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Biography |
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University education
Undergraduate and graduate studies
1974-1979: School of Chemical Engineering, National Technical University of Athens (Diploma of Chemical Engineering, 1979).
Postgraduate studies: 1979-1988 Institute for System Dynamics and Control (ISDC), University of Stuttgart, Germany.
PhD (Dr.-Ing.): University of Stuttgart (1988).
Professional experience
* 1988-1992 Chemical company Henkel (Duesseldorf): research and development on process control and safety.
University
* 1979-1988 Scientific researcher at the ISDC, University of Stuttgart.
* Since January 1st, 1993 Professor at the Hamburg University of Applied Sciences. Teaching and research in the fields of Control Technology, Process Safety/Risk Management, Technology Assessment (focus: Medical and Bio-Technology), History and Philosophy of Technology, Environmental History.
* 1997, 1998 lecturer of the joint graduate program “Philosophy and History of Sciences and Technology” of the University of Athens and the National Technical University of Athens, Greece.
* Since 1998 lecturer for Risk Assessment and Risk Management at the joint graduate course TECHNOSCOPE and (since 2008) the postgraduate project PENED (NTU Athens).
* 1999-2000, 2004 visiting lecturer of Arab History at the University of Crete, Greece, Department of History and Archaeology.
Memberships
· Gesellschaft fuer Technikgeschichte (Society for the History of Technology)
· International Society for the History of East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine
· European Association for the Study of Science and Technology
· Society for the Study of the Ancient Greek Technology (Athens)
· European Association of Cultural History
· Society for Historical Anthropology (Berlin)
· Commission on History of Science & Technology in Islamic Societies
· Hamburg Orient Gesellschaft
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Abstract |
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What to do with uncertainties? |
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What to do with uncertainties?Transfer of technological challenges and socioeconomic risks through genetically modified plants
The debates on and the experiences with genetically modified plants (GMP) – especially for food use – are characterised by controversial assessment representations. One repeatedly used argument to legitimise the introduction of GMP for food use especially in developing countries is the claim according to which developing countries need genetically modified crops to feed their populations. The counterargument claims that food shortage results from unequal distribution of the existing crops – a distortion which results from the unequal possibilities in the dominant (capitalistic, neoliberal) production and distribution system. Such fundamental debates keep under their shadow issues concerning the dependence of a national economy upon controversial resources, i.e. upon products (GMP) and technologies assessed controversially by transnational consumers. This dependence determines the degree of vulnerability of a given national economy in respect with disturbances in the production and distribution of such novel products, which exclusively depend on new biotechnologies (e.g. genetic engineering). In the case of developing countries the dependence upon imported or exported, patented GMP and GMP derivates, as well as upon transfer of knowhow, technology and infrastructures related with and accompanying these products (e.g. special pesticides) results into higher vulnerability levels.
The main goal of the present study is to demonstrate by means of real examples how this dependence can amplify even small disturbances in the globalised bio-safety network and how such disturbances can cause economical disasters and, in some cases, irreversible environmental degradation. The examples refer to major conflicts related to product transfer among the USA, Japan and European countries. The example of the genetically modified rice type LL 601™ produced by Bayer Crop Sciencedemonstrates how small disturbances in the globalised bio-safety system – even under the best conditions in respect with mechanisms conceived and implemented in order to avoid harmful impact – may provoke serious economic and irreversible environmental disasters. The case-study is significant for interpreting the effectiveness of bio-safety mechanisms when confronted with GMP. It leads to the conclusion that the weak point when handling GM crops is not just the non-effective quality control; moreover, the discrepancies (including communication strategies and tactics) result from inadequate political control in dealing with technological innovation.
In the case of developing countries the impact of such disturbances would be much stronger due to continuously changing, internationally very heterogeneous regulatory legal frames concerning GMP and GM crops for food use. During the last two decades numerous international conflicts in respect with regulations which allegedly still hinder an unlimited “free market” of commodities have seen developing countries under extreme political pressure through western countries “covering” or openly supporting companies which almost monopolise GM crops systems and try to obtain and maintain control over crucial nodes of the agriculture infrastructure in the developing world.
The above considerations imply that only sovereign political decision on the basis of multi-criteria assessment of the technological innovation can guarantee the societal benefit through the use of such novel products like GMP. However, in the case of GMP the risks undertaken by the decision makers are very complex in their nature and unequally distributed. Whereas the GMP providers undertake a purely monetary risk concerning revenue and control of market segments, the countries importing this technology undertake the whole risk in respect with the sovereignty upon and the sustainability of their own crops production, the impact on the export trade towards (many) countries where food based on GM crops is undesirable, as well as with the environmental impact of the novel crops and the health impact of the GM food.
A part of the criticism or reservation in respect with GMP and GM food in the public sphere is strongly related to the layman perspective which is characterised by lacking of sufficient scientific knowledge and by mistrusting of existing scientific and political control mechanisms. Indeed, there generally exists a significant, ever-growing discrepancy between public perception and expert representations of the risks related to GMP and GM food. International bio-safety agreements become broadly trustworthy only on the condition that they constitute reference point for decentralised procedures of societal control in respect with technologies characterised by uncertainties, and of decision-making with broad public participation.
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