish what is ‘national’ (intranational, sub-national, local) from what is ‘international’ (supranational, transnational, multinational). The division of tasks between stakeholders in world politics is also undergoing a process of re-definition and re-distribution. The political demand coming from local communities, local governments and from civil society organizations, and addressed to international institutions is to ignore state borders. People, and the organizations that represent them, are asking international institutions to provide the same things they ask of national governments: security, economic well-being, environmental protection, and the protection of fundamental rights. The local-international mix is de-territorializing politics.

The scenario offers great promise – the dynamics of worldwide interdependence can mean many things:
- Increased awareness from all actors;
- Possibility to pursue objectives of just global governance;
- The use of international and supra-national institutions to equitably distribute common global goods of human security and human development.

The ongoing processes of structural change are affecting local governments as providers of services, including those related to security. This is becoming more important as the capability of states alone to shield and order their inner social and political processes dwindles. A crisis of democracy is closely linked with the structural changes of national statehood. Crucial decisions are increasingly being taken in extra-national contexts: transparently in the case of some international institutions, less transparently at other venues. The nation-state can no longer properly guarantee the functioning of democracy as what must be legitimized and controlled is often no longer a domestic process.

**Citizenship from below** A useful way of addressing this situation is to re-conceptualize citizenship starting from below. That is from the roots of the political community up to the institutions of governance. The latter must then be seen in the light of their purpose and democratic legitimacy before considering them as sources of authority, power and capability.

Such a bottom-up view is even more urgent if we consider the conflicts in many territories (regions, cities, streets) where different ethnic, religious and cultural groups live, where xenophobia and discrimination may be growing, and where migrant people of different cultures rightly advocate the same citizenship rights as the nationals.
Human rights: the genetic change of international law

State-centric vs human-centric. The preceding section described how a changing political landscape is now occupied by more local actors significant for both domestic and international politics. States are no longer the exclusive actors of international politics. But are local governments legally entitled to act in the system of international relations on ‘dramatic’ issues like peace and security? These issues traditionally pertain to states’ foreign policies. The question can be answered with strong arguments.

The first of these is that the legal field has undergone a genetic mutation. International legal recognition of human rights has changed the driving force, the rationale of international law, from state-centric to human-centric. This has many implications.

The process is the outcome of a long historic movement marked by peoples suffering and reacting, intellectual endeavour, mass mobilizations, and political commitment that has brought democratic processes inside states. With the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the ‘constitutional’ rationale has been extended to the world level, overreaching the borders of state sovereignty. For the first time in the history of humanity, the human being, the person, has been recognized as subject, not as mere object, of International Law.

So the human-centric rationale is constantly being reinforced by the ‘new’ international law, or pan-human law, that is developing as a coherent body of principles and norms that complement and update the first part of the UN Charter. This body includes principles such as the universality of human rights, their interdependence and indivisibility, the proscription of war, the prohibition of the use of force for the settlement of international disputes, the rule of law, the universality of international criminal justice, personal responsibility for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.6

States as derived entities. The next argument is that the human-centric position means that states and international organizations are simply derived entities, instrumental to pursuing the primary aims of human rights and fundamental freedoms. To underline the primacy of the human being over derived systems, article 28 of the Universal Declaration proclaims the right to positive peace as a fundamental right.7

The analysis so far in this section is about interpreting existing law. If we extend the argument on state-centric and human-centric law, a revolutionary implication follows. The ‘right to war’ and the ‘right to peace’ are the strongest claims of state sovereignty. But if peace is a human right, the right to war cannot but disappear from the dictionary of state claims, endowments and inter-state relationships. And to positively confirm this position, the right of states to peace must be complemented by a duty to peace.

When a legal system is founded on human rights, it enters a new stage of human-centric maturation. We are passing beyond the phase of international relations as primary system; we are no longer in the Westphalian era, that which was first formally based upon nation-based sovereignty.

Evidence for the liberation of ‘territoriality’ in the world system

De-territorialization The international law of human rights acts as the genetic core of a global legal system becoming increasingly involved in supervising human rights respected ‘by’ and ‘within’ states. When referring to ‘within states’ we mean their territorial articulation in the cities, municipalities and local communities: in places and institutions where people live their day-to-day life.

Domestic territorial jurisdiction is becoming instrumental to the purpose of safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms. It can be surpassed in appeals to international bodies. And the local dimension becomes important as the space of life and peace, thus of the realization of human rights, especially of social rights. All in all leading to a clear de-territorialization of politics.

The fact that human beings are no longer an object of international law implies that the ‘common house’ in which they live and are entitled to claim their fundamental rights, that is local communities and habitats, become not only relevant but important in the international legal system. In other words, individuals, recognized as original legal subjects at the world level, confer to their respective local governments the seal of legal entitlement at the same world level.

Cities claiming their role Political and legal evolution works against the monopolistic management of states, a process that has all too often been abused in the name of the principles of territorial integrity and national interest. The rational, sensible and legal choice is that local governments take advantage of the enlarged opportunities to develop their own identity, an urban space dedicated to the practice of inclusion and positive peace, and give international evidence of this. In this perspective of sustainable statehood, the city can actually claim due legal recognition for the role it is playing in the decision-making processes of global governance, both at regional and world level.

So what are these international roles of local governments claimed on the basis of rational legal argument in actual practice? Three types of roles can be identified for local governments within the international political system:

• participation in programmes of international organizations;
• formal representation in the decision-making and thus functioning of international organizations;
• autonomous management of programmes through their associational structures.

Participation in programmes of international organizations The international agenda of local governments can be divided into two main parts, one related to international co-operation (from city twinning to more sophisticated programmes of development co-operation, environmental protection, and joint management of elements of world heritage), the other dealing with extraordinary tasks like peace-building and humanitarian aid.
In the UN system the growing role of local governments is being implemented and appreciated within many programmes:

- the Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS and the City Aids Programme
- policies for the prevention of urban crime in the framework of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime;
- ART, the Urban Millennium Partnership and the World Alliance of Cities against Poverty in the broad framework of the United Nations Development Programme;
- programmes on the planning and management of the urban environment and on water-related issues in the framework of the United Nations Environment Programme;
- the Management of Social Transformation Programmes, Growing up in Cities Programme, Small Historic Coastal Cities Programme, and the ‘regime’ committed to World Heritage and intercultural and inter-religious dialogue within UNESCO.

Worth noting is also the involvement of local governments in the activities of the regional commissions of the UN; in the World Bank the programmes for the improvement of urban living environments and local governance; and the World Health Organization which has among others the Healthy Cities Programme.

The UN Habitat is particularly significant with its agenda of principles and objectives that must be pursued in and by local governments. Those are respect of human rights, a democratic, transparent, representative and efficient local government that is reliable and just in all sectors, the true participation of civil society, capacity building and institutional development (Habitat Agenda 1996).

We can clearly see that local governments are being called upon to co-operate to put into practice a broad political agenda for the realization of human rights and social development.

In particular the City Diplomacy agenda is also striving to develop a more ‘glocal’ democracy, fostering intercultural dialogue, building inclusive local governments, developing plural citizenship, and in general mainstreaming human rights in all of its operative guidelines inside and outside the city.

Within all of these activities of public international utility it is vital to comply with international law principles and norms, in particular with the value tenets of the global legal system. They are an integral part of a coherent and comprehensive strategy for the creation of a peaceful, democratic and more just world order.

As stated, the EU system provides the most advanced legal recognitions of local and regional governments’ roles as well as an intensive involvement in programmes with high political profile such as the management of Structural Funds, INTERREG, the New Neighbourhood Policy-Wider Europe, the European Network of Cities for local integration policies for migrants (CLIP), Eurocities, gender equality, policies for children and family welfare, and sustainable local development (European Network of Cities for the Social Economy). Furthermore, there are the EU Territorial Dialogue and especially the EGTC which is addressed later in this chapter.

9 Kenneth Bush in this book further defines peace-building as ‘a twofold process of deconstructing the structures of violence, and constructing the structures of peace, [...] two inter-related, but separate, sets of activities which must be undertaken simultaneously’. The Preamble of the UNESCO Constitution is brought to mind here which recalls: ‘That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace must be constructed’.

10 An often used word in this thematic field indicating a mixture between ‘global’ and ‘local’.
**Formal representation of local governments in International institutions**

*The United Nations system*  In tandem with the involvement of local governments in the programmes of the UN and other international organizations there is their participation in the functioning of these institutions through formal representation. It is worthy of note that many intergovernmental organizations are more effective than states at giving visibility to subnational (territorial) entities and their associations. Strategically it is a way for international institutions to foster their own functional autonomy in a supranational environment, and for local governments to obtain additional contributions to their international legitimation. The Cardoso Report underlines that 'local authorities have been playing a growing role in both UN policy debates and in achieving global goals; they are a key constituency for the UN, but they are not non-governmental'. It proposes that the General Assembly be urged to adopt a resolution affirming and respecting the principle of local autonomy as a universal principle to underscore the growing importance of this constituency.\(^{11}\)

A distinction must be made between the 'consultative status' conferred to associations of local governments as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for instance United Cities and Local Governments, and the formal representation of local governments inside organs and bodies of intergovernmental organizations. Formal representation is greater at the regional level, in particular in the systems of the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU). In the UN system, the most significant example is provided by UN-Habitat which established the first representative cell of local governments within the UN system, that is the UN Advisory Committee of Local Authorities (UNACLA). UNACLA pursues its objective to develop a coherent international dialogue on decentralization by comparison with what is taking place in a more structured way in the EU system with the 'Territorial Agenda' and related 'Territorial Dialogue'.

*The European Union system*  In the EU system the greatest visibility to formal representation of regional and local governments is given by the EU Committee of the Regions. Subnational territorial actors can however represent their specific interests in a multitude of consultative committees. At the heart of the EU Territorial Agenda lies the strategic, infrastructural objective to promote trans-national competitive and innovative clusters of regions, networking in a polycentric pattern, as motors of Europe's development. In this context the networks of urban areas are considered strategic to the development of the whole of European integration dynamics. Though the Committee of the Regions has consultative power, it should be noted that its 'opinions' are fully formal acts. It has focused on the theme of human rights, both civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural rights, on active citizenship and on the role of civil society organizations.

*The Congress of Regional and Local Authorities of the Council of Europe*  The Congress of Regional and Local Authorities must be regarded as pioneer of local autonomy not only within the Council of Europe but also at the world level. The role of the Congress is particularly significant in promoting a coherent and organic standard-setting starting with

\(^{11}\) Panel of Eminent Persons on UN - Civil Society Relations (2004) p.51. The Panel was chaired by the former president of Brazil, Fernando Cardoso.
the far-sighted European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation of 1980 and the European Charter of Local Self-Government of 1985, subsequently enriched by other Conventions and Protocols. Furthermore the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on the participation of foreigners in local political life, whose implementation directly involves the responsibility of local governments.

**Formal and informal local government networks** The international role of local governments is carried out mainly by permanent organized structures of co-operation in the form of NGOs, some having consultative status at intergovernmental organizations. The roster includes United Cities and Local Governments; Global Metro City-The Global Forum; Mayors for Peace; the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives; Metropolis; Sister Cities International; Energie-Cités; EUROCITIES; Cities of Human Rights; Cities for Peace Prize (Unesco realm); European Network of Cities and Regions for the Social Economy; Cities for Children; European Network of Medium-sized Cities; Union of the Baltic Cities. There are many more. The practice of formal and informal networking, a strategy that also involves national associations and federations of cities and local governments, many of which have transnational aspirations, has become increasingly common.

A separate discourse should be dedicated to structures of trans-frontier and inter-regional co-operation where there is a greater formal use of territorial autonomy. The formal status of these entities varies: it can be based on a simple memorandum of understanding and cooperation, or a statute of an association of private law or it can even be established by intergovernmental agreement. However the personality of international law is still lacking.

**Quantitative and qualitative increase of the role of local governments in the developing dynamics of International Law**

**Legal personality of local governments** How is international law reacting to the changing situation? Is it ready to provide formal legal acknowledgment and international legal personality to non-state actors and specifically local governments? The question was raised, in general terms, some decades ago at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), when the ongoing world processes of structural change were not so evident and far advanced. The ICJ’s response was far-seeing: ‘The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in the collective activities of states has already given rise to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not states. This development culminated in the establishment in June 1945 of an international organization whose purposes and principles are specified in the Charter of the UN’.  

For the purpose of the present chapter, it is enough to point out that the far-sighted ICJ considers international law as a developing, growing reality. What is quoted above highlights

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12 The ICJ further argues referring to the UN: ‘The Organization is an international entity. That is not the same thing as saying that it is a state, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a state’.
the revolutionary potential of international law as defined by the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1945-1948 it was international law, which since the 1648 Westphalia Peace had been regulating relations between states as the exclusive subjects of that Law, that underwent the genetic change whose effects are still having their repercussions. Needless to recall that the Westphalian law was a territorialized law as it was based on state sovereignty, state-centric by nature. Rights and duties pertained to states. No other entities, apart from a very few exceptions, possessed legal rights and duties in the old state-centric system. The human being was conceived and treated as an object, not as a subject of international law. In other words, for centuries the territorial dimension of governance was the prerogative and monopoly of states that rested on the assumption of indivisibility and indissociability of the state and its borders.

**Universality of human rights** The fact that the new international law is increasingly being influenced by global civil society actors and networks is a good indicator that the universality of human rights is being adopted in the conscience of people worldwide. This also means that in case of violations, even gross violations, the current international law keeps its highly binding legal nature intact.

The ‘logic’ of universality has received clear international recognition in the course of the 20th century. Before that time, legal recognition took place within each national legal system, separately, giving way for instance to a practice of discriminatory treatment of non-national citizens. France’s declaration of 1789 is entitled ‘Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen’. In fact, national acknowledgment of ‘universal’ rights lay in the logic of privilege and added value for national citizens alone.

The question here is not whether a state is obliged to protect human rights in the international sphere as in the domestic sphere. The principle of the protection of human rights is derived from the concept of man as a person and his relationship with society which cannot be separated from universal human nature. The existence of human rights does not depend on the will of a state; either internally by its laws or any other legislative measure, nor internationally by treaty or custom in which the express or tacit will of a state constitutes the dominant element. A state or states are not capable of creating human rights by law or convention; they may only confirm their existence and give them protection. This meta-judicial and ultra-constitutional claim has been translated in written form into positive law by the UN Charter.\(^{13}\)

Once again we stress that human rights protection is not an exclusive business of states alone. While it is linked to state sovereignty it is being removed from the merchant game of inter-state relations.

**The right to peace**

On the one hand the UN Charter deprives states of the ‘right to war’, on the other, it establishes the system of collective security. We have previously quoted article 28 of the Universal Declaration that proclaims positive peace as a fundamental right of the individual. The UN Declaration of 12 November 1984 extends the Right to Peace to peoples. The integral

text is significant and worth quoting. Peace as a human right and a right of peoples is complemented and reinforced by other principles of international law included in the UN Charter. In particular, the prohibition of war (banned as a scourge), prohibition of the use of force to settle international disputes with the exception, rigorously circumscribed, of article 51, the duty of peaceful settlement of conflicts. In particular the rejection of war, together with the fundamental right to life of each human being, is central to international law currently in force. Furthermore it is useful to recall Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: ‘Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law’.

Thus has ius ad bellum (just war theory) of states been cancelled once and for all, and the use of force, for purposes radically different from those pursued through ‘classical’ war operations, has been subsumed by the UN in the framework of the system of collective security that is expected to operate along the principle of supranational authority.

Since the UN Charter establishes international peace and security as primary objectives of states, the international law in force is the law for peace and in peace, ius ad pacem and ius in pace, that must be complied with at all times, not only in times of peace. And it is for peace because it is for the life of all human beings. Article 4 (state of exception clause) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights confirms this interpretation. It is likewise worth noting that ‘Peace-loving’ is a statutory expectation in the process of becoming a member of the UN (Art. 4 of the Charter).

This ‘new’ law is demolishing the barrier of state sovereignty that for centuries monopolized human life, international legal personality, the use of force, and citizenship. The repositioning of this frontier of universal law is naturally disturbing many politicians.

**New citizenship, democracy, inter-cultural dialogue**

Democracy is linked to human rights, as such it is a human right and at the same time the appropriate method for the realization of all human rights. Democracy is rooted in human

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14 The UN Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace (1984) Reads in part as follows: ‘The General Assembly, reaffirming that the principal aim of the UN is the maintenance of international peace and security, bearing in mind the fundamental principles of international law set forth in the Charter of the UN, expressing the will and the aspirations of all peoples to eradicate war from the life of mankind and, above all, to avert a world-wide nuclear catastrophe, convinced that life without war serves as the primary international prerequisite for the material well-being, development and progress of countries, and for the full implementation of the rights and fundamental human freedoms proclaimed by the UN, aware that in the nuclear age the establishment of a lasting peace on Earth represents the primary condition for the preservation of human civilization and the survival of mankind, recognizing that the maintenance of a peaceful life for people is the sacred duty of each State:;
1. Solemnly proclaims that the peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace;
2. Solemnly declares that the preservation of the right of peoples to peace and the promotion of its implementation constitute a fundamental obligation of each state;
3. Emphasizes that ensuring the exercise of the right of peoples to peace demands that the policies of states be directed toward the elimination of the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means on the basis of the Charter of the UN’;

rights ontology: power belongs to the people because the people is sovereign, and it is sovereign because each of its members has inherent rights, that is he-she is sovereign pro quota.16

International-transnational democracy Today’s passionate and creative reality of civil society organizations and social movements, and of local governments acting across and beyond state borders demonstrate that civic and political roles, that is active citizenship, are no longer limited to the intra-state space, and the geometry of democracy is extending and growing in world space. The traditional inter-state system has always been an exclusive club of ‘rulers for rulers’. Now it is citizens, especially through their transnational organizations and movements, who are claiming a legitimate role, and showing their visibility in the world’s constitutional space. Democratizing international institutions and politics in the true sense of democracy – does not mean ‘one country, one vote’ (a procedural translation of the old principle of states’ sovereign equality), but more direct legitimacy of the relevant multilateral bodies and more effective political participation in their functioning – has become the new frontier for any significant human-centric and peaceful development of governance. Advocating an international-transnational democracy is already putting new citizenship into practice.

A ‘new’ concept of citizenship This mobilization is further being legitimized in a specific and innovative way by the UN Declaration ‘on the right and responsibility of individuals, groups and organs of society to promote and protect universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’.17 By virtue of this instrument, known as the ‘Magna Carta of Human Rights Defenders’, ‘everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at national and international levels’ (article 1). Emphasis is put on the right to overfly domestic borders. Article 7 states that ‘everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to develop and discuss new human rights ideas and principles and to advocate their acceptance’. Article 18, points 2 and 3, goes on:

‘Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have an important role to play and a responsibility in safeguarding democracy, promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and contributing to the promotion and advancement of democratic societies, institutions and processes. Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations also have an important role and a responsibility in contributing, as appropriate, to the promotion of the right of everyone to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments can be fully realized’.

The ‘new’ concept of citizenship implies huge changes in legal systems at all levels. In fact, internationally recognized human rights are the rights of every human being, not of the human being as a simple citizen of a given state.

The big challenge that lies ahead is for politics and education to help change culture, harmonize national legal systems with the international law of human rights, carry out proper national and international social policies, and foster the inclusion of all in the

framework of a multi-level architecture of governance. In the meantime a new frontier for human promotion and democracy development has been launched.

Since 'the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world' (Universal declaration), and respect for human dignity and human rights should be guaranteed where people live, the city that provides equal opportunities to all those living in it, the inclusive city, is the ground(work) of a peaceful and just world order. In such a city, particularly through intercultural dialogue, the evolutionary dynamics of identities will develop in a universalist, trans- and meta-territorial, and trans-cultural direction.

New citizenship in tandem with the impact of the necessary intercultural dialogue aimed at democratic inclusion can revitalize the public sphere in a perspective of multi-level and supra-national governance. And it is in fact the phenomenology 'in the plural' of citizenship, dialogue and inclusion that obliges institutions to redefine themselves and therefore to open up and develop multiple channels of representation and democratic participation.

The ‘responsibility to protect’ is inherent to cities

States are legally obliged to account to the international community with regard to human rights, a task that in the past was embedded into the domestic jurisdiction of each state. But as mentioned, international recognition and protection of fundamental rights is disengaging territory from the border sovereignty of states. This revolutionary process is taking place in parallel with the de-territorialization of politics.

Local governments are the venue of vital administrative and social services, incorporating artistic and cultural heritage. They share together with states the responsibility of protecting all those who live there. Furthermore local governments committed to defend life as they are, are entitled to claim active participation in the construction of a peaceful world order following article 28 of the Universal Declaration and the 1999 UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individual, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Readers will recall that principles related to human rights, including the proscription of war and the ban on the use of force, are ius cogens (compelling law). As this in particular concerns prohibition of war, article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that prohibits propaganda for war states clearly: ‘1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law’.

Principles of the responsibility to protect

The responsibility of local governments to protect underscores their rights and duty to actively participate in the processes and institutions of global governance. But the very ‘responsibility to protect’ as presented by the ‘Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ (ICISS)\(^{18}\) is assumed to lie with the sovereignty of states. The report sets out the following basic principles. A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for protection of its people lies with the state itself. B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in
question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’ (p.XI) and ‘Evolving international law has set many constraints on what states can do, and not only in the realm of human rights. The emerging concept of human security has created additional demands and expectations in relation to the way states treat their own people. And many new actors are playing international roles previously more or less the exclusive reserve of states’ (p.7, italics added). Furthermore it points out that ‘what has been gradually emerging is a parallel transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international accountability. International organizations, civil society activists and NGOs use the international human rights norms and instruments as concrete point of reference against which to judge state conduct’ (p.14).

The UN Secretary General Report ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’ of March 2005 refers to ‘an emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect’. It largely follows the ICSS Report 19.

How local governments link with the responsibility to protect

The current official doctrine of the responsibility to protect emphasizes the role of states saying that they are in the front line and the UN in the second. It calls upon the international community to intervene in internal affairs even by using force, though only as last resort. To avoid the abuse of exceptions that allow the use of force, it should be stressed once again that the matrix of the responsibility to protect lies with the concept of human security more than with that of state sovereignty, and that it is a right and duty inherent to local governments, thus the sovereignty of states is ‘instrumental’, not ‘foundational’ or fundamental. The ICSS says it as follows: ‘emphasis in the security debate is shifting from territorial security, primarily through armaments, to all-encompassing security through human development with access to food and employment, and environmental security’ and ‘The traditional narrow perception of security leaves out the most elementary and legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives’ (p.15).

In order to be effective in pursuing goals of security in the daily lives of citizens, local governments should have more suitable channels of access to decision making processes on the international plane. They can rightly claim to be formally recognized as human security (and human development) public stakeholders.

The new legal frontier of territorial co-operation

To involve local governments fully as public stakeholders in the responsibility to protect, international legal instruments are needed. At the European regional level, both the Council of Europe and the European Union are producing innovative rules that will hopefully be translated, with due adaptations, into the United Nations system. This section contains a survey of that pioneering work.

With regard to legal status, a distinction must first be made between the facilities provided by the UN and other international organizations to the associations of local governments and local authorities, and the legal recognition of entities created for ‘territorial co-operation’ and in which institutional issues of territorial governance are formally at stake. As announced, the greatest advance was achieved in the EU Law with the Regulation

19 UN General Assembly (2005) p.35.
n.1082/2006 jointly adopted by the Council and the European Parliament. It is the most progressive international legal instrument in the field because it formally recognizes co-operation between subnational territorial bodies.

Transfrontier co-operation between territorial communities or authorities

Within the European context, the ground was prepared and fertilized by the Council of Europe through the formal international recognition of the value-principle of territorial autonomy starting with the Outline Convention of 1980 and the European Charter of Local Self-Government, of 15 October 1985. Article 10 of this founding instrument establishes that ‘local authorities shall be entitled, in exercising their powers, to co-operate and, within the framework of law, to form consortia with other local authorities in order to carry out tasks of common interest’. Moreover states pledge to recognize ‘the entitlement of local authorities to belong to an association for the protection and promotion of their common interests and to belong to an international association of local authorities’.

The European Outline Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities, of 21st of May of 1980, is the pioneering international legal instrument with which member states of the Council of Europe ‘undertake to facilitate and foster transfrontier co-operation between territorial communities or authorities within their jurisdiction and territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of other Contracting Party’.

It is worth noting that within the general legal framework established through agreements among states, local or regional governments are allowed to stipulate agreements among themselves that also contain new statutes of bodies of transfrontier co-operation, including groupings with legal personality. The matter covered by these agreements varies from spatial planning to creating and managing transfrontier parks, from civil protection to the institution of a transfrontier school curriculum up to a vast array of economic and social co-operation arrangements. The First Protocol to the Outline Convention lays out precise provisions on the competences, responsibilities and powers of transfrontier co-operation bodies, established through agreements among local authorities.

Protocol No.2 of 1998 launches the new horizon of ‘interterritorial co-operation’, overcoming and extending mere transfrontier co-operation, starting with the consideration that ‘territorial communities or authorities are increasingly co-operating not only with neighbouring authorities of other states (transfrontier co-operation), but also with non-neighbouring authorities having common interests (interterritorial co-operation), and are doing so not only within the framework of transfrontier co-operation bodies and associations but also at the bilateral level’.

Standard-setting work by the Council of Europe underlines the constant development of co-operation among the local governments of different countries. The range of co-operation between sectors then becomes very large, and starting from territorially contiguous co-operations, many more co-operations worldwide are being created.

European Groupings of Territorial Co-operation

It should be emphasized that the Council of Europe Protocol clearly paves the way to Regulation (EC) No 1028/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 ‘on a European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation’, which is the most advanced instrument on exercising territorial autonomy in the international system today. The preparation of this document was enriched
in 2004 by an opinion of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities on the outlook report of the EU Committee of the Regions on ‘A new legal instrument for cross-border co-operation’ (Opinion 24 (2004). This opinion proves useful. It defines three types of co-operation among local governments. ‘Cross-border co-operation’ implies bi-, tri-or multilateral co-operation between local and regional authorities operating in geographically contiguous areas. ‘Interterritorial co-operation’ implies bi-, tri- or multilateral co-operation between local and regional authorities operating in non-contiguous areas. Trans-national co-operation is co-operation between national, regional and local authorities in respect of programmes and projects and covers larger contiguous areas and involves players from at least two EU member states and/or non-EU states. The Congress believes that the term ‘decentralized co-operation’ should be avoided in the context of the would-be European Grouping as it refers only to activities of ‘decentralized’ authorities, i.e. in the view of the Congress public authorities with no legislative power, whereas all infra-state public authorities – with or without legislative or international powers – also develop cross-border or interterritorial co-operation outside the realm of international public law.

The EU Regulation bases itself on the assumption that ‘the harmonious development of the entire Community territory and greater economic, social and territorial cohesion imply the strengthening of territorial co-operation’. It is therefore ‘necessary to institute a co-operation instrument at Community level for the creation of co-operative groupings in Community territory, vested with legal personality, called the ‘European groupings of territorial co-operation’. Article 1 prescribes that ‘the objective of an EGTC shall be to facilitate and promote cross-border, transnational and/or interregional co-operation, hereinafter referred to as ‘territorial co-operation’. An EGTC shall have in each member state the most extensive legal capacity accorded to legal persons under that member state’s national law. The members of an EGTC shall be member states, regional authorities, local authorities, bodies governed by public law.’ (art.3).

The European Grouping shall be governed by a convention and its own statutes. Its tasks shall be ‘limited to the facilitation and promotion of territorial co-operation to strengthen economic and social cohesion’, with this peremptory limitation: ‘police and regulatory powers cannot be the subject of a convention’. As noted, the line adopted is the one traced by the Council of Europe: the legal personality achieved in a EU member state is automatically recognized by all other member states.

This significant step in promoting the role of local governments is highlighted by three indicators: the legal basis is provided, once and for all, by a supranational legal instrument and not by single ad hoc agreements among states; within the ‘European Grouping’, regional and local authorities have the same ranking as states. Moreover, as a principle and in analogy with the Council of Europe rules, local authorities of third countries can join the European Grouping provided that their legislation or agreements with member states permits it. Organization of the European Grouping may thus become extremely complex and potentially have a spill-over both in geographic terms and scope. Complementary legal sources of this innovative undertaking include: possible agreements among states that regulate neighbourhood issues; the rules of the Council of Europe; bilateral framework agreements among states; mechanisms of community law on Interreg; internal law of the state in which the European Grouping has its headquarters as a subsidiary source. Though enjoying ample legal capacity in exercising its competences, the Grouping must respect the limits defined by the statutes according to a principle of functional specificity that excludes exercising competences in the field of public order and foreign affairs, but that does not reduce the strategic importance of this new transnational territorial entity endowed with a legal personality of community law.
Conclusions: towards an International Grouping of Territorial Co-operation with legal personality

According to international law in force that is founded on the paradigm of human rights - thus law for peace, *ius ad pacem* - the ‘responsibility to protect’ the life of human beings and human communities belongs not only to states but also to local governments. States therefore should not hinder the international initiatives of local governments that comply with that legal-moral principle especially where life and peace are in danger.

To further affirm their international role, it is important that local governments dedicate a part of their city diplomacy agenda to supporting the effectiveness of international law and commit themselves to initiatives that enhance the Right to Peace, the Right to Development, the Right to a safe and sustainable Environment, and all other human rights recognized by international law. Local governments can be natural allies of international institutions in the defence of human rights and can do a great deal to help them function with greater legitimacy and effectiveness. For instance, local governments should be concerned with the functioning of the Human Rights Council and the Peace-building Commission, and be active in enhancing the implementation of the Action Programmes issued by UN world conferences.

In particular, local governments must actively work to contribute to implement those international legal conventions that directly affect the governance of cities: for instance, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the European Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Political Life at Local Level, and the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural Expressions. It is important for local governments to actively participate in the reform of the UN, especially for its democratization by means, among others, of the establishment of a UN Parliamentary Assembly. In this context an alliance with NGOs should be developed on initiatives that include sensible issues like nuclear disarmament, a ban on weapons of mass destruction, the control of the arms trade and production, especially of small arms. To carry out all the above mentioned tasks, local governments must be equipped with the right structures and offices, a true human rights and international relations infrastructure, with trained staff that work in close collaboration with ombudspersons, NGOs and civil society organizations that include schools, firms and universities.

The Italian case is interesting and unique from a strictly legal point of view. In 1991, municipalities and provinces were allowed by a national Bill to exercise a larger degree of autonomy in revising their statutes. The result was that thousands of new statues include the so-called ‘peace human rights norm’ that reads as follows: ‘The Commune x (the Province x), in conformity with the Constitution principles that repudiate war as a means to resolve international disputes, and with the principles of the international law on human rights, recognizes peace as a fundamental right of the human being and of peoples. To this purpose it is committed to take initiatives and co-operate with civil society organizations, schools and universities’. By this statutory rule, Italian communes and provinces formally pledged to comply with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and in the international legal instruments on human rights, in particular with article 28 of the Universal Declaration. Owing to this ‘norm’ many communes and provinces established councillors and

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departments dealing specifically with human rights, peace education, development co-operation and international solidarity. This field is actively co-ordinated by the ‘National Network of Local Governments for Peace and Human Rights’ which currently includes more than 700 communes, provinces and regions, representing over half of the Italian population.

With regard to the formal status of local governments in the UN system, the Cardoso Report is a precious source of proposals that deserve consideration. It says among other things that ‘local authorities have been playing a growing role in both UN policy debates and in achieving global goals; they are a key constituency for the UN, but they are not non-governmental (…) As a result of its consultations with mayors, the Panel proposes that the General Assembly be urged to adopt a resolution affirming and respecting the principle of local autonomy to underscore the growing importance of this constituency’, and that ‘The General Assembly should debate a resolution affirming and respecting local autonomy as a universal principle’. It goes on to recommend reinforcing existing links of the UN system with local governments, and to explore an institutionalized link with United Cities and Local Governments.

Finally, thinking about the future in a radically progressive way, something else could be envisaged following the European legal advancements as regards the legal status of transnational territorial bodies. The establishment of the EGTC is an opportunity that ought to be seized to affirm the peaceful involvement and support of local governments in the international system. As a first step to enlarge the European experience to the world level, European local governments should whenever possible extend membership of the EGTC to local governments in third countries. In parallel, a process towards the recognition of the legal personality of an International Grouping of Territorial Co-operation in the name of the principles of local autonomy, self-government and democracy, should be undertaken to gain a UN framework Convention with the same criteria adopted by the EU Regulation. Once the International Grouping of Territorial Co-operation is established, a Committee of Territorial Co-operation within the UN could be envisaged with formal advisory functions.
This chapter investigates the potential of local governments to contribute to peace-building. To analyse this potential, the authors use the notion of social contract as a metaphor for the generally accepted conventions and political mechanisms through which a society strikes a balance between the particular interests of all its members. The authors argue that social contracts can be discerned both at the local and national levels. Peace-building can be pictured as re-establishing these social contracts.

Due to their specific characteristics that position them between citizens and authorities, as well as between the local and the national levels, local governments have the potential to enhance the effect and sustainability of state-building and peace-building, as they strengthen both the national and the local social contracts.

Local governments can do this through an efficient and fair, local provision of public services, through the representation of citizens and an increase in citizen participation, as well as through a well functioning local democracy. As such, they add the essential element of legitimacy and ownership that all too often is missing in the first phase of democratization and peace-building.

Moreover, by solving local conflicts, stimulating community building and facilitating reconciliation, local governments not only make their own local societies more liveable in, they also contribute indirectly to the overall peace-building process.

Although local governments possess the potential to contribute to peace, only a minority of them seize this potential. Often local authorities are unwilling or unable to make use of it. If it is a question of lack of ability, then foreign local governments can offer support. Through moral, technical or financial assistance, they can strengthen and stimulate their partners in post-conflict areas in their peace-building activities. Under certain circumstances, foreign local governments can also act as an unbiased intermediary or forum for dialogue and co-operation between specific groups in the local society.
Introduction

For over a century now, sub-national, local authorities have argued that they can play a role in the prevention and transformation of violent conflicts. Until recently, however, the role of local governments in conflict prevention and peace-building has been little acknowledged or researched. This has changed of late, as international and national actors increasingly regard local authorities as an instrument they can use in realizing sustainable peace. In addition, local governments themselves are currently professionalizing their peace-building activities, while academics in conflict studies have discovered this gap in their research and increasingly focus on this topic.

This chapter is intended as a building block in the ongoing discussion on how peace can be achieved and best maintained. It links newly gained academic insights to the growing status of sub-national authorities in conflict transformation.

We discuss three central questions:

1. In what way and under which conditions can local governments in post-conflict areas strengthen and sustain the peace-building process?
2. In what way and under which conditions can foreign local governments support their partners in post-conflict areas?
3. How do these activities interact with peace-building initiatives by other actors?

We answer these questions using a social-contract perspective. The notion of a social contract is used here as a metaphor that describes and prescribes how a group of individuals deal with conflicting interests and beliefs. We use this notion to analyze and explain the peace-building role of local governments. We see violent intra-state conflict as a failed social contract and, subsequently, peace-building as a process towards re-establishing the social contract, both on the national and the local levels.

From this perspective, we first present an introduction to conflict and conflict resolution, focussing on state-building and democratization as essential elements of peace-building. Then we identify the unique traits of local governments, to understand and analyze their contribution to national and local social contracts. We investigate their potential added-value in peace-building, and in particular their contribution to state-building and democratization. Finally, we analyze how municipalities from abroad can strengthen the peace-building initiatives of their partners in post-conflict areas and draw conclusions.

This chapter is based on a review of selected theoretical and applied literature on the topic, and on a wider reading of sources dealing with contemporary conflict. It is furthermore based on the authors’ experiences in conflict analysis and international municipal cooperation in post-conflict areas.

Violent conflict today

Three recent changes in both the number and character of conflicts increase the potential added-value of local governments in peace-building. The ethnic dimension in violent conflicts...
conflicts has increased, not least because many conflicts tend to become ethnicized. Parallel to this, the percentage of inter-state conflicts has decreased to less than 10% of the total number of conflicts. Lastly, and contrary to common perceptions, the total number of violent conflicts, as well as the number of intra-state conflicts, has shown a downward trend since the late 1950s. Among the reasons for this decrease is the rise in the number and effectiveness of international peace-building interventions. These changes imply that there is more scope for local governments to contribute to peacebuilding than before, when war was mainly fought between states at the international level.

**Root causes** Three major schools of thought can be discerned on the root causes of violent conflict. The cultural school argues that the root cause of civil war is cultural difference, often ethnic in nature. Violent conflict arises when grievances over this difference, directly or through elite manipulation, lead to political discrimination against minorities. The economic school asserts that intra-state war is caused by rebels seeking economic gain. This economic ‘greed’ argument is based on aggregated statistical analysis as well as demographic and environmental considerations. To the political regime school, the root of violent conflict lies in the absence of democracy or, more specifically, in the absence of mechanisms to redress problems between groups in society, including cultural minorities.

Although these three schools do at times contradict one another, they are essentially complementary. It is generally accepted that violent conflicts have multiple causes: that only a combination of long-term and short-term socio-cultural, political, economic and military reasons can explain the existence or eruption of conflicts. As a consequence, conflict resolution activities need to factor in this multi-dimensionality.

**War dynamics: linking local and overall conflicts** Root causes explain how war breaks out but ending violent conflict requires more than addressing the root causes since dynamics, unrelated to the original causes, develop once violence starts. War generates private and public gains and losses that are unevenly distributed in society. For some individuals or groups, the perpetuation of violence is or may seem a more profitable option in economic or political terms than working towards peace.

A typical war dynamic links local conflicts to the region-wide or nation-wide conflict. Whether or not they precede the wider conflict, or as soon as a wider conflict breaks out, local conflicts are perceived as, or become, part of this larger conflict. Sometimes a large-scale war builds on local conflicts, sometimes the overall conflict incorporates, subordinates or exacerbates local conflicts. Hence, it is important to analyze how the different forms and levels of conflict permeate and reconstitute each other.

Despite this entanglement, most peace agreements focus solely on the overall conflict. Even though the implementation of a peace agreement often has to take place at the local level, the

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3 Goodhand (2006), p. 31
4 Eck (2008)
5 Woodward (2007), p. 144
6 This division into three ‘schools’ is derived from Woodward (2007).
8 Bradbury (2006)
dynamics of local conflicts tend to be no part of the agreement. Local governments, and with them a host of other local-level actors, then face the difficult task of disentangling the roots and consequences of local conflicts from the wider conflict, in order to bring both to an end. It is here that local governments have an added value in the establishment of durable peace.

The social contract

This chapter is primarily built on the political regime argument, but we do not deny the economic, military and socio-cultural causes of conflict. We do not consider conflict per se to be a negative social phenomenon. It is rather the logical consequence of different prevailing interests in society. It is, however, the violent conflict that has a destructive impact on societies. We argue that violent conflict occurs when the system to moderate and balance the various interests in society has failed to such an extent that a critical number of individuals or groups ignore this system altogether, and resort to violence to further their own interests. Hence, rebuilding a legitimate political system is a crucial step in peace-building and in the structural transformation from conflict to peace.

In line with a long tradition in political theory, this political system can be portrayed as a social contract. Although linked to several other concepts in the study of conflicts, the term social contract is not regularly used in conflict analyses and conflict theory. Yet, it reveals better than any other concept how local authorities can contribute to peace-building. This article uses the concept of a social contract as a metaphor for the generally accepted convention that describes and prescribes the system through which a society strikes a balance between the particular interests of all its members as well as between individual interests and the interest of the society as a whole. Three components of this definition need further elaboration: (i) the social contract as a metaphor; (ii) the social contract as a generally accepted convention that describes and prescribes how to deal with conflicting interests; and (iii) the social contract as a double contract.

Social contract as metaphor

A social contract is not a written agreement, but a metaphor. It denotes the set of rules and consequent sanctions that governs both individual society members in their relationship with other individual members, and the relationship between each member (or group) and society as a whole. In other words, a society with a strong, binding social contract represents a society in which members generally refrain from violence to realize their own interests and instead use the accepted balancing mechanisms. The metaphor of the social contract emphasizes that root causes of conflict can be too strong to be contained through a hitherto collectively-accepted system of interest allocation.

9 Manning (2003), and Hohe (2003)
10 The only scholars in conflict theory that use the concept of ‘social contract’ are the rational-choice econometrists. They do not see the social contract as a metaphor but rather as a tool to map how potential future benefits for conflict parties could lead to a credible and sustainable end of violence. See for example Addison and Mansoob Murshed (2001).
11 Using metaphors in science is not without risk (Ortony, 1993). The use of the ‘social contract’ metaphor or analogy in this paper is, however, warranted: first, because it enables comprehension of the peace-building contribution of local governments that would otherwise be lost for lack of words and, secondly, because we make clear from the outset that the social contract is a metaphor, and not a real phenomenon.
**Social contract as a descriptive and normative concept** The metaphorical contract is both descriptive in the sense that it shows how the regulating system works, and normative, in the sense that it tells or instructs societal members how to deal with their conflicting interests. All the relevant political actors need to be bound by the same set of rules, by ‘the only game in town’ through which they can seek and exercise power and resolve conflicts.  

Both dimensions are equally important. On the one hand, the social contract denotes the real socio-political institutions in a society. On the other hand, the social contract refers to the trust and expectations of the members of the society that the pertinent socio-political institutions will indeed be used to regulate the conflicting interests.

The willingness of people to respect the social contract depends on whether they expect other society members to do the same, and how they perceive the future. If there is a high level of trust, the metaphor of a strong social contract is appropriate. Or, to put it another way, ‘when the social contract is well-established, the rules of the game create expectations of how people will behave towards each other.’

Social contracts are not static. On the contrary, in order to remain strong and viable, a social contract must be permanently reinvented to adjust to new developments in society.

**The social contract as a double contract** Our definition of a social contract effectively refers to a double contract. On the one hand, it regulates the collision of interests of all members of society vis-à-vis one another and, on the other, it regulates the relationship between each member of society and the overall government that represents society as a whole.

From a peace-building perspective, the first contract signifies the willingness of citizens to interact with one another without resorting to violence and to invest in shared structures and modes of co-operation to resolve their conflicts. Both national and local authorities derive their legitimacy from the second contract. People feel bound to the social contract, and accept the power of the authorities as legitimate, provided they believe that the autonomy they transfer to these authorities is sufficiently compensated by the benefits the state brings them in return: public services, human security, representation and fair, trustworthy balancing of societal interests.

Seeking a sustainable conflict solution boils down, in our view, to establishing a new social contract. From this perspective, peace-building means arriving at a contract to which all parties can agree; and it implies creating institutions, building trust and establishing a belief among all society members that these institutions are indeed the best way to solve societal problems. The creation of trust is a long process because it takes time for reciprocity and vested interests to establish themselves.

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12 Manning (2003), p. 31  
14 A more frequently used metaphor to represent these processes is ‘social capital’, a term coined by Robert Putnam. See Brinkerhoff (2005).  
15 Rakner et al. (2007), p. 17
Peace-building

**Negative and positive peace** The process from conflict to peace often involves two steps: initiation and consolidation. At the height of a conflict, the immediate goal is to put an end to the armed violence. This process, often resulting in some sort of peace agreement, is commonly referred to as peace-making. The resulting absence of violence is called ‘negative peace’.\(^\text{16}\) However, silencing the guns without addressing the underlying causes of conflict is often insufficient to permanently end violence. In many cases, large-scale violence restarts soon after the conflict has been ‘ended’.\(^\text{17}\)

Positive peace on the other hand implies the permanent absence of violence, where the conflict’s root causes have been addressed and citizens have built sustainable structures that peacefully solve their problems. The process towards positive peace is generally called peace-building, defined in the UN’s Agenda for Peace as the ‘comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people’.\(^\text{18}\)

Often the measures and interests involved in establishing negative peace are different, or even opposed, to the ones in the second stage, when positive peace is being established.\(^\text{19}\) As the potential impact of municipalities seems to be largest in peace-building\(^\text{20}\), this chapter primarily focuses on the added value of local governments in the domain of establishing and sustaining positive peace.\(^\text{21}\)

**Comprehensive peace-building** Peace-building is a transformative, future-oriented process that calls for a contextual, multi-dimensional, integrative approach that includes economic, military and psycho-social measures. The political and institutional realms are essential in this process, as explained earlier through the social contract metaphor. If the members of a society do manage to create a new social contract, then they have made a decisive step in the process towards sustainable peace.\(^\text{22}\) A condition for this approach to succeed is that they ultimately regard themselves as members of one society, whatever their identities.

Actors in peace-building can be categorized in three ways. Firstly, actors can be divided into international and domestic ones. The second approach distinguishes actors according to their origin or character. The concept of multi-track diplomacy calls upon no fewer than nine tracks or components, including government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), citizens, businesses and journalists, to cooperate in peace-building efforts.\(^\text{23}\) The third classification categorizes the actors according to the level at which they work. A
frequently used categorization is by Lederach who discerns top, middle and grassroots levels.\textsuperscript{24}

Not surprisingly, most academics and practitioners favour, at least in theory, multi-dimensional, multi-actor and multi-level approaches that implement a single co-ordinated, integrative peace-building process, with each actor contributing where it is best able.\textsuperscript{25}

Practice has taught us, however, that, in all the three actor categorizations, it is difficult to overcome the divisions. The lack of connectedness between, for example, the upper and lower levels of intervention is striking.\textsuperscript{26} A second salient element is that local governments are frequently ignored in the approaches propagated.

\textit{Where are the local governments?} The fact that local governments are hardly mentioned does not invalidate their bridging potential in peace-building. By connecting the national and the local levels, and linking public policy with the civic realm, local governments harbour a potentially significant added value in the peace-building process.

While the top leadership have access to information about the bigger picture and possess the capacity to make far-reaching decisions, it does not experience the day-to-day consequences of those decisions, as observed by Lederach. Conversely, people at the grassroots level do have this experience but lack the ability to see the broader picture and the power to have their own decisions implemented.\textsuperscript{27} To solve this dilemma, Lederach suggests a central and crucial role for the middle level. Middle-level leaders, he explains, ‘are positioned so that they are likely to know and be known by the top-level leadership, yet they have significant connections to the broader context and the constituency that the top leaders claim to represent. In other words, they are connected to both the top and the grassroots level. They have contact with top-level leaders, but are not bound by the political calculations that govern every move and decision made at that level. Similarly, they vicariously know the context and experience of people living at the grassroots level, yet they are not encumbered by the survival demands facing many at this level.’\textsuperscript{28}

It is not difficult to see how municipal leaders fit Lederach’s description of middle-level leaders. Networks of mayors often include influential political leaders at the national level and link to local networks in their own region or municipality. They can, in other words, speak the language of the national elite and of the people directly suffering from the conflict. As such, they can inform the top-level leadership on the needs and ideas arising on the ground as well as help to translate and implement the national agreement at the local level.

\textit{State-building} It may first appear unlikely that people who were recently fighting one another on the battlefield, are able and willing to accommodate their interests in a peaceful way once the fighting has ended. However, as Licklider observes, ‘creating a government from civil war opponents seems impossible except that practically every current state is the result of one or more such processes.’\textsuperscript{29} State-building is the term

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Lederach (1997)
\item \textsuperscript{25} Llamazares (2005)
\item \textsuperscript{26} Manning (2003)
\item \textsuperscript{27} Lederach (1997), p. 43
\item \textsuperscript{28} Lederach (1997), p. 41-2
\item \textsuperscript{29} Licklider (2002), p. 2
\end{itemize}
generally used in conflict research for the reconstruction of these political mechanisms. As the contribution of local governments to peace-building seems to lie primarily in this process of state-building, the main components, dilemmas and approaches of post-conflict state-building are outlined below.

**Institutional and functional state-building**  State-building or, in most post-conflict situations, state-rebuilding has two intertwined dimensions, an institutional one and a functional one. The functional dimension reflects the restoration of the three key functions of a fully-fledged state: the provision of security, representation and welfare. The institutional dimension reflects the restoration or reinvention of the state as a legitimized idea, concept and institute.

State-building deals, in other words, with building institutions to provide public services and with building faith in the idea of the state, involving a ‘transformation in mentality as much as a change in political structures.’ The two types of transition are intertwined in the sense that the more a state is trusted or legitimized, the better it will be able to provide the three key services and, likewise, effective and efficient public service provision will increase state legitimacy.

**Input and output legitimacy**  Legitimacy is defined as the popular acceptance of a governing regime as right. Legitimacy is essential for the survival of the political system, and hence crucial in attaining sustainable positive peace. Legitimacy is not something that can be imposed, nor something that is easily retained once it is there: it has to be won over and over again.

The legitimacy of public authorities can be enhanced in two ways. Firstly, a political system gains output legitimacy through the provision of public goods and services, and the promotion of welfare. Input legitimacy is gained when citizens believe that it is ‘right’ that the state is there, when they believe that the state is their state. Input legitimacy is realized through representation and participation. In a conflict setting, this requires two steps. Firstly, all the major actors must have a say in the peace agreement, which provides the outline for the future political arrangements. Secondly, all major actors must be represented or participate in these future political arrangements.

Local authorities can play an important role in enhancing both output and input legitimacy.

**Democratization**  In the eyes of the Western world, enhancing input legitimacy often equals democratization. Over the last decade, the notion of ‘liberal democratic peace’, rooted in liberal values and principles of open economies and democratic societies, has penetrated the discourse on post-war reconstruction and international peace-building interventions. Even though the precise relationship between democracy, democratization and peace-building remains far from clear, and despite several academic critiques on the
liberal peace thesis, democratization is still widely accepted as a peace-building tool in mainstream policy. However, despite its alleged strengths, democratization is far from a universal panacea to lead societies away from conflict into peace. First of all, newly established democracies are the very government system that is most likely to provoke resistance and violence. Massive foreign support hardly improves this picture: ‘Experience in state reconstruction has shown that external intervention to create stable democratic societies out of the ashes of intra-state conflagration is extraordinary difficult.’

Apart from this, two flaws make democratization a problematic tool in peace-building, even though it is hard to find a better alternative: firstly, the adverse effects of democratization and, secondly, the dilemma of ownership and participation versus stability and sustainability. Much of the added value of local governments lies in overcoming these flaws.

**How to repair the adverse effects of democratization?** Democracy is a system of institutionalized competition for power. This democratic competition may, however, exacerbate or reignite violent conflict in a post-conflict society, if cross-cutting cleavages, counterbalancing commitments and overarching identities have not yet been established.

Likewise, fair and free elections are an essential element of a democracy, even when the outcome can undermine the peace-building process or can lead to undemocratic results. In ethnically divided societies, parties tend to form along ethnic lines, which often hinders the consolidation of democracy. In such situations, elections can degenerate into little more than an ethnic census, and fuel violent conflict.

Another risk is that of a majoritarian democracy, where specific groups in society suffer from the tyranny and democratic dominance of a majority. Minority groups may no longer feel represented by the collective authority, nor experience any short or long-term benefits of the political system. In such cases, they may choose to terminate the social contract and opt for violence.

There are several ways to counter these risks, each with pros and cons. One way is to establish power sharing mechanisms to guarantee minority groups a minimum level of political influence. In practice, it is, however, extremely difficult to design a power-sharing mechanism...

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34 Despite his criticism of the unclear relationship between democritisation and peace, Paris (2004) favours democratization as the best peace-building tool above the other two alternatives he sees: authoritarianism and secession. Yet, he argues that democratic rights should only be introduced gradually to minimise the chances of regenerating violence. Paris ignores local government in that he does not consider starting the democratisation process at the local level as a component of the strategy he favours: institutionalization before liberalisation. For a critical overview of ‘liberal peace’ and its interventionist character, see: Richmond (2005) and Duffield (2001; 2007).

35 Stewart and Brown (2007), p. 226, who explain: ‘The usual interpretation of this is that ‘stable’ democracies are indeed able to avert violent conflict through a strong social contract, while strongly authoritarian regimes are able to suppress potential conflict.’


37 Diamond (1993), p. 96


39 Mason and Quinn (2005), p. 25

40 Roeder and Rothchild (2005), p. 3-5
mechanism that satisfies all groups in the long term. Some observers claim that there is 'surprisingly little empirical evidence that power sharing facilitates the consolidation of peace and democracy in ethnically divided societies in the developing world.'\textsuperscript{40} A second remedy is a division of power: creating checks and balances that counterbalance the concentration of too much power in the hands of one specific group.\textsuperscript{41} One of the most common ways to divide power is through decentralization. A third way to counteract the potentially negative results of democratization is through participation. Participation in the political process increases the legitimacy of the process and enhances social cohesion and inclusion, especially when the participatory instruments are adjusted to local or traditional practices, thereby increasing the legitimacy and acceptance of the new social contract. However, when implemented at the wrong time or in the wrong way, participation can have undemocratic effects, as the next section discusses.

The dilemma of ownership and participation versus stability and sustainability

While the development of a democracy can hardly be steered and controlled by the citizens themselves, it certainly cannot by external interventions that may or may not have hidden agendas. Democratization is only to a limited extent a technical affair that can be learned from handbooks. It is much more a political process, largely driven by its own dynamics. As such, it can at best be stimulated or strengthened. The two principle issues are thus who decides how the future democracy will function, and through what representation system it will function?

Often, public participation in the design of the new democracy is low, as peace negotiations usually involve representatives or elites – the ones with enough power to make and vindicate the necessary compromises. So in practice, as Barnes concludes:

'(…) official political negotiations occur behind closed doors – frequently in a foreign country – between the representatives of the armed combatant groups. [This] might result in an agreement that satisfies their core interests but it may not address the underlying substantive issues that are of concern to the public. While [this] strategy may be effective for ending violence, it may exacerbate public mistrust and undermine the legitimacy of the agreement – nor does the process facilitate reconciliation between communities and sectors divided by war.'\textsuperscript{42}

It is difficult to see a way out of this dilemma. Only careful manoeuvring between agreements made by elites and feedback from the people can lead to a sustainable peace. Later in this chapter, it is explained how local governments can support and strengthen this option.

Partly as a result of this elite influence in the drawing up a peace agreement and of the impact of foreign interventions in the peace-building process, there is a potential discrepancy between local ideas, beliefs and traditions, on the one hand, and Western ideas and traditions of democracy on the other. A new democracy with too many foreign characteristics is likely to be unsustainable. Conversely, traditional participatory customs are sometimes seen as undemocratic when they deny participation to specific groups in society, based on gender, race, age, clan, caste or group affiliation.\textsuperscript{43} It is the local layer of

\textsuperscript{41} See for example the practices of Kneževi Vinogradi in the chapter on Croatia.
\textsuperscript{42} Barnes (2002), p. 3
\textsuperscript{43} Hohe (2003)
government, rather than the more-distant national government, that, under certain circumstances, can find a way out of this dilemma of participation and local traditions versus modern democracy, thereby increasing the sustainability of the acquired peace.44

Even with a legitimized peace agreement and an acceptable mix of traditional and modern democratic structures, popular participation and representation is often limited in the early stages of a new democracy. At the beginning of the democratization process, the formal and informal influences of external forces are often significant. Despite this potential problem, several practitioners and scholars endorse a leading role for the ‘international community’ at this stage, often through an international transitional administration. The argument being that, immediately after a violent conflict, the situation is too tense to leave the introduction of democracy to the former warring parties, especially when – in the eyes of the interveners – the local population still needs to learn how democracies function. As a result, transitional administrations may disregard local ownership and impose democracy in the way they think best, even if this may run against basic democratic principles.

In post-war Bosnia, for instance, the international presence possessed and used the powers to replace democratically-elected mayors and presidents. Another telling example of undemocratic fostering of democracy was noted by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Ombudsperson for Kosovo, who stated in his 2002 annual report: ‘UNMIK45 is not structured according to democratic principles, does not function in accordance with the rule of law, and does not respect important international human rights norms. The people of Kosovo are therefore deprived of protection of their basic rights and freedoms three years after the end of the conflict, by the very entity set up to guarantee them.’46

It is debatable whether the dilemma of ownership versus stable democratization can ever be entirely resolved because, ‘if genuine local control were possible, then a transitional administration would not be necessary. [Local ownership] must be the end of a transitional administration, but [it] is not the means.’47 However, some major issues with imposing democracy can be resolved. Firstly, transitional administrations should not pretend there is local ownership when there is not. Secondly, there should be a well-defined situation and point in time that a transitional administration is working towards. Thirdly, transitional administrations need to function more transparently and accountably.

If foreign interveners do not change their attitudes on these essential issues, the practice of ‘faking democracy’48 will continue, harming both the legitimacy and the sustainability of the newly-founded ‘democracies’ that the transitional administrations were allegedly designed to deliver. Local governments can be an important supporter in bringing about such changes.

Now that we have reviewed the trends and dynamics of conflict, the relevance of the social contract metaphor, and the dilemmas and problems involved in peace-building, state-building and democratization, the focus shifts to the role of local governments in peace-building. Despite recognizing the unique characteristic of local governments and their

44 Large (2001), p. 10
45 UNMIK denotes the United Nations mission in Kosovo.
46 Chesterman (2004), p. 87
47 Chesterman (2005), p. 342-4
48 The term was coined in Chandler (1999).
leaders, Lederach and many of his fellow scholars do not consider them to be crucial actors in peace-building. This chapter argues that this omission is at best premature. Even if the role of local governments has not been decisive in many peace-building processes so far, their potential added value is too important to be ignored. The rest of this chapter therefore tries to show how, and under which circumstances, local authorities, both within the conflict area and abroad, can, and already do in some cases, enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of peace-building operations. To analyse their added value it is necessary to first identify the very features of local governments in which this added value is rooted.

**Defining local government**

Like the national state, a local government needs to be legitimate in order to function. In gaining legitimacy, local authorities share two of the three key functions of the state: the provision of public services and local representation. The third key function of the state, provision of security, lies only marginally within the competence of most local governments. As a result, we define local governments in this paper as the legitimate and accountable local layer of government – both the elected politicians and the administration – that represents the local community and provides it with public services.

At this stage, it is relatively easy to apply the notion of a social contract to a local setting. In fact, alongside the overall social contract of a society, one can identify a subcontract or local social contract in each municipality. These local social contracts are then, as before, a metaphor for the locally accepted governance system through which a municipality strikes a balance between the interests of its inhabitants among each other, as well as between those of the inhabitants and the municipal organization itself.

**The unique characteristics of local governments**

Local governments come in all sorts and sizes; they may be rooted in traditional practices or may be installed by an international organization. However, whatever their origin, their precise competences and resources, they possess a majority of the characteristics discussed below.

Firstly, and most significantly, local governments have a bipolar or hybrid character, as Blank describes:

‘On the one hand, localities are conceived of as an integral part of the state, an administrative convenience (…), a local ‘branch’ of the central national government (the bureaucratic conception); and on the other hand they are understood to be independent and autonomous corporations, reflecting the will of a local community, a semi-sovereign democratic entity distinct from and independent of the state (the democratic conception). (…) this ambivalence is reflected in the fact that in so many domestic legal systems across the world, legal doctrine treats localities as internal divisions of the central state apparatus, but also grants them autonomy and independent jurisdiction, free from central intervention.’ 49

Since most local governments implement nationally developed policies (deconcentration) as well as autonomously developed policies (decentralization), they are often regarded, by their citizens, and by themselves alike, as an intermediary between the (national) state and the
citizen. Given their bipolar nature, local governments are increasingly considered as less classically public, and more as an element of civil society, representing the voice of local constituencies.\textsuperscript{50}

Secondly, local governments can be regarded as ‘schoolhouses for democracy’. Due to their more-limited scale, and because they mainly deal with problems of daily life, local politics are said to be closer to citizens, thereby increasing the potential for public participation and citizens’ involvement. Bollens notes in his research on the democratization role of cities that ‘it is in the streets and neighbourhoods of urban agglomerations that there is the negotiation over, and clarification of, abstract concepts such as democracy, fairness, and tolerance.’\textsuperscript{51}

Local governments can be more effective and more efficient than national authorities in bridging the gap between citizens and the state. The criterion of belonging to a city or municipality is generally not one of race, religion, gender or ethnicity, but simply one of living within the city’s or the municipality’s territory. Whatever their other identities, living in a specific city or municipality provides each inhabitant with an additional, shared identity that is grounded in their daily experiences within the locality. Whatever their background, the inhabitants live in the same area and have no choice but to share and to solve their, sometimes trivial and often practical, problems. Distinct identity groups cannot easily escape each other in the small territory they live in, and hence cannot avoid a joint fate.\textsuperscript{52}

‘Amidst the uncertainty inherent in a societal transition to democracy, the ability of local policies to address issues of group identity, fairness, freedom of expression, and opportunity can create the conditions upon which fuller, more genuine democratic accords can be brokered. By literally bringing democracy to the streets, local policies can be central to the construction of new-based political identities and possibilities for inter-group tolerance and acceptance. [They are] the flesh and blood to abstract democratisation policies from national level.’\textsuperscript{53}

Thirdly, because of their smaller scale, local authorities can be seen and used as a model of the entire nation or society. Cities can be regarded as ‘microcosms of broader societal fault-lines and tensions affecting a nation’ and, as such, they can be used as ‘laboratories’ for innovative peace-building practices\textsuperscript{54}, as well as a locality where people can acquire political and conflict resolution skills that can later be used at the national level or elsewhere.\textsuperscript{55}

**Decentralization**  Local governments are only in a position to fill a peace-building role if they have the means, competences and knowledge to do so. Decentralization is a process through which resources, power and skills are transferred from the national government to the local level. Decentralization can strengthen the overall social contract, especially that part between citizens and the state. Decentralization can thus have a two-fold purpose: firstly, to more efficiently and effectively provide public services and, secondly, to increase public participation and civic involvement.

\textsuperscript{50} Blank (2006), p. 4; Lecours (2003) links this ‘bipolar nature’ to the concept of ‘paradiplomacy’, to clarify the international activities of sub-national governments.
\textsuperscript{52} Blank (2006), p. 51
\textsuperscript{53} Bollens (2007), p. 3-4
\textsuperscript{54} Bollens (2007), p. 6
\textsuperscript{55} Brinkerhoff (2007), p. 17
Decentralization is an essential step in peace-building. Firstly, local governments can only fill this peace-building role if they have the power to do so. Secondly, one can argue that the anticipated improvement in public service provision and citizen participation contributes to state legitimacy. Thirdly, decentralization can counterbalance the potential tyranny of a majoritarian democracy at the national level. Decentralization provides a means for former warring parties to achieve a ‘share’ of power through legitimate political competition, without the central government having to directly negotiate away some of its authority. Minorities have more autonomy to govern themselves after decentralization, and this can enhance the identification of these minorities with the state and its institutions. Moreover, decentralization generally increases the protection of both minority and individual rights.

However, alongside this constructive peace-building potential, decentralization can also increase the risk of state-building failure and the likelihood of conflict recurring. While decentralization may offer protection to minority groupings within the national state, it may fail to protect groups that are in the minority at the decentralized level. Minority groups can furthermore use the increased autonomy to prepare for a new round in the conflict, or use their new status as a springboard to separatism. Finally, decentralization may impede the emergence of an overarching national identity and reduce the willingness of minorities to invest in the overall social contract.

Despite the risks of failure, decentralization is still seen as an essential tool in state-building and peace-building alike, provided it is carefully implemented. One of the essential steps is to prepare local governments for the tasks and responsibilities to be transferred to them. With adequate preparation, local governments have the potential to use their new competences in such a way that it strengthens the peace-building process.

### A precautionary note
Before analyzing how local governments can contribute to peace-building, it is necessary to state two caveats. Firstly, local governments are not inherently drawn to peace-building by nature. The impact of local authorities on peace-building processes may be positive but also negative, and in many cases local governments have contributed little or nothing. Giving local authorities a larger role in peace-building is therefore not automatically a ‘good thing’, as can be illustrated by the abundance of examples where individuals or groups have used the local level of government to create divisions or restart a war.

Secondly, while this chapter considers the potential of local governments to positively impact on the peace process, whether local governments chose to use this potential depends to a large extent on the municipality itself, and to a much smaller extent on the support of foreign municipalities and other external actors. This peace-building potential is the focus of the next section.

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56 Cf. Hadi (2005)
57 Bland (2007), p. 221
60 Cf. Rojas (2005), p. 220
62 See, for instance, Lister (2007b), p. 3
The national and the local social contracts

In the previous section, we argued that, alongside the overall social contract in a society, many local social contracts exist. Moreover, we contended that peace-building boils down to re-establishing or strengthening the social contract. Now, if we extend the social contract metaphor, the added value of local governments in the peace-building process is twofold.

Firstly, local authorities can directly contribute to the strengthening of the overall, nationwide social contract. As the bottom democratic layer of the governmental system, that provides services and represents its constituency, local governments directly strengthen the national social contract and, thus, the sustainability of the newly won peace. They are able to provide public services in a fair, efficient and tailor-made way and to increase citizens’ representation and involvement in the peace agreement, during the transformation and within the new political system. Moreover, local democratization complements and may precede the national democratization process. In doing so, local governments directly contribute to the realization of a society with strong and generally accepted governmental institutions and conventions that regulate the interests in a society.

Secondly, local governments can support the creation of local social contracts, thereby indirectly contributing to nationwide peace-building. As one of its foundations, local social contracts are of prime interest to each local authority. The more citizens accept the local conventions and political structures as the only method to balance local interests and to solve local conflicts, the more effectively and efficiently the local government can function. The different local social contracts together reinforce the overall social contract. If citizens believe that their local government solves local issues in a just and right manner, then this belief strengthens their acceptance of the national conventions and institutions as well.

Below we deal first with the direct contributions of the local governments to the national social contract. Then we proceed to the indirect strengthening of national peace through the strengthening of local social contracts.

Peace-building through strengthening the national social contract

Local authorities directly contribute to the strengthening of the nationwide social contract when they enhance the output legitimacy of the state and its political system through the local provision of public services, and when they enlarge the input legitimacy through involving citizens in the peace-building and as the freely elected local layer of the national democracy.

63 A similar thought is expressed by Woodman (2004), who argues that conflict transformation may benefit from the idea that a national state can be regarded as a social contract between various identity groups.

64 Cf. Prendergast and Plumb (2002), p. 327, who address the value of local-level NGOs in peacebuilding, arguing ‘that in order for peace agreements between warring parties to lead to durable peace, there needs to be, alongside the top-down implementation of the peace agreement, concurrent bottom-up processes aimed at constructing a new social contract and healing societal divisions.’
The provision of human security  Guaranteeing the basic security of citizens lies outside the competence of local governments in most countries, with local police reporting directly to a national ministry. Nevertheless, municipalities can strengthen the peace-building process through security measures in at least two ways.

First of all, local governments can stimulate and strengthen the police’s integration into local communities, which will enable the police to improve community relations as well as help reduce the crime that is perceived most threatening to the citizens. The benefits of this approach were apparent when violence reigned in many localities in north Kosovo in 2004, after years of peace-making and peace-building initiatives: ‘(…) in most areas, heavily armed international peacekeepers were powerless to stop the violence, [whereas] local police units were most successful in stemming violence, and, in some communities, local political leadership was able to prevent or mitigate violence involving persons and youths from their communities.’

Secondly, local governments can positively contribute to security and the sense of security through urban planning. Research has shown that the reconfiguration of a post-conflict city through the building of shared public squares, through housing and other urban planning tools, can be a formative part of peace-building and democratization.

Peace-sensitive provision of public services  The local provision of public services strengthens the peace-building process in two distinct ways: by materializing the peace dividend and by re-allocating its benefits fairly and appropriately. Restoring basic public services following a conflict satisfies basic human needs. Moreover, most citizens perceive the restoration of these services as the materialization of the peace dividend. Especially when provided by domestic authorities, these services raise support for the acquired peace and the subsequent peace-building process, enhancing the legitimacy of the local and national governments, and of the local and the overall social contract. Local authorities can without question increase the peace-building impact of public services, because the quality of public services is generally higher when provided through local governments. Risley and Sisk go one step further and conclude ‘without a close tie between the international community and local channels for service delivery, peace-building will be unsuccessful.’

Moreover, the provision of services is not neutral. Service provision can easily backfire as a peace-building measure if the national or local authorities favour one specific group over others. In such a situation, the social contract will no longer be regarded as fair. Local governments are naturally better informed about the specifics of their communities than national authorities are, and therefore are better able to secure an equitable allocation of benefits. As a result, they are in a position to strengthen the overall social contract through a fair and peace-sensitive provision of services.

65  Risley and Sisk (2005), p. 20-3
67  Risley and Sisk (2005), p. 35-7
68  See the chapter by Kenneth Bush.
69  An example is the housing policy of the municipality of Erdut, presented in the chapter on Croatia.
Representing citizens in the peace negotiations  The people that have to live with the consequences of a peace agreement are rarely consulted when the agreement is being negotiated. Both from principled considerations (people have the right to decide about their own future) and for pragmatic reasons (popular participation increases the legitimacy and sustainability of any agreement), academics and NGOs plea for popular inputs into peace agreements. This is easier said than done, as popular input is rarely unequivocal and, hence, multi-actor participation can reduce the chances of success. Through their specific character, that positions them between civil society and the national authorities, local governments can play an important bridging role in these processes, as the following two examples from Africa show.

The resolution of the South African conflict following the end of apartheid shows that local authorities can play a facilitating role in successful public participation in peace negotiations. Public consultations and popular education took place alongside formal negotiations. Consultation meetings were held at the community level across the country and there were collection boxes in public locations where people could contribute their written submissions.70

In Mali, citizen participation did not run parallel to the formal negotiations, but rather initiated them. When the national government, the armed groups and the foreign mediators could not find a solution to the civil war between Tuaregs and the state, a series of fifty inter-community meetings were held, with up to 1,500 participants attending each. The goal of these local-level meetings was to develop a consensus on how to address the problems of the conflict. Together with religious leaders and village elders, the community leaders negotiated local arrangements to end the overall conflict. Subsequently, these arrangements were consolidated, leading to a national reconciliation ceremony that marked the official end of the conflict. 71

Representing citizens in the first phases of democratization  Young democracies built on the ruins of recent conflict are fragile by nature, with the chances of slipping back into conflict or authoritarianism high. Since introducing a fully-fledged democracy in one go is impossible, democracy is usually installed gradually in the post-conflict period. The international community normally has a large say in this process, either through conditional funding or through a transitional administration. An implication of this is that the core democratic values of participation and ownership, and hence the very legitimacy of the new democracy, are disregarded in the first phases of democratization. In practice, several foreign interventions have worsened this fundamental democratization flaw by faking popular participation and ownership, and by neglecting local circumstances and traditions, be it out of paternalism or own self-interest.

Involving local authorities in installing democracy, as well as in the transitional administration, could remove some of these difficulties and dilemmas. It would reduce local uneasiness that the local population is being ignored in the decisions that concern them and, at the same time given the small scale of local governments, it would facilitate the involvement of the international community in both basic and overall issues.72 Potentially, the newly established democracy will be more sustainable, as one layer of it would have

70  De Klerk (2002), and Barnes (2002), p. 8
71  Lode (2002)
72  Cf. Baskin (2004); See also Pattison (2007), p. 580-3
more time to become rooted in local practice and experience. As local governments can be regarded as ‘microcosms’ or model ‘laboratories’ for the entire nation, introducing democracy at the local level should generate important lessons and innovations, as well as skilled people with experience from local democratic practice. The lessons learned and the experience gained by people through the local democracy will be of great use in the second part of the democratization process: when democracy is fully introduced at the national level.

So far, the use of such an approach has been limited. Hohe concludes, for example, that although UNTAET, the transitional administration in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2002, ‘paid lip service to decentralization, it embodied a fundamentally centralized administration that was transmitted to the Timorese leadership with the transfer of sovereignty. The result is a young nation with national democratic institutions that have an unstable grassroots foundation.’ Chopra, another academic who was part of the international intervention in Timor-Leste, goes one step further, asserting that the transitional administrators ‘sabotaged the objective of viable self-government, when they refused to engage indigenous parties and to integrate them into a nascent system of governance.’

Despite the neglect of the local level in most transitional administrations, some foreign interventions have tried to strengthen local democracies. According to Chopra and Hohe, in Rwanda a successful decentralization process was implemented. Unlike most situations, the international community did not only decentralize the provision of services, they also successfully stimulated real local-level democratic mechanisms. In Kosovo, the UN established an entirely new layer of local government to promote reconciliation and build local capacity for service delivery, although some allege this was more of a smokescreen for the UN’s undemocratic behaviour at the national level. The results of this initiative were mixed, the technical functioning of local authorities increased, but local democratic practice lagged behind. Local majorities openly favoured their own ethnic group through the actions of the local governments. The main reason for this was arguably not to be found at the local level, but in the UN organization. Since Kosovo’s future remained unclear, and because international officers continued to influence local politics, the UN never gave the local authorities a real chance to succeed.

Given that most transitional administrations have never really tried to give local governments full autonomy in the early stages of democratization, the conclusion at this point is that local governments could, in theory, help overcome the flaws of democratization, as imposed through international interventions, but that future practices must prove whether this assumption is correct.

75 Chopra and Hohe (2004), p. 292-298
76 Baskin (2006), p. 89-92, and Risley and Sisk (2005), p. 22. An interesting perspective is provided by Holohan (2005). She explains the significant difference in material and immaterial progress of two comparable, neighbouring Kosovo municipalities through the difference in attitude of the international community. In the municipality that progressed the representatives of the international community acted as a co-operative networking organization, in the other the international actors were hierarchical and traditional.
**Local elections** Although an essential ingredient of democracy, elections alone do not build a democracy. What is more, elections can provoke conflict, especially if organized too soon after a conflict has ended. This poses state-builders with the dilemma of when and how to organize elections following violent conflict.77

In their analysis of state-building in Iraq, Fukuyama and Diamond offer a way out of this dilemma, arguing that local elections should precede national ones. The first national elections in Iraq in January 2005 did not bring the anticipated legitimacy. Fukuyama and Diamond assert the Coalition Provisional Authority should have permitted local elections well before January 2005, as ‘these elections would have created pockets of legitimacy that would have enhanced the authority of local officials and provided building blocks from which the national parties could have assembled coalitions.’78

Comparative studies support the view that local elections should be organized before national elections.79 Local elections lead to local democracy, and hence to stronger local social contracts that, in turn, strengthen and sustain the overall social contract.80 Since they are perceived as less far-reaching, local elections enable a more gradual and less perilous introduction of democracy, encouraging the development of party politics and inculcating voters in the routines of electoral politics.81 Moreover, local elections can be one of the counterbalancing means of preventing majoritarian democracy.

However, local elections will only have this state-building and peace-building effect if three conditions have been met. First of all, there must be some level of popular approval of the overall national state and its political system. If specific groups or specific parts of the state regard local elections primarily as a means to secure secession, then such elections are unlikely to build either peace or a state.82 Secondly, the local elections must not lead to a local majoritarian tyranny. Formal democracy at the local level does not automatically deliver public deliberation, participation and power sharing. The small size and proximity of local governments may help, but they are no guarantee whatsoever.83 This means that a fair local-level election system has to be designed that stimulates local checks and balances and minimizes the chance of this democratic flaw occurring.84

Thirdly, in order to avoid a fake democracy, it must be crystal clear to the citizens from the very outset what they are voting for. The competences, both of the elected individuals and of the municipal organization as a whole, must be clearly defined and explained before the local elections take place. Moreover, municipal autonomy must be guaranteed. If these conditions are met, local elections and local authorities increase the chance that elections will lead to sustainable democracy and decrease the potential of them having a conflict-promoting impact.

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78 Fukuyama (2006), p. 238  
79 Reilly (2004), p. 118  
80 Risley and Sisk (2005), p. 7 and p. 37  
81 Reilly (2004), p. 118  
82 Roeder and Rothchild (2005), p. 18-9  
83 Blank (2006), p. 51  
84 Roeder and Rothchild (2005), p. 18, argue for a division of power (‘institutional checks and balances with different majorities over various counterbalancing institutions without resorting to fixed proportions’) not only at the national, but also at the local level.
The local layer of national democracy

Apart from their contribution to the initial phases of the democratization process, local authorities also strengthen the state-building and peace-building processes through their development as a reliable and accountable local layer of the national democracy. The development of good local governance is as essential for the rebuilding of a sustainable democratic state as good national governance. Both are essential in realizing the goal of a sustainable peaceful state.\textsuperscript{85}

Sometimes the contribution of local governance is more than complementary. The establishment of democratic local governance can pave the way for the entire democratic political system, since it provides citizens with influence in the decision-making process that governs much of their daily lives while, simultaneously, providing state builders at the national level with sufficient time to prepare the national component of the democratization process. Unlike its national equivalent, local politics is often more about daily affairs than a confrontation between fundamentally opposed ideologies. As such, the building of local democracy can be less perilous (and also perceived in that way) than its national equivalent. There are other reasons for arguing that one should focus on the local level during the initial phases of the democratization process. Sometimes, the national level is far from ready to start the risky and difficult transition to democracy, as is clearly the case in failed states or states with large areas beyond central government control. Democratized local governments can then act as stabilizing points in a society in transformation, laying the foundation for a more extensive, meaningful and stable system to emerge over time.\textsuperscript{86}

Finally, starting democratization locally makes sense in a society where traditional structures prevail. Based on their experiences in Timor-Leste, Chopra and Hohe assert that finding a middle road between democracy and traditional convictions and power structures increases the legitimacy of the new political system, and enhances its sustainability. Such a compromise, they continue, is best found at the local level:

\'What may be feasible is a longer-term transition in which space is provided for local voices to be expressed and for communities to get directly involved in the evolution of their own cultural or political foundations as part of a gradual integration into the national state apparatus. This means giving time for an indigenous paradigm to coexist with, or to gradually transform during the creation of, modern institutions. Integral to the process is the design of mechanisms for genuine popular participation in administrative bodies at the local level, which can also guarantee representation upward throughout the government-building enterprise from the beginning to ensure its social viability.\textsuperscript{87}

Peace-building through strengthening local social contracts

Having reviewed the direct contribution of local governments to the national social contract, we now turn our attention to their impact through strengthening local social contracts. Three types of initiatives have an especially large effect on the strengthening of the local social contract: the peaceful resolution of local conflicts, community building and reconciliation.

\textsuperscript{85} Brinkerhoff (2005)
\textsuperscript{86} Large and Sisk (2006)
\textsuperscript{87} Chopra and Hohe (2004), p. 289
**Local conflict resolution**  During violent intra-state conflicts, the overall conflict is usually mixed up with numerous violent local conflicts. Rather than the other way around, the larger conflict tends to reignite, exacerbate or intensify local conflicts. Since peace agreements that end civil wars usually sidestep or ignore local conflicts, local governments and local communities face a costly and potentially destructive inheritance once the war is over. Amidst the local implementation of the overall peace agreement, and in a period when societal tensions are still high, local government and communities are also challenged to find ways to end these intensified local conflicts. If they fail to do so, the local-level violence undermines the wider attempts to consolidate peace.88

If, conversely, local governments do succeed in resolving local conflicts, they also remove some of the motives for reigniting the wider conflict, thereby strengthening both the local and the overall social contract, and reinforcing the establishment of a durable positive peace. Even when local governments cannot always transform local conflicts, they can diminish the escalating potential, when they manage to remove the ethnic or ideological dimension.89

This process is the central element in Wanasinghe’s argument that strengthening local governments in Sri Lanka might be the only strategy to structurally transform the conflict on the island. Even if ‘the cumulative element of serial episodes of perceived discriminations [have] entered the phase of ideology-based-violence, it would be logical to approach the task of conflict management from the starting point of the micro dimensions of the conflict.’90

The following observation from Mali reinforces this idea:

‘(…) peacemaking goes far beyond reaching a political agreement between the main parties. Their experience taught [Malinese citizens at the end of the civil war] the importance of establishing a ‘pragmatic peace’ between those who live side by side and have nowhere else to go. By involving people at a local level in developing strategies to tackle issues that were within their capacity to address, they were able to transform many of the factors that were generating conflict and were able to ensure a united front against those who used violence to promote their cause or position.’91

**Community building**  Local governments often adopt an integrative policy of community building in order to resolve or attenuate local violent conflicts. Community building presupposes that increased social linkages between individuals or sub-groups in local society lead to a mutually reinforcing spiral of information exchange, trust building, participation and co-operation. In particular, social connections between individuals from different sub-groups are thought to stimulate co-operation and social cohesion, and to prevent would-be local conflicts. Even after violent conflict, local people stand up to rebuild an inclusive community. As Kaldor observes:

‘In all the new wars there are local people and places who struggle against the politics of exclusivism — the Hutus and Tutsis who called themselves Hutusis and tried to defend their localities against genocide, the non-nationalists in the cities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly Tuzla and Sarajevo, who kept alive civic multicultural values, the elders in Northwest Somaliland who negotiated peace.’ 92
Local governments can instigate or strengthen these community building initiatives in many ways, from public meetings and cultural festivals to economic co-operation, and from youth clubs and urban planning to participatory projects. However, no matter its form, community building is an important foundation in (re)establishing the local social contract and hence in strengthening a durable peace.

Bohara et al. have thoroughly researched the effects of local social linkages on civil war and tried to find out why some municipalities saw heavy fighting during the recent insurgencies in Nepal, and others did not. They found, after controlling for geographic, demographic and economic influences, that municipalities with strong social linkages and a high level of citizens’ participation saw significantly less political violence than municipalities that lacked these.

Community building does not have to be limited to the territory of a single local government, it can easily be used to increase social linkages between individuals and groups of two or more neighbouring local governments. A good example is the successful initiatives to revive pela, the traditional inter-village alliance system of Indonesia’s Maluku, as a means to minimize potential antagonism between Moslems and Christians.

Cross-border community building has also been successful. Shortly after the war, the cities of Novi Sad (Serbia), Tuzla (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Osijek (Croatia) successfully strengthened the multi-ethnic community feeling between the inhabitants of their cities through long-term co-operation in sport, culture, youth activities and commerce. Similarly, the linkages between the populations of several Palestinian and Israeli municipalities increased when the local governments decided to co-operate in order to solve the problem of a shared polluted water basin.

**Reconciliation** This chapter has argued that a renewed local social contract may assist former warring parties to regulate their conflict in a peaceful way. Sometimes an ability to overcome the resistance to co-operation is mistaken for full reconciliation. However, pragmatically agreeing to co-operate with ‘former’ foes is different to overcoming psychological barriers and reconciling oneself with a former foe. Reconciliation is a delicate, difficult and long process that is difficult for a third party to promote. Nevertheless, many a foreign intervention attempts to propagate reconciliation.

Although reconciliation essentially takes place at the local level, and is generally also most effective at local level, local authorities are often reluctant to take the lead in reconciliation activities. Sometimes, however, local governments do play a facilitating and complementary role. In the violent conflict in Maluku (Indonesia) at the turn of the century, local governments tried to mitigate the violence through dialogue and reconciliation. Several times they brought together community leaders from different backgrounds and religions.

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93 For a good overview of the various forms of community building, including in post-conflict settings, see Pruitt (2007).
94 Bohara et al. (2006)
95 Rizal Panggabean (2004), p. 427-8
96 See www.amcsee.org
97 Blank (2006) p., 27
98 Cf. Menkhaus (1996) who shows that the only successful reconciliation efforts in Somalia were locally rooted and based on traditional reconciliation procedures.
In addition they created the Centre for Social Reconciliation as a parallel institute for their peacebuilding efforts.\textsuperscript{99} Another example is the South African truth and reconciliation commission that ‘has given people at all levels and on all sides the opportunity to declare their part in the conflict, to shed light on (...) human rights transgressions, and importantly to express regret and seek forgiveness and amnesty.’\textsuperscript{100}

Generally, however, reconciliation at the local level is best implemented by a neutral, devoted agency such as a domestic NGO.\textsuperscript{101} What local governments can do, however, is to facilitate the reconciliation process in an indirect way, just as a Croatian city did by offering office space to support a domestic NGO in its reconciliation projects.\textsuperscript{102}

Whether through community-building or through fair service provision, through solving local conflicts or through representation, local governments in a post-conflict setting can contribute to the peace-building process. Local governments are, however, only one of many players in the peace-building process, and due to scarce resources they often need external support for their peace-building activities. The next section analyses how foreign municipalities can contribute to municipal peace-building.

**The role of foreign local governments**

The peace-building activities of municipalities are rarely isolated initiatives. Through domestic interventions, they are closely embedded in the actions of citizens, local NGOs and the national government. Moreover, a variety of international actors come to the post-conflict area to strengthen the peace-building process, each with a separate agenda and each with a particular vision how peace can best be established.

International assistance is often crucial in establishing positive peace. If, however, foreign actors directly support local governments in peace-building, this can have the opposite effect. Since municipal peace-building is so closely linked to political and democratization processes, all with their own particular dynamics, external technical and financial assistance can only offer support to a limited extent or may even be unsuitable for the local conditions.\textsuperscript{103} What is more, the very fact that the support comes from outside affects local ownership of local governance, and hence weakens the legitimacy, sustainability and peace-building impact of local democracy.\textsuperscript{104}

It seems, however, that if the external assistance comes from a foreign local government that it is more likely to be a positive factor. Firstly, local governments from abroad do not have direct interests in the local municipality and, as a result, the local community and its authorities perceive the involvement of foreign municipalities as less pressurising and less threatening than from a national or international body. In addition to this, foreign municipalities are better able to understand the dilemmas of managing a local government, of strengthening local democracy and of fostering a local community, simply because this is their daily business back home.

\textsuperscript{99} Rizal Panggabean (2004), p. 425
\textsuperscript{100} Harris (1998), p. 73, and Spies (2002)
\textsuperscript{101} Diamond and McDonald (1996), p. 37
\textsuperscript{102} See the chapter on Eastern Croatia.
\textsuperscript{103} Burnell (2007)
\textsuperscript{104} Large and Sisk (2006), p.196
The role of foreign local governments in local peace-building is growing for a combination of reasons: globalization, an increase in the quality and quantity of ‘global public policy networks’ that propagate local democracy, pressure from their citizens and growing confidence in and justification of their activities because of the development and acceptance of international charters for local self-government and the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine.

The potentially unique contribution of foreign municipalities does not mean that they are immune to the pitfalls and fallacies that can befall foreign interventions. They may, like others, fall into the trap of the assumption that external actors wield the power and moral authority to bring about the peaceful change that communities have signally failed to do. However, if foreign local governments manage to translate their own experiences to a post-conflict context in another country – and it often takes a specialized NGO or multilateral organization to help them with this – they can be a valuable counterpart to their municipal colleagues in the post-conflict area.

The support to the local municipal peace-building activities can take many forms. The three most obvious types of assistance are material aid, technical assistance and financial support. The value of foreign municipalities’ material and financial support – mostly humanitarian assistance or reconstruction help – is often small and limited to municipal infrastructure. This kind of support can, however, act as a springboard, when it builds sufficient trust to continue the co-operation with other forms of assistance.

The added value of municipal co-operation in peace-building is much more apparent when it comes to technical assistance. Based on their own experiences, foreign local governments can assist in areas as diverse as citizen participation, conflict management, decentralization, service provision and local democracy. Even when not directly targeted at peace-building, technical assistance often contributes to the establishment of positive peace by strengthening municipal functioning. Technical assistance is seen to be especially useful in those countries that did not have a well-functioning local government layer before the war.

Even those municipalities that offer moral support and lobbying, two other forms of assistance, often underestimate their impact. Communities, cities and municipalities in post-conflict areas often perceive communication with the outside world as a lifeline that keeps them from slipping into isolation. During the violent conflict that followed the Timorese independence referendum, Australian cities literally told their twinned municipalities in Timor-Leste: ‘You are not alone. We are with you and walk with you.’ The thought that other municipalities have not forgotten them, strengthens people in the municipal organization in continuing their peace-building activities, especially when the municipal solidarity is accompanied by moral and physical support from individual citizens. Lobbying

105 Blank (2006), p.45-7
108 See Chapter 2.
109 Pugh quoted in Large (2001), p. 2
111 The various forms of assistance are distilled from the authors’ own experiences as well as from Van den Berg (1998), CERFE (2005), Large (1997) and Jain (2005).
112 Kehi (no date), p. 4-5
to improve the situation of municipalities in post-conflict areas can send a strong signal of solidarity, even if the lobbying turns out to be unsuccessful in achieving its stated aims.

The last type of assistance discussed is perhaps the most difficult and precarious one. A foreign municipality can act as an intermediary between two specific groups in their partner municipality. Although activities such as mediation and reconciliation are overambitious for foreign local governments, sometimes they can act as a forum for dialogue and co-operation. This is, however, a lengthy process that will require much persistence and sensitivity from the foreign municipality. Moreover, it requires trust that has to be built up during the co-operation and, frequently, support from specialized NGOs.

Good practices 113 do show that especially a foreign local government can be successful in this task because it is involved yet neutral, and because it has usually established a long-term relationship with the post-conflict municipality. An additional advantage of this assistance is that this ‘forum for dialogue and co-operation’ between identity groups can be presented as a side-event. If, for example, representatives from both groups join a study tour to the foreign municipality, they come closer than they could ever imagine.

In all the various types of contributions from foreign municipalities, it is important that the focus remains on supporting the local municipality in its peace-building activities and in its strengthening of the local and overall social contract. In other words, the peace-building initiatives of the local municipality should always be centre stage, and the foreign peace-building activities should always be supportive.

Conclusions

Some years ago, Karin Fogg, then Secretary-General of the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pointed out that local governments have entered the collective memory of peace builders as indispensable actors in the peace-building process:

‘[Peace builders] once thought that local-level action could be deferred for years while national states structures were being recreated or reformed. (…) Today, it is widely appreciated that this approach was, if not flawed, inadequate. It is now clear that legitimate local-level governance is needed at once in post-war environments to provide for human security, to enable the delivery of essential services, to allow citizens to have a voice in the political process, and to foster reconciliation among contending social groups.’ 114

Perhaps there was an element of wishful thinking in this, as Fogg seems to have overestimated the learning curve of the international community. The recognition of the importance of local governments is growing, but is not yet as widely shared as Fogg suggested. Moreover, practice has taught us that appreciating the role of local authorities in words is a world apart from strengthening this role in reality. As Lister and Wilder rightly observe:

113 See the co-operation between Wageningen, Ernestinovo and Sodolovci in the chapter on Croatia, or the Local Democracy Agencies in the Western Balkans (www.alda-europe.eu).
114 Karen Fogg, preface to Risley and Sisk (2005)
The consensus that has now been reached on the importance of reforming subnational administration and the political nature of the reform required was identified several years ago in Afghanistan, and was identified before that in other post-conflict contexts. (…) However, what really needs to be understood is why these lessons that have been identified time and again in different contexts are not learned. (…) When will it be recognized that, however distasteful or inconvenient it may be to some, statebuilding [also on the local level] is an essential task, and one that is not only complex and time-consuming, but primarily a political, and not a technocratic, endeavor?"115

This chapter underlines the need to strengthen good local governance as a peace-building tool. Due to their specific characteristics, that position them between citizens and authorities as well as between the local and the national level, local governments have the potential to enhance the effect and sustainability of state-building and peace-building, as they strengthen both the national and the local social contracts.

Local governments can increase the output legitimacy of post-conflict states and newly-established democracies through effective and efficient provision of public services. With their unique characteristics, local governments can furthermore add a complementary, and sometimes essential, dimension to the input legitimacy of states and its mechanisms to peacefully regulate conflicting interests. In many ways, local authorities are in the best position to represent citizens and to increase their involvement and participation in politics. As such, they can, metaphorically, strengthen the national social contract, as they add the essential element of legitimacy and ownership that all too often is missing in the first phase of democratization.

Moreover, local governments have the potential to contribute to a strong local social contract, and hence a sustainable peaceful society. In solving local conflicts, stimulating community building and facilitating reconciliation, they not only make their local societies more liveable in, they also contribute indirectly to the overall peace-building process.

Although the specific characteristics of local governments enable them to contribute to local and national peace, not all of them seize this potential. Often local authorities are unwilling or unable to make use of it. If it is a question of lack of ability, then foreign local governments are sometimes in a position to help. Through moral, technical or financial support, municipalities from abroad can strengthen and stimulate municipalities in post-conflict areas to bring their peace-building ideas and policies into practice. Under certain circumstances, and often aided by NGOs or international organizations, foreign local governments can further act as an unbiased intermediary or forum for dialogue and cooperation between specific groups in the local society.

Sometimes the role of local governments is essential for the success of the peace-building process. Mostly, however, municipal contributions to peace-building complement the activities of other actors, increasing their effect or efficiency. Whether the municipal contribution is essential or only complementary is not as important an issue as it might seem. As Diamond and McDonald emphasize:

115 Lister and Wilder (2007a), p. 255
‘Peace is not a measurable commodity. (...) Correspondingly, it is virtually impossible to determine the effectiveness of one action (...) in creating a more peaceful world. [It is more like] planting seeds here and there, watering them now and then, feeding them this way and that, hoping that the combined efforts, over time, will have lasting effects.’
City diplomacy campaigns in the Netherlands / lessons from recent times | Dion van den Berg

Summary

Mr Dion van den Berg reviews five campaigns in the Netherlands that are cited as the most striking of collective city diplomacy initiatives: nuclear-free local authorities; twinnings with Nicaragua; anti-apartheid policy; East-West municipal twinning; and solidarity with former Yugoslavia (in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Analyses focus, but not exclusively, on the aims of the campaigns; the variety of activities; the initiation of and support for municipal international policy; the relation to national government policy; and on the successes of the respective city diplomacy campaigns presented.

The author concludes that these city diplomacy campaigns were part of an overarching process of democratization of foreign and security policy and evolved similarly: from political statements, via solidarity, to development projects. Civil society organizations were already providing assistance in the development of campaigns when the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) was still considering active steps in this direction. However, since the early nineties, VNG has been very active. Analysis shows that lobbying has led to limited successes at the level of national and international politics, and that the greatest added value of city diplomacy surfaces in the more practical transitional processes (often in a post-conflict setting).

The author explains that many root causes of conflict have still not been solved, and that the ‘Liberal Peace Thesis’, that suggests that political reform should go hand in hand with the development of a free-market economy, is creating more problems than expected!

Local governments and their associations worldwide should meet these challenges and develop municipal anti-terrorist policies, engage in dialogue between the Muslim world and the West, pick up their part of bottom-up responsibility-to-protect strategies, and help rethink and remodel democratization strategies into more inclusive and tailored approaches. Let them do it.
Introduction

Some consider city diplomacy something new. It is not. One of the earliest examples of what United Cities and Local Governments now calls city diplomacy is provided by the many city twinning contacts developed after 1945, so-called jumelages. The success that these twinnings have had in bringing together local governments and citizenry from different countries is impressive. Other long standing examples of city diplomacy include local governments involving themselves in peace campaigns and programmes dealing with conflicts and conflict regions.\(^1\) Under the definition used in this document, both sets of activities qualify as city diplomacy.\(^2\)

It is impossible to cover the whole history of city diplomacy. So this chapter focuses on certain developments in the Netherlands.\(^3\) However, brief references to similar developments in other western countries are also made. The study is limited to five campaigns. In the Netherlands, the municipal campaigns rank as the most striking of collective city diplomacy initiatives. They are the nuclear-free zone local authorities; city twinning with Nicaragua; anti-apartheid policy; East-West municipal twinning; and finally solidarity with former Yugoslavia (in particular Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Of the first four, five aspects are reviewed for each: relevant discussions at municipal level; activities of Dutch municipalities; the position of central government and the VNG; similar activities in other countries; and relevant developments after the 1980s. The analysis of the only case that took place in the 1990s, the solidarity campaign of (Dutch) municipalities with the former Yugoslavia, is further subdivided.

The analysis focuses on the aims of the campaigns; the variety of activities; the initiative and support for municipal international policy; the relation to national government policy; sustainability of the campaigns; similar developments in other western countries; and on the successes. A comparison between the 1980s cases and the 1990s case is made. Differences and similarities between the respective city diplomacy campaigns were found and are presented.

Nuclear-Free Local Authorities

The context in the eighties The issue of (new) nuclear weapons has been high on the agenda of Dutch politics and society for many years. The Dutch peace movement always lobbied hard against the nuclear option and pleaded against deployment of such armaments as cruise-missiles on Dutch soil. It forced the Dutch government to have a footnote added to the NATO double-track\(^4\) decision of December 1979, declaring that the Netherlands supported the decision as such but would decide later on local deployment of cruise missiles. End-1985 the Dutch government decided in favour of deployment of cruise-missiles

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2 See chapter 1 of this book.
4 Double-track: prepare for deployment whilst at the same negotiating with the Soviet Union to reach an agreement that would make deployment superfluous.
in the Netherlands. But thanks to the INF (intermediate range nuclear forces) Treaty of 1987, the cruise-missiles were effectively not deployed. 5

**Discussions at the municipalities level** The Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) 6 and other peace organizations lobbied for local government support for the peace movement. More than 100 Dutch municipalities declared themselves nuclear-free. Hellevoetsluis was the first to do so, in October 1981, following the Manchester Nuclear-Free Zone Local Authority (NFZLA) resolution of 1980. A strong element of self-commitment made the resolution politically relevant, notably the decision that local governments would use all legal means possible to prevent deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil and resist transport of nuclear weapons over their soil. 7 In numerous municipal assemblies, christian-democratic council members decided not to follow the official position of their party (CDA) and supported the resolution.

**Activities at municipalities level** Dutch municipalities undertook many activities: political statements against nuclear weapons, appeals to participate in peace demonstrations, educational programmes and brochures, financial support for local peace groups, and promotion of peace education at school. 8 Some municipalities undertook action against companies involved (by boycott, overruled by the national authorities) and protested against the civil defence policy for which the municipalities were considered responsible. Some activities were even initiated by municipalities who did not adopt a NFZLA resolution.

IKV and its local chapters were actively involved. For IKV, the emphasis was not only on the nuclear-free resolution. It called for a 'proactive policy', as opposed to a 'reactive policy'. Local governments could help create conditions for overcoming the Cold War dynamics and the East-West divide by means of: information policy, educational programmes, support for local peace groups and most of all international contacts – within the framework of the existing twinning contacts and with municipalities in Warsaw Pact countries. Attracted by this approach, some half of the nuclear-free municipalities implemented a municipal peace policy in the course of the eighties.

**The position of central government and VNG** The Dutch Ministry of the Interior informed Parliament that such a resolution could be adopted by any municipal assembly, 9 but could and if necessary would indeed be overruled by national legislation. Interestingly, in that same period the VNG advised municipalities not to adopt such a resolution ('parliament must decide, not local governments'), thus taking a rather restricted legal position and ignoring the political dimension of the resolution. 10

June 1983, the government decided to prepare deployment of cruise missiles at the airbase in

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6 As of the 1st of January 2007, the two Dutch peace movements, Pax Christi and IKV, merged. The movement is now known as IKV Pax Christi.
8 De Haar (1989)
9 This position was taken by Minister Van Thijn (PvdA, social-democrat) in 1982 as well as his successor Rietkerk (VVD, conservative-liberal) in 1983.
10 Van den Berg & Benschop (1985)
Woensdrecht. The municipal assembly promptly adopted a resolution against the deployment (with the support of a few CDA council members). This municipal decision was indeed later overruled by state authorities and building activities started to prepare the base for the cruise missiles.

*Developments since the nineties* Already by the mid-eighties, only a few municipalities were (still) actively involved in anti-nuclear activities. They had shifted their attention to other topics and campaigns. Nevertheless, over recent years support for the international network of Mayors for Peace (MfP) was growing. Internationally, this network, headed by the Mayor of Hiroshima, has grown, and Dutch Mayors were joining. Currently, 40 Dutch Mayors are full members of MfP. An additional 58 Mayors have signed a letter of support for the 2020 Vision Campaign (demanding a world free of nuclear weapons by the year 2020). 11

*NFZLA campaigns in other countries* The Nuclear-Free Zone movement in the 80s covered almost all continents. In countries such as the United Kingdom and Italy, the NFZLA campaigns started earlier than in the Netherlands and continued to play a central role for many more years. In the United Kingdom, the debate over civil defence and local governments’ responsibilities in that field lasted for many years and dominated part of the discussion on nuclear policy in national parliament. 12 Logically, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and other Japanese cities were very active (Kobe declared itself a nuclear-free port city) and local governments in Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Canada also set up elaborate programmes.

In this period various international peace networks of municipalities were active, among which the Peace Messenger Cities and the ‘Union of Martyr Cities, Cities of Peace’, but the only international municipal peace organization that had its roots in this period and is still growing is Mayors for Peace. As of March 2008, Mayors for Peace membership stood at 2,170 cities in 127 countries, with new members enrolling every week.

*Municipal Twinning with Nicaragua* 13

*The context in the eighties* In the seventies, the Central American country of Nicaragua was governed by the kleptocratic and dictatorial Somoza family, an ally of the USA administration. The Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN or Sandinista National Liberation Front), organized popular resistance to the government. After a civil war, the Sandinistas – following Marxist ideology – came into power in Nicaragua in 1979. By means of a literacy campaign and other social programmes, the FSLN government sought to improve living conditions for its citizens. 14

US President Jimmy Carter chose a rather neutral approach to Nicaragua but his successor, President Reagan, perceived Nicaragua as a communist threat, thus legitimizing support for

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11 [www.mayorsforpeace.org](http://www.mayorsforpeace.org)
12 Arnold (2008)
13 For this paragraph, the case study research done by Mrs. Pascale Schuit (Schuit, 2008) was very valuable.
14 Walker (1982)
the Contras, a group that tried to overthrow the Sandinista government by military means. The USA provided extensive financial and political support for the Contras until 1990. In 1989, the Nicaraguan government and the Contras agreed on a peace settlement that included the demilitarization of the Contras and free and fair democratic elections. After the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections, the new government strengthened the economy and democratic institutions.15

Discussions at the municipalities level In many countries, a pro-Sandinista movement grew in the first half of the eighties. In the Netherlands, as early as 1978, a national Nicaragua Committee was set up. In the early 80s, especially in the bigger cities, local Nicaragua Committees grew up. Regularly, they targeted the Dutch parliament and government with political demands. Many were supported by left-wing parties, but also by the more pro-Atlantic Christian-Democratic party (CDA).

The Nicaragua Committees started to lobby for municipal twinning contacts with Nicaragua. The campaign was quite successful, and in only a few years over 15 such friendship links with Nicaragua were established.

Discussions on Nicaragua in Dutch town halls had a political profile. Starting a twinning contact for instance meant rejecting US policy. In many municipal councils, the position of the Christian-Democrats was crucial. Without their support, there would be no majority. In big cities, among which The Hague, Leiden, Groningen, Tilburg and Nijmegen, majorities were achieved.

Activities in the Dutch–Nicaraguan municipal twinning contacts In the first years of the twinning contacts, co-operation in the Netherlands between local governments and the local Nicaragua committee or Dutch-Nicaraguan twinning foundation was strong. Official twinning structures facilitated work on a number of issues and topics.16 Over time, a certain (logical) division of labour developed, with the municipality dealing with the issues of local democracy and municipal policy, and the committee or foundation focusing on the concrete projects dealing with housing, education, sports, health-care and so on.

There was a lot of travelling, mostly in mixed delegations (mainly local government officials and civic activists). Many volunteers were involved, active both in the partner city, and in awareness-raising activities in the Netherlands. Dutch-Nicaraguan twinning contacts made good use of the long-term co-operation: knowledge of the local context, tailor-made projects, a management infrastructure (Dutch people working in the partner city) to help design and implement activities.17

The national network for Dutch – Nicaraguan twinning (LBSNN) The ‘National Council City Twinning Netherlands – Nicaragua’ (LBSNN) was set up by the national Nicaragua Committee and Dutch local governments and local twinning foundations in 1986. Its main aim was to organize the exchange of ideas and information and to facilitate co-operation. LBSNN was successful in assisting local partners, both in the Netherlands and in Nicaragua. It also played an important role in the situations of change (elections) or urgency

16 VNG/NCO (1990)
17 VNG/NCO (1990)
18 Van der Hijden (1996).
19 The consequence of programme financing was that twin cities focused most energy and resources on a limited number of issues. Flexibility declined, but in this way the municipalities had much to gain from active participation in the LBSNN network.
20 Many partners from Czechoslovakia, just liberated from communism, had difficulties understanding that the Dutch cities were supporting the (Marxist-oriented) Sandinistas: ‘We were forced to work our free weekends for the communist comrades in places such as Nicaragua. And you, Dutch people, supported the FSLN government and at the same time worked for détente in Europe, looking for alternatives to communism...?’
21 The NEWS project led to five new Dutch-Nicaraguan twinning contacts.

The position of the central government and VNG

The first VNG involvement came about in 1990, with the NEWS (North East West South) programme: linking cities from Nicaragua, the Netherlands and the then Czechoslovakia in a triangular working relationship, with the main focus on exchange of expertise on good democratic governance. This programme encountered many difficulties (miscommunication and misunderstandings due to history and transitional dynamics in Nicaragua and Czechoslovakia), but also provided numerous unexpected and expected learning moments.

In the eighties, the Dutch government gave reconstruction aid to Nicaragua (22 million EURO per year), but was at the same time silent on US political interference and aid to the Contras. In the course of the nineties, various government funds found their way to the Dutch-Nicaraguan twinning schemes, and on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of LBSNN, the Minister for Development Co-operation, Mrs. Agnes van Ardenne, acknowledged the relevance of the Dutch-Nicaraguan twinning contacts: ‘The past decennia, city links have made an important contribution to democratization in Nicaragua with ideas often in contrast with each other.’

Developments in the nineties and in the new millennium

The involvement of Dutch citizens with Nicaragua developed on from anger about the civil war. Twinning contacts gave expression to this. Over the years, the focus shifted. The solidarity remained but the development projects attracted new groups in the Dutch local communities (sometimes less motivated by political anger, more motivated by humanitarian considerations). This process coincided with political changes in Nicaragua.

Rather unexpectedly, the Sandinistas lost the municipal elections in 1990. New mayors were appointed from the ranks of the anti-Sandinista, National Opposition Union (UNO, Union Nacional Opositora) coalition. Discussions commenced in Dutch cities, and almost all decided not to break ties with partner municipalities. The developmental component of twinning efforts started to dominate. After the 1990 elections, many local Nicaragua committees closed down.

(hurricane Mitch) in Nicaragua. It coordinated numerous delegations – such as the delegation with the Nicaraguan deputy-minister of Education and representatives of educational institutes, who visited the Netherlands in 2007. Over the years, LBSNN cooperated on various projects with VNG and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Since 1994, LBSNN has handled Nicaragua-related project applications presented to the government-funded subsidy programme KPA (Small Local Activities).
Sometimes, unexpected discussions popped up. The UNO government was in favour of more conservative legislation on homosexuality for instance, and many Dutch partner cities used the opportunity to explain the rights of homosexuals in the Netherlands (among the large group of Dutch solidarity workers, there were many homosexuals). 24

In 1998, Nicaragua was devastated by hurricane Mitch. In a nationwide humanitarian action, Dutch cities twinned with Nicaragua and LBSNN raised EURO 7 million. They decided, in co-operation with the Nicaraguan government, that a special local government capacity building programme should be implemented fostering municipal administrative reform. In the nineties, Dutch municipalities saw a special role in supporting the processes of decentralization by means of municipal staff exchanges and expert visits. Both the LBSNN and the VNG provided assistance and advice. 25

When the UN launched the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, LBSNN and the twinned cities decided to use the MDGs as umbrella for the further development of their relationships. Four priorities for the work were listed: tax systems, strategic planning, housing, and education. The Nicaraguan government was making a serious decentralization effort – although financial resources did not follow the transfer of mandates to the local level. The MDG framework enhanced the division of labour already developed: local governments dealt with the transfer of knowledge, and civil society organizations dealt with concrete projects. As a consequence, much municipal work was of a rather technical character.

**Twinning with Nicaragua in other countries** The region of Central America was worldwide news in the seventies and eighties: people fighting dictators, ‘dirty wars’, and US support for suppressive regimes (but anti-communist and therefore legitimate allies). In many countries, people sympathized with the Sandinistas and municipal twinning contacts were, in addition to ‘building brigades’, common instruments to work on political agenda and express solidarity with the Nicaraguan people. 26

May 1988 saw the ‘First European Conference on City Linking with Nicaragua’ in Amsterdam 27, with some 350 people from over 15 countries. The action-oriented conference led to the drafting of the ‘Amsterdam Appeal’ and establishment of small networks of cities all working with the same city in Nicaragua. Some of these small networks still exist today. 28

In the eighties, local governments from many countries had twinning contacts with Nicaragua. By 1988, there were in total 323 twinning contacts, mainly with the United States of America (91) 29 and various European countries (Germany 49, Spain 43, United Kingdom

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23 Vrieze (2007)
24 Berge (2007)
26 See Peace (2008) for an interesting analysis of the coalition of pro-Sandinista movements in the USA.
27 To illustrate the broad support for the city twinning: the conference was organized by LSBNN, the city of Amsterdam, Novib, Pax Christi and the national Nicaragua Committee, and financed by the EU, Dutch MFA and Terre des Hommes.
28 Posthumus (1998)
29 For interesting information on activities of US local governments, see the Bulletin for Municipal Foreign Policy, published by CID (Center for Innovative Diplomacy), in the period 1984-1992
20, Italy 16, Netherlands 16, Sweden 16 and France 15). In the course of the nineties, with the decline in the risks of a US military intervention in Nicaragua, the number of contacts started declining in almost all countries.

**Municipal Anti-Apartheid Policy**

*The context in the eighties* For many decades, South-Africa was a theatre of capitalist ideology, of white supremacy clashing with non-whites. Decolonialization, poverty, racism, lack of human rights... were all part of the problem. The African National Congress had been banned in 1960, its leaders – among them Nelson Mandela – sent to Robben Island Prison. ANC went into exile and initiated armed struggle. Inside South-Africa the black consciousness movement grew.

For a long time, the western world supported the apartheid regime, but this changed after the Sharpeville massacre (1961) and the severe repression in the seventies and eighties. Resistance in South-Africa against apartheid grew and united in the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983. The Netherlands and South-Africa have always had a special relationship due to early colonization and language familiarity (Afrikaans, though in syntax and morphology heavily influenced by English, developed from the 17th century Dutch) and many Dutch families had emigrated to South-Africa. The Dutch government only reluctantly started criticizing the South-African government.

*Discussions at the municipalities level* In the Netherlands, a number of anti-apartheid organizations were active from the sixties onwards. Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (KZA, Committee Southern Africa) was the most active and important. Also, in many cities and towns local groups were actively lobbying against the apartheid system.

By the mid-eighties, KZA asked Dutch local governments to support the anti-apartheid campaigns by means of cultural, economic and sports boycotts, awareness-raising activities and support to resistance movements in South-Africa and Namibia. KZA suggested Dutch local governments explore the legal boundaries.

*Activities of Dutch municipalities* Many local governments did indeed give such support and adopted political statements. More than ten municipalities asked local companies to stop doing business with South-Africa. Local governments helped in the implementation of the sports and cultural boycott and asked the national government for a full economic boycott. The city of Amsterdam declared itself, officially anti-apartheid city in 1986. Other municipalities would follow. Local governments developed, together with local

30 Zelinsky (1991)
31 At present, less than 20 US-Nicaraguan and 30 German-Nicaraguan twinning contacts exist.
32 For this paragraph, the case study research of Mrs. Esther Boere (Boere, 2008) was most valuable.
33 Posthumus (1998)
34 Posthumus (1998)
35 Others, such as Working Committee Kairos, AABN (Anti-Apartheid Movement Netherlands) and Boycott Outspan Action (BOA) regularly joined in.
36 Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (1986)
anti-apartheid groups, awareness-raising campaigns and there was much discussion about changing street names. In many cases, this policy was supported by municipal council members from conservative political parties.37

**The LOTA network: Local Authorities against Apartheid** In 1987, KZA and a group of active municipalities set up a special organization: the national membership coalition LOTA (Lokale Overheden tegen Apartheid, Local Authorities against Apartheid). 66 municipalities and 3 provinces joined. LOTA issued political statements, supported divestment campaigns and developed a so-called ‘preference policy’, purchasing and promoting products from frontline states, South-Africa’s neighbours. LOTA organized working visits for small groups of local government representatives to South-Africa, and municipal projects developed on the basis of these.38

In the second half of the eighties, LOT A and the municipalities started providing concrete support for the so-called Civics, inhabitants’ organizations in the townships, set up by the black population.39 In the municipal elections held in 1988, many civics won a majority of votes in the townships. They started playing a crucial role in local government structures. The bottom-up pressure on the national government to abandon the apartheid system continued to grow.

**The position of the central government and VNG** In the eighties, the VNG was not yet active. The VNG felt that support for municipal anti-apartheid activities would not be approved by a majority of its members (all Dutch municipalities).

It was after Sharpeville, that the Dutch government slowly changed its policy. It started ‘open dialogue policy’ with South-Africa. Support for the liberation movements increased, more development projects inside the country were supported, but the government still did not support a full economic boycott.40

In Dutch parliament, questions were raised over municipal boycott activities. Rotterdam declared it wanted to end the transit of South-African oil through Rotterdam. The government stated that municipal anti-apartheid policy must not conflict with national government policy.41 That meant that actions against companies or anti-apartheid references in public tender procedures were unacceptable and illegal. Dissatisfied and frustrated, cities decided to join forces and set up LOTA.

At the same time, the Ministry facilitated the local awareness-raising activities by means of subsidy facilities, matching money collected in the local community. It also supported LOTA through a labour-cost subsidy.

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37 Posthumus (1998)  
38 Posthumus (1998)  
39 The townships were given certain mandates by the government, but due to lack of money, they could not deliver services to the citizens. The townships started boycotting the national governments and citizens organized themselves in so-called Civics.  
40 Klein (1987)  
41 Klein (1987)
Developments in the nineties and in the new millennium  It became clear by the end of the eighties that the apartheid system was losing grip. The South-African government saw no alternative but to lift the ban on the ANC, and embark in a negotiating process named CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South Africa).\textsuperscript{42} The civics, as citizens' organizations legitimized by the people, played an important role in the transition process of which processes of decentralization were part.\textsuperscript{43} Following the release of Nelson Mandela, a symbol of anti-apartheid effectiveness (in 1990), and the 1994 elections, more regular twinning arrangements between the Netherlands and South Africa developed.

The transition led to a shift for LOTA and its members. Some people did not yet want to abandon the preference policy, but most LOTA members felt an urge to redefine their action agenda, and looked for positive action. In January 1991, LOTA organized a conference on how to support the civics. From the South-African perspective, there was a great need to develop relations upon the basis of equality and reciprocity (clearly, after the apartheid regime, the new actors on the political scene did not want other white people telling them what to do). In only a few months time, more than 15 contacts with civics had been established.\textsuperscript{44}

LOTA and the Dutch municipalities decided to focus on the priority topic of housing. Under the apartheid regime, housing policy (having mono-coloured towns and neighbourhoods, close to industrial sites) was a very political topic. Doing away with apartheid structures also meant the development of a fundamentally new housing policy.

In 1991, the VNG became involved with a training programme for South-African local government representatives. LOTA moved its offices to the VNG premises (January 1993) and was renamed Municipal Platform Southern Afrika (GPZA, Gemeentelijk Platform Zuidelijk Afrika). It maintained the (LOTA) membership structure and therewith its independence, although its staff was on the payroll of VNG.\textsuperscript{45} The VNG counterpart, as of 1996, is SALGA, the South-African Local Government Association.\textsuperscript{46}

A number of new Dutch municipalities joined LOTA and later GPZA, eager to do concrete work to support the transition in South-Africa. At the first GPZA congress, priorities were defined: giving support to the civics, organizing training programmes for South-African local government representatives, and sending observers to the (1994) elections.\textsuperscript{47}

Finally, these first democratic national elections, held in April 1994, led to the long-awaited change in parliament. ANC won an absolute majority and developed the Reconstruction Development Plan (RDP), launched in 1996. In this plan the improvement of the direct living conditions of citizens was the most urgent priority and with housing as priority, Dutch local governments and housing corporations could make an active contribution. The South-African government ordered all municipalities to elaborate a so-called ‘Integrated Development Plan’ (IDP). It had to follow a strategy of building more houses and working on water supply and sanitation, but also to vitalize neighbourhoods where all ethnic groups
could work and live together. Unfortunately, many local governments lacked the capacity to draw up such a plan. There was a lack of vision, implementation capacity and financial resources. Co-operation between the Netherlands and South-Africa was not without its problems. On the Dutch side, there was a lack of understanding of the complex local transition processes, flexibility in planning and implementation, and models of participatory project development.

In 1999, the work of the Municipal Platform Southern Africa was taken over by the Habitat Platform South-Africa. The Habitat Platform South-Africa aimed to provide better coordination between organizations active in housing and urban planning in South-Africa.

Municipal anti-apartheid policy in other countries

The anti-apartheid movement was an international movement, and logically local governments from many countries stepped in. In reaction to the Sharpeville massacre, many UK local governments stopped purchasing South-African products. Economic boycotts and awareness-raising campaigns followed. The Greater London Council organized a large disinvestment campaign. 120 local governments participated in the nation-wide ‘Action Weeks against Apartheid’ in 1985. In Norway, the two largest cities, Oslo and Bergen, declared themselves anti-apartheid cities and some Italian cities established (sometimes also official) links with the ANC and SWAPO, the liberation movement of Namibia. Also in the USA, the anti-apartheid movement was active. From the early seventies, cities began to question and criticise businesses working in South-Africa. A large disinvestment campaign was launched. Major cities including Washington DC and New York developed anti-apartheid policies, as did various US states.

East-West Municipal Twinning Contacts

The context of the eighties

The signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1977 was the result of a period of interstate détente, directed by the two military blocks, NATO and Warsaw Pact. With a new round in the nuclear arms race, a new period of stagnation started. The Cold War was as cold as ever before. Many came to understand that the so-called détente processes guided by the military and political blocs would not easily bring the breakthroughs all were longing for.

Within the international peace movement and in some political parties, alternatives for the ‘détente from above’ were discussed. In the Netherlands, peace organizations such as IKV (Interchurch Peace Council) and Pax Christi developed contacts and co-operation with

48 Posthumus (1998)
51 Very interesting information on the discussion and activities by US local governments can be found in the issues of the magazine Bulletin for Municipal Foreign Policy, published by the Center for Innovative Diplomacy (CID), in the period 1984-1992
52 Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika (1986)
53 For this paragraph the case study research by Mrs. Karin van Doorn (Van Doorn, 2008) was most valuable.
54 Crampton (2006)
55 Commissie Ontspanningsbeleid IKV (1986/1987)
dissidents and independent groups in Warsaw Pact countries.\(^{56}\) This was started by church-related individuals and small groups in the GDR, in the second half of the seventies\(^ {57}\), but the crucial turning point was the declaration of martial law in Poland by President Jaruzelski (December 13, 1981), intended to save communism and outlaw the independent trade union Solidarnosc.\(^ {58}\) A number of independent West European peace organizations developed the concept of 'détente from below', combining the struggle for disarmament (their lobby in Western Europe) with the struggle for democracy and human rights (the difficult work of 'Helsinki activists' and independent groups in the Warsaw Pact countries).\(^ {59}\) Dissidents from Central Europe introduced western peace movements to the civil society concept,\(^ {60}\) and peace activists from the west\(^ {61}\) tried to explain to human rights activists that disarmament would help create manoeuvring space for their work.\(^ {62}\)

**Discussions at the municipalities level** By the end of the seventies, no more than a handful of Dutch municipalities had contacts with a Warsaw Pact municipality. In the course of the eighties this changed. In the Netherlands municipalities were systematically targeted to play a role in détente from below. Within the framework of the ‘active municipal peace policy’, IKV challenged municipalities to develop municipal twinning contacts with local governments in Warsaw Pact countries.\(^ {63}\) IKV advised municipalities and disseminated experiences on existing East-West municipal twinning contacts. Key challenges were discussion opportunities on issues related to the division of Europe, and visits at which ordinary citizens could meet and talk in an unpoliced environment. That implied organizing stays for visitors in private homes (not in hotels or youth hostels), allowing them to talk in the absence of any officials, and only accept exchanges of full school classes (not just a selected group of children of party officials).\(^ {64}\) Among others, IKV organized a travelling exhibition to inform people about the possibilities of co-operation with counterparts in Warsaw Pact countries.\(^ {65}\)

Nevertheless, the political concept of détente from below was not easily endorsed by the municipalities – nor by other organizations working on establishing contacts with counterparts in Warsaw Pact countries. Many people favoured a more apolitical approach: dealing with enemy images, and showing that the communists were not devils but simply ordinary people. This apolitical approach from the West (also present in the discussions within the wider peace movement\(^ {66}\)) was precisely the type of approach the communist

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56 Van den Berg (2006)  
57 De Graaf (2004)  
59 Precan et al. (2007), Kavaloski (1990)  
60 Ivancheva (2008), Kaldor (1989), Tismaneanu (1990)  
61 This East-West dialogue was developed by among others IKV (the Netherlands) and the international networks of IPCC (International Peace and Co-ordinating Centre), END (European Nuclear Disarmament) and the East-West Network.  
62 This was not an easy thing to do. Many of the Solidarnosc activists, for instance, were strong supporters of the policies outlined by Reagan and Thatcher. It was the more intellectual part of the dissident movement that helped define the common ground.  
64 Hora, Kooyman & Heeke (1996), Van den Berg (1990)  
65 The exhibition travelled to more than 30 municipalities in the period 1987-1989 and led to discussions on municipal East-West twinning contacts in many of the town halls.  
66 Largely due to the active participation of Western communist parties and groups in the peace movement, and a quite strong anti-American sentiment in large parts of the peace movement.
rulers wanted to promote. From the communist perspective, making friends was better than discussing human rights and the East-West divide.\textsuperscript{67} This approach was supported by ‘friendship associations’ based in the western countries, such as the Association Netherlands – GDR (Vereniging Nederland - DDR), the Friendship Association USSR – Netherlands, and the peace groups who were less critical of the ‘real existing socialism’.\textsuperscript{68}

In the case of the GDR, it was impossible to avoid the Association Netherlands – GDR, and the Liga für Völkerfreundschaft (League for Friendship among Peoples) in the GDR. Once the Liga had decided (in 1987) that five municipal twinning contacts with big cities in the Netherlands\textsuperscript{69} was enough, all further requests were simply put aside!\textsuperscript{70} A similar organization, officially independent but de facto part of the state structure, controlled international contacts of Soviet Union local governments. The situation in Poland was different, there municipal contacts developed out of humanitarian contacts – most of which were created after introduction of martial law in December 1981!\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{Activities of Dutch municipalities} Municipal twinning contacts with Warsaw Pact countries started – after long preparations – with the signing of official protocols by the two mayors. In most twinning programmes, exchanges and visits of mayors and other representatives of the municipal executive and municipal council were central. Cultural exchanges were often organized, as were sports events, in relatively large numbers. Once such activities provided a solid basis, school and youth exchanges arrived. Occasionally, companies and production plants started co-operations.\textsuperscript{72}

In some cases, direct contact with dissidents was possible. After some preparatory work by IKV, Mayor Ad Havermans of The Hague used the opportunity of a visit to partner city Warsaw (Poland) in January 1989 to meet with representatives of the independent peace organization Wolność i Pokój (Freedom and Peace).\textsuperscript{73}

By the time the Berlin Wall fell in November 1989, some 50 East-West municipal twinning contacts had been established by Dutch local governments and a few dozens of Dutch local governments were in the process of examining possibilities of establishing such contacts.\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{The Network for Municipal Peace Policy (PGV)} October 1986, at the Third International NFZLA Conference held in Perugia (Italy), the Dutch delegation (representatives of six cities and IKV) pleaded for East-West municipal twinning contacts as being logically related to municipal anti-nuclear policy, but only a few other delegates showed interest. Some delegations continued to focus on anti-nuclear policy for a longer period, others made a link to the anti-nuclear energy lobby. A third group favoured a broader ‘culture of peace’ strategy.\textsuperscript{75}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{67} De Jong (ed.) (1985)
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Ter Veer (1998)
  \item \textsuperscript{69} Amsterdam, Arnhem, Delft, Rotterdam, Zaanstad
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Dekker (1990)
  \item \textsuperscript{71} Van Oijik (1997)
  \item \textsuperscript{72} Van den Berg & Knip (1987), p.35-41
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Van den Berg (1990)
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Van den Berg (1990)
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Van den Berg (1987)
\end{itemize}
The Dutch Perugia delegation took the initiative for a national conference in the Netherlands on municipal peace policy held in Delft, June 1987. The conference was a success and the participants decided to set up the Network for Municipal Peace Policy (Platform Gemeentelijk Vredesbeleid, PGV). The VNG felt it could no longer ignore the growing number of Dutch local governments developing a municipal peace policy. It was decided that the PGV would work from the VNG premises, its secretariat would be on the payroll of the VNG but paid for by PGV members. In this form, PGV started working in June 1989.

The position of the central government and VNG

In the first half of the eighties, the VNG was still not enthusiastic about East-West twinning. For the VNG, the East-West municipal twinning contacts were politically controversial and only a relatively small group of municipalities worked on these. Half way through the eighties, the VNG started providing information to municipalities upon request.

Initially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also hesitated. The idea of municipalities constantly 'getting in the way' of official détente policy was not attractive. Nevertheless, many organizations were involved and municipalities developed their own strategies and started establishing East-West municipal twinning contacts. The Ministry asked municipalities to be cautious and inform the Dutch embassies about their initiatives and activities.

At the occasion of the First National Conference on Municipal Peace Policy (Delft, June 1987), deputy-minister Mrs. De Graaff-Nauta, gave a speech in which she welcomed the East-West municipal twinning contacts: 'The municipal contacts with Eastern Europe focus mainly on sports and culture. Issues of peace and security have, more and more, become topics on the twinning agenda. As such these international contacts are to be applauded. They can contribute to the improvement of international relations.'

At the international level, the associations of municipalities had their fixed positions. The International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) – the associations most influential among Dutch municipalities - feared that twinning contacts were being used by the communist regimes as legitimization and that equal partnership would not be possible due to lack of autonomy of the local governments in Warsaw Pact countries. They would hold that position till the fall of the Berlin War. The United Towns Organization (UTO) – ideologically closer to communist and socialist parties, and more influential in France and other southern European countries - was in favour of East-West twinnings, but it preferred the friendship approach over a détente from below strategy.

Developments after the fall of the Berlin Wall

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the possibility to travel freely to and from Warsaw Pact countries had a tremendous impact. In only a few years, more than 200 East-West municipal contacts were created by Dutch municipalities. There was a great willingness to help citizens in Central

76 Alderliesten & Knip (eds.), 1987; Van den Berg & Knip (1987)
77 Brouwer et al. (1990)
79 Van den Berg (1987)
80 Van den Berg (1990)
81 Pfaff (1996)
and Eastern Europe on their way to prosperity and democracy.\textsuperscript{82} Whereas before 1990 the initiative for an East-West municipal twinning contact was put on the municipal agenda by local civil society organizations, after 1989 local governments themselves more frequently initiated the discussion.\textsuperscript{81}

The end of the Cold War also marked a fundamental change within the VNG, the Dutch Foreign Ministry and the international associations of municipalities.\textsuperscript{84} The VNG started providing assistance to a number of (newly founded) associations of local governments in Central and Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{85} and set up an International Projects Unit (IPU) that later developed into VNG-International (VNG-I). The Ministry indicated that Dutch municipalities could indeed play an important role in supporting reform processes in the former communist countries. All saw great opportunities for local governments to help counterparts in democratization processes and in the shift of a centralized society and economy to an open society and liberal market economy. IKV, making a swift shift from ‘détente from below’ to ‘integration to below’, requested attention for the need to help establish strong civil society organizations and redefine the European identity in the new European environment.

PGV was the main body to support Dutch local governments in the development of East-West contacts. It set up so-called ‘country circles’ for municipalities dealing with the same former Warsaw Pact country, and started a long series of seminars and publications. PGV and VNG together with the city of Rotterdam organized the First European Conference on East-West Municipal Twinning Contacts, held in May 1990.\textsuperscript{86} With more than 300 participants, many of them former dissidents and new politicians of new non-communist parties, the conference was a huge success – a first opportunity for local governments from all over Europe to meet and discuss the challenges of international partnership in post-Cold War Europe.\textsuperscript{87}

The East-West municipal twinning contacts, although of course all different, more or less followed a similar development after 1989. For the twinning with most Central European countries, this was the sequence\textsuperscript{88}:

- 1990-1993: material support, cultural exchanges, orientation visits, basic introduction to the Dutch local government system.
- 1993-1998: technical assistance and transfer of knowledge (main areas of interest: urban planning, participatory planning methodology, neighbourhood policy, and minority policy). Now, professionals, including municipal staff, started playing a (more) central role.
- 1998-2004: support in the pre-accession process (for countries that would joint the EU by May 1, 2004: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia). In this period, VNG was responsible for the management of the programme that provided financial support for Dutch cities actively supporting the pre-accession process in their

\textsuperscript{82} Dekker (1990), Platform Gemeentelijk Vredesbeleid & Werkgroep Oost-Europa Projecten (1990)
\textsuperscript{83} Den Hartog (1995)
\textsuperscript{84} De Nijs (1992)
\textsuperscript{85} Knip (1999)
\textsuperscript{86} Van den Berg & Volwater (eds.) (1990)
\textsuperscript{87} Volwater (1990)
\textsuperscript{88} Knip (1999), Van Zwol & Klem (2002)
\textsuperscript{89} There are no Dutch twinning contacts with Slovenia, one of the former Yugoslav republics. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU on January 1, 2007. In the twinning with Romania and Bulgaria, the focus on pre-accession logically lasted longer.
partner municipalities (GST Programme). It is interesting that the Ministry concluded that little was done in directly dealing with the acquis communautaire, but that twinning was clearly successful in supporting development of a democratic atmosphere and attitude.\(^{90}\)

- 2004-onwards: more equal partnership? New topics are being looked at and in some cases partners deciding to start a project together with another municipality in a third country.

Altogether, across many of the East-West municipal twinning contacts, the number of people involved in the exchanges and projects is now decreasing. Twinning committees or foundations regularly complain about lack of interest and support for their work from the part of the local government. Some twinning contacts have been officially terminated or are 'sleeping'. PGV was renamed PES (Platform Europese Stedenbanden, Network for European City Twinning) and as of January 1, 2008, PES merged with the VNG Service Desk Europe.

East-West municipal twinning initiatives in other countries In countries where the nuclear-free campaign was still very strong such as the United Kingdom and Italy, local governments were less active than in the Netherlands, at least during the eighties. As of November 1989, local governments from all EU member states became involved and developed East-West contacts. The international associations of municipalities developed major programmes for co-operation with local governments and their (new) associations in Central and Eastern Europe.

Of particular interest of course was the situation in West-Germany, where Ostpolitik and détente policy were always hot political issues. The Christian-democrats (CDU and CSU) spoke of Innerdeutsche Städtepartnerschaften\(^91\), the Social-democrats (SPD) preferred the term Deutsch-Deutsche Städtepartnerschaften!\(^92\) The political importance was clear. Contacts were made with independent groups in the GDR, by West-German municipal delegations, and from autumn 1989 meetings were organized with local subscribers and chapters of Neues Forum, the citizens’ movement that played a key-role in the popular resistance to the Berlin Wall.\(^93\) After November 1989, the number of contacts between East-German and West-German municipalities grew enormously.\(^94\) In the first years of the nineties, there were numerous exchanges and co-operation projects, and a lot of money involved (going West to East).

A case from the nineties - the Bosnian war and its aftermath \(^95\)

City diplomacy campaigns in the eighties progressed along similar paths. Were the eighties a very specific period and have the dynamics changed since? We take a brief look at local governments’ reactions to the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in particular to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995).

\(^{90}\) IOB (2004)
\(^{91}\) Becher (1989)
\(^{92}\) A difference in approach that goes back to the question whether West-Germany (FRG, Federal Republic of Germany) should recognize East-Germany (GDR, German Democratic Republic) as an independent state or not
\(^{93}\) Stadt Mainz (1989)
\(^{94}\) Burghof (1990)
\(^{95}\) For the paragraph, the case study research by Mrs. Annemieke Schrijver (Schrijver, 2008) was most valuable.
**The context of the Bosnian war** After Tito’s death in 1980, the process of disintegration of Yugoslavia started. In Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, ethnic and religious identities began to surface with a vengeance. Nationalist politicians promoted and cruelly exploited existing differences (ethnic, religious and economic) by means of hate speech and political manipulation. The international community, not sufficiently aware of the complex conflict dynamics, did not react appropriately. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991. War broke out in Croatia. March 1992, war started in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the republic inhabited by Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims, 43.7%), Serbs (31.3%), Croats (17.3%) and ’others’ (‘Yugoslavs’, Jews, Roma, Turks, Germans, etc.: 5.5%). Both the Serbian and Croatian political leadership hoped to split up Bosnia and Herzegovina into ’greater Serbia’ and ’greater Croatia’. Various peace plans proposed by the international community failed. Sarajevo was under siege for more than 1,000 days. The EU was not united and could not force a solution. Only after atrocities in 1995 (the shelling of the market in Sarajevo and Kapija Square in Tuzla, and the genocide of Srebrenica) was the USA found willing to step in and bring the warring parties to the USA for negotiations leading to the Dayton Peace Accords, signed in December 1995.96

**Lobbying in the period 1991 – 1995** The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the start of bloodshed led to many debates in municipalities and their associations across the world. Nevertheless there was little concrete output, with the exception of some declaratory statements and calls for humanitarian aid. In fact, calls for more direct municipal involvement came from the peace movement. Some peace organizations had started working in Yugoslavia in the second half of the eighties, and were thus more familiar with the situation and had reliable partners there.97

In November 1981 IKV organized – together with the Dutch Network for Municipal Peace Policy - a Municipal Peace Conference on (former) Yugoslavia, in co-operation with the Mayor of Budapest. The conference launched an appeal for international solidarity links with (former) Yugoslavia. On behalf of the conference, the Mayor of Budapest (Demszky Gabor) and the Mayor of Delft (Huib van Walsum) sent an urgent letter to the UN special envoy, Cyrus Vance, asking him for preventive deployment of UN forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unfortunately, Vance did not support this appeal.98

More initiatives from local governments followed. The Citizens’ and Municipal Peace Conference brought 450 people to the city of Ohrid (Macedonia), in November 1992. This conference, organized by a group including IKV and the European peace and human rights organization hCa99 with support of the Council of Europe, launched an appeal100 to set up local protectorates throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.101 The Bosnian city of Tuzla hosted an international seminar in October 1994102, and the Annual Assembly of peace and human

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96 Crampton (2006), Silber & Little (1996)
97 Van den Berg (1996)
99 Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly. hCa was founded in 1990, upon the basis of the contacts the independent West European peace movement had established during the eighties with dissidents and independent groups in the communist countries.
100 An international postcard action was successful, and 350,000 postcards were delivered to the UN Headquarters in Geneva.
101 hCa & IKV (1992)
102 Faber (1994)
rights organization hCa, in November 1995. At these two meetings, participants supported the Bosnian anti-war campaigns and provided the basis for major programmes such as ABC (Assistance to Bosnian Communities, see below).

In 1993, the Council of Europe initiated the so-called Agencies for Local Democracy programme. The idea was that a group of cities would help develop and maintain a small office in a specific city of former Yugoslavia, to work for peace and democracy. The first ones were set up in Subotica (Vojvodina, Serbia), Osijek (Croatia), Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina) – in political terms three ‘oppositional cities’.

**Municipal initiatives in the Netherlands during the war** In the Netherlands, IKV and PGV organized various national meetings and some smaller campaigns. In small numbers, local governments joined in and supported the political actions. Fall 1993, they supported the campaign ‘Blankets and Protection for Bosnia’ (combining the collecting of money with information, lobby and debate) initiated by IKV, Pax Christi and two development organizations. At a later stage, many more organizations joined the campaign. A nationwide TV promotion was held, and on Saturday December 18, 1993, 425 town halls opened their doors and participated. In the period 1994-1997, IKV and PGV were partners in the ‘Desk for Municipal Initiatives on Former Yugoslavia’, providing advice and helping in the development of initiatives, such as the Dutch participation in the Agencies of Local Democracy and the promotion of the ABC programme.

**Democratization in post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina** The devastation in post-war Bosnia was enormous and many minority groups had been driven from their homes. The number of refugees and displaced persons was estimated (conservatively) to be some 2.2 million. The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) created two entities, the Republika Srpska and the Bosniak-Croat Federation. The Federation has ten cantons: 5 with a Bosniak majority, 3 with a Croat majority, and 2 ethnically mixed. State bodies, headed by a rotating presidency, were weak. The entities, on the contrary, and in the Federation, the cantons, were very strong. Municipalities again were rather weak, in mandates and in resources.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the post-conflict setting, had to deal with the transition from socialism to democratization, while at the same time going from ethnic warfare to multi-ethnic peace. Dayton accords meant there would be a strong international presence. This led to the well-known paradox that people had to take up democratic responsibilities while under a (necessarily undemocratic) type of ‘international protectorate’. It made many domestic actors reluctant to participate and passive. Under these circumstances, it was important to work at the local level where democratization successes might be easier to achieve (a specific local context would have fewer actors, interventions could be tailor-made, and visible results could be pursued relatively quickly). IKV and others concluded that

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103 Schou (ed.) (1996)
104 Van den Berg (1998); IKV, hCa & Desk for Municipal Initiatives Former Yugoslavia (1996)
107 Bojkov (2003), 42
108 UNDP (1998)
109 Hewitt (1999)
110 See Bojkov (2003) and Januszewska (2006)
the international community was focusing too much on top-down democratization and institutional reform. More attention should be given to bottom-up democratization and non-institutional (i.e. cultural, values-related) democratic organization.

Projects and lobbying in the post-Dayton era  The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) stopped the fighting. Nevertheless, the state structure as defined in Dayton would create – for a long period – many problems. Critics often said that the DPA legitimized ethnic cleansing. The DPA stopped the war but also allowed many war criminals and extremist nationalists to retain and even strengthen their positions, economically and politically.

IKV, hCa and PGV had seen the potential of Tuzla as an oppositional city, where the local government and citizens worked together - during the war to save the city, and after the city to rebuild and revitalise it as multi-ethnic and multi-religious community. During the war, the Mayor and various local organizations, in particular the Forum of Tuzla Citizens, developed an outspoken strategy to respond to the threats to society, and sought to involve many partners from abroad.

At meetings held in 1994 and 1995, the basis was laid for larger-scale projects, such as TALDI (Tuzla Agency for Local Development Initiatives) and the ABC programme (Assistance to Bosnian Communities). The main aim of the ABC programme was to support the reconstruction and revitalisation of the Tuzla city and region, so heavily affected by war damage and the influx of 60,000 displaced persons. The ABC programme was a rehabilitation programme, combining physical reconstruction with social revitalization (incl. inter-ethnic co-operation) and democratization, in a city in a post-conflict setting, through partnership models of international city-to-city co-operation. It was targeted at the visible improvement of living conditions in the direct environment - not only in a demand-driven way, but also based upon citizens' participation, balancing short-term goals (quick fix) with longer-term goals (anchoring of participatory models, sustainable partnerships). The programme looked beyond 'victimhood': it saw citizens as actors and owners, not merely as victims of war and recipients of aid. An office was set up.

The ABC programme dealt with approximately 100 projects, targeted at small infrastructural improvements, all levels of education, culture, youth, the elderly, trauma treatment, and the displaced. The Dutch government provided grants; Dutch local governments and NGOs gave cash contributions. Twenty Dutch municipalities and 75 NGOs participated in the programme that lasted from May 1996 through June 2000.

The organizers of the ABC programme concluded that it could serve as a model for city-to-city cooperation in a post-conflict setting provided that certain conditions were met:

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111 Beslagic (1997)
112 Kaldor (2004)
114 Dutch Cities for Tuzla (1996)
115 Dutch Cities for Tuzla (1996)
116 A grant of 1.4 million Euro
117 In total 0.5 million Euro
118 In total 0.9 million Euro
119 Board of ABC Programme (2001)
knowledge of the situation and context-related processes, presence in the post-conflict city, involvement of experienced (foreign) cities and NGOs, strong co-ordination and financial resources.\textsuperscript{120} Others also came to a positive assessment: ‘The ABC programme was a small example of how collaboration can achieve quick results. (…) It is a programme that literally sheds light on the real meaning of co-operation.’\textsuperscript{121}

From the Tuzla side, the evaluation was also positive. Tuzla partners listed various key elements that made it successful: the partnership model, the participatory methodology and the importance of study and working visits. Lessons learned included: ‘Post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building has to be done in close co-operation with local people. Partners have to be from both institutional and civil society sides. (…) The process is often more important than actual achievements. (…) Study trips recognized real needs and adopted best learning approaches. Friendship was created and the project should mean not just support, but support with taste and soul.’\textsuperscript{122}

Due to lack of resources, the programme could not be continued after June 2000 and was finalized. Too soon in the eyes of Mirza Kusljugic, at the time TALDI director:\textsuperscript{123} ‘The importance of local democracy had been underestimated by the international community. Transition processes take more time than diplomats believe, long-term support is much needed. Now, in peaceful times, local governments lack the international support they need. I see people and organizations again making the same mistakes they made before. The transition and democratization process is far from finished. We continue to need international partnerships for local governments.’\textsuperscript{124}

\textit{The position of the central government and VNG} The VNG became involved in humanitarian initiatives - among others promoting Red Cross projects providing shelter to displaced persons and refugees in 1992. When it came to the political lobbying, it was logical that the PGV should take the lead, and that is precisely what happened. After the Bosnian war, when the reconstruction and revitalization projects developed, the VNG supported these projects more directly.\textsuperscript{125}

The Dutch government did not support the lobbying for the preventive deployment of blue helmets in Bosnia, but various peace initiatives also involving Dutch municipalities were co-financed by the Dutch government and the European Union. After the war, the Ministry paid a key-role by financing the ABC programme.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{120} Board of the ABC programme (2001), Van den Berg (2007)
\item \textsuperscript{121} Cooperazione Italiana et al. (1998)
\item \textsuperscript{122} Balta (2007)
\item \textsuperscript{123} Later Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations (2001-2005)
\item \textsuperscript{124} Meeting with Kusljugic at the 15 years anniversary of Forum of Tuzla Citizens, Tuzla, February 2008
\item \textsuperscript{125} Van den Berg (1997)
\item \textsuperscript{126} In fact, the Dutch Minister for Development Co-operation himself decided to provide much more money than advised by staff dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ever since the war, the Dutch governments has been among the biggest donors to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
\end{itemize}
Evaluation of the cases of the eighties

Many striking similarities There are many similarities in comparing the campaigns and in the way they started and developed. A certain pattern unfolded in all of them. These are the most significant processes.

Part of a wider democratization process The development of 'municipal peace policy' of Dutch local government can be best understood in relation to the overarching process that took place in the seventies and eighties that had a profound and fundamental character: the democratization of foreign and security policy. Security and foreign policy issues dominated the political agenda for many years. Society at large participated in the debate over these issues. Numerous civil society organizations, both at the national and local level, implemented elaborate advocacy and lobby campaigns. In the course of the seventies, municipal involvement in international affairs came to be accepted by national Dutch authorities. Three criteria emerged from the discussion in parliament and from the ministries: activities should not contradict national government policy; 'substantial action from citizens' was required to allow for financial support; awareness-raising and education should be part and parcel of activities.

The aims What were the main aims of local governments embarking on peace work in the eighties? Clearly, in the beginning, changing government policy was the most crucial element. Municipalities also tried to change international policies. In all four cases from the eighties, a clear relationship with the situation of the Cold War was visible, either directly (anti-nuclear campaigning and East-West twinning) or more indirectly (Nicaragua and anti-Apartheid policy).

Local authorities also put emphasis on the role of citizens in international affairs. They promoted the model of world citizenship. Municipalities actively supported local awareness-raising and educational projects.

In the course of the eighties, aspects of solidarity emerged. Solidarity visits and solidarity campaigns gave a human face to the problem. Abstract analysis and intervention strategy all boiled down to meeting people and supporting them – in presence and in projects. In this phase, civil society activists travelled, but also individuals representing certain sectors, such as education, health-care, cultural associations, youth clubs and women's associations. Experienced municipal staff (in fields such as urban planning, water management, social programmes) also became involved.

Initiatives then started increasingly to focus on classical development co-operation projects. The local government would do so by means of decentralized co-operation, technical assistance and training of all kinds – with less attention and resources for political lobbying. Co-operation with local foundations and civil society actors changed. A division of labour emerged. And fairly often, at the local government level, a rather false image of 'volunteers' gained ground. They, the volunteers of the twinning foundations, were in charge of the soft

127 Ter Veer (1996)
128 De Haar (1989)
129 Brouwer et al. (1990), Chapter 1
topics (culture, youth, awareness-raising), whereas the ‘municipal professionals’ dealt with the hard sectors (municipal management, urban planning, environmental protection, economic development, and so on). Where division of labour led to such divergent paths, in the end either public support or political support for the twinning, or both faded. Better was to find models of co-operation and develop links, such as involving young people in environmental protection, and organize citizens’ participation in all processes of municipal policy development and implementation.

A variety of activities What type of activities were developed and implemented? Following definition and acceptance of the aims, activities developed accordingly. Political lobbying was organized through political statements and municipal resolutions, mostly in support of national campaigns initiated by civil society movements. Education and awareness-raising in the local community was developed and supported simultaneously, often with local committees and associations in the driving seat. From both sides, the urge to co-operate was strong. Municipalities gave both material and immaterial support to local groups. Concrete solidarity was expressed by material and financial help and through personal contacts (delegations and expert missions). Once democratization and transfer of knowledge came to the fore, technical assistance and capacity building were key – and still are.

The political ‘colour’ of the active municipalities In the Netherlands, at all levels of government, many political parties compete for the support of voters and always have to make coalitions. As a consequence of this tradition, many political parties became involved in city diplomacy campaigns, and not only the parties on the left of the political spectrum. In many municipal councils, the role of the Christian-democratic council members was crucial. The broad support for the city diplomacy campaigns was also useful to get access to the members of Parliament, and ministers and their policy staff.

Initiative and support for municipal international policy In all of the cases described, local peace groups and solidarity committees played a crucial role in the local context. They sent letters to municipal assemblies, consulted with political parties and had an active media strategy. They organized broad public support for the demands put forward.

At the national level, the local groups and municipalities were supported by national organizations and committees. They gave advice and helped explore possibilities. They lobbied at the national level (parliament, ministries, embassies) on behalf of the

130 IKV, Cos West- en Midden-Brabant (1998)
131 That does not mean that in all municipalities the social-democrat were fully supportive. Within the social-democratic party one could also find quite a strong statist sentiment, of people who were of the opinion that such security and foreign issues should exclusively be dealt with by national politicians and diplomats. A few years later, within the smaller left-wing parties, in particular the Communist party (CPN) and the Political Radical Party (PPR), many people rejected the détente from below approach because they were less critical of the situation and developments in the Warsaw Pact countries.
133 For the campaigns analyzed, in particular IKV (Interchurch Peace Council), Nicaragua Committee and Southern Africa Committee (Komitee Zuidelijk Afrika)
municipalities. These national organizations were also involved in the establishment of national networks of local governments involved: LBSNN in 1986, LOTA in 1987, and PGV in 1989.

The Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) was not involved in the city diplomacy campaign in its initial stages. The association was clearly reluctant to be drawn in. Nevertheless, in the second half of the eighties, the VNG changed its position, partly because it saw that large numbers of local governments had become active and that mainstream parties, also in parliament, supported them.

For some city diplomacy campaigns, international networks were relevant. Think of the 1988 European conference on twinning with Nicaragua or the 1990 First European East-West Twinning Conference, followed by a second held in Prague in 1991.

The relationship with national government policy

How did the municipal programmes relate to the then current government policy? In the initial phase, the oppositional character of the campaigns regularly caused heated discussions in parliament. But despite the fact that national government often disagreed with the municipalities, it did allow most of the activities to take place. Quite in line with Dutch political traditions, respective ministers of the interior defended the right of municipalities to take positions also on political issues such as cruise missiles. Interior Minister Van Thijn (social-democrat, PvdA) informed parliament along these lines in 1982, and his successor Rietkerk (conservative-liberal, VVD) a year later held to that position. The ministry nevertheless did draw a line (and overruled municipal decisions) where policies were announced and implemented in the fields of boycotting and refusing tenders of certain ‘contaminated’ building companies.

In the second half of the eighties, the position of the national government changed and opened to more ‘political’ local government programmes abroad. This process coincided with international changes such as the INF Accords in 1987 (as a consequence of which cruise missiles would no longer be deployed in the Netherlands) and growing international criticism on US policy on Nicaragua. The growing involvement of the VNG was also important for the national government, as the VNG was and is from the Ministry’s perspective, the main spokesperson for the collective of municipalities.

Slowly, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs started providing funds for activities of municipalities and in the course of the nineties more elaborated models of co-operation were set up. By that time, much had changed: the fall of the Berlin Wall, transition in South-Africa, and end of the Contra War in Nicaragua. With many of the political controversies off
The table, the Ministry came to see the potential of local governments’ involvement. Partnership became an option, and even a logical and promising one. Today, the added value of municipal international co-operation is accepted by Foreign Affairs, and many Dutch embassies now actively support and promote municipal international co-operation.140

**The sustainability of city diplomacy campaigns** To what extent have these municipal peace programmes been shown to be sustainable? The level of sustainability of contacts and co-operation with partners abroad seems largely determined by the question as to whether the national networks are still alive and active.

For the anti-nuclear weapons campaign, such a national network never existed. The East-West municipal twinning contacts were supported for a number of years by the Network for Municipal Peace Policy (PGV) and its successors.141 City twinning with Nicaragua is still going strong. The municipalities and LBSNN have defined new priorities and the local committees or foundations have a strong basis in society. LBSNN itself now has long-term financing, also for financial support for projects of LBSNN members. As public interest for Nicaragua has decreased over the last 20 years, this is a remarkable achievement. The number of Dutch local governments twinned with Nicaragua is almost as high now as twenty years ago (20).142

After the demise of the Apartheid system in South Africa, a period started in which a differentiated group of actors became involved in co-operation with counterparts in South Africa, including the business community and Dutch housing corporations. Yet, the last few years has shown that continuation is difficult. South Africa still faces enormous difficulties and in the absence of a pro-active national network to support and organize Dutch municipalities, they have to come up with answers and initiatives themselves. The number of Dutch local governments actively working in South-Africa has decreased over the last ten years.

It is clear that national networking was not only crucial for the initial phases of city diplomacy, but is also crucial for programme sustainability.

**A comparison with other Western countries** What specific characteristics come to the fore when comparing Dutch municipalities’ programmes and activities with those of local governments in other Western countries? In some areas other countries were active before Dutch municipalities became involved, whereas in other cases Dutch municipalities were among the first to develop policy and initiate projects. While in other Western countries, local governments changed from a reactive to a proactive policy, this step was made earlier in the Netherlands. This phenomenon was probably linked to the fact that in the Dutch political context, compromises are almost always needed. And the Dutch political culture is rather output-oriented. ’It is OK to lobby the national government, but what can we, as local government, do ourselves to address the problem at stake?’

140 Van Ojik (1997)

141 Fact is, that the number of (functional) twinning contacts is decreasing (although still approximately 175).

It is to be expected that the number of municipal twinning contacts with the former Warsaw Pact countries will continue to decrease.

142 www.stedenbanden.nl
Consequently, there was and is broad political support for international municipal policy and city diplomacy, and in almost all cases it has been formalized in a policy framework outlining aims, priorities and activities. There is a relatively high level of continuity and stability in city diplomacy efforts. Nowadays, VNG International is very much involved in city diplomacy.\textsuperscript{143} Local governments and some civil society organizations, have successfully and effectively lobbied the VNG. Compared to many sister organizations, the VNG is strong and influential and its international programmes are numerous and elaborate.

A similar successful lobby was achieved by cities and civil society organizations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Interior\textsuperscript{144}. Nowadays, there is hardly any discussion on the mandates of municipalities in the field of municipal international co-operation and city diplomacy. The complementary role of local governments is accepted and financial facilities (grants) have been put in place by the ministries to support local governments’ international programmes. Many Dutch embassies have played and are playing supportive roles with regard to municipalities’ international activities.\textsuperscript{145}

\textbf{Successes} Today, one of the main questions regarding these city diplomacy campaigns is: how successful were they? We differentiate four levels of success.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{The contribution to general awareness and public debate}
In terms of awareness-raising and involving local communities in the public debate, the city diplomacy campaigns were certainly successful in the eighties. Nevertheless, in the course of the nineties the number of involved local groups working on awareness-raising declined. Municipalities were less interested in providing information and awareness-raising – an undesired consequence of the process of professionalization.

\item \textbf{The lobby at the level of the national government and ‘international politics’}
In most cases we only see a limited level of success. The nuclear-free resolutions did help keep the discussion on cruise missiles on the table, but ultimately the Dutch government decided to deploy the cruise missiles in the Netherlands. It is fair to conclude that the worldwide pro-Nicaraguan twinning movement, also supported within the USA, did have an impact on US policy. But it did not stop financial and political support to the Contras, it only forced the US administration to act secretly and cautiously. In the case of South Africa, the success was that in the course of the eighties the Dutch government also slowly developed a more critical and publicly voiced stance against the Apartheid regime. And definitely, those in power in South-Africa did not like to be confronted with cities in the Netherlands lobbying for boycotts and questioning their legitimacy. With regard to East-West municipal twinning contacts: not too many were established by the Autumn of 1989 when the Berlin War came down, and clearly other dynamics were much
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{143} Until the mid-eighties, VNG involvement in international affairs was restricted to support for jumelage or twinnings efforts, municipal support for (mostly non-political) development projects in Third World countries and co-ordination of municipalities’ delegations to the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (Council of Europe).

\textsuperscript{144} Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties & VNG (2005)

\textsuperscript{145} We should not underestimate the role of embassies in this process. Ambassadors and embassy staff have seen the enthusiasm for and results of municipal international co-operation and city diplomacy ‘in the field’ and have helped create better conditions for municipalities and VNG to develop these programmes. Still, policy-makers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still tend to work more from a statist starting point and focus more easily on multilateral programmes than structural co-operation with local governments.
more relevant in ending the era of ‘real existing socialism’. Yet, the twinning contacts contributed modestly to a network of East-West contacts that challenged the internal organization of the Warsaw Pact countries and in particular played an important role after November 1989 in the reform processes. The overall conclusion is that results of political lobbying were limited before the moments or periods of transition. There were international networks, but also differences in strategy and at the local activity level. In the future, international campaigning will receive more attention. Nevertheless, city diplomacy did help create conditions for solidarity and international support during transitional processes.

- **The solidarity with partners, before and during processes of transition**

  The expression of solidarity was strong and successful. In particular with regard to Nicaragua and South-Africa, solidarity was visible and articulate. As this type of solidarity was not blind, open discussions were held on numerous topics. 146

- **Contributions to the processes of democratization**

  The most visible and tangible results of the city diplomacy campaigns lie in the contribution, through twinning and co-operation models, in the transition periods. In a transition context, city diplomacy campaigns can play an interesting role – not by providing blueprints for development (or giving concrete recommendations on how to reach the EU acquis communautaire), but by allowing many people to travel, to learn from the Dutch (and other) experiences (both good and bad), and exchange information and expertise. Preferably expert input and technical assistance (focusing on institutional reform processes) go hand in hand with presentation of models of local democracy, citizens’ initiatives, participatory planning and so on (the non-institutional or cultural reform processes). There is a, sometimes rather unexpected, quality of reciprocity in the exchanges, as foreign guests and partners (can) shed new light on dilemmas Dutch municipalities face in areas such as social cohesion and reaching out to vulnerable groups. Where democratization efforts were facilitated in a national framework, sometimes national policy would follow suit. 147

In a way, differentiating these levels of success is artificial. An interesting aspect of city diplomacy is that many local government go all the way from awareness-raising and lobbying, via work on solidarity projects to development and democratization programmes. Such long-term involvement creates legitimacy and trust between partners. It is a strong feature of city diplomacy campaigns that local government and their partners stay involved for long periods and play various roles in accordance with the various stages of development. The national and international NGO community dealing with international co-operation is still rather fragmented, as are international government bodies and organizations. 148 In each of the conflict transition phases, other agencies were at work, and not always properly aware or sensitive of the specific local context. As foreign local governments generally had good knowledge of the specific local context, their interventions have proven to be tailored, effective and successful.

146 An example was the law in Nicaragua that made life for homosexuals in that country very difficult. Homosexual foreign volunteers made this an issue, and also some Dutch cities expressed strong opinions.

147 Joining forces in a national framework proved successful, (decentralization in Nicaragua, housing policy in South-Africa). In this respect, the role of the VNG working with (starting) associations of municipalities must not be underestimated.
Conclusions

The main findings

1 Most city diplomacy campaigns evolved similarly, and municipal activities followed similar stages of development:

   Political statements > solidarity > development projects

   These campaigning dynamics enabled municipalities to innovate their city diplomacy activities and to develop models of co-operation with new partners in the local community.

2 Most municipalities eagerly used the framework provided by national networks organized by civil society organizations. When the Association of Netherlands Municipalities was not yet active in city diplomacy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not yet enthusiastic about it, the role of civil society organizations was of great importance.

3 National civil society organizations and active municipalities successfully mobilized both VNG and MFA in only a very short time.

4 Networks to support local governments were not only important in the early phase of policy development (in the eighties). The networks successfully adapted policy and strategies to evolving circumstances.

5 Where networks are still active (and can provide not only advice but organizational and financial support), the number of active local governments remains high. Where such networks have eroded or ceased to operate, the number of active local governments drops.\textsuperscript{149}

Conclusions 1990s case

Comparing the Bosnian case with those originating in the eighties, there was a similar process visible - from political statements to solidarity and development projects, a strong role for civil society organizations, limited success during the war period and an important role in the revitalization of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. The roles of VNG and MFA are interesting and here an important difference with the previous cases is obvious. The involvement of VNG helped mobilize large numbers of Dutch local governments, and financial support from the Dutch government enabled local governments and NGOs to become more effectively involved in the reconstruction and democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

\textsuperscript{148} Peace organizations, emergency aid agencies, development organizations, specialized bodies dealing with NGO capacity building, media training, fighting against human trafficking, local government capacity building, human rights education and so on.

\textsuperscript{149} In many publications, the period in which the VNG was not yet active is given little attention. In this publication, it is necessary and worthwhile to focus on precisely that first period, as we know that associations of municipalities often do not take the lead in programmes targeting conflict regions and international conflict issues. In the Netherlands and other countries, groups of municipalities supported by civil society organizations often took the first steps.
A final reflection: back to politics? What has been achieved by city diplomacy campaigns is remarkable and impressive. Nevertheless, the very same campaign dynamics that enabled local governments to redefine their policy in response to changes abroad, also often led to a process of ‘depoliticization’ and ‘technicalization’ – notably in a stage in which underlying problems (the root causes of conflict) had not yet been properly addressed and countered.

The root causes of conflict Nuclear weapons are still around, and even worse: many fear further proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is barely alive, and the opportunity to really get rid of nuclear arms was missed. Nicaragua is still one of the poorest countries in the world and some analysts even claim that there is still reason for dark pessimism: ‘Even local governments admit that free-market changes have so far mainly served the urban wealthy and upper middle class.’ And: ‘Peace will not last (...) if it means a return to the living conditions that sparked the wars’. Analysts urge that simultaneous political and economic liberalization, the so-called Wilsonian approach or ‘Liberal Peace Thesis’, as a remedy for civil conflict is problematic. South-Africa is in a problematic state as well. Crime, HIV-Aids, corruption, broken families and domestic violence all add up to ‘normal’ problems of transition. And many fear that the worst is yet to come... Compared to Nicaragua and South-Africa, the situation in Central Europe is much better – largely because of EU membership. Nevertheless, in the ‘new EU member states’ there is still a serious lack of vibrant civil society activity and nationalism is a threatening and powerful cultural and political force throughout Europe (East and West). Relations with Russia have worsened, especially since Putin revitalized Russia’s ambitions as a superpower. The EU is divided on almost all major issues of foreign and security policy. In the former Yugoslavia, some states (Macedonia and Croatia) are making progress. Far more problematic is the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. These two countries still live largely in an atmosphere and mood of war, the brain-drain continues and apathy is paramount.

Are Dutch local governments and their partners aware of these processes, and will they be capable and willing to address them? Will they have the ambition to focus on such problems (again), or will they be happy with current practice as has developed over time? Is it possible to revitalize the political component in development projects or through solidarity or political statements? This may be a complicated process, but the question should be on the table!

A practical tool: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) The conclusions and reflections above may trigger the question whether what we do still serves peace. Peace-building is often far more complicated than expected. In this book Professor Kenneth Bush describes the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) process. He illustrates how certain projects may be highly effective from the perspective of development, but less useful or even counterproductive from the perspective of peace-building. The model of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment can help identify the risks and consequences of interventions that are good for peace and development. Any city can use this model to assess its own policy and project practice. Enhancing the peace impact of ongoing and new

151 Frerks et al. (2003)
152 See Chapter 5.
What to do with new challenges? It is easy to dwell upon today’s global problems! Think of the global war on terror (and the devastating impact it is having everywhere on human rights and democratization in general), the clash of civilisations, the need to build new bridges between in particular the Muslim world and ‘the West’. According to the latest Freedom House review, all our democratization efforts have not made the world more democratic over the last years – on the contrary, in many countries the situation has worsened. Development of the concept of Responsibility to Protect, so much needed in the many regions where states are not willing or able to provide security to its citizens, is hampering progress, not helped by bullying interventions by the USA and its ad-hoc and often strong-armed ‘coalitions of the willing’. Current democratization strategies – with their focus on top-down introduction of democracy, on institutional reform rather than cultural and value-related dimensions of citizenship and democracy – have to be modified and reconsidered. The Liberal Peace Thesis, that suggests that political reform should go hand in hand with the introduction of a free-market economy, creates more problems than expected!

Local governments and their associations, worldwide, can meet these challenges and develop municipal anti-terrorist policies, engage in dialogue between the Muslim world and the West, pick up their part of bottom-up responsibility-to-protect strategies to provide protection to citizens and communities under threat, help rethink and remodel democratization strategies into more inclusive and tailored approaches making use of local capacities for peace and democracy.

Yet, only few local governments are today embarking on the adventure to meet these challenges. They did enthusiastically 25 years ago, but today hardly. There may indeed be a shortage of civil society organizations paving the way or taking the lead, many associations of local governments may indeed be busy with the many projects they have to handle, local governments may indeed have limited ‘city diplomacy absorption capacity’ (commitments with ‘old partners’, in Nicaragua or South-Africa or elsewhere in Europe). The globalizing world is nevertheless bringing new problems and new challenges. Even when city diplomacy is an effective phenomenon that adds real added value to all that other actors can do for the promotion of peace (defence, development, classical diplomacy, conflict prevention), we still have these new issues to address.

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The peace-building role of local governments

Summary

This chapter emphasizes the reality that any activity within a conflict-prone zone can either contribute towards peace-building or increase the likelihood of the conflict escalating: that is activities are rarely peace- or conflict-neutral.

In conflict zones, local government is often the most appropriate organized entity able to provide services such as healthcare, education, electricity and water to its citizens. Local government is often, literally, on the front line of violent militarized conflict alongside its citizens. Within this explosive context, anything it does will affect the dynamics of peace and conflict: decisions about the allocation of scarce public resources; the choice of beneficiaries; selection of contractors to undertake municipal work; hiring policies and practices; and so on.

The chapter illustrates with a hypothetical example of a water project, seen by its instigators in purely developmental terms, how unconsidered factors can result in a project contributing to peace-building or alternatively can sustain or even increase conflict.

Four real-life case studies are then considered and provide good examples of how various factors and decisions can influence the outcomes of projects and programmes in terms of their contribution to peace or conflict. Based on these and other experiences, the chapter ends with a graphic listing and explaining good peace-building practices.

A strong message to development practitioners is that while today it is becoming unthinkable not to consider the gender and environmental ramifications of any proposed project, this is rarely extended to the potential impact on peace versus conflict – and it should be.
Introduction

Anyone who has spent time in areas that do not enjoy peace and security knows why it is so important to make the connections between local government and peace-building. In conflict zones, local government is often the most appropriate (and sometimes the only) organized entity able to provide services such as healthcare, social services, education, electricity and water to its citizens. Local government is often, literally, on the front line of violent militarized conflict alongside its citizens. Within this explosive context, anything it does will affect the dynamics of peace and conflict: decisions about the allocation of scarce public resources; the choice of beneficiaries; selection of contractors to undertake municipal work; hiring policies and practices; and so on.

Unfortunately, in conflict zones, local governments are often unable to provide municipal services. Sometimes they are captured by extremist elements involved in the conflict who terrorize segments of the urban population. At other times, its workers are unable to enter conflict areas or are forced to leave. On occasions, the infrastructure needed for local governments to do their work is destroyed or looted by armed stakeholders (electricity pylons are destroyed, roads and fields are mined, transport routes are closed down). Escalating conflict challenges and strains the capacities of local governments at the very moment when such capacities are most needed. Or, put another way, the need for effective local government is greatest in those environments where its capacities are most stressed.

One of the key lessons that I have drawn from a study prepared for the Federation of Canadian Municipalities based on urban experiences in three countries (Philippines, the Palestinian Territories and Bosnia & Herzegovina) at different stages of violent conflict is that the most significant contributions to peace-building and conflict-dismantling may be found in the conventional, even mundane, work of local governments. This is perfectly logical given that this is the level of government closest to the citizens and therefore most likely to be aware of, and responsive to, their needs. This covers their work in water and sanitation, health and social services, public safety, local transportation, public employment and local economic development. Within communities that have been terrorized, traumatized and factionalized, the way in which local government delivers public goods and services will have a far greater impact on their citizens’ support for (or non-blocking of) constructive alternatives to fighting than say short-term, donor-driven, ‘reconciliation’ initiatives.

One fact needs to be central in discussions about city diplomacy: in environments characterized by hyper-politicization or military volatility, the work of local governments will inevitably and unavoidably contribute either to peace or to conflict.

Failure to consider this, risks making city diplomacy a subset of the usual top-down (outside-in) work of the international development/peace-building industry. In so doing, we may miss opportunities to support the peace-building efforts and impacts of those local actors who were there before the arrival of the multilateral actors, and who will certainly be there long after their attention has moved on to the next crisis. We would fail to support that which is most unique about city diplomacy, and which is the foundation of any success it
achieves: the intimate people-to-people linkages involving communication, trust and cooperation that sustain long-term relationships. So, when officials from the Barcelona City Council were asked why the city supported Sarajevo so tenaciously during the Balkan wars, they simply answered: ‘the people of Barcelona still remember the support of Sarajevo in our fight against Franco.’ Within a global environment dominated by political actors who tend to suffer from selective amnesia and attention deficiency, this basic, human, underpinning of city diplomacy should not be overlooked.

This chapter is structured as follows. After this introduction, impacts of city diplomacy related to development, to peace and to conflict are defined and the implications of accepting this position will be explored in Section 2. Section 3 presents four mini-cases that illustrate dilemmas and surprises drawn from practice. These show that the development impact is not automatically associated with the peace impact, and that activities can inadvertently generate or increase conflict. While analyzing these cases, I will try to identify dangers, lessons to be learned, and best and worst practices in an effort to provide advice for future activities. Section 4 draws conclusions and outlines future steps.

By focussing on cases of success (those with a peace impact) and of failure (a conflict impact), we are better able to understand, in practical terms, what it is to do the right thing. Equally importantly, we also begin to see how to avoid doing the wrong things. It is particularly important that we understand when our initiatives are likely to create or worsen conflicts. If we ignore how municipal-level work interacts with the conflicts that affect every community, then all our positive work in peace-building and city diplomacy can be swept away during one bad night. In other words, sustainable peace-building requires that we do more than just build peace; we need to, at the same time, unbuild or deconstruct the foundations of violent conflicts.

‘If you don’t know where you are going, any road will take you there.’
(Lewis Carroll)

Peace-building: where are we going?

As the quote from Alice in Wonderland suggests, unless we have a clear idea of where we are trying to get to, and what we are trying to achieve, we risk running in any and all directions in the mistaken belief that whatever we are doing is contributing to peace.

The term peace-building has been used in so many different ways that there is a danger that it may begin to mean everything and nothing. It may begin to lose its usefulness in helping us think about, and contribute to, a peace which is equitable, sustainable and fundamentally just. For example, soldiers in Afghanistan talk about their military missions as peace-building interventions, governments call development projects in Rwanda peace-building projects and so-called peace-building NGOs label everything they do (mainly workshops delivered by foreigners) as peace-building activities.

It is useful, therefore, to begin with a brief discussion of our objective – this thing we call peace-building.

3 This exchange took place at the International Conference, ‘The Role of Local Governments in Peace-building’ organized by the Barcelona Provincial Council and the Barcelona City Council, Barcelona, 6-7 September 2007.
The golden lesson: Peace-building is an impact

As a (recovering) academic, I acknowledge the tendency of my profession to define, rather than to engage in, whatever issue is at hand. Nevertheless, I present a definition of peace-building for a reason: if we are not clear and consistent in our understanding of the much-used (often overused, sometimes misused) term peace-building, then we cannot start a coherent discussion on the roles of local governments in peace and development, let alone support and strengthen their peace-building capacities. It becomes a tower of Babel. Without starting with the basics, we have no idea where to look, what to look at or what to support. The ways in which we examine an issue will shape the conclusions and solutions that we derive.

In this paper, peace-building is used in its broadest sense to refer to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence and decrease the likelihood of an outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of violent conflict. This process entails both short- and long-term objectives such as short-term humanitarian operations coupled to longer-term developmental, political, economic and social objectives.

Peace-building, therefore, is a two-fold process of dismantling the structures of violence, and constructing the structures of peace. These are related but separate sets of activities which need to be undertaken simultaneously. Any intervention which includes one without the other is almost guaranteed not to have a net positive impact. Clearly, the instruments required for peace construction (such as for building trust within and between communities, governance capacity and institution strengthening) are different from those required for deconstructing violence (including, in broad terms, the demilitarization of society, the economy and the polity, as well as disarmament, demobilization etc.).

Any efforts to support the peace-building capacities of local government need to be conceptualized and operationalized alongside efforts to defuse the conflict-sustaining impacts of certain activities – summed up in the term ‘bad governance’. Thus, as noted above, it is not enough to do (or to support) the right thing; we also have to stop doing (and counteract) the wrong things.

Peace-building is not about imposing solutions, it is about creating opportunities. The challenge is to identify and nurture the political, economic and social space within which indigenous actors can develop and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful, prosperous and just society. In other words, genuine peace-building requires the increasingly top-down and controlled approaches to be inverted. Ultimately, peace-building entails the strengthening or creation of structures and processes that are democratic, fair and responsive to the needs and concerns of an entire population, from its weakest members to the most powerful. That is, institutions which protect and advance the political rights and responsibilities of the state and civil society, and which strengthen human security through the promotion of robust and sustainable economic, judicial and social practices.

This extended definition is meant to guide our thinking, not to constrain it. The principal or cardinal concepts that guide our work should be revisited regularly. Unfortunately, this has not been the case with the international peace-building dialogue; instead ‘peace-building’ as a term, has become infinitely elastic and applicable to just about any activity that will enable an organization to liberate resources in a tight funding market.
It cannot be over-emphasized that, in essence, *peace-building is an impact or outcome rather than an activity.* This, for me, is the ‘Golden Rule’ of peace-building. Over the last few years, peace-building has been a label attached to such activities as dialogue projects, human rights projects, security sector reform, democratic institution strengthening, public sector reform and, even more nebulously, good governance projects. While such activities may have positive impacts on peace and the conflict environment, there are also many examples where they have had negative impacts. ⁵

In practical terms, this means that we should not limit our focus to the clearly labelled peace-building projects – dialogue projects, community based conflict resolution and so on. All initiatives focusing on violence-prone regions should be seen as possessing the potential to either build peace or exacerbate violent and non-violent conflict – private sector investments, education projects, health projects and so on. Not only are such initiatives and instruments far more prevalent than ‘peace-building’ projects, they are also less likely to be viewed as being overtly political and therefore are less likely to encounter political flak. If we understand peace-building as an impact, then it is necessary to distinguish the peace-building impact of an initiative from its developmental, economic, environmental, gender and other impacts. When we do so, we see that positive humanitarian or developmental impacts are happily, at times, coincident with a positive peace-building impact but, disturbingly, sometimes that they are not.

*Development does not always lead to peace* One of the most common misconceptions that we still hear today is that development equals peace and, therefore, that all development work contributes to peace. If development equals peace, then conflict should decrease as a country or region ‘develops’. Clearly, this does not always happen and, in fact, we usually see that violence increases if the living conditions of only some groups in a region improve. In many cases, development itself creates conflict such as when groups fight each other for the benefits of a project, or for access to municipal services.

Further, genuine development inevitably challenges existing social, economic and political structures – and by challenging these structures and the old rules of the game, conflict is almost certainly created.

The critical issue is whether conflict created (or aggravated) by developmental interventions is resolved violently or non-violently. This is one place where local government clearly comes into the equation. Will those individuals or groups in conflict approach local government to address the conflict? If so, do local governments possess the means to address and resolve these conflicts non-violently?

It is fair to say that development initiatives sometimes contribute to peace and sometimes contribute to conflict. The challenge, as is discussed below, is to ensure that a municipal project or initiative does not lead to violent conflict, and, as far as possible, makes a positive contribution to peace. A positive and sustainable developmental impact may be dependent on achieving a positive peace-building impact.

*The need to differentiate between development impacts, and peace/conflict impacts* In order to clarify the differences between development, peace and conflict impacts, it is useful to begin with some hypothetical examples. Once these distinctions have been
delineated more clearly in our minds, we can then turn our attention to specific examples outlined in the following case studies. The examples below illustrate how it is possible for a project to fail according to limited developmental criteria (such as irrigation targets, healthcare delivery, literacy levels) but to succeed according to broader, peace-building, criteria, and vice versa.

**EXAMPLE 1: DEVELOPMENTAL FAILURE, PEACE-BUILDING SUCCESS**

An education project may fail to produce students able to pass national exams (its developmental goal), but succeed in reducing tensions between particular social groups by creating and institutionalizing a non-threatening and constructive environment that increases contact and decreases misunderstanding by dispelling stereotypes and misconceptions. Unless there is sensitivity to the peace nurturing achievements of such a project, it would be seen as an unsuccessful project. That is, its failure to achieve the specified developmental impact would eclipse its positive peace-building impact.

**EXAMPLE 2: DEVELOPMENTAL SUCCESS, PEACE-BUILDING FAILURE**

The converse of the above is equally possible, a project can succeed according to established developmental criteria but fail in terms of peace nurturing. To use a similar hypothetical example to the one above: an education project may indeed succeed in increasing the number of students passing exams. However, if the bulk of those students are (or are perceived to be) members of one particular social or ethnic group then the project may exacerbate inter-group tensions by creating/reinforcing the perception that one group is being privileged at the expense of the other.

As the development assistance industry is currently configured, the second project is more likely to have its funding renewed than the first unless the created tensions in the second scenario lead to it being decided that continuation is too risky for project staff. Further, in this situation, the postponement/termination of the project would be blamed on the impact of the conflict on the project rather than the impact of the project on the conflict!

**EXAMPLE 3: DRINKING WATER PROJECT – THE NEED FOR MULTI-DIMENSIONAL EVALUATION**

Imagine a municipal water project that seeks to improve household access to clean water in an area where there have been tensions between communities. The project, supported by an international donor, extends the municipal water network to selected households.

We could say that this initiative has had a positive peace-building impact if:
- it helped to bring members of the communities together because of their shared interest in clean water and the benefits this has for public health and the general quality of life.
- it created communication channels and opportunities enabling diverse members of different communities to work together on issues beyond water management.
- it increased the inclusion and participation of both women and men from violence-affected groups in decision-making at the community level on issues they consider a priority.
- professional or interpersonal relationships began to grow across community lines and perhaps encouraged communities to work together in other areas of activities.
That same water project could have a conflict-creating impact if:

- one community starts to think that the other community is benefiting more than its own, or worse, if it believes that the other community is benefiting by ‘stealing’ its water.
- if the decision-making process is seen to be politicized or corrupt.
- if the international actor supporting the project is demonized by some elements of the community (raising questions over motives, control and so on) regardless of whether this is justified or not.

This hypothetical case illustrates how easily a development project could help peace-building efforts but, just as easily, could raise tensions and have just the opposite effect. It highlights why we need to apply a two-level analysis to our work if we are to identify the many ways in which the work of local governments affects peace and conflict. In order to identify and understand the overall peace or conflict impact of such an example, we must ask different questions to the ones that usually get asked about the impact of initiatives. We need to know more than just the total number of beneficiaries, or the increase in water access or the decreased costs. We need to develop ways to think about, carry out and evaluate work in conflict-prone areas so that we can reinforce peace-building impacts and avoid the conflict-creating impacts.

- When municipal governments are located in conflict-prone areas, all decisions, all services, and all projects will unavoidably affect the peace and conflict dynamics because of the volatility/explosiveness of the environment.
- It is not what you do, but how you do it that will determine whether you end up supporting peace or sustaining conflict.
- We can only begin to systematically understand peace and conflict impacts when we ask the right questions before, during and after a project. In other words, we need to integrate the consideration of peace and conflict impacts into our planning and programming just as we do (or should do) when it comes to environmental and gender impacts.

‘It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards.’

(Lewis Carroll)

Case studies: learning from experience

This section consists of four mini-cases, drawn from a variety of different countries and contexts. These are intended to sharpen our understanding of the ways in which initiatives can affect the dynamics of peace or conflict within conflict-prone settings. Particular emphasis is placed on municipal-level initiatives. In the pursuit of brevity, interesting details have been sacrificed to keep the cases relatively short and focussed on the objectives of this chapter. In practice, attention to such details is absolutely essential if one is to respond effectively and avoid/reduce conflict and optimize possibilities for peace. Nevertheless, space constraints have forced me to prioritize explanation over description.
CASE 1: WATER TANK REHABILITATION – THE DANGER OF BUSINESS AS USUAL

A development agency from a rich developed country decided that it would like to help rebuild water storage facilities in a war-affected country. The water reservoirs had broken down long ago, but had never been repaired during 20 years of war. However, peace talks had now created an opportunity to do some much needed development work in areas that had been impossible to reach for many years.

So, following its usual rules, the development agency did what it always does: it asked interested companies to send in proposals to rebuild a particular reservoir in a rebel-controlled area. After reviewing all the proposals, the agency chose the lowest bid – which was in fact half the price of any other bid. Eight months later, the agency received a report informing them that the project had been completed in line with the proposal. The company was paid in full, and the agency was happy in the belief that it had completed a cost-effective water project that would benefit the local community. However, when the rainy season arrived the rebuilt reservoir completely fell apart! What had gone wrong?

The company which had won the bid was controlled by the main rebel group. One of the reasons that it was able to do the work so cheaply was because the project used ‘volunteer’ labour – farmers who owned tractors were forced to donate their time and equipment, and villagers were forced to work for free. None of the labour costs included in the project budget went to the labourers. Furthermore, the reservoir was not reconstructed according to the technical plan in the proposal. It did not include the waterproof lining needed to ensure it held water! When the original engineer refused to sign off the project as satisfactory, the rebels simply found another engineer who was more pliable.

In the end, contrary to the positive assessment of the development agency, the outcomes of the project were:

- a significant financial contribution to the rebels
- a strengthening of the rebels’ authoritarian control over civilians
- the abuse of the rights of the labourers and children who were forced to work on the project
- no positive or sustainable developmental impact

In short, the project had negative developmental and peace-building impacts. Did this project really take place? Yes, it did.

Lessons:
- Sometimes, in order to have a positive peace-building impact, we have to modify the standard rules by which we operate. In this case, the priority placed on financial cost-effectiveness blinded the decision-makers to the conflict-sustaining impacts of the project. A peace-sensitive project may be more expensive than one driven by the standard rules of financial efficiency. So, for example, to promote peace it may be necessary to start infrastructure work in the most war-affected areas, rather than in those areas where you initially appear to get more value for your financial input.
- Sustainable peace-building impacts require as much attention to be paid to process (transparency, accountability, legitimacy, sustainability) as to product (reservoir reconstruction/development outputs).

6 These were artificial lakes or reservoirs used to store irrigation water for later use.
The case of the 3000 houses is one where the arithmetic of a municipal project appeared clear and straightforward. This project was set within the context of two decades of war in eastern Sri Lanka, and sought to provide 3000 houses in a community consisting of equal percentages of displaced Tamil, Sinhalese and Muslim populations. The decision by the municipal planners, in consultation with the affected communities and under pressure from the donor, was to allocate 1000 houses to each group. While there were some complaints about this decision, it was accepted by the community as a whole and the houses were built.

This case illustrates how the communities made an explicitly political decision about the allocation of development resources based on the ethnic geography. However, here is the complication: each community had not been affected equally by the violence. Some communities clearly had greater need for housing. In this case, the principle of equity (needs-based allocation) was subordinated to the political expedient of equality (arithmetic allocation). We have to ask ourselves, despite the decision being made in consultation with the communities themselves, whether this development project reinforced politicized ethnic boundaries and the divisions between the communities? In some ways it did, but was there an alternative? Perhaps an example of greater success in such a project would be if the communities themselves had allocated the houses on the straightforward criteria of need. The issue that confronts us is how to get from where we are to a situation where such an approach would be possible. This case, like the one above, illustrates how it might be better to subordinate standard developmental practices (spreadsheet-based decisions; efficiency-driven logic; product-oriented rather than process-oriented approaches) to peace-building objectives.

Lesson

• This project provides an insightful micro-level example of complex interconnections between developmental interventions and the dynamics of peace and conflict. In a more practical vein, the example emphasizes that we might have to do our work differently if we want to consciously reinforce peace-building incentives through our municipal programming. Importantly, the example also highlights some of the trade-offs that may be required in order to increase the likelihood of constructive peace-building outcomes.

CASE 3: THE GAL OYA WATER PROJECT – SUCCESSFUL PEACE-BUILDING FROM A CASE WITH ALL THE INGREDIENTS FOR FAILURE

The Gal Oya water project was, and is, one of the largest and most complex water schemes in Sri Lanka. It faced daunting obstacles—physical, infrastructural, bureaucratic and political. To top it all, the project was confronted with an ethnic dimension: the upstream areas were inhabited by members of a Sinhalese group, whereas the downstream allotments were held by Tamil-speaking farmers. In other words, the Tamil-Sinhalese divide at the national level was paralleled at the local level of the project. In the context of ethnic tensions, if water did not reach the Tamils, there would be every chance that this would be attributed to the ‘maliciousness’ of the Sinhalese rather than to geographical or other factors. In other words, the context within which the project was set was not conducive to co-operation between the communities; if anything quite the opposite.

7 This displacement was caused by war, not the 2004 tsunami.
The project was not consciously designed to perform a peace-building function or to achieve peace-building objectives. Nevertheless, it is an example of a development project with noteworthy peace-building spin-offs. So what does the Gal Oya teach us about development assistance and peace-building? It appears that some of the factors that contributed to its success as a development project may also have contributed to its success in peace-building. The fact that it is a thoroughly participatory development project may be an important factor in explaining its success in both areas. The emphasis on promoting participation (as both a means and an end) generated a number of operating principles which have clear peace-building implications:

- ensuring continuity of personnel to make a learning process more feasible
- having a network of supportive, committed people in a variety of positions
- avoiding partisan political involvement
- attracting and retaining the right kind of community leadership
- going beyond narrow conceptions of self-interest

Particularly relevant to the argument that peace-building requires a strong participatory dimension is Uphoff’s observation that: ‘more important than knowing how much participation is occurring is knowing who is or is not involved in different kinds of participation. Which groups are less involved in different kinds of decision making, or in different kinds of implementation, or in different kinds of benefits, or in different kinds of evaluation? Women? Youth? Ethnic minorities? Persons living in remote villages? Insecure tenants? Is it being done at the initiatives of officials, an NGO or the villagers themselves? With a monetary incentive, or voluntary, or through coercion? In an organized manner or on an individual basis? Directly or indirectly? On a regular or ad hoc basis? Is the process continuous, intermittent, or sporadic? With a degree of empowerment – how much?’

It is possible to identify lessons from Gal Oya which can be generalized and applied in order to explicitly cultivate a peace-building dimension in development projects:

**Lessons**

- emphasizing capacity-building to enhance local capabilities for self-management and self-reliance in both resource use and communal relations is beneficial
- the project benefited from being participatory from the start, and it incorporated learning from experience throughout the project
- one should avoid too much government involvement
- the project benefited from ‘accept[ing], genuinely and fully, that intended beneficiaries have intelligence and social skills, not just labour and funds, that can be useful for project design and implementation. The poor can even usefully comment on technical design questions, but more important, they can help to plan and carry out the management of project activities’

Although some of the factors which contributed to the development success of the project may also have contributed to its peace-building success, there is still a need for a distinct set of criteria to assess the peace-building impact of the project. That is, the criteria used to assess the efficacy of a development project are not necessarily suitable for assessing the efficacy of peace-building activities

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8 Uphoff (1992a) p. 141
9 Uphoff (1992a) p. 143
The Canada-Bosnia & Herzegovina local and cantonal government co-operation programme (CBiHCP) was a capacity-building programme which sought to improve urban management in the Tuzla Canton of Bosnia & Herzegovina. The main focus of the programme was to provide the assistance needed to enable local governments to ‘open up decision-making in developing and implementing solid plans to guide growth and development’.

While the primary programme partners were the Tuzla Canton and the constituent municipalities (including the City of Tuzla), the experiences coming out of the programme created model approaches for other local governments to follow in both the Federation and in Republika Srpska. Through demonstration projects, partnerships were established with civil society groups active in the canton – non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations and private sector associations. The rationale for this project was based on the need to promote good governance in Bosnia & Herzegovina within the context of an emerging democratic system and market-based economy.

Specifically, the project sought the following:

- to help find innovative ways to make the decentralized governance system decreed by the Dayton Accords operational and effective
- to develop mechanisms for intergovernmental co-operation at the local level
- to develop a better understanding of the principles and practices of governing democratically among local authorities (cantonal and municipal)
- to improve revenue generation opportunities for local governments
- to establish effective and up-to-date methods of delivering local services
- to find ways to improve local decision-making to enhance the strategic expenditure of limited resources in tackling the reconstruction of basic infrastructure and housing, and providing key social services

The project mainstreamed some good practices. According to project documents, the project tried to establish mechanisms that would integrate the project management structure into local decision-making processes (in the Institute for Urbanism at Tuzla, as well as in the Municipality of Tuzla and in the Tuzla Canton). This is good practice because it helps ensure that the project is driven by local priorities and context. Equally important, it contributes to the sustainability of the project and the transfer of expertise.

Another good practice was the use of study tours. CBiHCP made extensive use of study tours in building capacity. On one level, the specific capacities relevant to the project are technical: that is, skills and expertise related to strategic planning. However, study tours can also make important strategic and catalytic contributions to peace and unity by nurturing personal and professional relationships across barriers created by war. Such barriers may be physical, geographical, psychological, political or organizational.

Study tours may also remove people from the stresses of working and living in highly politicized and segregated environments. Individuals, who might not otherwise meet, are brought into a neutral environment of professional development and learning. Such professional space is inextricably nested within personal space. Success within the former is contingent upon the construction of collaborative modalities within the latter. Dialogue at the professional level is the first step towards understanding, reconciliation and, ultimately, peace and unity within these groups.
In addition to study tours to Canada, there was an interesting East-East element in the CBiHCP study tour programme. An exchange with Hungary enabled Bosnian participants to learn more about Hungarian efforts to join the EU, an objective shared by many within Bosnia & Herzegovina. Concrete contributions to peace and unity which might grow out of this include a network of collaborative institutions, within and between the Federation and the Republika Srpska, which will be necessary for launching successful bids for EU membership; and incentives for peace and unity, and disincentives for violence and disunity, as members of the EU.

A full assessment of the extent to which study tours contribute to peace and unity requires the measurement of attitudinal and behavioral changes as well as the tracing of subsequent communication and contact networks.

A final good practice was the responsiveness to, and cultivation of, local initiatives. Also noteworthy in CBiHCP has been the recent development of a local development fund. Ten percent of the overall budget has been set aside for this purpose. The fund invites innovative project proposals from local-level actors. Through the strategic allocation of seed money, the fund hopes to build positive momentum and energies that might otherwise never be encouraged, developed or harnessed. This constitutes a contribution to governance capacity-building within civil society.

Lessons:

• ‘Champions’ are important and useful. A critical ingredient in the ultimate success of the programme was the presence of a champion – someone who is willing to defend and to promote a project or programme. In this case, an important champion was the Mayor of Tuzla, the leader of an inter-ethnic party with inter-ethnic goals and aspirations. This is particularly important in environments characterized by distrust such as post-conflict settings. In such settings, the trust that a group or individuals has in the champion may be ‘lent’ to a project. That is, if people trust the champion, they are willing to trust his or her judgment in promoting a particular project. A champion is usually someone who already has a positive profile in the community. It may be anyone who feels strongly about a project and who is able to persuade others to support it. It is someone who knows the rules of the game and wants to change them in ways that contribute directly and indirectly to peace and unity. A champion may be a political leader or a community leader.

• Demonstrating ideals and unity in practice helps. In addition to the inter-ethnic platform of the Mayor of Tuzla, other principal partners were also inter-ethnic in composition and orientation. Thus, for example, the staff of the municipality and the Urbanism Institute were made up of people from the three ethnic groups. Even the cantonal government, which was controlled by the Muslim party (SDA), sought to maintain Tuzla’s reputation as an island of relative tolerance in a country driven by inter-ethnic tension.

• Developing mentoring relationships helps. Throughout the project, strong personal and professional relationships developed between Canadian and Bosnian partners that had a positive impact on peace and unity to the extent that similar mentoring relationships were cultivated among professionals and decision-makers across ethnic divides.

• Opportunity missed: despite requests by project partners to build a reflective learning component into the project so as to identify and learn from their successes and mistakes, the principal donor declined to do so, despite claiming to give priority to governance, as well as peace and unity, issues. While such critical self-reflection is important for any project, it is especially important for projects and programmes set in conflict-prone settings. It is bad practice to decline the opportunity to collect, analyze and learn from project experience. All projects in conflict-prone areas should monitor and document the
impact of the project on peace and conflict, in a systematic, structured and on-going way.

- Lessons may be learned or spurned: governance and peace-building initiatives take a long, long time. Nothing will work unless it is built upon a foundation of trust. It takes time to develop trusting relationships between project partners; between partners and communities; within and between governments; between governments and civil society; and between groups within civil society. A critical element in the trust-building process is physical presence – ‘being there for the weddings and the funerals’ as a colleague of mine once said in eastern Sri Lanka. Dipping in and out of a project site limits the ability to build deep-rooted trust. Long-term commitment is as important as physical presence. Most residents in conflict-prone areas have seen humanitarian and development actors come and go; projects begin and end. The people of Bosnia & Herzegovina are perhaps more aware than other war-affected communities of the capriciousness of donors (in terms of diplomatic, military, developmental and humanitarian commitments). Adopting long-term perspectives may be difficult for donors. Funding and project cycles require them to force organic, long-term, responsive visions into the narrow mechanistic, short-term, structures of the development industry.

Now what?

Drawing this chapter to a close, we have a list of lessons drawn from some brief descriptions of various case studies – advice about what seems to work and what does not in particular circumstances. Over the past few years, there has been a vigorous debate and many efforts to strengthen the peace-building impacts of conventional development work, including at the local level through city-to-city initiatives. The central challenge has been to develop and apply peace- and conflict-sensitive planning, monitoring and evaluation tools.

While there are limits to how far one can generalize and apply the lessons generated from one context to another, the scheme at the end of this chapter suggests some specific best practices drawn from the case studies. It suggests where to look, how to look, and what to support in efforts to strengthen peace-building and conflict-resilience within cities and municipalities. It tells where and how to look to determine the likely impact of a project or programme on peace and conflict.

The scheme suggests a practical analytical lens that can be applied to the work of local governments in conflict-prone areas. It identifies a number of areas with potential peace and conflict impacts - both positive and negative - in municipal-level projects. Although it has been applied in assessing conventional development projects and peace-focused projects in conflict-prone areas around the world, it should not be applied rigidly or mechanistically in planning and monitoring. Rather, it should serve as a starting point for identifying and supporting existing peace- and conflict-sensitive mechanisms being used with local governments. It is more of a guide to interpretation than a recipe.

Peace-building is not something that can be pre-processed and imposed from the outside. Individuals, communities and organizations living and working in conflict-prone settings have already developed their own peace-building and conflict-avoidance techniques and mechanisms. This is the only way that they can survive and work under such difficult and explosive conditions. The role for foreign local governments is not to introduce or impose foreign or abstract peace-building techniques, it is to identify, support and, most importantly, systematize existing peace- and conflict-sensitive practices that have grown in the very specific conditions (social, political, economic, military, organizational etc.).
Applying this analytical lens to projects and programmes begins the process of drawing out their various impacts. The case studies in this chapter show not only that projects have multiple impacts on different levels, but that unless we have a systematic means of anticipating, monitoring and evaluating peace and conflict impacts, we are likely to miss them and, in missing them, we may well end up doing more harm than good.

Next steps

In light of this discussion, where should we be placing our emphasis? In my opinion, the foregoing analysis suggests the following.

We should cultivate **patient and collaborative working relationships with partners in conflict areas.** These can form the foundation for learning from their experiences with formal and informal peace-building initiatives (both successes and failures), for understanding how they can be supported and how knowledge and experiences may be spread through our relationships with communities in other conflict settings. It cannot be over-emphasized that genuine partnerships are possible, but only if they are built on respect, true collaboration and long-term relationships. More often than not, participation is forced onto agendas that are defined by foreigners, and characterized by arrogant top-down control, short-term transactions, and budgets that often benefit outside ‘partners’ over those in the conflict area.

Even more useful than the cultivation of respectful relationships is establishing **connections between organizations and individuals in conflict areas who already possess practical experience and expertise and groups in other violence-prone areas.** This proved very beneficial in Habarana, Sri Lanka where facilitators from the Local Governance Support Programme in the Philippines led a week-long peace-building workshop for Sri Lankan and Nepalese fieldworkers.

The **explicit engagement of foreign municipalities in the challenge of integrating peace- and conflict-impact issues in their work with counterparts from conflict areas** is also important. The Federation of Canadian Municipalities has taken a step in this direction with its Municipal Co-operation Programme in Sri Lanka. While learning from such efforts, we should not ignore those initiatives by international organizations and NGOs where, although they might have learned how to sprinkle peace-building phrases into proposals to satisfy donors, they have so far failed to genuinely integrate peace-building into their projects, let alone programmes. Among the possible reasons for this failure is the fact that **peace-building must be participatory:** it must include communities, and it must build on and develop existing local and national capacities if it is to be useful and relevant.

All this is necessary for the simple reason that it is impossible to identify or understand impacts without the active participation, analysis and assessment of partners and communities on the ground. However, one must be aware that genuine participation with municipal-level actors may generate problems from the perspective of foreign organizations because it increases perceived inefficiency (for example by increasing the time needed to conduct an assessment; or by involving the gradual cultivation of trust with communities, instead of the usual short-term-transactional relationships) and risks loss of control (by raising expectations and increasing community demands for accountability, and by creating the space for community influence over the means and ends of an initiative).

The final priority is to **consolidate understanding of the roles of municipalities in peace-building** based on experience. Although there is a general appreciation of the various roles that municipalities (both individual municipalities and associations of municipalities) can play in supporting and nurturing peace, this appreciation has yet to be translated into systematic
knowledge and understanding. More importantly, it has not been operationalized or self-consciously integrated into the work of municipalities in conflict areas, or into relationships and programmes. There is a need to collect and consolidate our understandings, experiences and tools in this field of work in a way that serves as a repository of resources for all stakeholders interested in using, and ultimately integrating, peace and conflict sensitivity into their work.

The initiatives surrounding the World Conference on City diplomacy in the summer of 2008 offer an opportunity to work collaboratively within and between partners to work out the details of how we might move the agenda forward in a coherent and sustainable way.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Areas of Peace &amp; Conflict Impact</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Institutional Capacity to Address Conflict Non-violently &amp; to Promote Tolerance &amp; Build Peace</td>
<td>Impact on capacity to identify and respond to peace and conflict challenges and opportunities; organizational responsiveness; bureaucratic flexibility; efficiency and effectiveness; ability to modify institutional roles and expectations to suit changing environment and needs; financial management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military &amp; Human Security</td>
<td>Direct and indirect impact on: the level, intensity, dynamics of violence; violent behaviour; (in)security (broadly defined); defence/security policy; repatriation, demobilization and reintegration; reform and retraining of police and security forces/structures; disarmament; banditry; organized crime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Structures &amp; Processes</td>
<td>Impact on formal and informal political structures and processes, such as: government capabilities from the level of the state government down to the municipality; policy content and efficacy; decentralization/concentration of power; political ethnicization; representation; transparency; accountability; democratic culture; dialogue; conflict mediation and reconciliation; strengthening/weakening civil society actors; political mobilization. Impact on rule of law; independence/politicization of legal system; human rights conditions; labour standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Structures and Processes</td>
<td>Impact on strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic structures/processes; distortion/conversion of war economies; impact on economic infrastructure; supply of basic goods; availability of investment capital; banking system; employment impact; productivity; training; income generation; production of commercial product or service; food (in)security; impacts on the exploitation, generation or distribution of resources, esp. non-renewable resources and the material basis of economic sustenance or food security.</td>
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Social Reconstruction and Empowerment
Examples

Capacity Focus: Even when there is a systemic and effective dismantling of formal political structures through militarized violence, it is possible to invest in peace & unity through a focus on capacity building objectives.

The Inclusion of Ex-Combatants: The participation of ex-combatants in mainstream community development affairs is significant and important – in terms of both the deconstruction of structures of violence and the construction of structures of peace.

Delinking Decision Authority: The question of how to develop governance capacity within systems affected by corruption is a difficult one. In PMMP, all control and monitoring rests at the municipal level. There are no direct administrative or decision-making linkages to higher level political actors in the central government tainted by allegations of corruption. In essence, devolution of decision-making power within the project helps to guard against mismanagement and misappropriation.

‘Walking the Talk’: The Participatory dimensions of a project help to ensure transparency. Any project that seeks to increase representation, transparency, accountability, democratic culture and dialogue in the structures and processes of governance must model these principles in everything it does – or else it loses credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness.

Demonstration Effects: The inter-ethnic composition of a project team sends important messages of tolerance, inclusiveness and participation to the communities within which it works. The strategic allocation of seed money may build positive momentum and energies that might otherwise never be encouraged, developed or harnessed. This is a contribution to governance capacity building within civil society.

Piggy-Backing/ Synergistic impact: ‘Synergy’ refers to the combined action of more than one development initiative so that the total impact is greater than the impact of each project individually. It also illustrates the way in which the positive peace and unity impact of conventional development projects can be augmented (or ‘supercharged’) when tied explicitly to peace-specific projects.

Civil Society involvement: in local level planning and decision-making. This creates an incentive for inter-ethnic cooperation in issue areas affecting each community. The initial motivation may be self-interest, but over time this may lead to cooperation based on joint interest, and ultimately common interest.

Personal & Professional Linkages: The incorporation of senior officials from other municipalities serves to increase the pool of ideas and inputs into the planning process but, from a Peace and Unity perspective, it may also strengthen personal professional linkages through out a conflict-affected area and thereby contribute to the solidarity and unity of separated communities

Linking Dialogue to Peace: Without dialogue there can be no understanding. Without understanding, there can be no reconciliation. Without reconciliation, there can be no peace. Impact on: quality of life; constructive social communication (e.g., those promoting tolerance, inclusiveness and participatory principles); displaced people; (in)adequacy of health care and social services; (in)compatibility of interests; (dis)trust; inter-group hostility/dialogue; communications; transport; resettlement/displacement; housing; education; nurturing a culture of peace.

Stakes, buying-in & Cohesion: Social cohesion is strongest when majority of members consider themselves to be stakeholders in a particular activity and concern. Conversely, it is weakest when the majority are alienated or ‘stakeless’.

Champions: A ‘Champion’ is someone who is willing to defend and to promote a project or programme. This is particularly important in environments characterized by distrust such as post-conflict settings.
Local democracy, the tie that binds us / city diplomacy for peace-building in the northern part of the Cauca, Colombia | Andrés Paz Ramos and Marianne Moor

Summary

The main national actors in peace-building efforts in the Northern part of the Cauca, a region in the southwest of Colombia, are the Association of Municipalities of the Northern part of the Cauca (AMUNORCA) and the Association of Indigenous Municipal Councils (ACIN). From the European side the actors are VNG International, IKV Pax Christi, and various committed municipalities. The article looks at the role of local democracy in peace-building and democratization, why this particular moment was selected to recruit international support and the impacts of the international support.

Conclusions of the assessment include the following. Participation of local governments (including traditional indigenous local authorities) in peace initiatives and the garnering of international support in the midst of an internal armed conflict are critical. The solidarity campaign helped push local governments to work in a determined manner in favour of peace-building. City diplomacy activities catalyzed, accelerated and supported existing local processes. The experience made visible the problems of the threatened local governments, and the capacity of local democracy to resist the violence and threats. This had the effect of raising the involvement and support of the state at a regional and national level in the peace initiatives. The regional actors valued the possibilities of starting and maintaining international cooperation relations for peace-building. Local actors now better understand that international relations and contacts must have proper follow up, itself facilitated by the personal contact of those involved. The experience contributed to municipalities incorporating their support for peace initiatives in annual municipal development plans making them more sustainable. International contacts extended local actor’s horizons, and provided case studies to imitate, especially contacts with Latin American municipalities, some of which had a past comparable to that of Colombia, which generated new ideas to address the armed conflict at the local level. Both main beneficiary organizations, ACIN and AMUNORCA, recognized their weaknesses in keeping alive city diplomacy relations. The assessment concluded with a substantial list of recommended follow-up actions.
Introduction

With Colombia experiencing an internal armed conflict in rural zones, multiple efforts are not only being made from local areas to overcome it and build peace. Peace-building efforts undertaken by the two existing associations of local governments in the northern part of the Cauca (a region located in the southwest of the country) in recent years have combined with the support and solidarity of international actors and thus represent a striking example of city diplomacy. One can place the start of this process of cooperative peace-building in the final months of 2003 and so the activities considered to write this chapter cover the four years to October 2007. It should be emphasised that local initiatives are planned to continue.

The protagonist in this experience is the local democratic infrastructure of the northern part of the Cauca, in the broadest sense of the word. That is to say the local communities of indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and mixed peoples, and the representatives of the 12 municipalities. In the north of the Cauca, the two principal actors are the Association of Municipalities of the Northern part of the Cauca (AMUNORCA, from its acronym in Spanish) and the Association of Indigenous Municipal Councils (ACIN, from its acronym in Spanish).1

The international actors in this example of city diplomacy are IKV Pax Christi of the Netherlands2 and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) in collaboration with various European municipalities. The role of these two organizations has been various. In the first place, they gave their political support and facilitated contact and relations with new national and international actors related to the process. IKV Pax Christi offered technical assistance and financial contributions to specific initiatives that were seen to assist peace-building and conflict reduction.

This article seeks to contribute to greater understanding of the phenomenon of city diplomacy in general practice, and to analyze the start, development, and achievements of this international project of solidarity in the northern part of the Cauca of Colombia. We focus on the following questions:

- What was the role of local democracy in the northern part of the Cauca in local peace-building and democratization?
- Why this particular moment was selected to recruit international support for local democracy and was this the right moment under the given circumstances?
- What was the impact and medium and long term effects of the international support?

We define ‘local peace-building’ in this context as the integration of efforts and actions carried out by local actors, with an emphasis on local authorities or governments, that seek peaceful coexistence, the respect of rights, non-violent resistance, and the improvement of democracy in the context of the internal armed conflict in Colombia.

In the first section, the reader will find a general description of the impact of the internal

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1 For more information, see: www.amunorca.gov.co and www.nasaacin.gov.co.
2 As of the 1st of January 2007, the two Dutch peace movements, Pax Christi and IKV, have merged. The movement is now called IKV Pax Christi.
The impact of the conflict on local democracy

Armed conflict in Colombia has been present for four decades. The principal actors in this complex confrontation are the guerrillas of the left (FARC and ELN), paramilitary groups (principally the AUC), and the armed bodies of the State. Through the years, the conflict has transformed several times and the civil population has suffered different stages of major violence. In the 1990s, the conflict changed drastically because illegal groups increasingly financed their activities with income derived from the drug trade, extortion, and kidnappings. Drug trade-financed bands of dealers and delinquents increased violence and corruption. The impact of the violence has been felt principally in the rural areas of the country where most of the massacres, displacements, kidnappings, and forced disappearances happen.

The Cauca department and its northern zone particularly suffer from the presence and activity of those who wish to retain and expand their influence by making war and financing it. As in the rest of the country over the last twenty years, this zone has experienced a bloody war between guerrillas, paramilitary, and public forces, simultaneously with the appearance of illicit crops and drug trafficking. While it is the small landowner peasants of the middle and high zones that tend to cultivate the coca plant and opium poppy on a modest scale, the processing and trafficking of the drugs is in the hands of the illegal groups. The zone is located astride one of the main drug trafficking routes to the Colombian coast.

Ethnic, economic, social, and geographical diversities of the northern part of the Cauca make this a very complex reality. In the mountainous parts, where most of the indigenous reserves and afro communities of Buenos Aires and Suarez are located, the guerrilla is present. These groups exercise military and political pressure directly on the population. The municipality of Toribio, for example, has suffered five attacks by guerrillas in the last three years (the last prior to this report on 18 December, 2007, when three policemen died).

3 It is estimated that the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) today has about 15,000 combatants while the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) has between 1,500 and 3,000.

4 The 15 of July, 2003, the government of Colombia and the leaders of the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) signed an agreement for the phased demobilization of the paramilitary. Today, some 32,000 combatants have been demobilized collectively and are in the process of reintegration. Some 3,000 paramilitary also entered the demobilization process individually. Four reduced blocks have not participated in the process. The OAS mission which accompanied the peace process for Colombia has pointed out that some ex-combatants have rearmed.
But the communities of afros and indigenous peoples of the high zones have also suffered massacres perpetrated by the paramilitary forces who accuse the inhabitants of collaborating with the guerrillas.5

In the low lying zones, there are communities of afros, mestizos, and mixed bloods, also threatened by drug dealers and ex-paramilitary forces. These actors have generated much violence and social disintegration. The paramilitary have carried out, on several occasions, what they refer to as ‘social cleansing’ resulting in murders and displacements. A municipality such as Puerto Tejada (pop 50,000) presently suffers from juvenile gangs, which led in 2006 to 106 violent deaths of young people, a sad record for the number of young people murdered in proportion to the population.

The weakness of the democratic structures, and their local operations, are often cited as one of the main reasons for the armed conflict. At elections, local democracy is further weakened by low voter participation6 and common corrupt practices such as buying votes and electoral manipulation (such as people from one place being taken to another to vote).

Other than the elections, local democracy has structural weaknesses that are not easy to overcome. The UNDP has identified in its 2003 human development report Colombia7, among others, the following characteristics of the municipalities with the greatest vulnerability.

In the first place, the major levels of corruption. Many bodies of government demonstrate a lack of legitimacy before the community. There is a lack of investment in security and encouragement to coexistence by local governments. Local social movements are fragile and face constant tensions between the collective and individual interest. Collective actions against violence meet with considerable challenge from the armed groups and simultaneously from traditional politics.8 It has recently been demonstrated that in several parts of the country pacts between the paramilitary or guerrillas on one side and elected officials on the other are common.9

But the fragility of local democracy is not the only cause of the conflict. Threats from illegal armed groups undermine local efforts at democracy. The threats to and murders of social

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5 The more serious massacres included Nilo in December 1991 in which 20 people died, and Naya in April 2001, in which it is said that more than 100 died. Officially, 43 murders were recognized in this last massacre.

6 Less than 30% of potential voters usually exercise their right to vote.


8 The UNDP report points out that in addition to weak governability, or governing by cooperation and interaction between public and private sectors, mixed network decisions are confronted by obstacles such as: a lack of institutional capacity, legitimacy, and transparency; restricted local autonomy; little support and lack of coordination between government levels; a lack of feeling for the citizen; opportunistic behaviour; sporadic and ineffective participation by citizens; and almost non-existent accountability.

leaders and elected officials do not allow the democratic and social processes to prosper and grow. In some parts, armed groups control large proportions of local funds and provide public benefits. Another disastrous phenomenon has been the handing over of the management of parts of the public services, such as health, in some regions to these groups.

The pressure by armed groups on local democracy is notable in the northern part of the Cauca. Death threats to mayoral candidates understandably alarm. For example, in 2007 in the municipality of Corinto, almost all candidates were threatened and one regional representative was murdered. Several elected leaders have been kidnapped over recent years. And of course there have been pressures on elected and public officials to change policies and to ‘come to terms’ with the illegal groups.

Such a complex reality has created another obstacle to strengthening local democracy. The great distrust between different sectors at the local level has produced a strong polarization between social organizations and local governments, and between the private sector and citizens. Often, the polarization is so strong that dialogue comes to a halt and the different groups actively seek to discredit each other.

In the middle of all of this suffering and difficulties, the representatives of local democracy and the civil population try to overcome the effects of violence and to create peace in the municipalities. In those cases where some kind of interchange between local authorities and the population also has international support, peace initiatives achieve the best results. In the next part a good example of such a local initiative that is supported by international actors is given - the movement of peaceful civil resistance of the indigenous peoples of the northern part of the Cauca.

A local answer to armed conflict

*Peaceful civil resistance* Civil resistance for peace in Colombia is presented by the media as an expression of people who do not want to continue being submitted to the violence that is a scourge to their region and environment, and as a valuable example of unarmed opposition to the conflict. Among the examples of peaceful civil resistance in Colombia, the Indigenous Guard of the northern Cauca is one of the most significant having won national and international recognition.

The Indigenous Guard is an organization for peace established by the local municipal councils of the northern Cauca, whose peoples have deep roots in the history of resistance.

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10 ...For the paeces and guambianos, indigenous peoples of the Cauca, resistance to violence has historic roots, it is communal, and linked to the social processes of unity that are being developed in several parts of Colombia, which the Colombian media ignores. http://www.mediosparalapaz.org/index.php?idcategoria=823.

11 ...‘The Indigenous Guard is conceived as an ancestral organization and instrument of resistance, unity, and autonomy in defence of the territory and the lives of the indigenous communities. It is not a policing structure; it is rather a humanitarian mechanism and one of civil resistance. It seeks to protect and spread its ancestral culture and the exercise of its own rights. It takes its mandate from its own assemblies, so it depends directly on the indigenous authorities. It originally appeared to defend the community from all actors who would attack it, but it only defends itself with its ‘chonta’ or command truncheon, which gives the guard a symbolic value.’… Official document of the National Peace Prize Jury - 2004
The indigenous Paéz Nasa community of the Cauca Department in southeast Colombia sent more than 250 members of its indigenous guard for dialogue with the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) which had sequestered several of its leaders this past 22nd of August. ‘They are going on a humanitarian mission of civil resistance because they carry no weapons’, said Ezequiel Vitonás, ex-mayor and Nasa leader, to the BBC, ‘The mission of the commission is to come back with the mayor of Toribio, Cauca, Arquímedes Vitonás Noscué, declared ‘Master of Knowledge’ by UNESCO in 1997, and ex-mayor and coordinator of the Centre for Studies and Training Gilberto Muñoz Coronado. Ezequiel Vitonás confirmed to the BBC the liberation this Saturday of Plinio Trochez and Rubén Darío Escué, indigenous governors of the Toribío and San Francisco jails, respectively and the driver Erminson Velasco who was with the two leaders when they were kidnapped.


Another important objective is the prevention of the violation of human rights and of forced displacements. One of the fundamental decisions made by the indigenous authorities and communities of the northern part of the Cauca within the peaceful resistance strategy is not to abandon territory when attacks are carried out by armed groups. For that purpose, so-called ‘territories of permanent assembly’ have been established in schools and community centres so that the population may meet there and shelter when emergency situations arise. The Guard also focuses on gathering information on threats. Denunciations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and the search for solidarity are expressed

12 The indigenous Paéz Nasa community of the Cauca Department in southeast Colombia sent more than 250 members of its indigenous guard for dialogue with the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) which had sequestered several of its leaders this past 22nd of August. ‘They are going on a humanitarian mission of civil resistance because they carry no weapons’, said Ezequiel Vitonás, ex-mayor and Nasa leader, to the BBC, ‘The mission of the commission is to come back with the mayor of Toribio, Cauca, Arquímedes Vitonás Noscué, declared ‘Master of Knowledge’ by UNESCO in 1997, and ex-mayor and coordinator of the Centre for Studies and Training Gilberto Muñoz Coronado. Ezequiel Vitonás confirmed to the BBC the liberation this Saturday of Plinio Trochez and Rubén Darío Escué, indigenous governors of the Toribío and San Francisco jails, respectively and the driver Erminson Velasco who was with the two leaders when they were kidnapped.

13 The presentors of the national peace prize, given to the Indigenous Guard of the northern part of the Cauca in 2004, describe in the act the humanitarian role of the guard: ‘Among the humanitarian tasks are searching for persons who have disappeared, freeing kidnapped and detained persons, accompaniment and permanent support of city councils, transportation of the wounded and first aid, security and protection for the mobilizations, marches, congresses, permanent assemblies, protection of sacred places, among others’ Official Document of the Jury.
in reports of violent deaths of members of the cooperative occurring between 2000 and 2006.\textsuperscript{14}

The determination of the community to remain at the margin of the armed conflict contrasts with the role of the Indigenous Guard which places it in the middle of the confrontation with those who wish to wage war. Not only are they accused by the armed actors of collaboration with their opponents but actors seek to recruit them to their own cause. What follows is an explanation of the origins of the involvement of international actors in these local efforts, or in other words of ‘the city diplomacy experience of northern Cauca’.

\textit{Local democracy, the tie that binds us} Besides the structural pressure of the illegal armed groups, local democracy in Colombia in 2002 was confronted with a new threat. This was a frontal FARC offensive. After terminating the peace dialogue with the Pastrana government, the guerrillas decided to declare local authorities ‘military objectives’. Council members, public officials, and mayors were threatened in such a way that they were forced to transfer to other more urbanized municipalities. According to UN sources, a third of mayors in Colombia have received death threats. Because of the fact that the mayors could not work in their municipalities, Colombia suffered a government crisis. In 2003, the local authorities went back to their municipalities. But some of them paid for their return with their lives. In October of 2003, local elections were carried out in Colombia. During the process, all of the illegal armed groups pressured candidates and made deals with them.

During that critical situation, IKV Pax Christi decided, in 2002, to call international attention to the threats to local democracy and seek to demonstrate the capacity of local democracy to overcome the crisis through local peace initiatives. IKV Pax Christi established contact with the Colombian Federation of Municipalities (FCM, from its acronym in Spanish) with the idea of working together on the problem of threatened local democracy. The Federation, together with a group of four mayors from threatened indigenous authorities headed by the governor of Cauca, Floro Tunubalá of indian origin, gathered for a meeting. End-2002, the delegation toured Europe to publicize the difficulties local governments were facing in the internal armed conflict. The group visited several cities in The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and France. Their audiences included mayors of European municipalities, national associations of municipalities, national and European parliaments, officials of foreign relations ministries, NGOs, UCLG staff and the press.

In international solidarity terms, the visit to Europe was a success. The subject of threatened local democracy was placed on the public and political agenda in Europe. Several European actors wrote letters of solidarity and lobbied the Colombian authorities, the European Commission, and European entities in charge of municipal matters to call attention to the problem. A number of European NGOs gave their backing to the indigenous civil resistance movement, focusing on the support to specific projects such as, for example, the Early Warning Project in the indigenous zones. European mayors traveled to Colombia to better understand the local situation and demonstrate solidarity. The municipality of Hannover offered the indigenous authorities a sister city agreement between Hannover and an indeterminate number of municipalities of northern Cauca, because of the efforts and bravery of the Indigenous Guard in the case of the kidnapping of a German aid worker.

\textsuperscript{14} These reports can be read at: \url{http://www.nasaacin.net/defensa_vida.htm}\newline \url{http://www.nasaacin.net/informe_db_y_dih.htm}.
In public awareness terms, the tour also had a high impact. The Colombian delegation was large and diversified, and members informed European listeners clearly and emphatically about the reality of the conflict and the efforts to build peace at the local level. They gave interviews to newspapers and radio and television channels. They gave public talks in academic circles. And the people and entities visited made great efforts to issue statements to national and regional media.

The representatives of the north of the Cauca valued highly the access given to them to places of political debate and decision in Europe. Reactions also impressed the members of the delegation. They felt that international political support contributed substantially both to the protection of their processes and demand for respect from the armed groups. The initiative was also the start of a greater level of attention to international relations at the local level in the northern part of the Cauca. They felt less ‘isolated’ and became aware that international relations were not only the concern of great cities or national governmental entities.

In public awareness terms, the tour also had a high impact. Because of the positive international response to the delegation’s visit, ways were sought to channel European solidarity to aid the threatened democracy. IKV Pax Christi and VNG decided to start a solidarity campaign in Colombia.

The first component of this campaign was a delegation of six European mayors travelling to Colombia to express their solidarity in the country itself. During the visit in October of 2003, they met with local governments and candidates in the northern part of the Cauca and the west of Antioquia two weeks before local elections were held. They talked to mayoral candidates of Bogotá and with the representatives of the central government and international entities. IKV Pax Christi also decided to strengthen the message of the delegation through a campaign in the Colombian media. Four mayors, of The Hague, Stockholm, Barcelona and Hannover, broadcast their words through ‘spots’ broadcast on national and regional television channels, in airports, and on the radio and which carried the message ‘democracy, the tie that binds us’.

The message of solidarity attracted much attention in both Colombia and Europe. In addition to the ‘spots’, the delegation ended its visit with a press conference in Bogotá which also accrued good coverage. In The Netherlands and Germany, the tour received broad attention from the media. The delegation publicised its impressions at different European venues. It is certain the various armed groups clearly heard about and understood the public’s denunciation of their violations. In the period after the elections, the situation became less tense, and the majority of the threatened officials were able to get back to work.

The campaign allowed a larger visibility to and solidarity with the local democracy of the north of the Cauca, which was later expressed through new relationships for cooperation. A definitive sister city agreement was signed between the German city of Hannover and several Cauca municipalities. This created, firstly, a bond of solidarity and in 2005 was the origin of the creation of the Cooperative of Aqueducts of the Northern Part of the Cauca (COOPESAN). The Dutch institute Nuffic decided to work on the subject of (local) democracy in Colombia. Two of its educational projects were developed in the northern part of the Cauca.

So, in this way ‘the city diplomacy experience of northern Cauca’ came about and took shape. As important as the start however, was of course how the first initiatives evolved. This is the subject of the next chapter.
Creating a road as we walk

**Political support is transformed into tangible cooperation** The number one reason for the campaign was to create ties of solidarity between European and Colombian local democracy. The political part followed, in more general terms, through the work of the Committee on City Diplomacy, Peace-building and Human Rights of the UCLG, which successfully called attention to the Colombian case through the support of the Mayor of The Hague and VNG. Nevertheless, this was the only political work that followed.

A year after the visit of the European mayors, direct solidarity relationships had been transformed from a political character to one of concrete cooperation. One of the reasons for such a change had to do with the difficulty of keeping alive a solidarity relationship over an extended period of time. From Colombia, information was sent concerning threats that was answered with calls of support. But the cultural barrier is too large to create a tie based on political support alone. The Europeans were running out of opportunities to call attention at the international level to the situation of local democracy in the northern part of the Cauca. There was also a lack of support groups in the various municipalities to work on making the population aware of the subject.

The clearest example of transformation was the sister city agreement between the city of Hannover and the municipalities of the northern part of the Cauca. Representations of the municipalities met to establish a regional theme for the work to be done under the sister city agreement. The theme of drinking water was decided upon for several reasons. Apart from the most obvious reason, the need to improve the quality of drinking water services in some of the municipalities of the northern part of the Cauca, more strategic reasons related to the conflict were taken into account. Water rights, just as the ownership of land, are one of the most important causes of conflict in the region. Good land and water resources have diminished significantly because of the growth of the agricultural industry in the area and illicit cultivation in the mountains, frequently promoted by the armed actors. Some of the populations of the plain suffer drinking water rationing during the summer. The armed groups take advantage of these ‘hot’ subjects and try to mobilize social groups in the name of a solution to this problem. That is why the social problem of land and water has a relationship with armed conflict. To respond to the challenge of drinking water delivery, it was decided to create COOPESAN, which offered technical assistance and training to better drinking water services in public and community companies of the region. The process met with difficulties such as the initial distrust of some governments and companies who subsequently decided not to participate. Moreover, the collaboration by Hannover has been very limited. The management of COOPESAN and IKV Pax Christi, worried by the lack of concrete support, took the initiative to look for new alliances and specific support.

It can be said that in the two years of its life, the achievements of the cooperative were considerable. It managed to establish a regional laboratory for analyzing water quality to serve the companies of the region with European support. On top of that, timely support was obtained from various companies in Amsterdam and Surinam and the Caritas agency in Switzerland, to address technical aspects of control of water loss and access of rural communities to drinking water. COOPESAN has a role to play in the management of conflict.

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15 Coopesan is a cooperative of municipal aqueduct companies in the northern part of the Cauca. From six associated entities in two years it grew to have ten; a clear expression of the commitment of local governments.
stemming from the access to water and it took the form of a school for the communal mediation of conflicts, another of the initiatives in peace-building in the northern part of the Cauca. Its initial contribution consisted of characterizing and supporting the mediation of conflict between indigenous and afro communities in reference to access to drinking water. Through the mediation of conflicts at the local level, it tries, in a very practical manner, to overcome these obstacles and, in the long run, make a contribution to peaceful coexistence.

The management of drinking water at the regional level has the great advantage that municipalities with different ethnic groups have to work on collaborating with each other. And the different polarized social sectors that form an aggravating factor in local democracy have to work jointly. At the time of writing, COOPESAN has started a regional drive for reforestation and source conservation, which can count on the cooperation of all of the municipalities. The cooperative has become a reference initiative in favouring recognition of the fundamental rights to water.

Other activities of the campaign, including a course given by the Nuffic institute on strengthening local democracy, stimulated international relationships. During the course, visits were made to El Salvador and Guatemala and students were impressed by the way the municipality of Tecoluca (El Salvador) had overcome conflict and how different social sectors had been able to reconcile themselves. The subject of local economic development has been very important in this post-conflict phase and the reconciliation process.

Because of this visit, two municipalities belonging to AMUNORCA signed a sister city agreement in 2006 with the Salvadoran municipality of Tecoluca. To firmly establish the sister city agreement, the subject of solidarity in local economic development was chosen. The first activities to be developed focused on the exchange of experiences and technical and political visits. These worked as motivation for the economic initiatives in the municipalities and generated a process of association between small producers. We have managed to maintain the relationship and the mutual support continues to grow.

**Follow up to the support for the local peace initiatives** The second motive for the European-Colombian local democracy solidarity campaign consists of generating support for existing peace initiatives at the local level. Because of the campaign, several actions have been initiated with the purpose of strengthening local democracy and peace-building.

The civil resistance of the indigenous populations, and more specifically, the work of the Indigenous Guard, has received much attention at the international level. As a follow up to the campaign, it was not the European municipalities who focused their support on this peaceful initiative. More than anybody, it was the European NGOs, enthused by the call from city councils, that decided to work on it.

The strengthening of the Guard had both internal and external aspects. Internally, training of the Guard and improved knowledge concerning rights was highly valued. This allowed some important achievements. In the first place, a greater number of complaints for infractions or violations of human rights. City councils initiated investigations concerning violations of human rights by the police. And communications structures were created to investigate these allegations. As a consequence of all of this, greater solidarity exists today in the community for the protection of the life of leaders and the civil population. Additionally, the community has more arguments for the defence of its plans and communal processes before the armed actors.
External factors concerned national and international recognition, the example set for other sectors of civil society in Colombia, and the respect garnered, not without difficulties and disappointments, from the armed groups. Through the European support, they managed to obtain national attention and extend the support of many peasant organizations, universities, and NGOs to strengthen the Guard in other communities. Moreover, control increased over the vulnerability of human rights in the communities by members of the public forces and infractions of international humanitarian law by illegal armed bands. Other indigenous communities in other regions also started to organize in order to garner respect from the armed actors in the conflict.

The support of the international community in the processes of the city councils and of the Guard is clearly evident today and there are frequent visits by delegations which wish to know more about the Guard and express solidarity with it. The national peace prize for the Indigenous Guard (2004) and the Nasa de Toribio (2000) project, as well as the equatorial prize from UNDP (2005), among others, demonstrate the international recognition that the indigenous process has achieved.

Because of the campaign, subject work has also been done on local democracy. Generally speaking, these initiatives are promoted and organized by IKV Pax Christi of The Netherlands and by VNG International, the International Cooperation Agency of the VNG, in collaboration with their counterparts AMUNORCA and ACIN. Representatives of diverse regional and local governmental organizations participate in these projects. In the 2004–2007 period, various courses and workshops were held to emphasize the subjects of prevention, make practical suggestions on how to act in a conflict, and strengthen local democracy in the Cauca. The local communities learned methods for the systematization of the peace experiences and received help also in publishing these. The following section assesses what the impact of the international involvement in the Caucaan situation actually was.

16 ‘The anguish created by the psychological war carried out by the actors of the armed conflict to confront the community diminished and the base organizations of indigenous communities were strengthened. Today, the idea is for the communities themselves to care for the territory in an organized manner as well as the life of every cooperative worker not linked to the conflict, and that the armed actors leave the territory’ (Feliciano Valencia, indigenous leader of the northern Cauca region in an evaluation interview concerning the work of the guard in 2005)

17 ‘The following are some of its most distinguished accomplishments: Liberating kidnap victims, such as the mayor of Toribio, Arquímides Vitonás, it has avoided the incursion of armed groups into the municipalities, as well as the forced recruitment of young men. Prevented aggressions and massive forced displacements of its communities and of peasants. Dismantling of cocaine laboratories. A march of more than 30 thousand indigenous persons the 15 of May 2004 between Santander de Quilichao and Cali in support of ‘the great struggle for life and against violence’ Official document of the jury of the National Peace prize 2004.

18 www.amunorca.gov.co An example of the systematization is the abstract published in the notebook of experiences that contribute to the culture of peace in the northern part of the Cauca (see, http://www.educacionparalapaz.org.co/recursos2.htm?x=18936576)
How we have progressed from international contributions

The work carried out by the international actors and the local governmental associations described in this chapter has supported unification of the work in the region. Representative organizations of the diverse social sectors present have been identified and they have been invited to work on shared projects. In recent years, the concept and expression ‘the northern part of the Cauca’ has been strongly established: it has become a common term for actions and presentations in favour of peace and overcoming conflict. It is important to appreciate the substantial contribution that international allies have made in fostering and supporting the initiatives, their activities, their reach, and their impacts.

The sister city agreements of the municipalities of the northern part of the Cauca with the city of Hannover, Germany and the municipality of Tecoluca in El Salvador were originated by organizations such as COOPESAN and the association of small producers in the municipality of Corinto. These represent an example of the joint work between different sectors and contribute to the strengthening of the public sector and of local democracy. They contribute to peace and the transformation of conflict scenarios marked by the problems of land ownership and the planting of crops for illicit use. Along with the School of Communal Mediation, they are contributing to overcoming the obstacles for peaceful coexistence.

The majority of the features of the weakness of local democracy mentioned in the 2003 human development report for Colombia have their origin in the uncaring or fearful attitudes before the local armed conflict. The northern part of the Cauca has demonstrated determination and resistance to them partly because they can count on international support.

This is even more evident in the strengthening of civil resistance of the indigenous peoples which is even more solid today. The achievements described concerning the indigenous guard are responsible for greater levels of complaints of outrageous behaviour and violations, and of the greater guarantees demanded of competent authorities. Another achievement is that armed groups outside the law have increased respect for communal processes and for traditional authorities. This strengthening is due in great measure to the involvement of international support (training and providing equipment), accompaniment (in hearings, assemblies, and mobilizations), visibility and recognition (political solidarity, awards made).

The presence for more than three years of international allies in favour of peace and international solidarity has allowed AMUNORCA and ACIN to involve the promotion of peace, human rights, and resistance in their discourse and work objectives. AMUNORCA has gone forward, for example, with the systematization and publicizing of diverse local and zone-centred peace initiatives. The group of mayors elected in October 2007 who will govern to December 2011 included peace and coexistence as priority matters in their work of zone-centred reach, for which AMUNORCA is responsible.

19 The municipalities of Toribio and Corinto maintain a sister city relationship with the municipality of Tecoluca, El Salvador, through visits and interchanges of experiences, not only to support peace-building but also local economic development and international solidarity.

http://www.saliendodelcallejon.pnud.org.co/
In the organization of the delegation, the municipalities and social organizations of the northern part of the Cauca made contact with national networks, international agencies and governmental entities they had not met before. The growth of the international dimension of AMUNORCA’s work is reflected in the fact that the association today has an office of international cooperation. That office is supported by a committee made up of representatives of different local actors with the idea of organizing joint efforts. Generating confidence is one of the fundamental requisites for coexistence in armed conflict. The experience of international cooperation in the northern part of the Cauca has improved trust between associations of local governments and the social groups they represent. Distrust between individual municipalities and social organization has diminished in only a few cases. But at least they were able to get the organizations and the local governments to collaborate in projects and concrete activities.

For northern Cauca, the dynamics of international support have generated more external commitments of the governmental variety. It is about, for example, institutions such as the people’s legal defence and more recently the district attorney’s office. This type of presence is fundamental for garnering further credibility for the Colombian government at the local level. Because of the visit by the European mayors, we were able to get access to Colombian national decision makers such as the Vice-President of the Republic.

In the concrete case of the Indigenous Guard, the results of international support are seen in the evaluations performed (by members of the Indigenous Guard themselves). They stated that new conceptual positions had been achieved in human rights and international humanitarian law within the indigenous organization, and that there was better knowledge of the state of human rights in the communities. They state that the Indigenous Guard is better positioned in the community and that ties have widened to include other organizations concerned with human rights and international humanitarian law. Another improvement can be seen in the effectiveness of the actions of the Indigenous Guard. Obviously, there were also a number of difficulties and obstacles during the city diplomacy process, of which some still exist. The most important ones are described in the following section.

21 In 2006, seven experiences that contributed to peace-building in the northern region of the Cauca were systemized and published. The document may be read and downloaded from http://www.educacionparalapaz.org.co/. Mid-2006 ACIN published the book Kiwe T’enza, a guide from the Nasa people concerning the emergency, directed at members of the Indigenous Guard and the community. It offers guidance on the way to act in case of emergencies in the middle of an armed conflict. It offers content on indigenous identity, the history of resistance and its origins, autonomy, international humanitarian rights, the place for a permanent assembly, and places to take temporary refuge in the territory in case combat threatens forced displacement, and about the functioning of the Indigenous Guard.

22 There is more information on Amunorca International in: http://www.amunorca.gov.co/servicios/. The agenda for regional sustainable social development (an exercise in regional characterization and future vision created by Amunorca in 2005, with international support) expresses in its projection for 2019 that the region of northern Cauca will, among others, be a multiethnic territory, leader in peace and coexistence proposals, and respectful of differences. www.nasaacin.net is an important source of information for getting to know the peace-building process of the Association of Traditional Local Indigenous Governments of the northern region of the Cauca.

23 Interethnic meetings are given as examples, bringing together the joint participation of Amunorca and ACIN in various projects.
**The stones on the road: obstacles and missed opportunities**

Over time, it has not been easy to maintain international relationships of support between Caucan and European municipalities. Contacts have been maintained through IKV Pax Christi. But as far as the Cauca municipalities are concerned, the meagre current activities of local governments concerning international relations and cultural differences hinder communication, visibility and follow up. It is difficult for Cauca municipalities and city councils to garner international political solidarity. For most of them, the principal value of international ties consists of access to donated funds.

Another limitation has to do with the fear and weak disposition that some officials and mayors possess for promoting peace initiatives in contexts where there are conflicts. In some municipalities, elected representatives were not willing to really dedicate themselves to peace-building, and these people tended to abuse the international support for their own personal political interests. They mainly sought to convince the population of their capacity to maintain international relations. The favourable processes continue thanks to the determination and conviction of those local government officials and leaders who do insist on working for human rights and coexistence and peace.

On the European municipalities' side, one can see that they began to run out of opportunities to call international attention to situations of local democracy or the lack of it in Colombia. But in concrete cooperation activities also, the commitment of the European municipalities was not long lasting. On many occasions it was up to IKV Pax Christi to follow up on a project or to seek new allies so the experience would not be lost. One supposes that the lack of commitment on the part of the municipalities has to do with the fact that participation in the campaign was a decision made by the European local governments. Contrary to the international ties during the seventies and eighties, these relationships were not stimulated by the local population. Local push and commitment is needed to keep relationships alive.

On the political side, the support of the Europeans is valuable because of its access it offers from international and supranational entities. But in other areas, the European support did not always have an added value. For example, a visit to Germany by COOPESAN served primarily to emphasize technological differences and language barriers. The technical assistance – in peace-building, reconciliation, reintegration of ex-combatants, local economic development – would often have been more effective if it had come from a Latin American region, with greater language, cultural and thematic proximity. It has not always been demanded that governmental and non-governmental entities collaborate in projects of cooperation and sister city agreements. Real involvement by other actors is important so that a durable peace initiative can be constructed especially when the subject to be worked on is difficult and complex. The collaboration between IKV Pax Christi and the Colombian Federation of Municipalities did not work out as was foreseen, and was ended after the campaign in Colombia.

**Conclusions**

*Answers to the main questions* The first of the three main questions asked concerned the role of local democracy in the northern part of the Cauca in peace-building. We conclude that more than municipalities, the participation of local governments
(including traditional indigenous local authorities) in peace initiatives and the garnering of international support in the midst of an internal armed conflict are critical. A review of the experience of northern Cauca emphasizes the role of local authorities in peace-building and in democratization.

In a country where management of public order and the subject of peace are considered outside the jurisdiction of local governments, what the people of the northern part of the Cauca have done is impressive. Opportunities have been created for peace-building and human rights initiatives in the agenda of local governments and organizations. Indigenous people’s traditional authorities have positioned the work and claims for human rights before the actors of war and demanded respect for the communities. While we are dealing with a process of which the results are not definitive and which has to confront the reality of an internal armed conflict, we express the hope that authorities that started their mandate in January of 2008 in the territory of the northern part of the Cauca are today more sensitive to carrying out their duties from a human rights point of view, to preventing the damage resulting from armed conflict, to the promotion of peaceful coexistence and peace-building at a local level, and to counting on the local governments of other countries for support.

The second question that guided the writing of this chapter was when to start an international contribution. For the northern part of the Cauca the start of the campaign was well timed. Although local democracy has always been intimidated, the recent wave of threats struck the rest of the world hard. The moment offered a good opportunity to show many of the aspects of the vulnerability of local democracy. With the visibility of peaceful resistance, the world was presented moreover with an alternative to violence which deserves to be supported. The initiative offered a ‘perspective of action’ to those who wanted to support local democracy. From the point of view of the Cauca authorities and leaders, the solidarity campaign was one of the fundamental acts that pushed local governments to work in a determined manner in favour of peace-building.

The third and last question concerned the medium and long term effects of the international support. The answer to this question is not easy, but nevertheless crucial. The city diplomacy experience took place within the context of an existing process in the municipalities involved, focused on the strengthening of peace initiatives and local democracy. So it is sometimes hard to determine the exact impact of the international support. What is certain is that the city diplomacy activities catalyzed and accelerated the existing local processes. Evaluating the experience leads to the conclusion that it had a positive impact in various ways.

In the first place, the city diplomacy experience made visible the problems of the threatened local governments, and the capacity of local democracy to resist the violence and the threats. This visibility had the effect of raising the involvement and support of the state at a regional and national level in the peace initiatives. This governmental support made the initiatives stronger and more sustainable.

A second impact of the city diplomacy experience concerns the change in attitude, focus and strategies of the involved municipalities. The region opened itself to the world. Before the experience described in this chapter, a systematic and established practice of local international cooperation had not existed in the northern part of the Cauca. Now, the regional actors value the possibilities of starting and maintaining international cooperation relations on the subject of peace and of decentralized cooperation. They also understand better that international relations and contacts must have proper follow up, itself facilitated by the personal contact of those involved. On the other hand, the evolution of the armed conflict in Colombia must allow local institutions to retain the initiative.
In the third place, the city diplomacy experience contributed to the inclusion of peace-building and overcoming the conflict in the long term vision of the associations of local governments ACIN and AMUNORCA. The importance that AMUNORCA now places on the cooperation between municipalities is reflected in the establishment in 2007 of the office of international cooperation in that Association. What counts for ACIN and AMUNORCA, also counts for the commitment of their members. The local governments of northern Cauca are much more committed to local peace projects and initiatives. Some five years ago the role of the municipalities was less proactive, and their involvement tended to be ad hoc. Nowadays, the municipalities have incorporated their support for peace initiatives in annual municipal development plans. In the indigenous communities the municipalities and traditional authorities finally started to coordinate and equip local peace activities. In this way, the initiatives have become more sustainable.

Another primary impact of city diplomacy in northern Cauca has to do with the mental change of the leaders in the region. The international contacts extended their horizon, and provided them with new perceptions regarding the potential of their region. Especially the contacts with Latin American municipalities, some of which had a past comparable to the present situation of Colombia, generated new ideas to overcome the effects of the armed conflict at the local level. This convinced those involved that Colombians themselves are capable of changing their situation and circumstances of life at the local level.

Finally, one impact of the city diplomacy experience that may be seen as negative (but is maybe not) was the increase of ‘envy’ among the municipalities of northern Cauca that received less attention and support because of the lack of initiatives, towards the municipalities that received more attention and support because they were involved in more relevant peace initiatives or because they had been more affected by the conflict.

Both main beneficiary organizations, ACIN and AMUNORCA, recognized their own weaknesses in keeping alive the city diplomacy relations started with the campaign in which local government officials from Colombia and European mayors participated. To quote a metaphor often used among the Nasa Peoples of the northern part of the Cauca, local government diplomacy is like a rope (democracy here is known as the tie that binds us) braided between two peoples: for it to be strong and robust, it needs the participation of both parties ‘because we need each other mutually to braid life and walk the world’.

Epilogue: suggestions for UCLG’s Committee on City Diplomacy, Peace-building and Human Rights

The efforts of the territorial governments and communities in Colombia in peace-building and overcoming conflict have not been recognized decisively by the national government. International organizations, on the other hand, have placed great value on them, accompanied them, and there are many action proposals.

The creation of a Committee on City Diplomacy, Peace-building and Human Rights within

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Amunorca hopes that by 2019 the region of northern Cauca will be a multi-ethnic territory, a leader in peace proposals and coexistence, and respectful of differences. The ACIN, for its part, aspires to a zone of indigenous communities which has integrated people of mixed blood, blacks, and peasants identified as a people, and in the presentation of the indigenous guard it expressed that the objective of the guard is to defend their way of life and to continue its advance as a mechanism of peace-building and harmonious coexistence. (See: http://www.amunorca.gov.co. Agenda for regional development and http://www.nasaacin.net/)
UCLG is an important step on the road to solidarity, the incidence and joint participation in actions and strategies of local authorities in conflict zones. The strategy of the working committee should include, besides what can be done by the committee itself, suggestions concerning the contributions that international bodies can make to local democracies in conflict zones. In Colombia, particularly, one could think of the following:

- Political ‘accompaniment’ of the local democracy by external local governments and the international community in subjects such as initiatives following elections, complaints of death threats, etc.
- Encouraging all levels of government to recognize the role of municipalities and other local authorities in overcoming conflict (for example, regional dialogues, humanitarian agreements, help for victims, help for those demobilized).
- Encouraging national government to delegate greater political and budgetary autonomy to local authorities for them to carry out local peace initiatives (including humanitarian agreements).
- Encouraging the recognition of the role of indigenous authorities in peace-building and local democracy, for example the Indigenous Guard.
- Support in helping victims, more than anything in gathering ‘memoirs’, the search for truth, and access to justice. For example, with help and technical support (equipment), accompaniments, international visits. In the municipality of Buenos Aires victims are supported psycho-socially and with access to justice. Efforts are made to uncover the truth so that the whole community may know about what happened and in this way avoid repetition, and so that the social and economic fabric, so affected by the violence, can be reconstituted.
- International cooperation focused on subjects that can unify the different sectors (social, governmental, ethnic, and economic, etc.). The social mediation of conflicts, for example.
- Decentralized agreements (between local governments in territories where there is no conflict and local governments in territories where there is conflict) of support with concrete initiatives for peace.
- Support for programmes that help demobilized fighters and reincorporate them positively into society.

25 The call to indigenous peoples of the northern part of the Cauca and of Colombia to express solidarity and mobilize for peace, life, dignity, and a new country which is possible and necessary. In launching the national peace prize in Toribio the 7th of July, 2005, the call finished with a poetic and profound speech which was a call to dialogue and to action: ‘Words without action are empty words. Action without words is blind. Words and actions outside the spirit of the community are death.’

26 The Human Development report of 2003 suggests support and promotion of forms of action at the local level: i) systemization of experiences; ii) strategies for social communication; iii) the formation of moderators and mediators; iv) the formation of local leaders starting with the experiences in Colombia and v) reaching agreements with organizations experienced in the subjects above. Among the activities which might be supported are: i) recovery and publication of municipal history; ii) integration of the community by cultural, entertainment, and sports programmes; iii) training and exchange of experiences with other municipalities; iv) renovation of public infrastructure where citizens can meet (plazas, parks, street corners), and v) formation of groups that support community. UNDP. Report for Human Development for Colombia 2003. ‘El conflicto. Callejón con Salida’ http://www.saliendodelcallejon.pnud.org.co/

27 Looking, additionally, to raise awareness of more emblematic cases than ‘the massacre at Naya’, which occurred in April of 2001 in the Buenos Aires territory, and in which more than 100 persons were murdered by the paramilitary. Deaths, disappearances, and forced displacements also happened in other areas in the municipality.
Local governments building peace in eastern Croatia | 

Martijn Klem

Summary

This chapter examines the peace-building role of municipalities after the war between Serbia and Croatia (1991-1995) to illuminate the factors that enabled some municipalities to contribute to positive, sustainable peace.

Most of multi-ethnic Eastern Slavonia was under Serbian rule during the war. After the war, with help from the international community and civil society the region was peacefully integrated into Croatia. The absence of violence and the supportive integrating approach enabled local authorities hereafter to contribute to the peace-building process. A minority of Croatian municipalities seized this opportunity.

Three necessary conditions had to be in place for a municipality to contribute to peace-building: the support of key figures with the vigour and power to work towards peace; solid prospects of tangible benefits of peace; and sufficient acceptance from all social and ethnic groups for the various municipal peace-building policies. Not necessary, but certainly supportive factors included appropriate budget, an active civil society and support from international municipalities.

Peace-building activities that Croatian municipalities used included: (1) facilitating a peaceful solution to local inter-ethnic conflicts; (2) convincing citizens to tolerate if not actively accept a multi-ethnic society; (3) providing public services in a transparent, fair way; (4) bringing multi-ethnic co-operation into practice; (5) implementing policies to bring citizens from different ethnic groups together.

In the post-conflict period, international municipalities mainly strengthened the peace-building activities of Croatian municipalities through financial support, moral encouragement and technical assistance. Sometimes the international municipality provided intermedi-ary services to bridge the gap between the various ethnic groups or between the municipality and its citizens.

In Eastern Slavonia, the municipal contribution was not a necessary condition for the peace-building process. Still, it was an important and exemplary strand in the rope that represents sustainable peace. Municipal peace-building is also not the strongest strand, but perhaps the very strand that makes the difference between breaking and not breaking.
Introduction

An increasing number of mayors and city councils regard themselves as actors that can contribute to peace-building and reconstruction in conflict and post-conflict areas abroad. Whether they can indeed is hard to assess in the absence of more empirical research. In fact, the debate on the role of domestic and foreign local governments in peace-building has only recently emerged. This article is a modest contribution to the debate, since it analyses the efforts of selected local governments to raise the level of peace-building in Eastern Slavonia. This eastern part of Croatia is one of the areas where the war between Croatia and Serbia (1991-1995) was fought. Eastern Slavonia was the only region that was peacefully transferred to the new state of Croatia and the only region that managed to retain some degree of its pre-war multi-ethnic character.

This paper argues that some Croatian municipalities have contributed to the establishment of sustainable peace in Eastern Slavonia. The paper focuses on the following three questions:

1. In what way have the selected local municipalities contributed to the peace-building process in Eastern Slavonia?
2. In what way have foreign municipalities played a role in this peacebuilding process?
3. What were the circumstances or conditions that enabled municipalities to play a role in this process?

An exhaustive overview of all municipal peacebuilding activities in Eastern Slavonia as well as an analysis of the contribution of local governments to the overall peacebuilding process as a whole fall both outside the scope of this article.

The paper is structured as follows. After defining the concept of peace-building, a brief introduction to the conflict and subsequent peace-building process of Eastern Slavonia is presented. This section identifies the regional conditions that enabled only some municipalities in Eastern Slavonia to contribute to the peace-building process. The main part of the paper describes eight examples of municipal contributions to the peace-building, focusing on local variables accounting for why these local governments were able to play their peace-building role. Sources used include field research and interviews, policy documents and a review of the scientific literature. The paper concludes with the implications and lessons of the local experiences in Eastern Slavonia.

The concept of peace-building Peacebuilding is a central concept in this analysis. Practitioners and academics have not been able to agree upon a clear and coherent definition of peace-building. The following definition is employed in this paper: the totality of activities that aim to permanently keep the use of violence at bay in solving conflicts and to create those conditions that make peaceful conflict resolution increasingly attractive.

Associated with this definition is the distinction between negative and positive peace. Negative peace is the absence of violence, hence the minimum condition for peace. Positive peace encompasses much more. It can be regarded as a situation in which citizens can live
together, because they have built and invested in sustainable structures that solve their problems in a peaceful way. Activities to reach positive peace include reconciliation, the establishment of law and order, equal political and economical rights for all citizens, as well as the sufficient and fair provision of public services such as housing, infrastructure etc.\textsuperscript{1} Statistical research shows that there exists at least a 25% chance that a civil war in which a ceasefire is brokered degenerates back into violent conflict within five years.\textsuperscript{2} This shows that a ceasefire or the establishment of negative peace is only half the process; eventually, positive peace is equally important to prevent recurrence of violent conflict.

In the case of Eastern Slavonia, there were only a few Croatian and foreign municipalities active in peace-making and peace-building during the conflict. The municipal support to peace-building increased once others had put an end to violence. Consequently, this article focuses on the post-conflict stage, and deals with the role of local authorities in the establishment of positive peace in Eastern Slavonia.

A second remark derived from the peace-building definition, is that peace-building is an instrument, and not a goal in itself. It is a process that consists of initiatives, actions, and policy measures. Its impact must, however, not be judged by these initiatives and measures. What counts is the result: a society that is unlikely to resort to violence in resolving its tensions and conflicting interests; and a society that contains sufficient checks and balances to ensure that violence will not be used in the near future. It is this transformative element of peace-building upon which the efforts must be judged.\textsuperscript{3}

It is from this transformative perspective that the examples in this chapter are analyzed. To understand the dynamics and additional value of municipalities to the Eastern Slavonia peace process, the historical and ethnic context of the conflict and its aftermath is presented below.

**Eastern Slavonia** Eastern Slavonia lies in the far east of Croatia. It has an area of 50 km (East-West) by 100 km (North-South) and is bordered by Hungary in the north, Serbia in the East and the Bosnian entity of Republika Srpska in the South. Since the territory of Eastern Slavonia is not clearly defined, neither by administrative nor historical boundaries, in this chapter, Eastern Slavonia denotes the area of the current Croatian Osjecko-Baranjska and Vukovarsko-Srijemska counties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2001</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced persons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Table 1:** changing ethnic background of Eastern Slavonia\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} The terms negative and positive peace were coined by Johan Galtung in the 1960s. See for a more recent elaboration: Galtung (1996).

\textsuperscript{2} Collier et al. (2003). The figures of Collier et al. of 44% to 50% are not uncontested. See: Suhrke and Samset (2007), who convincingly claim that a percentage of little over 20% is more accurate.

\textsuperscript{3} Mason and Meerdink (2006)

\textsuperscript{4} Source: Census of Croatian Bureau for Statistics (accessed 31 January 2008): http://www.dzs.hr
After a prosperous period within the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, Eastern Slavonia was part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. During the Second World War the region fell under the Nazi-allied Independent State of Croatia. From 1945 to 1991 Slavonia was one the richest parts within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During the conflict of 1991-1995 most of Slavonia was part of the autonomous Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). Since 1998 Eastern Slavonia has been a part of the Republic of Croatia. The shifts in the ethnic composition of Eastern Slavonia reflect this geographical and historical background (table 1).

**From war to peace (1991-1995)** The conflict in Eastern Slavonia comprised one of the stages in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. In Eastern Slavonia the conflict started in June 1991, when Croatia declared itself independent. An immediate Serbian response followed. Serbian paramilitary groups and divisions of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav’s Peoples Army isolated the Croatian areas where ethnic Serbs constituted at least a significant minority of the population. Once they secured a large share of Eastern Slavonia as well as some other parts of Croatia, the local Serbian leaders proclaimed the independent Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK).

The fighting between the Croats and the Serbs over these territories was brutal and short. The area that would become part of the RSK was ethnically cleansed: all non-Serbs were either killed or forced to flee. Similarly, many Serbs from other parts of Croatia could only save their lives if they fled. They either left for Serbia proper, or moved into the houses in Eastern Slavonia that were abandoned by the Croatian refugees. Most of the fighting ended after six months in January 1992, when the Serbian and Croatian side agreed to a ceasefire. Fighting and incidents continued at the frontline, but major changes did not occur.

This status quo ended in 1995, when the Croatian army terminated the ceasefire and rapidly defeated the army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the centre of Croatia. As a result, the Eastern part of Slavonia remained the only region on Croatian territory held by the Serbs. Unlike the other war zones, the outcome of the conflict over Eastern Slavonia was not decided by military means, but at the negotiating table. On 12 November 1995 the Republic of Serbian Krajina and the Croatian Army signed a ceasefire in the Basic Agreement. Immediately, Croatia, Serbia, the United States and the United Nations (UN) openly endorsed this Erdut Agreement.

Since a large share of Eastern Slavonia was still in the hands of the Serbs, the parties called upon the UN Security Council to install a Transitional Administration for a maximum period of two years. This temporary UN government would see to a peaceful transition from the Republic of Serbian Krajina into a multi-ethnic region of the Republic of Croatia. The United Nations mission UNTAES[^5] assumed authority from the Serbian rulers on 15 January 1996. After exactly two years the UN transferred its responsibility over the area onto the Republic of Croatia. Building upon earlier local peace-building initiatives, the Transitional Administration reinforced negative peace and laid the foundations for positive peace in the region. After the UN’s departure local and foreign actors continued the strengthening of positive peace.

Since most peace-building by municipalities built on the foundations of UNTAES[^5]

achievements, a closer look into the method and results of the UNTAES mission contributes to one of this paper’s central themes: the conditions for municipal peace-building. As the approach of the Transitional Administration has been of cardinal importance in creating these conditions, the UNTAES working method is presented below.

*The Transitional Administration of UNTAES (1996-1998)* The UN Security Council mandated UNTAES with two goals: a permanent end to violence and a solid foundation with clear future directions for a sustainable positive peace.6 UN practitioners and researchers generally regard UNTAES as one of the most successful UN peace-building missions in recent history. Most military and civil tasks were accomplished within the agreed period of time. Moreover, Eastern Slavonia regained, to a considerable extent, its pre-war multiethnic character.7

For the peace-building process, and, consequently, for the peace-building activities of local governments in Eastern Slavonia from 1996 up to now, three key achievements of the Transitional Administration stand out:

1. Absence of violence
2. Incentives and measures to foster inter-ethnic cooperation
3. Rapid and ethnically fair restoration of public services

**Absence of violence** The mandate required that Eastern Slavonia would be demilitarised within 30 days after the start of the mission. The Transitional Administration managed to achieve this. UNTAES convinced the Serbian military leadership, and hence the Serbian population, that they would benefit from co-operation with UNTAES. Secondly, UNTAES made a successful effort in showing that it was able and ready to protect all citizens in the area, whatever their ethnic background. Lastly, UNTAES closely monitored whether human rights were respected – as a result of which violations of human rights hardly took place. With the establishment and training of the multi-ethnic Temporary Police Force, UNTAES ensured that the basic security it had established would be maintained after the mission. And successfully so: safety and security have not been seriously threatened since.

**Incentives and measures to foster inter-ethnic cooperation** From the very start UNTAES propagated and practised an approach of co-operation: between the UN staff and the local people, between different ethnic groups and between the military and the civil staff. It is telling that Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein removed the UNTAES headquarters from the Croatian capital Zagreb into a temporary, improvised building in the middle of the war ruins of Vukovar.

The ultimate goal of the peace operation was to create an area within the Republic of Croatia in which citizens from all ethnic backgrounds could live securely and without being discriminated. To realise this, UNTAES fostered the participation of all significant ethnic groups in the reintegration process from the very beginning. It is important to note that

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6 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (no date)
7 For an appraisal and the details of the UNTAES operation, see, in order of importance: Howard (2008); Šimunovic (1999); Boothby (2004); Large (2003); Smoljan (2003); Binnendijk (2006); UN Lessons Learned Unit of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (no date); Human Rights Watch (1997); Hanset (2001).
UNTAES did not start this approach from scratch. During the war and in the period immediately hereafter, many local and international NGOs and citizens had already established, or rather, maintained inter-ethnic meetings and cooperation opportunities. From 1993 onward NGOs held regular meetings and exchanges between people from Croatia, RSK and Serbia. UNTAES built on this groundwork and facilitated the continuation of similar peace-building initiatives.

Moreover, UNTAES replicated the NGO working method and ensured that local and regional representatives of various ethnic backgrounds took part in the relevant decision making and implementation processes. The main instruments UNTAES used to reach this goal were the Joint Implementation Committees (JICs), together with a host of subcommittees for all relevant policy areas. Each committee was led by an UNTAES official and composed of a Croatian and a Serbian representative. UNTAES put much effort in identifying representatives with enough local support. Since it was difficult to identify moderate Serbs who were willing to represent the Serbian population, UNTAES founded the Joint Municipal Council to acts as an intermediary to the Serbian part of the population. In using both local authorities and civil society, UNTAES tried to make the most of the local capacities for peace. As such, the JICs established a forum for ethnic groups to start a dialogue on the peaceful reintegration of the region into Croatia.

The question to what extent UNTAES and the JICs achieved the goal of a sustainable and safe multi-ethnic society is a matter of debate. Deputy Transitional Administrator Derek Boothby perhaps summarised best when he stated in 2004, that ‘the answer is mixed: [Eastern Slavonia] is multi-ethnic, but uncomfortably so’. When UNTAES left in 1998 there was still a lot of work to be done to make ethnic groups live together. The further creation of a sustainable peace and ethnic cooperation were left to others. It was in this vacuum that several local governments together with other stakeholders took the opportunity for their peace-building activities.

Rapid and ethnically fair restoration of public services During its two-year mandate UNTAES was the highest government body in the area that previously belonged to the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK). As such it was responsible for the immediate restoration of public services. UNTAES made very clear that it aimed to reintegrate the public institutions of the Serbian-led RSK into the Croatian system, thereby taking into account the ethnic population distribution as reflected in the 1991 census. In other words, UNTAES used the public services as a peace-building instrument, preventing services being used to favour specific ethnic groups.

One of the most sensitive issues in the field of public services was housing. Many houses had to rebuilt, and a large share of the housing stock had to be reallocated from the one family to the other. The main problem was the link to the refugee issue. Many houses had seen various occupants during and after the conflict. In 1991 the majority of Croats from Eastern Slavonia left their houses behind when they fled to other parts of Croatia. In the following years, Serbs expelled from other parts of Croatia fled to Eastern Slavonia and occupied these very houses. After the war many Serbs left the region to move to nearby Yugoslavia. Their houses were often occupied by Croatian immigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina. These waves of migration created a complicated patchwork of tenant rights and claims.
UNTAES tried to solve the issue through a regional JIC, supported by many housing commissions at local level. All major ethnic groups had to be represented in the housing commissions. In reality many commissions ignored this requirement, or blocked decision making. As a result, the regional JIC and many local commissions turned out to be a failure, forcing UNTAES to quit the dialogue structure and intervene directly.\footnote{Smoljan (2003).} Even then many tried and often succeeded to disregard the rules for ethnic proportional distribution of the housing stock. Many mayors were urged to do so under heavy pressure of their electorate and their nationalistic political parties. However, some municipalities withstood the urge to favour one ethnic group over to the other. The illustrations and examples below show that several mayors respected the procedures, using the housing issue as a peace-building instrument instead.

As interim government UNTAES had the explicit task to organise free and fair local elections. To make the elections and the outcome acceptable to all ethnic groups, UNTAES formed a JIC as an instrument to discuss and solve the potentially explosive problems of the elections.\footnote{United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (no date), 94} A large majority of the population turned out to vote. The election outcome was accepted by all major parties, not in the least because the outcome was undeniably clear. Most voters had voted according to their ethnic background. In most municipalities, political par-ties from the same ethnic background set aside their ideological differences in order to prevent parties from another ethnic group coming to power.

After the local elections the multi-ethnic population of Eastern Slavonia had a legal representation in the Croatian political and legal system. From that moment, the municipal potential to play a role in the peace-building increased. Depending on the outcome of the municipal elections and depending on the personalities of the elected representatives, some municipalities contributed to the process from the very beginning, others followed later on and the majority never really did.

As a transformative activity, peace-building in Eastern Slavonia has been moderately successful. On the one hand, the ethnic composition has dramatically changed, and tensions between ethnic groups are still present in multiple ways. On the other hand, Eastern Slavonia has retained a level of multi-ethnicity that is higher than anywhere else in Croatia. And despite the tensions, co-operation has resumed on all levels since the end of the conflict. The population does not resort to violence in solving their conflicts. Moreover, the population is unlikely to do so in the future, as the societal transition of East-ern Slavonia seems to have created sufficient checks and balances.\footnote{See however Large (2003) and Smoljan (2003).} It is telling that in 2006 the city of Osijek wanted to share experiences with a foreign partner city not in the field of social inclusion, but on dog excrement. It is hard to imagine something that better resembles the return to normalisation.

Six illustrations of municipal peace-building: football, religion, housing, waste, and youth

Domestic and foreign municipalities have played a role in this process of normalisation. The next part of this article focuses on selected cases of municipal activities that brought ethnic groups together in the period after the war.
It is important to note that the active municipalities did not function in a vacuum, but were closely embedded in a peace-building process in which NGOs, citizens, national authorities and international actors played a role. Secondly, the illustrations and examples below are not representative for the entire local government sector in post-war Eastern Slavonia. Most local authorities did not actively support the peace process, and they even tried to obstruct it. However, only through the analysis of selected municipalities that did contribute to peace-building in Eastern Slavonia is it possible to understand how and under which conditions local authorities played their peace-building role.

The first illustration comes from the war-period. From 1993 onward, the Hungarian city of Mohács, less than 10 km across the Croatian border, hosted a meeting place where especially youngsters from Croatia, Serbia and the Re-public of Serbian Krajina met. The neutral, nearby space for people and NGOs that wanted to strengthen the bridges between the people of Eastern Slavonia, encouraged and supported many people during the war. In retrospect it can be concluded that meetings like these laid the groundwork for many peace-building initiatives that sprung up once the violence ended.

A second illustration shows how international municipalities strengthened the peace-building activities of Croatian municipalities after the war. Together with the close-by cities of Tuzla (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and Novi Sad (Serbia), the Slavonian city of Osijek developed an intense co-operation. Youth, sport and local economic development were only areas in which Croats, Serbs and Muslims co-operated. To further stimulate a sustainable multi-ethnic society, the three local governments, together with representatives of the civil society from each city, signed the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance. From 2003 onward this unique initiative was extended into the Balkan-wide Association of Multiethnic Cities. After a political change in the city of Osijek, the Croatian participation in the project ended.

Four illustrations from three municipalities in Eastern Slavonia in the post-conflict period further shed first light on the question how municipalities contributed to peace-building. A first illustration is the mayor of Kneževi Vinogradi. When the US government visited the municipality to see how they could help with reconstruction, all the mayor asked for was a couple of lawn mowers so the football team could play again. Significantly Croats, Serbs and Hungarians were all represented in the team.

In other cases the municipal peace-building activities had a broader impact, as in Erdut, the place where the conflict parties signed the Agreement that ended the war. This small municipality of around 8,000 inhabitants hosts a Catholic shrine that is of great importance for the Croatian population in the wider region. Very soon after the war the mayor of the town opened this shrine for all Catholic visitors. The significance of this is not self-evident, since Catholics are always ethnic Croats, whereas the mayor represents the Serbian Orthodox majority of the municipality. Without any doubt the mayor could have put various kinds of obstacles to prevent Croats visiting their holy place. He himself choose however to open the shrine, thereby showing his willingness to cooperate with other ethnic groups, as well as his personal opinion that investment in a multi-ethnic society would pay off.

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13 The Agreement, as well as the history and achievements of the co-operation and association can be found at www.amcsee.org. Another initiative to stimulate international co-operation between civil society and local governments in Osijek was the Local Democracy Academy. For more information, see: www.ldaonline.org.

The second example from Erdut similarly shows that one local elected official can make the difference between successful and unsuccessful peace-building. Jovan Jelic, the current mayor of Erdut, was part of the housing commission in the years after the war. Although he did not always agree with the official housing policies, and although he still suggests that the Croatian national government has used the housing issue to favour ethnic Croats, the municipal housing commission ensured that the housing policy did not get out of hand in Erdut. The main problems were posed by the refugees, both Croatian and Serb, who did not live in Erdut before the war. The commission achieved two important goals set out in the Erdut Agreement. First of all, the municipality became multi-ethnic again, because many Serbs could be persuaded to stay, and because many Croats could find a place in the settlements. Secondly, the housing and reintegration issue was managed peacefully, without leading to inter-ethnic incidents.

Mr Jelic used three rules to make sure that the housing problems did not lead to more inter-ethnic tension in the area. Firstly, he always kept out local and regional media to make sure that tensions were not fuelled by blown-up newspaper reports. Secondly, he put a lot of effort in preventing a conflict between two families to grow into a Croat-Serbian conflict that involved more people and families. And thirdly, he always tried to play it correctly and fair: when public services were gradually restored he made sure that these limited services were fairly distributed over both groups; when there were complaints he always tried to lower tensions, and if this would not work, he always used the official Croatian procedures.

In doing so, he was mistrusted by both the Serbs and Croats; by Croats, because he was a Serb and represented a Serbian party, and by Serbs – his electorate – because he sought a rapprochement with Croats. The mayor claims that he was nevertheless able to convince most people, because he tried to show both sides that they had no choice but to live together. ‘The Serbian community must understand that they are part of the Republic of Croatia now, and that integration into Croatian society was therefore to their own advantage. However, Croats had to understand that integration of Serbs into Croatian society would benefit this society as a whole. They should regard the Serbian minority as a bonus’. 16

An illustration from the municipality of Darda similarly shows that public services can have a reintegrating impact. 17 Soon after the war, Darda started to co-operate with the Belgian municipality of Stabroek and the Dutch municipality of Woonserdrecht. When discussing the areas of co-operation, Darda mentioned waste management, a major problem in Darda at the time. The foreign municipalities agreed to include waste management in the trilateral cooperation activities, but insisted that the implementation would have an equal benefit for all ethnic inhabitants in the municipality. Darda not only approved of this condition, but took it to a higher level. Because the donated trucks for waste collection had more capacity than Darda could absorb, Darda and its international partners decided that it would be good to start co-operating with neighbouring municipalities. Achieving this goal was less obvious than it might have seemed, since the surrounding municipalities were headed by mayors from various ethnic and party backgrounds. In the Eastern Slavonian context, many mayors would reject a joint initiative, even when their own municipality would benefit, simply because mayors from another ethnic background could benefit from it too.

Even in such a technical area like waste management, co-operation was not easy. Among the
participating mayors there was mistrust and resistance. But the prospect of good technical equipment and the persistence of several key people convinced all mayors in the end. Hence, in a still widely segregated area, eight municipalities headed by Croatian, Serbian and Hungarian mayors started a successful cooperation in 1998. First of all this immensely improved the service delivery to all inhabitants in the eight municipalities, literally materialising the peace dividend. And secondly, it clearly showed the inhabitants that it was possible indeed to make a success out of multi-ethnic cooperation. As such, these local authorities, together with their partner municipalities from abroad, proved that they could play an important role, both in the physical and mental reconstruction of their municipalities.18

Three detailed examples: integration, ethnic proportionality, inter-municipal co-operation

The four illustrations above shed a first light on how municipalities in Eastern Slavonia used their potential to contribute to the establishment of positive peace. The three more comprehensive examples of municipal peace-building in the next section identify the conditions that made this outcome possible. The examples deal with: (1) the integration of Serbian villages in the predominantly Croatian city of Osijek; (2) the ethnically proportional representation in Kneževi Vinogradi; (3) the co-operation between the Croatian municipality of Ernestinovo with the Serbian municipality of Šodolovci.

The reintegration of Serbian suburbs into the city of Osijek

With over 114,000 inhabitants, Osijek is the fourth-largest city in Croatia and the capital of Eastern Slavonia. In the first years after the conflict the municipality19 of Osijek contributed to the establishment of positive peace on its territory, when it successfully incorporated two Serbian settlements in its predominantly Croatian society. During this period Mr Kramarić was the liberal mayor of Osijek, making the city one of the few areas not headed by a nationalistic party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Osijek20</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants</td>
<td>165,253</td>
<td>114,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: changing population in Osijek

The River Drava that flows directly north of Osijek was the frontline during the war. Osijek was heavily shelled, especially during the first years of the conflict. The frontline did not change. Most of the current municipality of Osijek was never under Serbian rule, except for

18 Interview with Tomas Ilic, vice-mayor when this co-operation was set up, and currently head of the intermunicipal company that resulted from the cooperation, August 2007.

19 According to Croatian law, Osijek is not a municipality (opcina), but a town or city (grad). Together towns and municipalities constitute the Croatian local administrative level, but towns have more rights and duties. For clarity’s sake, all local authorities in this chapter, including grad Osijek, will be denoted as municipalities.
two nearby suburban villages called Sarvaš and old Tenja. Parts of these small settlements were predominantly Serbian before the war, and became rapidly part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Many Croatians living in Sarvaš and old Tenja (new Tenja was predominantly Croatian and was never part of the RSK) fled or were killed in 1991, and, likewise, many Serbs living in Osijek fled or were killed (see table; note that the data for Osijek include the data for Tenja and Sarvaš; some data for the two settlements are estimates).22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: changing population in Tenja & Sarvaš

Between 1991 and 1995 Osijek and the two suburbs had a totally different life. Whereas the citizens from Osijek could reach the Croatian capital Zagreb by car and telephone, this was impossible for the inhabitants of old Tenja and Sarvaš. Here the telephone lines were redirected to the Serbian capital Belgrade. Roadblocks and checkpoints prevented any citizen crossing the new borderline. In the rare case that a foreigner had the right papers, it would still take some 6 hours to travel between Osijek and old Tenja or Sarvaš, a couple of kilometres down the road, as he would have to go through Croatia, Hungary and Serbia.

Once peace was established, the population of old Tenja and Sarvaš were able to express their preference for becoming either one independent municipality or to administratively join the municipality of Osijek. The citizens of the two villages opted for the second alternative, most probably because of economic prospects. And thus from 1996 onward two predominantly Serbian settlements with an entirely different recent past became integrated into the predominantly Croatian municipality of Osijek.

It is in the confrontation with this challenge that Osijek municipality showed willingness and capacity to contribute to the peace-building process. The integration had two closely related dimensions, a physical and a psychological one. The physical dimension dealt with restoration of public services. A difficult and contested task, as a large share of the Osijek population did not see the use of resuming public services to people who had lived on the other side of the frontline. The psychological element of the integration was more intricate, and consisted primarily in convincing people on both sides not to obstruct the integration.

Between 1997 and 2001 Mr Tihomir Salajic was the municipal official responsible for the integration process. In his view the peace-building process would be helped best if the largest possible share of the original Serbian population in old Tenja and Sarvaš could be

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21 During the war, the Croatian authorities implemented a comprehensive decentralization process. As a result, the number of municipalities rose over fourfold. The municipality of Osijek, for instance, included over 50% of the current province Osijek-Baranja before the war, and is now one of 37 local government units in the province. During and after the war settlements and villages of certain sizes (not too big and not too small) could become part of a neighbouring municipality, or remain independent. Until 1998 UNTAES had a say in this, hereafter the Croatian government coordinated the process. To some extent the preference of the local population was taken into account. See: Bjeljac (2001).
23 Estimates based on Mol (2000), and interview with Mr Salajic, August 2007.
24 Interview with Mr Salajic, August 2007

To show the Serbian population that it would be worthwhile to stay in old Tenja and Sarvaš, it was urgent to repair the deplorable public services. However, the municipality of Osijek was confronted with the problem of prioritizing neighbourhoods, since funds were far from sufficient. Many Croats had the opinion that Croatian quarters of Osijek should get access to the restored services first. There was not a clear solution to this dilemma; hence the municipality resumed public service delivery in some Croatian and in some Serbian quarters. Mr Salajic made sure that a water pipe between Osijek and Tenja and Sarvaš was quickly restored, despite public pressure to do otherwise. 25

Parts of the population expressed similar opposition when Osijek sought to remove checkpoints between Osijek and Sarvaš and Tenja. Hereafter, the municipality put a bus connection between Osijek and the two villages in place. And although the number of people using this connection was small, the municipality gave a clear sign that it was committed to investing in building bridges between the two ethnic groups.

The restoration of municipal services was decisive for two reasons. Firstly, it showed that the municipality of Osijek was willing to invest in the integration of the Serbian villages. Secondly it made clear that the municipality could convince the majority of its Croatian population not to object to these investments, despite the influence of nationalist and radical Croats.

To achieve this, the municipality had to give attention to the psychological dimension of the peace-building process. In a period so short after the war, tensions between the two ethnic groups were still strong. The municipality of Osijek devoted much time to talking to Serbs in Tenja and Sarvaš, convincing them that it was safe and worthwhile to stay. Even more attention was given to persuading Croatian inhabitants in the city that municipal contributions to the peace-building process were necessary and of collective, municipal interest. Notwithstanding the support of the mayor and the municipal council, the responsible municipal officer was openly despised and threatened, by Serbs because he was a Croat, and by Croats because he helped Serbs. Moreover, ethnic tensions were far from gone. The situation improved once the first post-war years were over.

Most resistance came from Croats and Serbs who had not lived as neighbours before the war, but who had come to Osijek as war refugees. A public meeting in Sarvaš serves as illustration. From the very start of the public meeting a group of Serbs physically threatened Salajic. This group consisted of Serbian refugees. The situation deteriorated until Serbs originally from Tenja and Sarvaš defended Salajic against the Serbian refugees.

It is important to note that Osijek’s activities in the mental or psychological sphere were strongly embedded in initiatives and programmes of other players, most notably of citizens and NGOs. The Osijek based Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights, for instance, made great efforts in decreasing tensions and rebuilding the social fabric in Tenja. 26

24 Interview with Mr Salajic, August 2007
25 It should be noted that, nevertheless, the restoration of services in old Tenja took more time than in most other places; see: Mol (2000), p. 55.
26 Kruhonja (2000)
Their activities as well other civic initiatives were the first attempts to build inter-ethnic bridges. It is in this context that the municipality managed to gain a sufficient level of trust from both groups to pursue its peace-building activities.

As a transformative concept, the impact of peace-building must be measured by the condition in which the society finds itself at the end of the process. From this perspective the peace-building efforts to integrate Tenja and Sarvaš into the municipality of Osijek can be regarded as successful. Although the number of Serbs in Tenja and Sarvaš has dramatically fallen, Osijek has retained its multi-ethnic character. Moreover, co-operation between the two ethnic groups has resumed in Osijek as well as in the two villages, something that is illustrated by the current council of the Osijek district of Tenja led by a coalition of the Croatian and Serbian local political parties.

These results do not imply that Osijek has obtained sustainable peace on all fronts. Ethnic and Nazi oriented graffiti on walls in Sarvaš shows that ethnic animosity has not disappeared. Yet many aspects of an all-encompassing positive peace are in place, generally believed to cumulate in a sustainable multi-ethnic society that does not resort to violence to solve its conflicts.

The role of other stakeholders in the first years of the integration provides additional insight into the role of the municipality of Osijek and its international partners in the local peace-building process. It is worth noting that between 1995 and 2001 the national and regional tiers of the Croatian government hardly helped. This is partly explained by the nationalistic character of the then leading political party at regional and national level. In some cases the county purposely hindered the municipal peace-building. Being responsible for financing most public services both at regional and local level, the regional government refused to allocate budget for Osijek’s public services when the integration of old Tenja and Sarvaš was involved.

With local and regional peace NGOs the cooperation was better, albeit not very intensive and mainly limited to facilitating some aspects of NGO activities. For example the municipality offered accommodation to NGOs, enabling them to do their peace-building work in Osijek and Tenja.

International partners actively supported Osijek’s peace-building efforts seeing Osijek as a liberal stronghold in a largely nationalistic area. Through Osijek’s successes in peace-building, so the international community hoped, the surrounding area would be convinced that investing in positive peace did indeed pay off. A key partner for Osijek was UNTAES. Other international actors followed soon after. The most important partners were the Norwegian government, several international NGOs, and three local governments from abroad: Pécs (Hungary), Pforzheim (Germany) and Veneto (Italy). Pécs and Pforzheim are still officially twinned to Osijek.

Two examples, one of physical and one of moral support, illustrate that the co-operation with international actors proved to be important, yet not essential for the implementation of Osijek’s peace-building initiatives. The material help to the population of Osijek was enormous. For several years, trucks with all kind of goods arrived in Osijek on a daily basis. This strengthened Osijek’s peace-building efforts. After the municipality had the checkpoints between Osijek and Tenja and Sarvaš removed, the German city of Pforzheim

gave buses. Families and friends from both ethnic groups finally had the opportunity to meet again. The buses had not been donated on the condition that they were used as a peace-building instrument. The municipality of Osijek itself decided to use them this way. However, the fact that international partners played a role in the bridge building projects did not go unnoticed to the general public. That the Pforzheim buses were locally known as Genscher’s says it all.

Next to material aid Osijek was strengthened with moral support. The continuous presence and involvement of foreign cities was a sign that the municipality was not isolated, and did not have to fulfil all complicated tasks alone. It is telling in that respect that for many years 15 mayors of befriended cities and 15 ambassadors attended the city’s anniversary on 2 December. Nowadays, not more than five international mayors show up, while ambassadors have shifted their attention to other places.

The municipal contribution was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the success of peace-building process. Civil society, national and international efforts are other key variables.

**Ethnically Proportional Power Structures in Kneževi Vinogradi**

The municipality of Kneževi Vinogradi consists of a string of small villages close to the Hungarian and Serbian border. During the war Kneževi Vinogradi did not experience many of the high-impact events that hit many other municipalities in Eastern Slavonia: no major military operations, no forced displacements and only few casualties. Over 20% of the population, mainly young Croats and Hungarians, left Kneževi Vinogradi at the beginning of the war. After the war many Croats and Hungarians returned, and many Serbs decided to stay. As a result, the multi-ethnic character of the population was retained after the war (see Table 1). Kneževi Vinogradi is the only municipality in Croatia where Hungarians are the largest ethnic group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kneževi Vinogradi</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants (total)</td>
<td>6,848</td>
<td>5,186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kneževi Vinogradi serves as a case in this article because the municipality managed to establish sustainable co-operation between its ethnic groups. Croatian municipalities were legally required to formulate and implement national policies to enhance multi-ethnic co-operation. But Kneževi Vinogradi stands out in two ways: firstly because it has actually

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28 Hans Dietrich Genscher was Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1974-1992, and one of the first Foreign Ministers to recognize Croatia’s independence.

29 Sources: Interview and Djuric (2004)


31 As not many new Croatian immigrants settled in Kneževi Vinogradi, the main reason for the increase of percentage of Croats can probably be explained by the nationwide trend that a significant number of people of other ethnic origin choose to register themselves as ‘Croat’ in the post-war census (Djuric, ‘A Success Story’, 88).
converted national legislation into legal municipal statutes, and secondly because Kneževi Vinogradi indeed observes these municipal statutes and puts them in practice. Both municipal decision making and policies aim to keep a workable balance between the ethnic groups; a balance that enables each group to preserve its specific character as long as this does not harm other ethnic groups. The municipal council and the mayor are permanently alert that the balance is not upset.

An important feature of this aspiration is manifest in the municipal council of Kneževi Vinogradi. All over Croatia, especially in the first years after the war, both radical and moderate Croatian parties did all they could to keep Serbian parties out of the local governments. Kneževi Vinogradi proved to be a rare exception. After the first elections of 1997 the municipality was led by a coalition of a Croatian, a Hungarian and a Serbian party.32 Without major problems, the coalition managed to complete its full term.

After the local elections of 2001, the composition of council and coalition changed, but the local political culture of co-operation continued, and the decisions of the council passed ‘consensually and in unison in 99 percent of the cases’.33 Moreover, parties that did not participate in the municipal coalition after 2001 were invited to take part in the various municipal committees, whereby posts were distributed in correspondence with the ethnic composition of the population. In this way, Kneževi Vinogradi – as one of few municipalities – actively continued the practice of multi-ethnic cooperation that UNTAES started through its JICs.

The participation of all ethnic groups in the development and implementation of municipal policy is not the only characteristic of Kneževi Vinogradi’s pursuit of a sustainable multi-ethnic society. Another trait can be found in the way the municipality deals with practical issues. One such issue arose when a particular group of citizens demanded one of the churches in the municipality be rebuilt. Immediately the municipality was very careful not to favour one religious – hence ethnic – group above the other. The municipality pragmatically decided that the Hungarian evangelical, the Croatian Catholic and the Serbian Orthodox churches would all be rebuilt.

Kneževi Vinogradi deals with multi-ethnic policy quite differently than most local authorities in Eastern Slavonia. Two sorts of reason help explain why it was Kneže

vi Vinogradi contributed to the establishment of a positive peace. The first contains contextual reasons: static, independent features of the municipality. The second category consists of specific reasons: features dependent on the decisions and actions of the municipality and its inhabitants.

First of all the peace-building process was easier to implement than elsewhere due to the unique circumstance that the Hungarians were the largest ethnic group in the municipality, so they could act as a buffer between Croats and Serbs. A second contextual reason for the comparably low level of tension be-tween Croats and Serbs lies in the marginal role of Kneževi Vinogradi in the conflict. Here the wounds from the war were not as deep as in many other places in Eastern Slavonia. Other scholars have mentioned the small size of

32 The Kneževi Vinogradi coalition after the 1997 elections consisted of all elected representatives in the municipal council, and was constituted as follows: 7 representatives from HDZ (Croatian), 5 representatives from the Independent Hungarian list and 4 representatives from SDSS (Serbian).

Kneževi Vinogradi as an explanation for the success of the municipal peace-building initiatives. This does not seem convincing. Kneževi Vinogradi is admittedly a small municipality where most inhabitants know each other personally. But its size does not differ much from the average municipal size in Eastern Slavonia. A final contextual explanation is the absence of radicals and extremists in local politics. Due to their absence, none of the political parties were forced to follow hardline approaches.

Where the absence of extreme politicians is a contextual factor that lies outside the control of the municipality (something mayor Deneš Šoja considers ‘a coincidence, sheer luck’), the absence may also be regarded as a specific factor of Kneževi Vinogradi’s careful policy in multi-ethnic affairs. Exactly because they were anxious not to arouse ethnic unrest, the local parties and politicians discouraged radical, nationalistic behaviour. In fact one of the first specific conditions for the creation of a successful peace-building process seems to be the fact that the local representatives in the municipal council do not provide potential extremists with any reasonable pretext to complain or to take action.

The second specific reason relates to the municipality’s decision to make proportional ethnic representation the cornerstone of local politics. Because all parties and local politicians agreed upon this local ‘law’ or custom, the explosive ethnic dimension was taken away from many municipal topics straight away. It must, however, be emphasized that the tool of ethnic representation was used pragmatically and carefully. An extremely strict application of ethnic representation would have been near to impossible and, moreover, potentially counter-productive to its purpose.

A third specific reason for the absence of ethnic unrest in Kneževi Vinogradi are its integrative activities, most notably in the area of sports. The inhabitants elected a non-political, moderate mayor, Mr Šoja, who favoured such activities.

International support, especially from foreign municipalities, has not played a specific role in the establishment of positive peace in Kneževi Vinogradi. Kneževi Vinogradi benefited from international support during the Transitional Administration and in the years hereafter, but this can hardly explain the unique circumstances in Kneževi Vinogradi, since large-scale international support was offered to all municipalities in Eastern Slavonia.

Moreover, assistance from foreign local governments did not contribute to the creation of positive peace in Kneževi Vinogradi, as this constituted only a negligible part of the international support. Most international aid reached Kneževi Vinogradi directly from national governments like Norway, Hungary and the United States or through the Croatian national government. However, there were contacts and exchanges with foreign municipalities, for instance with the Hungarian city of Mohács in the field of sports and municipal affairs. That this never led to official partnerships has been a deliberate choice. If Kneževi Vinogradi were to have signed an official twinning agreement with a city like Mohács, other ethnic minorities would most probably demand an official twinning with a municipality from their respective country of origin.

**Inter-municipal co-operation between Ernestinovo and Šodolovci** Ernestinovo and Šodolovci are two neighbouring municipalities. Before the war the municipality of Ernestinovo was much larger, containing the villages of Ernestinovo and Šodolovci along

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35 See for example the disastrous results in the Bosnia-Herzegovina city of Mostar: Bieber (2006).
with a series of smaller settlements. In the years 1991-1995 the area saw heavy fighting and ethnic cleansing. For many people in Eastern Slavonia the village of Šodolovići became synonymous with the ‘Šodolovići Group’, a small group of Serbs that committed war crimes during the conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ernestinovo</th>
<th>Šodolovići</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croats</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbs</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants (total)</td>
<td>2,225</td>
<td>1,955</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: ethnic composition of Ernestinovo & Šodolovići in 2001

After the war Transitional Administrator Jacques Klein decided to take the five predominantly Serbian villages out of the municipality of Ernestinovo, and create the new municipality of Šodolovići from them. Klein’s main aim was to give the Serbian villages a larger sense of security in a municipality of their own, thereby decreasing the level of inter-ethnic tensions. As a result, Ernestinovo became a largely Croatian municipality, whereas in the new municipality of Šodolovići the vast majority of the inhabitants were Serb (see table).

Knowing this historical and ethnic background, few would assume that these two municipalities would overcome ethnic differences and start an intense co-operation only some years after the end of the war. However, this is exactly what happened.

In the process of municipal co-operation the position of the two mayors is essential. These days the two mayors, Matija Greif of Ernestinovo, and Pero Klicković of Šodolovići, are two entirely different people. Mr Greif is a pensioner of German-Croatian descent, seriously wounded by a Serbian grenade in the war. Greif has been an independent mayor of Ernestinovo since 2001. Klicković is a Serb, elected as mayor in 1997, and in office ever since. In 2000 Klicković was accused, but not convicted, of war crimes as member of the Šodolovići Group. Before he was cleared of all charges, Klicković spent six months in prison. It is important to mention that during this period he was visited twice by the foreign municipality of Wageningen. Wageningen was careful not to take sides, only urging the responsible authorities to see to a fair process.

The first step for rapprochement between the two municipalities did not come from themselves. Youth and women’s activities preceded municipal co-operation. And it was a foreign municipality, actively supported by Croatian and Dutch citizens and NGOs that stimulated the mayors to meet. Back in 1992 the Dutch municipality of Wageningen met representatives of one of Ernestinovo’s villages during an international peace conference for local governments in Ohrid, Macedonia. Their contacts were furthered during the war. In the post-war period the support from Wagningen shifted from moral encouragement and humanitarian assistance to reconstruction and reconciliation. After mutual consultation Wageningen decided to finance the renovation of a primary school and its playground. Assisted by IKV, a Dutch peace organization, Wageningen demanded the school and playground to be open for children from Šodolovići too. After consultation with the mayor

36 See note 20.
37 See chapter by Dion van den Berg.
and council of Šodolovci, the co-operation between the three municipalities took off. Together Ernestinovo, Šodolovci and Wageningen renovated the playground. And, as was the intention, children from the surrounding Croatian and Serbian villages indeed made use of it to play together.

For some time the municipal co-operation between Ernestinovo and Šodolovci was less intense. But as soon as Greif succeeded his predecessor in 2001, trust between the two mayors increased. Again, so the mayors claim, the step towards further co-operation was only made after they sat together with the mayor and an alderman of Wageningen and a representative of IKV. In fact it took many years of hard, persistent work to convince both municipalities to resume co-operation.

The main reason for rapprochement was municipal self-interest. Both municipalities are in fact too small to fulfil the tasks assigned to them. Only through co-operation with neighbours can the municipalities properly support their inhabitants. Through the international focus on the benefit of working together, both mayors realized that they did not have to agree on the past in order to agree about a joint future. Or as one of the mayors put it: ‘When I became mayor many destroyed houses had not been rebuilt. But that was not all. The relationships between neighbours drawn willingly or unwillingly into the war, had to be rebuilt. So I told myself: ‘forget the destroyed homes, forget your wounds, and start working together as before the war, only smarter this time’.38

Where the international community was important in reestablishing the first foundations of trust and dialogue, the mayors were essential in convincing their electorate and population that it was in their own interest to co-operate. In both communities there were radicals that accused the mayor of working together with the other ethnic group. And indeed large parts of the population initially disapproved of the inter-ethnic cooperation. It underlines the wise leadership of both mayors that they continued to uphold the unpopular and sensitive vision of cooperation between Croats and Serbs, and still managed to be re-elected. It helped that both mayors were local personalities who had directly suffered from the war themselves.

The last reason for others to start believing in the multi-ethnic cooperation were the visible results. The aforementioned playground was swiftly put into place. A second project was the realization of a greenhouse that combined the agricultural output for the municipalities with their educational needs.

In 2006, the co-operation with Wageningen ended. But this has not stopped the co-operation between Ernestinovo and Šodolovci. In fact, the mayor of Ernestinovo emphasises that cooperation with the Serb village of Šodolovci is better than with many neighbouring Croatian municipalities. This can be illustrated with their latest joint project: the revitalisation of the River Vuka that meanders through their territories. Currently the national government is considering financing the project.

From a peace-building perspective, this continued co-operation is even more important than the results it brought about. For it shows that a Croatian and a Serbian local governments have managed to step over a contested history, and to invest in a future together. And the peace-building practice of the mayors does not stand on its own. When the mayors felt encouraged by their international partner municipality and the activities of local NGOs and citizens, their vision and successes in turn stimulated inhabitants from both municipalities to work together on joint economic, cultural and political initiatives.

38 Interview with Mr Greif and Mr Klickovic (August 2007).
Conclusions and implications

After the first months of the war in Eastern Slavonia (1991-1995) former neighbours, friends and colleagues found themselves on different sides of the frontline; Croats in the Western part and Serbs in the Eastern part. Four years later, after mass migrations and ethnic cleansing on both sides, peace was signed. The contending parties agreed that Eastern Slavonia would be part of the Republic of Croatia, provided that all ethnic groups would have equal rights. Moreover, the two parties decided to call upon the UN to install a Temporary Administration that would see to a safe and fair integration of the Serb dominated part of Eastern Slavonia into Croatia. This agreement was the foundation for the successful peace-building process that followed. The Transitional Administration assumed power early 1996, stayed for two years and met most of its requirements. Hereafter local, national and international stakeholders from the public and the non-profit sector sought to establish a society in which not only violence was absent (negative peace), but that also possessed sufficient trust, social fabric and structures to guarantee a situation of sustainable peace in which members of the society would solve their conflicts in a peaceful way (positive peace).

Local authorities have contributed to this process, as the illustrations and examples in this article show. These are, however, not representative for the entire local layer of governance in Eastern Slavonia. Still, the illustrations and examples allow an answer to the question as to how Croatian and international municipalities have played their peace-building role, and under which conditions.

How Croatian municipalities strengthened the peace-building process

It is important to appreciate two things: firstly that the war in Eastern Slavonia was an ethnic civil war, and secondly that the war was no longer violent when most municipalities started to play their part. Consequently, the municipal contribution to peace-building lay not so much in ensuring human security, but much more in facilitating and stimulating the normalisation of multi-ethnic relations in the post-conflict stage.

The illustrations and examples in this article show that Croatian municipalities have contributed to positive peace in at least five different ways. The first municipal instrument was direct intervention in local inter-ethnic conflicts to facilitate a peaceful solution. Erdut constitutes a good example. Through talking, mediating and keeping the media at bay its mayor prevented quarrels over housing turning into inter-ethnic conflicts.

Secondly, municipalities stimulated citizens to invest in or at least tolerate a multi-ethnic society by talking, informing and convincing. In doing so, they often followed the initiative of citizens or local NGOs that started working on community building before. The city of Osijek shows the effects achieved by a municipality determined to invest in multi-ethnic cooperation. When the Serbian suburbs of Tenja and Sarvaš choose to integrate in the predominantly Croatian city of Osijek, the mayor, aldermen and administration tried to convince both Serbs and Croats that the multi-ethnic integration would benefit both. The comparably high number of Serbs that stayed in Tenja and Sarvaš shows that the municipal efforts have had success.

A third way to establish positive peace deals with the provision of public services. Public services can ignite ethnic tension when one ethnic group receives more or better services than the other group. Public services can build bridges between ethnic groups, if cooperation is necessary to obtain the service, and when they are provided in a transparent,
proportionate and fair way. The policy of the municipality of Erdut to allocate houses in an ethnically fair way is one example; the introduction of bus services, water pipes, and telephone connection in the Osijek suburbs of Tenja and Sarvaš another. A more elaborate illustration of this method is the inter-municipal co-operation set up by the municipality of Darda. Together, participating municipalities of various ethnic backgrounds provided a system of waste management to all their citizens, showing that nobody was excluded from municipal services.

Moreover, Darda set an example to its citizens through the co-operation with municipalities of other ethnic make-up, and showing that this could pay off. Not only preaching that multi-ethnic co-operation benefits the entire municipality in the end, but also practising it. Another such case is Kneževi Vinogradi. The local politicians showed that they stood behind their vision of multi-ethnic co-operation as the only way forward, simply by bringing this co-operation into practice. In Ernestinovo and Šodolovci it was the other way around. Here the mayors followed existing peace-building activities of local NGOs and citizens. The co-operation of the mayors had a stimulating effect and reinforced existing initiatives. Whereas the vast majority of the inhabitants still choose to live within their own ethnic group, the mayors reached out to one another. As their co-operation proved to be fruitful, more and more citizens followed their example. Social structures to uphold the positive peace thus gradually emerged.

The fifth and last way through which municipalities strengthened inter-ethnic cooperation is the most obvious one: through municipal projects or measures that directly aimed to bring citizens from different ethnic groups together. The greenhouse of Ernestinovo and Šodolovci is one such example. Pupils with a different ethnic background had to work together in the greenhouse, discovering the critically important experience that cooperation bears fruit. Another example is Kneževi Vinograd’s investment in the local football pitch, enabling the multi-ethnic football team to play again.

How international municipalities strengthened the peace-building process

Croatian municipalities were far from the only actors in the peace-building process after the war. Their activities and initiatives were embedded in a broad peace-building effort, to which many local, national and international actors contributed. Among the international actors were municipalities from abroad that tried to support the peace-building process through co-operation with their Croatian partners.

Contributions by foreign local authorities can be divided into four categories: financial backing, moral encouragement, technical assistance in municipal affairs and intermediary services between various ethnic groups or between the municipality and its citizens.

Although the financial aid of foreign municipalities pales into insignificance when compared to the total amount of reconstruction budget, it had a real added value that other stakeholders could not provide. Contributions were often tailor-made and not bureaucratic. A good example is the donation of buses by the German municipality of Pforzheim to Osijek. These buses enabled Osijek to reconnect the bus service between the predominantly Serbian settlements of Sarvaš, Tenja and the predominantly Croatian city of Osijek. Without the long bureaucratic procedures of international organizations, Pforzheim could quickly send some of its buses to Osijek, thereby enabling friends and families living on both sides of the former frontline to reunite soon after the war ended. The financial support of foreign municipalities also had extra value because it was specifically used for municipal co-operation, of which there are many illustrations and examples.
The second type of assistance that foreign municipalities offered was moral encouragement. This moral support took place between municipal personalities, but also between NGOs and citizens from Croatian and foreign municipalities. Especially during the war and in the first years thereafter, this support was highly valued by Croatian municipalities. It freed them from their isolated position and showed them that others knew what they were going through. It strengthened local champions of peace in their idea that they were pursuing the right vision. The 15 foreign mayors who annually attended Osijek’s anniversary were meant and perceived as a heartening token of encouragement.

Thirdly, municipalities from abroad supported the peace-building process through technical support, for example when the city of Osijek exchanged ideas and good practices on social inclusion and minority issues with its international partner municipalities.

Lastly, foreign municipalities played an intermediary role; as catalyst in bringing together various ethnic groups within one or more municipalities, or as initiator of closer cooperation between municipality and civil society. The Dutch municipality of Wageningen and the peace organization IKV, for instance, managed to do this in Ernestinovo and Šodolovci. Their stimulation of a joint project with concrete results for citizens resulted in rapprochement.

**Conditions for municipal contributions to the peace-building process** Clear conditions for municipal contributions to the peace-building process in Eastern Slavonia cannot be identified on the basis of the research for this article. However, some factors help explain why municipalities had the opportunity to play a peace-building role in the first place (the regional or general factors), and why some municipalities actually seized this opportunity (the municipal or specific factors).

Several regional circumstances give insight into why municipalities could play a role in the peace-building process of Eastern Slavonia. The foremost condition that enabled local authorities to contribute was the establishment and maintenance of negative peace – the absence of violence. In that sense the ceasefire, the approval of the peace agreement by the national governments of Croatia and Serbia as well as the successful mission of UNTAES were essential for municipal peace-building in Eastern Slavonia.

This leads to the second condition: agreement among external powers, including the international community, that sustainable peace was something worth fighting for. UNTAES believed that all stakeholders including municipalities had to be involved in the establishment of positive peace: in reconstruction and, simultaneously, in the rebuilding of the multi-ethnic society. This two-way track laid the foundations on which most of the municipal peace-building initiatives were built.

The fact that the legal framework and the direction of the reconstruction of Eastern Slavonia were widely accepted is the last general condition. That Eastern Slavonia would be a part of Croatia was hardly contested. Indeed, legal and political measures that enabled all ethnic groups to live in Eastern Slavonia were generally observed and monitored. As a result, most people believed that investments in the physical and mental/psychological reconstruction of Eastern Slavonia were worthwhile. Municipalities could implement their peace-building activities within a broad and accepted framework.

However, not many municipalities seized the peace-building opportunities. Specific circumstances shed light on the question why some did, while many did not.
The first specific condition for municipal peace-building is the presence of key individuals who have the conviction, vigour, and power – and in many cases interest – to start and to sustain working towards positive peace. Whether they are called local champions or agents for peace, and whether politician or civil servant, without them municipalities would not be able to achieve tangible results in the field of peace-building.

A second necessary condition is local support. Either representing the population (mayor) or serving the citizens (civil servants), the municipal organization has no choice but to ensure sufficient acceptance or support for its peace-building and integrative policies. This does not imply that municipal activities can only respond to civic initiatives. A municipality that is convinced of the need for peace-building activities can surely take the lead, even when its activities are not yet rooted in the local society. Ultimately, however, the municipality must be able to convince its citizens to support or at least tolerate the activities.

The last prerequisite that determines whether a municipality adopts a peace-building policy or not, is the prospect of local benefits of peace. These benefits can take many forms. It is obvious that in the long run the structural absence of violence is the main profit for the population. But for peace-building to be successful, it is also necessary to achieve tangible benefits within a short period of time, be they emotional, financial or infrastructural.

Leadership, local support and tangible benefits of peace are the three necessary conditions that must be locally met for municipal peace-building activities to take off and to be sustainable. Four other factors are not an absolute necessity for municipal peace-building, but certainly help in making initiatives successful. The first of these is trivial in character: finance. Local initiatives can be more effective and durable when there is money to invest; when there are sufficient resources to implement the ideas that come out of the participation process. Especially when it comes to realizing short-term, visible results and sustainable achievements, budgets can make a difference.

A second supporting factor is the presence of an active civil society working on building bridges. Especially in the first years after the war in Eastern Slavonia, the civic initiatives in peace-building outnumbered the municipal ones. Small and large, local, national and international NGOs as well as individual initiatives paved the way for many a municipal policy. This does not imply that municipal peace-building is impossible without prior peace-building by citizens and NGOs. This is certainly not the case, as the example of Kneževi Vinogradi shows. But in many other situations, it did stimulate a peace-building role of local authorities to such an extent that it is hard to think of a municipal contribution without the civic pioneering work.

A third factor is the help from international municipalities. Examples in this article show that domestic local authorities are well able to create peace-building conditions by themselves. There are, however, many cases that make clear that support from a partner municipality was an incentive or accelerator in a peace-building effort. Support from foreign colleagues – be it financial, technical or moral – simply increases opportunities and persistence of the domestic municipality. For some domestic municipalities this results in better peace-building activities, for others it means the difference between starting a peace-building policy or not.

The absence of local spoilers is the last contributing factor to successful peace-building activities. Spoilers can have many forms, from radicalised politicians to influential diasporas. Some can be contained by the municipality, others are too strong to be effectively counteracted.
Final concluding remarks  After the identification of the conditions that enable municipalities to contribute to peace-building processes, this paper ends by turning the issue around: is municipal involvement a condition for successful peace-building processes? On the basis of the illustrations and examples in this article, one is tempted to say that municipalities, both domestic and from abroad, can make a worthwhile contribution to peace-building. However, in the case of Eastern Slavonia, the municipal contribution was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the peace-building process to be successful. Other factors and actors were more important in determining the outcome.

Municipal peace-building activities have hardly made the difference between sustainable peace and the reoccurrence of war. That outcome depends on a huge array of interdependent factors as well as of local, national and international stakeholders, in which local governments are only one in many. All domestic and foreign municipalities can do to prevent a society sliding back into violent conflict, is to optimally embed their peace-building activities in the total stream of policies, measures, projects and activities that try to establish a positive peace.

Still, and especially in the long run, several local governments have managed to weave that extra bit of social fabric necessary for sustainable peace. Or, to use another metaphor: the various local government peace-building activities can be regarded as individual strands of the rope that represents sustainable peace in Eastern Slavonia. Each is not the only strand in the rope, nor the strongest, but perhaps exactly that strand that makes the difference between breaking and not breaking.
A case study in city diplomacy / the Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East | Chris van Hemert

Summary

This chapter presents a review of a real case of city diplomacy involving Palestinian, Israeli and ‘international’ municipalities. The activities are broken down into three stages or periods, and the various actors involved and issues that arose in these stages are highlighted with lessons drawn.

The first phase covers approximately five years, 1999-2004, during which the basis for the formal establishment of the Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East (MAP) in 2005 was laid. Mediation from international partners at the macro-level, combined with local support – based on idealistic or utilitarian motives – at the micro-level were the dominant factors in this phase. The process leading up to the establishment of MAP was not a bottom-up process. The impetus was provided by the ideas of city diplomacy - but the factors that sustained it were mainly local. There were negative influences, such as the conflict dynamics and limited financial resources, which affected the process but did not halt it.

The second topic reviewed concerns the development of MAP from 2004 onwards. Micro-level support was most apparent immediately following the founding conference in June 2005 but later managerial difficulties and wavering commitment at the micro-level severely impeded MAP’s development. Various macro-level factors also slowed the process, but these were at least partially offset by the continuing willingness to engage in dialogue and the willingness of international partners to invest in MAP.

The third stage is about the development of concrete projects as part of MAP activities since 2005. A major issue has been the lack of funding from macro-level actors due to the wider political situation. Micro-level factors proved to be especially important with many hurdles to overcome, with the result that projects took a long time to get started and then deliver concrete results.

And, despite all the problems, there are still local city diplomacy actors willing to bridge the divides.
Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has affected the lives of many people and has held international diplomacy hostage for decades. Palestinians and Israelis regularly issue loud appeals for peace, security and prosperity while, at the national level, peace talks stagnate. In this context, Israeli and Palestinian local authorities and their associations have requested their international partners to assist in a process of dialogue, and some have responded. This response constitutes a case of city diplomacy.

The case is special because it combines dialogue with projects, and because it takes place while the conflict remains violent. The process that led to the establishment of the Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East (MAP), and its development provides insights into the possibilities, the impossibilities, the challenges and the conditions faced by city diplomacy.

The Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East (MAP)  The Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East is a framework for Israeli-Palestinian municipal dialogue with contributions from foreign municipalities. This trilateral municipal co-operation initiative was instigated by the Association of Palestinian Local Authorities (APLA) and the Union of Local Authorities in Israel (ULAI). Co-operation is to be based on concrete trilateral development projects, covering a variety of areas including specifically culture and youth, environment, economic development and municipal management. These four target areas were defined in order to tackle practical municipal problems, while promoting peace and encouraging greater dialogue between citizens.

MAP was established at a conference in The Hague in June 2005. Its founding was endorsed by 33 Israeli and Palestinian mayors, in the presence of municipal representatives from 15 countries and a range of international organizations including UN Habitat, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), UNDP, WHO, the Global Forum and UNESCO.

MAP is run by an International Board consisting of APLA, ULAI, the UNDP Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP), UCLG, The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), the European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East (ELPME), the City of Hamar, the City of Rome, the City of Barcelona and the City of Cologne. The President of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) chairs the board.

MAP is a network and has yet to be formally incorporated. UNDP/PAPP hosts the MAP Secretariat in Jerusalem. The Secretariat ensures direct communication with Israeli and Palestinian municipalities. It is staffed by an Israeli ULAI liaison officer and a Palestinian APLA liaison officer.

Methodology  This chapter identifies both hurdles and favourable factors that influenced the preliminary process of dialogue before MAP was established, during its establishment and during its later institutional development. It identifies lessons learned and the challenges ahead.

A distinction is made between the macro-level and the micro-level. The terms ‘macro’ here
denotes national or inter/supranational factors and ‘micro’ refers to local factors. APLA and ULA I are predominantly discussed at the micro-level since they act on behalf of Israeli and Palestinian local authorities and mostly operate on the local level. Foreign associations of local authorities are mostly classified as ‘macro’.

The following research questions are addressed in this chapter:
• What have been the most important factors in the MAP process so far?
• Were these factors mainly on the micro- or the macro-level?
• Should the MAP process be regarded as a success?
• Can one learn lessons from these factors, deduce conditions for success, or offer suggestions for city diplomacy in the Middle East?

In the context of Israeli-Palestinian relations, these are sensitive issues that may link to perspectives on right and wrong in the conflict. Further, MAP is still developing. Therefore, answering the research questions necessitates a general, rather than a specific, review of the issues. Measuring the success of MAP is the most challenging of the research questions. Primarily, success means realizing MAP’s stated objectives, and the extent to which adverse factors have been overcome. Implementation of trilateral municipal development projects is one of the stated objectives, but this activity only started in 2007. Consequently, evaluating project outcomes is not part of this review. Nevertheless, the process of formulating them and the fact that they are now underway are taken into account.

This chapter is based on written sources, on participant observation by the author and on interviews. The written sources are few, but important, because there needs to be thorough political consensus before something is committed to paper. Participation in meetings, missions and working visits provided the author with useful insights. Many key MAP actors were interviewed to ensure a balanced perspective. The multiplicity of sources has helped to make the analysis as objective as possible. Information that might endanger individuals or be likely to increase political pressure on them has been excluded.

Structure of the chapter This chapter has a sectional structure. Section 2 presents MAP’s key actors and their motives for participation. Sections 3, 4 and 5 evaluate the most important positive and negative factors in various stages of MAP’s development. Firstly, the start of the dialogue between APLA and ULA I (1999 – 2004) is discussed in Section 3. Next, MAP’s establishment and institutional development (2004 – 2007) is reviewed in Section 4. Then the latest phase involving the setting up of municipal projects (2005 – 2007) is commented upon in Section 5. The chapter concludes with an overview of the most important factors, lessons learned, conditions for success and suggestions for city diplomacy in the Middle East in Section 6.

Actors and their motives

This section provides an overview of the most relevant actors in the development of MAP. After presenting the actors, the section will briefly discuss the various motives and roles. This section only deals with key organizations that played a role in MAP’s development and are still actively involved on a regular basis. There have been numerous other organizations that, at certain moments in the process, provided valuable contributions.¹

¹ These actors are mentioned in subsequent sections.
Association of Palestinian Local Authorities (APLA) The Association of Palestinian Local Authorities (APLA) was established in June 1997, the first local government association in the Arab world. The objectives of APLA are to represent the interests of its members by advocacy and lobbying; to provide services to its member municipalities; to coordinate with other institutions, agencies and associations for the benefit of its members; and to represent the Palestinian local authorities at the international level.²

The main activities of APLA include: training sessions for the staff and councillors of local authorities on management, planning and decentralization; provision of legal advice to members; participation in national and international forums on local government issues; consultation with donors and international organizations on programmes offering assistance to local authorities; coordination of and assistance to Palestinian participation in the formulation and implementation of local-level development projects.

Union of Local Authorities in Israel (ULAI) The Union of Local Authorities in Israel (ULAI) was established in 1938 as the ‘League of Local Councils’. In 1953, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv-Yafo and Haifa joined the organization and the name was changed to ULAI.

ULAI represents the interests of Israeli municipalities, and local and regional councils, in contacts with the Knesset (the Israeli national parliament), the national government and ministries, and other institutions. ULAI’s main activities include: providing training to improve service delivery by local authorities; standardizing municipal management, such as through formulating collective labour agreements for municipal employees; assisting local authorities in founding companies, partnerships and co-operatives; and facilitating municipal international co-operation.³

Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) The Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) has existed since 1912. VNG promotes and discusses the interests of municipalities with the central government, Parliament, European institutions and other public organizations. Furthermore, the association represents the interests of its members in negotiations on collective labour agreements with the unions of local government personnel.

Besides its advocacy role, VNG assists its members in their administrative tasks. To this end, the association proposes model bylaws, runs an online documentation and information desk, provides services in all areas of municipal interest, and co-operates with relevant national ministries and international organizations.

VNG has a long-standing relationship with ULAI and implemented the project that supported the establishment of APLA.

UNDP/PAPP UNDP’s Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People (UNDP/PAPP) commenced operations in 1980.⁴

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² VNG International (2005a), p. 25
³ ULAI (1982)
⁴ United Nations General Assembly (1978), A/RES/33/147, art. 2
UNDP/PAPP aims to build technical capacity, and to strengthen the project management and administrative capacities of its Palestinian partner organizations. These include the Palestinian National Authority, local authorities, the private sector and NGOs. UNDP/PAPP’s projects focus on social and economic development in fields such as water, health, education facilities, social services, infrastructure and agriculture.

United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) is a worldwide organization linking local governments. UCLG’s mission is to be ‘the united voice and world advocate of democratic self-government, promoting its values, objectives and interests, through co-operation between local governments, and within the wider international community’. UCLG was the outcome of a merger between the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the World Federation of United Towns and Cities (FMCU-UTO).

UCLG supports international co-operation between local governments, executes programmes and initiates networks to build the capacity of local governments. The UCLG Committee on City Diplomacy is relevant to the MAP process as an important voice at the international level.

The European section of UCLG is known as the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR). The first political-level meeting between APLA and ULAI took place in Barcelona at the IULA world congress in 1999, on the initiative of CEMR.

European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East (ELPME) The European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East (ELPME) is an initiative of Belgian, French, Greek, Italian and Spanish local authorities. Its members include the Central Union of Municipalities and Communes of Greece (KEDKE), Cités Unies France (CUF), the City of Barcelona, Fons Català de Cooperació al Desenvolupament and the Italian Co-ordination of Local Authorities for Peace and Human Rights.

ELPME has the following objectives: to promote dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian municipalities, to lobby the European Union to increase its commitment, to create a large movement of local authorities, and to support peace initiatives between Israelis and Palestinians.

Motives of the MAP partners Among the MAP actors, various motives for involvement can be discerned. Starting with APLA, one can identify a utilitarian stance toward MAP. Its support is rooted in the needs of Palestinian municipalities. Its approach emphasizes tangible, material results, because these legitimize the participation of local politicians. The dialogue in this view is instrumental for technical reconstruction. As Mr Isam Akel, APLA’s executive director, explains: ‘Peace brings stability, and stability is necessary for reconstruction. At the same time, stability is essential for durable peace. So, peace, reconstruction and stability are interdependent’. In addition to this utilitarian view,

5 UCLG (2004), art. 2
6 For the founding declaration of ELPME, see ELPME (2005) or http://www.andaluciasolidaria.org/conferenciaeuropea/docs/Declaracion_I_Conferencia EUROPEA ESP.pdf
7 Interview Mr Isam Akelf
APLA sees MAP as a platform through which the plight of Palestinians can be brought to international attention.

For ULAI, the dialogue itself is the key activity: it emphasizes people-to-people actions with support of municipal leaders. Peace-building has been an important focus of ULAI’s activities over the last decade. 8 Mr Avi Rabinovitch, ULAI’s deputy director general, confided as early as 1990 that ‘once you have looked each other in the eye, you will not use violence anymore’. 9 In addition, ULAI perceives opportunities to enhance its image through co-operation with Palestinian municipalities. 10

The collective efforts of MAP’s international partners may be viewed as a single factor in MAP’s development, but their motives are illustrative of their diversity. ELPME, for instance, stresses its ideological commitments, while UNDP approaches MAP from an institutional perspective of local government autonomy. 11 VNG sees how ideological and mundane motives can go hand in hand: it believes in Israeli-Palestinian dialogue and it is encouraged by its good relations with both ULAI and APLA. However, it also recognizes the extra benefits that an important international initiative such as MAP can bring to its organization. The same is true in the city marketing considerations of participating municipalities. 12

Foreign partners also differ in defining their roles. UNDP/PAPP does not regard itself as a mediator since it does not pretend to have the power to persuade parties. According to Mr Timothy Rothermel, UNDP Special Representative at the time of MAP’s establishment, the term facilitator and funder would be better terminology. 13 Some agree with this view because they associate mediation with calming warring parties and do not see MAP as having such a role. Others however do use the term mediator, at least for the first phase of the MAP process. According to Mr Wim Deetman, MAP’s chairman from its establishment through to 31 December 2007, the key prerequisite is to be very reserved in expressing one’s opinion about political developments and attitudes.

Values and priorities are influenced by the conflict, by political developments and by changes in association leadership. This context makes it difficult to act solely on idealistic grounds. The MAP process only advances when multiple motives are allowed to drive it.

Is it a problem that there are different motives? Mr Jeremy Smith, IULA secretary-general when MAP was founded and currently secretary-general of CEMR, describes this situation as follows: ‘there are ultimate objectives and realistic objectives, and those are not necessarily in contradiction’. 14 In the words of Mr Flavio Lotti of ELPME, ‘it is not necessary to only have one [end goal], as long as you operate coherently, [and] the goals do not conflict’. Although a certain idealism is probably an important motivator for most partners,
the clear prospect of projects and external incentives is essential for some. Apart from the direct material interests, practical incentives can also reduce the level of local political support required to allow involvement. According to Isam Akel, as long as the various actors, spurred by different motives, speak in the same ‘peace-building voice’, their efforts should be welcomed even if they do not have the same priorities as those defined by MAP’s end goals.

The differences in their approaches to MAP by ULAI and APLA are interesting. For APLA, the dialogue serves to promote technical projects, while ULAI’s approach stresses a string of easy-to-organize dialogue activities. Nevertheless, the process does advance, albeit in fits and starts. Thus, fully-shared motives are not a precondition for progress. However, individual motives should not be allowed to take precedence over the common goal; and both the instruments of the MAP process and its outcomes need to be adhered to at some minimum level. Wim Deetman has never doubted that they do.

**The process that led to MAP**

The Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East was launched in 2005. This was the culmination of a long process of preparations and dialogue between APLA, ULAI and their international partners including the cities of Athens, Barcelona, Rome and The Hague. Especially in this initial phase, most meetings took place outside the region, away from political tension. These activities led to the conviction among the involved parties that they were on the way towards achieving important progress at the local level.

Mutual co-operation between APLA and ULAI was spurred on by the international agreement fostered by the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) in Barcelona in March 1999. Subsequently, various exchange visits took place, and discussions were held hosted by international local government partners. These culminated in a meeting between the executive administrators of APLA and ULAI at an IULA/FMCU-UTO meeting in Guadalajara in June 2002. At this meeting, the first practical ideas for co-operation, in the form of a joint municipal conference in Israel and Palestine and a municipal reconstruction programme, were conceived.

Declarations were drafted, discussed and sometimes signed. For instance, in 2002, the ‘Rome Declaration’ was adopted (but not signed). This stated that ‘while aiming at a peaceful and secure solution to the problem, both sides should promote socio-economic as well as people-to-people co-operation on the local level for the purposes of rehabilitation, economic development and prosperity, as well as the sustainability of peace’.

A meeting at the Wittenburg Estate near The Hague took place in January 2003. A very important common understanding was reached (the Wittenburg Declaration) on prevailing political issues including violence and terrorism, Jerusalem, settlements, water, refugees and

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15 Interview Mr Jeremy Smith
16 Interview Mr Wim Deetman
17 This strategy has also been used by other initiatives such as the Glocal Forum.
18 APLA/ULAI/CEMR (1999)
19 FMCU-UTO (2002), p. 1
20 Municipalities of Nablus/Rishon leZion/Qalqilya/Ashdod/Ra’anana (2002)
borders. The remainder of 2003 saw no concrete progress, but the willingness of APLA and ULAI to co-operate was again confirmed in the signing of the ‘KEDKE Declaration’, at the invitation of the Central Union of Municipalities and Communes in Greece (KEDKE).

This section now discusses the process leading up to MAP's formal establishment, covering roughly the period 1999 - 2004. The most important factors affecting the process during this period are assessed. Activities following the KEDKE Declaration are discussed in the subsequent section.

**Impact of the conflict dynamics** The conflict dynamics severely undermined the confidence that national Israeli and Palestinian leaders would reach an agreement acceptable to both parties during the period being considered (1999-2004). After an earlier period of hope, the Oslo Accords (1993), the Interim Agreement (on West Bank and Gaza, 1995), the Wye River Memorandum (1998) and the Camp David summit (2000) resulted in little change on the ground. Subsequently, the second intifada started in 2000.

Within the MAP framework, international visits ran into practical problems, such as the Israeli Defense Forces closing off roads after the Netanya hotel bombing in March 2002. ‘Before every step forward, a step backward was required first’. The sustained facilitation of a process of dialogue required much resilience before MAP was even established.

Palestinian and Israeli municipalities alike suffered the effects of violence. Palestinian mayors and the national leadership were criticized by Israel and the international community for not making enough efforts to stop the bombings. Israeli and Palestinian mayors saw their municipalities hit by violent actions and subsequent retaliations, causing outcry over civilian casualties.

Cancelled meetings, ‘partially because of travel restrictions, but possibly also because at that moment [the actors were] not very keen’, led to a difficult situation in 2002 with APLA not being represented at the political level. For politicians, participation in MAP carries more risk than for administrators.

When meetings took place, there was constant tension over the balance of proposals. For instance, ULAI denounced one proposed initiative – an International Conference of Local Authorities for Palestine – aimed at the reconstruction of Palestinian municipalities, as being ‘in competition with that of ULAI and call[ing] into question a commitment made [by ULAI] in conjunction with APLA and the VNG’. The perceived problem was that APLA and the VNG had confirmed the start of dialogue between APLA and ULAI in the near future, but that this initiative insufficiently involved ULAI. ULAI felt that the focus of this initiative was too one-sided and focused disproportionately on the interests of the Palestinian municipalities.

Nevertheless, contacts on the local level were maintained, and agreements between APLA and ULAI that would form the basis for more elaborate co-operation were signed during this
period. Jeremy Smith, former Secretary General of IULA, explains ‘… that general willingness to co-operate was there. There was hope on the ground. Later the situation worsened and the process became more complex, but even then there was a follow-up through meetings organized by the VNG’.

While the non-attendance at a meeting may, by one party, be accepted or seen as the inevitable consequence of travel restrictions, another party may regard it as a deliberate refusal to attend the meeting or a slight. In this way, the conflict influences the thoughts and attitudes of the involved parties. The conflict at the macro-level has therefore clearly resulted in obstacles and difficulties at the micro-level. However, the impact has not been as severe as one might have expected: it did not stop the process as a whole progressing. The foundations for MAP were established.

**Impact of financial constraints** Throughout MAP’s conception phase, financing activities was a continuous source of concern. The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially allowed VNG to draw on funds allocated to VNG International’s technical assistance work with APLA. Direct contacts between VNG board members and ministers were required to achieve this agreement. This ensured some stability at the operational level.

A grant proposal submitted in 2002 to the EU Partnership for Peace Programme was unsuccessful, with the EU citing a lack of funds. However, the application feedback also identified significant concerns: ‘The proposed activities under the programme may be adversely affected by external circumstances that are beyond the direct control of the project. Particularly the security circumstances and travel restrictions on the West Bank can change rapidly, without prior notice.’ Jeremy Smith saw this lack of EU funding for the dialogue process as perhaps the most significant obstacle in this phase of MAP’s development. Early in 2004, however, the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved new funding for the dialogue through VNG.

Not only the international partners, but also APLA and ULAI were facing severe financial constraints. Mr Joop van den Berg, at the time chairman of the Board of Directors of VNG, observed that this might actually have had a positive, rather than a negative, influence on APLA’s willingness to participate in MAP. The logic being that the lack of available finances from national Palestinian institutions increased the interest of Palestinian local authorities in tapping external funds. The uncertainty of funding for the process and the willingness of international parties in the process to finance the follow-up to the initiative have been crucial macro-level factors in this phase of MAP’s development.

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25 Interview Mr Jeremy Smith.
   The proposal was modified in Guadalajara in 2002 to incorporate the shared priorities.
26 Interview Mr Jeremy Smith
27 Interview Mr Joop van den Berg
28 VNG International (2004b), Annex 1, p. 1
29 VNG International (2002), p. 21
30 Interview Mr Jeremy Smith
31 VNG International (2004b) p. 3.
   This period saw the first discussions about the Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East in terms of the format in which it was eventually established in June 2005.
32 Interview Mr Joop van den Berg
Impact of the involvement of international partners  The support of the international partners has been essential. The first time this support manifested itself on a large scale was in 2002, when over thirty international local authorities, municipal associations, APLA and ULAI discussed a joint Israeli-Palestinian municipal conference and reconstruction programme. A working group was established consisting of ULAI, APLA, IULA, Cités Unies France (CUF), the City of Rome, the Union of Belgian Cities and Municipalities (VBSG) and the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG).33

An even-handed approach from the international side was essential to keep the process going. Having been involved in the establishment of APLA in 1997, VNG also continued to maintain its long-standing relationship with ULAI, and always visited both APLA and ULAI when in the region. This impartial approach helped to resolve matters whenever criticism was voiced.

The roles of IULA and FMCU-UTO (merged as UCLG since 2004) were complex. APLA and ULAI had both been members of IULA, but IULA had closer historical ties with ULAI than with APLA. Some FMCU-UTO members supported the Palestinian cause explicitly, and the organization had signed resolutions that condemned the state of Israel for its actions or emphasized Palestinian suffering.34 FMCU-UTO tried to insist that the membership of Israeli local authorities would be conditional upon Israel respecting UN resolution 24235 and withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza. For ULAI, it was very important that VNG stated unequivocally that local authorities did not have the mandate to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the national level, and that the best contribution local authorities could make would be to engage in dialogue.36 Without the ongoing plans to create a single worldwide organization for local government, there would have been less impetus to promote the dialogue process and the merger plans raised the question as to how to accommodate both associations.37

Since this period, there has been constant mediation by international partners and, indeed, it is hard to imagine MAP succeeding without it.

Impact of sustained local willingness to engage in dialogue  Despite the difficult circumstances, APLA and ULAI delegations did meet on various occasions. The general willingness to meet each other at that time may have been supported by the address of US President Bush on 24 June 2002 in which he spoke for the first time of the ‘vision [of] two states living side by side in peace and security’ and presented the principles of the Road Map for Peace.38 There was even an acceptance of the view that a responsibility of local authorities was to provide security, freedom and prosperity. The involved parties were convinced that, at the local level, modest but real contributions could be made.

Meetings and initiatives such as ‘Local Authorities – together we are creating HOPE’, in

33 Knip, P. (2002), p. 1
34 Interview Mr Peter Knip and Ms Alexandra Sizoo.
   For examples of resolutions, see European Coordinating Committee for NGOs on the Question of Palestine (1998) or FMCU-UTO (1998)
36 Knip, P. (2007)
37 Interview Mr Jeremy Smith
which ULAI put forward a number of municipal project proposals, sustained the dialogue.\textsuperscript{39} Another contribution was the declarations, such as the Barcelona declaration of 1999, the Rome Declaration of 2002, the Wittenburg Declaration and the KEDKE Declaration of 2003 on the issue. The Wittenburg Declaration marks a watershed in the process as it addressed many political issues, such as violence and terrorism, Jerusalem, settlements, water, refugees and borders.\textsuperscript{40} Unfortunately, it was never shared with the members of APLA and ULAI due to the sensitive nature of the declaration and the difficult political situation in the region at the time.\textsuperscript{41} Consequently, its impact has been less substantial than it might otherwise have been.

Declarations get mixed press, largely because they are not legally binding. They only have value if they are signed in good faith and not as a diplomatic token of appreciation towards the meeting’s host. Declarations tend to be relevant at a specific time and in a specific place, and their value wears off as the political context changes and leaders are replaced. However, declarations have been useful as reminders of agreements reached in the past, providing a reason to move on.

The sustained local willingness based on meetings and declarations has created momentum at the micro-level while, at the macro-level, the international partners see one of their preconditions for involvement, namely local commitment, satisfied.

\textbf{Impact of the involvement of associations of municipalities} The leaderships of the local government associations, APLA and ULAI, were of tremendous importance in the phase leading up to MAP. A politically charged process will not take root if the involved mayors are only speaking on behalf of their own municipalities. A mechanism to bring in the support of many municipalities is needed, and this can be realized through the presidents of associations.\textsuperscript{43}

Association presidents are in a position to communicate with national governments, who need to support the process, or at least refrain from blocking it, if it is to succeed. The Glocal Forum, as one of its activities, also ensures information sharing and interaction with national government officials. On behalf of MAP, APLA and ULAI have always, behind the scenes, fine-tuned all activities through their contacts with the national authorities. For instance, Avi Rabinovitch of ULAI explained how the success of the municipal Israeli-Palestinian dialogue is always brought to the attention of high ranking military officers and the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since this ensures support for MAP.\textsuperscript{44} These efforts go beyond the traditional role of Israeli and Palestinian municipal actors, who do not normally coordinate with the military and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly.\textsuperscript{45}

One particular aspect of APLA’s political leadership’s involvement was the prospect of
reconstruction projects being launched as part of the MAP process. This has been identified as a dominant motive, as noted in Section 2. Activities visible to the citizens are seen as politically important. In addition to gaining visible hardware, APLA recognized that Israeli municipalities shared many of their own practical problems and could be useful sources of practical insights, best practices and lessons learned.

Apart from the importance of political leadership, it is also crucial to work with administrators who are reliable, diligent and truly committed to the mission of the cooperation activity. The promotion of the process by administrators, with political backing from the presidents of the associations, is a condition for success, especially since the political leadership does not always have the time to follow events closely. As we will see later, for example in the discussions on ‘managerial difficulties’, one could argue that this worked better in the phase leading up to the formal start of MAP than in subsequent phases.

In what is a highly political context, the involvements of APLA and ULAI have been essential at the micro-level. They have ensured the backing of both the national governments and their members.

**Intermediate conclusion** Mediation from international partners at the macro-level, combined with the support – based on idealistic or utilitarian motives – at the micro-level were the dominant factors in this phase. The process leading up to the establishment of MAP was not a bottom-up process, building on the level of Israeli and Palestinian municipalities; it was primarily the idea of associations of municipalities and their international partners. The impetus was provided by the ideas of city diplomacy, but the factors that sustained it were mainly local. Negative influences such as the conflict dynamics and limited financial resources affected the process but did not halt it.

**MAP’s establishment and development**

This section discusses the establishment and institutional development of MAP, roughly covering the period 2004 - 2007. Operational processes have been important in this phase, alongside city diplomacy as a political process. The municipal dialogue on the association level was sustained, and the first interest from individual Israeli and Palestinian municipalities appeared.

**Impact of the conflict dynamics** The conflict dynamics became more volatile in this period. In 2003, Israeli President Ariel Sharon and Palestinian then-Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas were still discussing the implementation of the Road Map for Peace. Abbas managed to persuade Hamas and Islamic Jihad to agree to a ceasefire. However, the truce disintegrated with a series of suicide bombings, raids and assassinations. The construction of the separation barrier was speeded up. In autumn 2004, Israeli forces entered Gaza after a series of rocket attacks. In August 2005, Sharon ordered the withdrawal of Israeli settlers.

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44 Interview Mr Avi Rabinovitch
46 Interview Mr Joop van den Berg
47 Interview Mr Isam Akel
48 Interview Mr Wim Deetman
from Gaza. In Palestine, Hamas became more powerful in 2006; Israel became involved in what amounted to a short war against Hezbollah.

These events all had impacts on the development of MAP at the micro-level. There were few opportunities for Palestinian MAP partners to travel. For instance, a planned roundtable session preparing for the establishment of MAP, in The Hague, had to be cancelled.\(^{49}\) Local politicians also became less motivated to publicly affiliate themselves with initiatives such as MAP.\(^{50}\)

When the declaration for the founding conference was discussed at a preparatory meeting in 2005, a reference to the ‘Israeli occupation’ was deleted from the text.\(^{51}\) Nevertheless, since a general agreement on political issues had already been reached in Wittenburg, MAP’s founding conference in The Hague could focus on the objectives of MAP itself, such as initiating ‘on-the-ground co-operation through joint projects in Palestinian, Israeli and international partner municipalities, that are aimed at promoting lasting peace in the region’.\(^{52}\)

National governments continued to support MAP, or at least not impede its development.\(^{53}\) In 2005, local elections took place, with Hamas gaining power in many municipalities, and in 2006 Hamas won legislative elections. The rise of Hamas influenced MAP in several ways. Firstly, APLA struggled to come to terms with the new reality and, as of late 2007, it still had no new Executive Board. ULAI adopted a more distant stance to the dialogue, preferring to see how matters would develop, and the Government of Israel discouraged its municipalities from talking to Hamas-run municipalities.\(^{54}\) Secondly, struggles between Fatah and Hamas greatly affected the environment for organizing projects. It became increasingly difficult to organize MAP activities, especially in Gaza. Thirdly, the situation provided a justification for foreign partners to opt out, claiming they could not participate as long as Hamas was in power due to their own government’s standpoint. Few new MAP partners presented themselves, and some existing ones became less active. Wim Deetman regretted this stating, ‘if the local willingness to co-operate exists, there can be no excuse not to endorse it as a third party, regardless of political considerations’.

As in the previous period, the conflict dynamic had continually hindered the development of MAP at the micro-level. At the macro-level, the rise of Hamas resulted in reduced commitment from various bodies, but this did not prevent willing actors from exploring opportunities to co-operate. The conflict dynamic also influenced the management of MAP and the financing of MAP activities. These aspects are discussed in the subsections below.

**Impact of financial constraints** Financing MAP’s activities continued to be a source of concern. Funding opportunities became increasingly scarce as funding agencies became worried that money would benefit bodies and people officially excluded on the basis of various lists and government policies. Additionally, the unstable project environment, especially for peace-building activities, made donors reluctant to advance money, a fact observed by Ms Benedetta Alfieri of the Glocal Forum.\(^{55}\)
Attempts to obtain grants from donors such as the EU Partnership for Peace, or to create a multi-donor trust fund for MAP, failed to get off the ground. A donor conference in 2005 resulted in plenty of goodwill but no funds. According to Mr Peter Knip, director of VNG’s agency for international co-operation, national governments and donor agencies did not sufficiently recognize the possible role for local governments in development co-operation, let alone in peace-building. 56

Funding was eventually obtained from the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs to formally create MAP and sustain it thereafter. Since late 2005, MAP has received additional financial support from UNDP/PAPP which was still able to allocate funds to Palestinian beneficiaries without legal implications 57, unlike many other donor organizations.

Impact of managerial difficulties Once MAP was established, a secretariat was created in Jerusalem. Its responsibilities and tasks are: to support lobbying activities, to assist in the formulation and implementation of project proposals, to co-ordinate and foster mutual learning, and to mobilize resources. Political sensitivities, constant worries over funding and vulnerable personal relationships have hampered its work. 58 Both APLA and ULAI failed to assign staff members to deal with MAP affairs. After two years of operation, only a few of its objectives have been realized. Practical commitment is a problem for all the parties involved. The secretariat of the MAP chairman, based at VNG, tends to do most of the international communication because the secretariat in Jerusalem is fully occupied with fine-tuning local activities with APLA and ULAI. Reflecting on the situation, Wim Deetman notes that an effective local secretariat is of utmost importance, and Isam Akel states that the local secretariat deserves greater support from MAP’s stakeholders and partners.

With the conflict dynamics intensifying and constituencies splitting, relationships within MAP’s International Board became fraught. Mutual tolerance between APLA and ULAI at the executive level deteriorated. Mr Jens Toyberg-Frandzen, Special Representative of UNDP/PAPP observed, ‘There is room for improvement’. In a letter to the APLA presidency, the MAP chairman commented that ‘the communication and co-operation between [APLA and ULAI] at the moment is not optimal, which harms the prospects of MAP as a whole’. 59 During meetings, difficulties can be discussed and resolved before they become a serious problem but the number of face-to-face meetings between officers and political leaders has been insufficient to resolve this issue. 60 Jens Toyberg-Frandzen considers the impact of managerial difficulties at the local level to be more severe than the impact of the conflict dynamics and emphasizes that ownership, commitment and the organizational setup are major factors in determining MAP’s effectiveness and efficiency.

A declaration signed by APLA, ULAI and VNG in 2007 does indicate a willingness and desire to eliminate managerial difficulties – by further institutionalizing MAP and incorporating it

56 Knip, P. (2005), p. 3.
Ms Benedetta Alfieri of the Glocal Forum notes that donors do not see local government peace-building initiatives as a top priority relative to humanitarian crises.
Mr Jens Toyberg-Frandzen does note, however, that long-term interventions through MAP are difficult due to the current lack of a clear vision for its financial sustainability.
58 Interview Mr Ralph Pans
60 Interview Mr Isam Akel
within a foundation, by installing an international team member in the Secretariat and by appointing a rapid intervention team of Israeli and Palestinian mayors to deal with urgent on-the-ground issues. Although the long-term significance of the various declarations is uncertain, as discussed in Section 3, schemes for the institutionalization of MAP have been developed and approved since July 2007. These should be implemented in 2008.

The managerial problems at MAP’s core institutions illustrate how capacity and personality problems create micro-level issues, and how important it is to have local champions who stand up against the radicalization of constituencies.

**The involvement of international partners** ‘Since peace-building efforts, in the Israeli-Palestinian context, do not take place spontaneously, outside stimulation is required’. 62 This was as true during the establishment phase as in the preceding initial phase. Wim Deetman argues that grassroots support is essential, and MAP should not be a hobby for its international partners.

VNG continued the support it had given since 2002 during this phase, and the support of UNDP/PAPP became more prominent with the establishment of a secretariat in Jerusalem. The City Diplomacy label and the UCLG Commission on City Diplomacy provided a framework to get international organizations and local authorities on board.

There are many peace initiatives that try to stimulate dialogue between Israeli and Palestinian citizens or organizations including: COPPEM, the European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East (ELPME), Friends of the Earth Middle East (FoEME), the Global Forum and the WHO EPIC network, to name but a few. Timothy Rothermel sees a positive aspect to this and argues that it increases the number of potentially effective dialogue tracks. According to Flavio Lotti, MAP could, as an overall network, in theory provide an alternative to the ad hoc actions of a large number of actors.

However, one should not overlook the fact that these initiatives have different mandates, and they need their own identity and individual successes to survive. Additionally, donors and international municipalities have criteria and preferences for co-operation with particular Israeli or Palestinian municipalities.63 A disadvantage of this is that APLA and ULAI officials participate in a plethora of international meetings and conferences, distracting them from operations at home. Isam Akel argues that it would be good if all the various initiatives were streamlined within a single mechanism, to prevent the constant diluting of efforts.

Organizing MAP’s 2005 founding conference was a true exercise in city diplomacy. All the identified agencies and organizations that might attend were visited by VNG, APLA and ULAI jointly in advance. A commitment to participation in the conference and beyond was discussed and made explicit in the conference background document.64 Political and geographical spread, as well as the sizes of the attending municipalities, were finely tuned.65 After the establishment of MAP, a broad awareness among international organizations and municipal associations emerged. This resulted in moral support, human resources and

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61 See APLA/ULAI/VNG (2007)
62 Interview Mr Timothy Rothermel
63 Knip, P. (2007)
64 VNG International (2005d), Annex 1, p. 2
financial support. The conflict dynamic and wider political developments, however, rendered international partners less effective than they might otherwise have been. As an example, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), one of MAP’s International Board members, suffered from a lack of funding for MAP-related activities as a result of the Canadian response to Hamas’ rise to power.

While some useful progress was made without the involvement of international MAP partners, such as an agreement to organize a joint visit to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the safety and mobility of Palestinian citizens and mayors, the involvement of international partners remained crucial if MAP was to move forward.

The need for mediation, their financial constraints and the lack of capacity in APLA and ULAI have made support by international partners a crucial macro-level factor in MAP’s establishment and successful continuation. Paradoxically, because it creates competition for funds and results, the proliferation of international peace initiatives has had a disturbing impact overall. The disarray at the macro-level is also unhelpful to APLA and ULAI.

**Impact of involvement by local associations of municipalities and their political leaders** As in the preceding phase, APLA and ULAI have been highly relevant through their mobilization of support among local political leaders, citizens and national political parties, and in convincing international partners that MAP is a local rather than a foreign initiative. As a demonstration of the importance of their support, a meeting of ‘Mayors for Peace’ in the Middle East in 2004 never raised much interest from Israeli mayors because it lacked a full ULAI endorsement.

Benedetta Alfieri of the Global Forum recognizes the need for local commitment for the success of their activities: ‘It is the personal commitment of individuals to counteract the cycle of violence and conflict [that] is most often the strongest stimulating factor for peace-building initiatives’.

The commitment to realizing MAP’s objectives faltered in this phase. Several reasons can be identified: change within the APLA membership following local elections, the practical obstacles resulting from intra-Palestinian unrest and travel restrictions, and severe tension over an ULAI Congress in Jerusalem.

APLA has had four different presidents during the period covering MAP’s establishment and development, and two executive directors. This has harmed the continuity of the process, although changes in leadership can also have positive effects. The limited opportunities to meet with the APLA presidency have hindered political decision-making. Since the elections of January 2006, the APLA General Assembly has not convened nor has a new Board been elected. Renewed institutions would probably have a larger number of Hamas members, which would increase the level of democratic representation, but might also
negatively affect the willingness of the international community to invest,\textsuperscript{73} which is already a critical obstacle to MAP’s development.\textsuperscript{74}

In conclusion, both APLA and ULAI carry the process forward at times, but equally they can become micro-level liabilities whenever they fail to explicitly commit and take action.

\textbf{Willingness to engage in dialogue} Initially, the willingness to engage in real dialogue seen in the preceding phase continued into this one. The extensive list of 33 Palestinian and Israeli municipalities participating in the founding conference bears witness to this.\textsuperscript{75} While APLA, ULAI and VNG reconfirmed their commitment ‘at the political, executive and administrative level’, to the objectives of MAP in Jerusalem in July 2007, this declaration was signed by the associations, not by individual municipalities.

At the micro-level, sustained local willingness remained an important favourable factor in MAP’s development. The fact that local willingness to talk was reconfirmed by APLA and ULAI in 2007, and that Israeli and Palestinian municipalities continued to discuss project opportunities with international partners should be seen as a positive omen. Nevertheless, it is impossible to claim with any confidence that local support increased in this period, and it probably did not. According to Benedetta Alfieri, the culture of fear ‘that is perpetuated by media, politicians and religious leaders’ heavily affects both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides, and the willingness of citizens to work together.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{Intermediate conclusion} Both during and after MAP’s establishment, progress was made on the macro- and the micro-levels in equal measures. Micro-level support was most apparent immediately following the founding conference. Negative and positive factors were more or less in balance. Financial constraints and the reaction of the international community to the rise of Hamas slowed the process, but this was at least partially offset by the continuing willingness to engage in dialogue and the willingness of international partners to invest in MAP.

Managerial difficulties and wavering commitment at the micro-level have severely impeded MAP’s recent development. Although the obstacles present themselves as micro-level practical problems, such as travel restrictions, one should note that political tensions determine the vigour with which they are addressed.

\textbf{Towards trilateral municipal projects}

MAP’s hallmarks are the trilateral municipal co-operation projects: city diplomacy in the form of concrete actions. Whereas the associations of municipalities and the international organizations were the drivers of the process in the earlier two phases, individual municipalities are now more central. The year 2007 saw projects starting to be implemented. Two projects started in the environment field, involving 11 municipalities (four Palestinian, four Israeli, three Dutch). Politicians, municipal staff and citizens are in regular contact to implement project activities. The formulation of three other projects, on

\textsuperscript{73} Interview Mr Joop van den Berg
\textsuperscript{74} Interview Mr Timothy Rothermel
\textsuperscript{75} See Annex 6 in VNG International (2005d)
\textsuperscript{76} Interview Ms Benedetta Alfieri
water management, sewage and park development, started in late 2007 and early 2008. It is too early to make definitive claims on MAP’s successes. Instead, this section will analyze the conception and initiation of the projects. The activities analyzed took place in a period that started with the establishment of MAP in June 2005 and ran through to the end of 2007. Chronologically this section partly overlaps the previous section and, therefore, not all contextual aspects need to be reiterated.

**Impact of the conflict dynamic** The impact of the conflict dynamic on the projects is much the same as reported in the preceding section. On the micro- and the macro-levels, participation in MAP projects is constantly reassessed by the various parties. The attraction of the resulting concrete outcomes for citizens has protected the concept of instigating projects, as has also been the case in projects linked to other initiatives. However, raids and incursions have forced the participating municipalities to concentrate on the security and needs of their citizens. The MAP Secretariat concluded in 2006 that ‘The humanitarian crisis that followed the elections reached an unprecedented level in the Palestinian territories and in some deeply affected areas peace became secondary to survival’. In 2007, the potential benefits of concrete projects encouraged municipalities to maintain a dialogue and continue to prepare and implement project activities.

The interest of foreign municipalities has also been affected. In 2006, the Dutch municipality of Groningen, which has ties with the Palestinian municipality of Jabalya, decided not to start a project but to mark time until the Dutch government had officially stated its position on the new balance of power in Palestine. Municipalities in other countries experienced similar obstacles and uncertainties stemming from the positions of their national governments. Similarly, activities on water projects, under the umbrella of Friends of the Earth Middle East, temporarily came to a halt when the conflict intensified, while trilateral project developments by the Glocal Forum had to be modified and sometimes even terminated.

As in the other two phases, micro-level practicalities influenced MAP’s development. Practical hindrances seem to have larger effects than national, ideological differences. As Isam Akel notes: ‘Even the most extreme radicals ultimately want peace. Disagreement over what is the right moment and practical obstacles such as travel restrictions are the main problems.’

**Impact of financial constraints** The problems after January 2006 in funding Palestinian project beneficiaries poses a serious threat to trilateral municipal co-operation and will probably continue to do so into the future. Lack of any clear commitment that funds will be available once a project is implemented reinforces local hesitation. The few available sources of funding are often earmarked for specific goals, thus limiting possibilities.

77 EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East (2005), p. 12
78 MAP Secretariat (2006), p. 3
79 MAP Secretariat (2006), p. 3
81 Tagar, Z. (2007), p. 13 and Interview Ms Benedetta Alfieri
82 Interview Mr Jens Toyberg-Frandzen
The decision by the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allow MAP projects to be implemented under the VNG LOGO South programme has been vital to progress. The only other concrete commitment came from Fons Català in 2006. In 2007, project identification with a number of other donors started and was continued into 2008. From this, the formulation of three new projects started towards the end of 2007 or in early 2008. Other initiatives, such as those by Friends of the Earth Middle East and the Glocal Forum, show a similar dependence on external funding for project implementation.  

Lack of funding sources at the macro-level has caused municipalities to be hesitant about participating. The few available funding sources are often only open to countries on the OECD/DAC list of developing countries, thus denying funding to Israeli municipalities. Through their direct impact on project implementation, macro-level financial constraints became a micro-level factor. ‘The national and international umbrella has affected day-to-day issues at the local level as the capacity of projects in the Middle East cannot avoid the needs of funds and of security, which could not in the past years be granted by most partners involved in the programmes’.  

Impact of managerial difficulties The general management difficulties that MAP has encountered in its core institutions have also manifested themselves at the project level.

The secretariat in Jerusalem monitors the project formulation process, keeping a keen eye on the potential emergence of conflict between involved municipalities. Friction has occurred. For instance, there was a clash between an Israeli and a Palestinian municipality over a project proposal in 2007. Lack of coordination between the MAP Secretariat and ULAI led to a rough draft of the proposal, drawn up by the Palestinian municipality, being presented to the Israeli municipality, which then felt offended by certain phrases in the proposal that it deemed to be politically biased. Despite mediation efforts by their Dutch partner, they cancelled their foreseen presence at a joint meeting.

Apart from managing the politics, the technicalities also need managing. Cobbling together limited and conditional sources of funding results in an abundance of guidelines and criteria. This situation has led to much criticism: municipalities feel that procedures are too stringent, draw too heavily on their internal organizations and do not reflect the needs on the ground.

Overall, it is fair to say that the micro-level has seen its share of conflicts in the project formulation process between Israeli and Palestinian municipalities. At the macro-level, donor-imposed conditions and procedures appear as obstacles to project formulation and implementation.

Willingness to engage in dialogue It is remarkable that municipalities have remained willing to formulate projects, even in these very difficult times. In this respect, MAP’s experiences are similar to projects fostered by other initiatives such as Friends of the Earth Middle East, where local leadership, mediation by third parties, and mutual interest in peace
and finding solutions to shared problems proved essential catalysts for co-operation.\textsuperscript{86} Nevertheless, overall, support from Palestinian and Israeli municipalities does seem to have decreased, and it is not difficult to see why. Opportunities to deliver material results have always been important motivators for Palestinian municipalities, but they see how long it takes to even start to realize them.

Some of the initial ideas of the founding conference,\textsuperscript{87} such as youth parliaments, joint radio programmes and joint local markets were never implemented. There are two aspects to this:

- The different project preferences of APLA and ULAI, which were never explicitly discussed by the international partners.\textsuperscript{88}
- The lack of funds and the slow engagement of the VNG LOGO South programme, making it clear that even international partners had difficulties in getting from the dialogue stage to the project stage.

These aspects reflect an interesting problem with the adopted model of trilateral co-operation: ‘The two main stakeholders can be tempted to sit back and expect the foreign municipality to solve any problems’.\textsuperscript{89} Overall, however, a modest interest in participating in MAP projects has endured over the years – an important micro-level factor. Nevertheless, the lack of concrete results remains a threat.

\textit{Limits to municipal capacity for projects} One special factor in this phase is that city diplomacy in the form of concrete projects draws heavily on the internal organizations and on the competencies of the involved municipalities. In the MAP environment, the diplomatic qualities and technical competencies of local civil servants and local politicians in the projects need to be high. Other organizations can assist but, in the projects, they cannot substitute for municipalities.

It has been stated a couple of times that mayors in Israel and Palestine have to deal with issues of legitimacy and popular support. This is equally true of the foreign municipalities in a trilateral co-operation. Legitimacy and popular support need to be carefully maintained both in the field and at home. Friends of the Earth Middle East seeks to overcome this challenge through a strong focus on community participation and development,\textsuperscript{90} while the Glocal Forum has so far mainly focused on working with youth. Despite this approach, they do believe that mayors are ‘poised to be the new diplomats of our world’ and that, ultimately, local governments are responsible for city diplomacy activities. Therefore, expectations and project objectives should not be too ambitious, and mayors should be duly credited for successes.\textsuperscript{91}

MAP has yet to provide an example of ‘city diplomacy going wrong’ due to insufficient municipal capacity, but the wrangle over a project proposal described in the assessment of managerial difficulties demonstrates that projects do not take the need for diplomacy out of City Diplomacy.

Although not a bottleneck per se, limited municipal capacity can be a risk factor.

\textsuperscript{86} Tagar, Z. (2007), p. 14  
\textsuperscript{87} See annex 5 in VNG International (2005d)  
\textsuperscript{88} Interview Mr Ralph Pans  
\textsuperscript{89} Interview Mr Ralph Pans  
\textsuperscript{90} EcoPeace/Friends of the Earth Middle East (2005), pp. 36-38  
\textsuperscript{91} Interview Ms Benedetta Alfieri
Intermediate conclusion  Micro-level factors especially prove to be very important in the project phase of MAP’s development. The other identified issue was the lack of funding from macro-level actors who choose not to provide funds in case these should reach Hamas.

There appears to be more hurdles to overcome than favourable factors at both levels, and it takes much longer than it should for projects to start and then deliver concrete results. Managerial difficulties have increased, and there remains the ever-present constraints such as travel restrictions. A willingness to support the trilateral co-operation model among local stakeholders, however, remains.

Despite all the problems, a positive development in the project phase is the shift of responsibilities towards the municipalities. While the legitimacy of MAP at the local level as a whole has probably decreased, the municipalities involved in the two existing projects did take the lead in formulating and starting them, with the help of the MAP Secretariat in Jerusalem. This reflects a situation in which there are still local city diplomacy actors willing to bridge the divides.

Conclusions

This chapter investigated both hurdles to be overcome and favourable factors in three phases of MAP’s development: the start of the dialogue between APLA and ULAI, MAP’s establishment and institutional development, and the identification and start of the first municipal projects. Four research questions were posed, and these questions structure the conclusions to this chapter.

What have been the dominant factors in the MAP process? The MAP process has been influenced by several factors, some of which were initially favourable but turned into potential liabilities. Especially during the current project phase, the obstacles have outnumbered the favourable factors.

The decisive favourable factors in the MAP process are seen as the MAP format itself, the continued support of MAP’s international partners, the sustained willingness on the local level – even during difficult times (such as the second intifada) – and the involvement of APLA and ULAI. Within APLA and ULAI, the roles played by their political leaders have been crucial in getting national level backing. The will to co-operate by APLA and ULAI would probably not have been sufficient on its own, in practice one requires at least tacit acceptance from national governments for initiatives such as MAP to develop and succeed.

On the negative side, the MAP process has been hindered by a lack of financing, the local impact of the conflict dynamics, the failure to achieve quick concrete results and managerial difficulties. If Hamas had not become so prominent, more funding would probably have been made available, which would have likely eased project development. The lack of capacity in both APLA and ULAI, and the tensions between them, also hindered progress.

The combination of many actors, many peace initiatives and political tensions has resulted in vague goals, little incorporation of each other’s activities and few co-ordinated procedures. However, ideology has not, so far, made communication impossible. The conflict has mainly been a problem for MAP when it has had practical consequences.
Were these factors mainly on the micro- or the macro-level? The ratio of macro- to micro-level impacts has shifted over time. The start of the dialogue between APLA and ULAI (Section 3) was mainly a macro-level process, MAP’s establishment and institutional development (Section 4) saw a fairly even balance between micro- and macro-level factors. The nascent project phase (Section 5) was dominated more by micro-level factors.

Macro-level actors create micro-level consequences when they make their actions or local-level funding conditional on what is happening in the wider Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The war between Israel and Hezbollah and the rise to prominence of Hamas are cases in point that hugely influenced international organizations, foreign municipalities and national governments. Stemming from this situation, financial constraints, travel restrictions and tensions between APLA and ULAI became micro-level factors in their own right. Flavio Lotti notes that ‘in the Middle East there is not really a distinction between the local and the national levels, because the conflict is so intricate. [Mayors] are under great political pressure, from their local electorate, but also from the national level’.

In the case of MAP, the impetus for city diplomacy has come mainly from the international macro-level, whereas most of the obstacles have followed developments at the micro-level. The conflict dynamic and the local factors have become increasingly difficult to deal with. This raises an awkward question for city diplomacy: at what point does the reliance on international partners become too great, and the prospects of results too remote?

Should the MAP process be regarded as a success? It is too early to determine whether the MAP process is a success in terms of its stated aims. The first municipal projects have only recently started, and MAP is still in the process of further institutionalization. MAP’s mission to be a broad-based, action-oriented movement working towards peace\textsuperscript{92} has not yet been achieved. The practice witnessed in the ongoing projects and the realization of their objectives, not their inception, will be the acid test.

In terms of overcoming difficulties, some indicators are encouraging. Project development as a practical topic for dialogue has provided a vehicle to circumvent political debate, both on the association and the municipal levels. The repeated and mutual acknowledgement by APLA and ULAI of the need for dialogue, the development of the MAP models and programme, and the first municipal projects bringing people with goodwill together are measures of success. Given the difficult circumstances, these achievements should not be lightly dismissed.

One problem is that local tensions are currently very high, at a time when the local, micro-level has become more important for MAP. Isam Akel has remarked that in the current circumstances, ‘those who talk about peace, are sometimes still drawn into war’. This emphasizes the importance of persistence in supporting dialogue. Within the next year, MAP will have to decide whether city diplomacy, in the form of trilateral municipal concrete action, stands a realistic chance of success in the Israeli-Palestinian context, or whether dialogue through conferences is all that can be hoped for in the current political climate.

\textsuperscript{92} VNG International & UNDP/PAPP (2005), first insert
Can one learn lessons from these factors, deduce conditions for success, or offer suggestions for city diplomacy in the Middle East? The analysis of the MAP process presented in the chapter leads to the following observations, which may be seen as lessons learned, conditions for success or suggestions for other local government actors active in city diplomacy, especially in the Middle East:

- A process such as MAP needs extreme patience, constant nurturing (politically and often financially) and regular face-to-face contacts, which initially are more effective if they take place outside the conflict region.
- This type of process is very dependent on donor funding. Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures, donor preconditions and political preferences have resulted in missed opportunities and slowed the dialogue process.
- Sufficient capacity of the main local stakeholders is important and the qualities of individual local politicians and local civil servants matter. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that foreign municipalities automatically have sufficient capacity and quality.
- The MAP case presents a dilemma of legitimacy versus efficiency and effectiveness in city diplomacy. While having many international actors and peace initiatives under one umbrella creates legitimacy, the streamlining of efforts, or at least coordination between different initiatives, which is necessary to retain efficiency and prevent the available capacity of local stakeholders becoming exhausted is often difficult.
- Trilateral technical co-operation can be a very useful basis for dialogue. Third parties can provide technical and financial assistance, a neutral zone for meetings, and access to their network. On the downside, trilateral co-operation may make project development more complex than in a bilateral situation. It is also more difficult to organize than dialogue.
- True commitment and ownership by local stakeholders – municipalities and their associations – requires the support of mayors, councils, citizens and civil society, but also concrete results. Tangible outputs can be the cement in co-operation exercises.
- City diplomacy is typically attempted in situations marked by dynamic, difficult environments. These require realism, pragmatism and proper on-the-ground assistance in setting project goals. Donors need to understand this and respond appropriately.
- The influence of a single municipality is limited, especially in complex regions such as the Middle East. City diplomacy can work when parties at the national level are stalemated, but only if national governments leave room for it: politically, practically and legally. Ideally, there should already be rapprochement.93
- Conflict resolution, development aid and community development are not mutually exclusive; they can go hand-in-hand and reinforce each other.
- National, international and supranational governments should acknowledge that local governments can play an important role in peace-building and conflict resolution; and should operate accordingly.

**Final Reflections** Finally, a reflection on city diplomacy, based on the conclusions of this chapter. There are those who argue that city diplomacy, as a concept, can never have negative effects: failures are the result of insufficiently qualified actors, poor programme designs, bad timing or the simple refusal of partners to agree, and that this does not detract

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93 Isam Akel emphasises that the mandate of municipalities is to serve citizens. ‘If the best interest of the citizens is to live in peace, then the municipal mandate is to work towards that goal. Local leaders are closer to citizens than national governments and thus they can lobby national governments bottom-up to invest in grassroots dialogue. No municipality should be prevented from improving the lives of citizens. However, national policy should be left to national governments.’
from the inherent value of city diplomacy. Others feel that there will only be negative consequences if the activities become too detached from national or international objectives (implying that one should stay within the boundaries of these objectives).

No-one, however, claims that city diplomacy is a bad idea in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The deadlock at the national/international level results in local-level dialogue and municipal projects being seen as attractive alternatives. Especially in situations where the main objective is to change mentalities, such as inMAP, municipalities are good motors for change.94 After all, as Avi Rabinovitch put it, ‘local leaders are the future national leaders; they should be prepared to lead the way in the peace process’. Isam Akel admits that ‘it may take time, but in the end there is no choice but negotiated peace. The sooner we realize it, the better for the people and the more lives we save’.

To conclude, using the words of Wim Deetman on the role of municipalities in peacebuilding: ‘Today’s world has become a global village, with ever closer connections between the different layers of government. This comes with responsibilities’.

94 Interview Mr Ralph Pans
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Ms Benedetta Alfieri, Director of the City Diplomacy Department of the Glocal Forum
Mr Joop van den Berg, former Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG)
Mr Gidon Bromberg, Israeli Director of EcoPeace / Friends of the Earth Middle East
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Mr Yonathan Druckman, ULAI Liaison at the MAP Secretariat in Jerusalem
Mr Peter Knip, Director of VNG International, the International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) (interviewed together with Ms Sizoo)
Mr Flavio Lotti, Director of the Italian Coordination of Local Authorities for Peace and Human Rights and member of the European Network of Local Authorities for Peace in the Middle East (ELPME)
Mr Ralph Pans, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG)
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Dr Kenneth Bush is a tenured Associate Professor in the Conflict Studies Programme at St. Paul University, Ottawa, Canada. He received his PhD in International Relations and Comparative Politics from Cornell University. Kenneth has worked with such organizations as VNG International, the Canadian Federation of Municipalities, SIDA, DFID, DFAIT, CIDA, UNICEF, OECD DAC, the World Bank, IDRC and a host of NGOs on the challenges of peace-building from local to global levels. He has published widely on issues related to peace-building, identity-based conflict and bad governance. In 2004, his study Building Capacity for Peace and Unity: The Role of Local Government in Peace building was published by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. Kenneth’s book Reading Between the Lines: the intra-group dimensions of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was published in December 2003. Current research includes: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA); the peace-building roles of diaspora; the politics of art; and the commodification of peace-building or the peace-destroying impacts of ‘peace-building’ initiatives.
Mr Andrés Eduardo Paz Ramos graduated in law from the University of Cauca, and then specialised in Public Administration at the ESAP (Graduate School of Public Administration). He has a Master’s Degree in International Cooperation and Project Management from the IUOG (Ortega y Gasset Institute) in Madrid, Spain. Andrés has worked for 18 years on projects involved with cooperation, supporting local and regional development, and municipal management in Cauca. These have been financed by UNDP (drinking water and basic sanitation), WFP (World Food Programme – indigenous programme), European Union (drinking water and municipal training) and GTZ (German Cooperation Organization - Bota Cauca Project). Since 2003, alongside the Dutch peace movement IKV Pax Christi, he has taken part in work in the north of Cauca oriented towards building peace, guaranteeing human rights and strengthening local democracy and development cooperation with local and regional organisations.

Ms Marianne Moor is the senior programme officer for Latin America of the Dutch peace movement Pax Christi (which in 2007 merged with the Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) to become IKV Pax Christi). Marianne joined the Latin America Department of Pax Christi in 2000. She is a historian, specializing in Latin American history. Her work focuses on Colombia and Cuba. The main issues for IKV Pax Christi in Colombia are the DDR process (re-integration of former combatants and support for victims of violence), local peace initiatives within the context of the local democracy and human security. In 2004, Pax Christi’s collaboration with VNG International in Colombia started with a joint solidarity campaign for threatened representatives of local democracy.

Mr Chris van Hemert is a junior project manager at VNG International. He has been involved in the coordination of the Municipal Alliance for Peace in the Middle East (MAP) and in policy assistance to its chairman since September 2005, two months after MAP’s establishment. Further, he is responsible for implementing various projects on strengthening democratic local government in South-East Europe and the Caucasus, and technical assistance to the Association of Palestinian Local Authorities (APLA). Chris obtained a Bachelor’s Degree (with distinction) in Political Science, History and Anthropology from University College Utrecht (the Netherlands), and a Master’s Degree in International Studies from the University of Birmingham (UK). Earlier experiences include working with the Permanent Representation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to UNESCO, the EU Committee of the Regions and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
About VNG International

VNG International is the international co-operation agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities. We are committed to strengthening democratic local government worldwide.

VNG International supports decentralization processes and facilitates decentralized co-operation. The organization strengthens local governments, their associations, training institutes and decentralisation task forces both in developing countries and in countries in transition. In addition, our Service Bureau Europe assists municipalities in the Netherlands and other EU countries in accessing European subsidies and in forming knowledge networks.

Our home office is composed of 50 staff. Furthermore, we have project offices in various countries. We work with a large group of local government experts with broad international experience. MEPCO and CMRA are our two daughter companies: MEPCO is a joint venture of VNG International and the Union of Towns and Municipalities in the Czech Republic; CMRA was set up in close co-operation with the South African Local Government Association.