Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction Biological and chemical weapons have generally been associated with each other in the public mind, and the extensive use of poison gas in World War I (resulting in over a million casualties and over 100,000 deaths) led to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of both poison gas and bacteriological methods in warfare. At the 1932 - 1937 Disarmament Conference, unsuccessful attempts were made to work out an agreement that would prohibit the production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons. During World War
II, new and more toxic nerve gases were developed, and research and development was begun on biological weapons. Neither side used such weapons. President Roosevelt, in a statement warning the Axis powers against the use of chemical weapons, declared:
Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.
In the postwar negotiations on general disarmament, biological and chemical weapons were usually considered together with nuclear and conventional weapons.
Both the United States and Soviet Union, in the 1962 sessions of the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), offered plans for general and complete disarmament that included provisions for eliminating chemical and biological weapons.
An issue that long hindered progress was whether chemical and biological weapons should continue to be linked. A British draft convention submitted to the ENDC on July 10, 1969, concentrated on the elimination of biological weapons only. A draft convention proposed in the General Assembly by the Soviet Union and its allies on September 19 dealt with both chemical and biological weapons. The Soviet representative argued that they had been treated together in the Geneva
Protocol and in the General Assembly resolutions and report, and should continue to be dealt with in the same instrument. A separate biological weapons convention, he warned, might serve to intensify the chemical arms race.
The United States supported the British position and stressed the difference between the two kinds of weapons. Unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons had actually been used in modern warfare. Many states maintained chemical weapons in their arsenals to deter the use of this type of weapon against them, and to provide a retaliatory capability if deterrence failed. Many of these nations, the United States pointed out, would be reluctant to give up this capability without reliable assurance that other nations were not developing, producing, and stockpiling chemical weapons.
While the United States did not consider prohibition of one of these classes of weapons less urgent or important than the other, it held that biological weapons presented less intractable problems, and an agreement on banning them should not be delayed until agreement on a reliable prohibition of chemical weapons could be reached.
Shortly after President Nixon took office, he ordered a review of U.S. policy and programs regarding biological and chemical warfare. On November 25, 1969, the President declared that the United States unilaterally renounced first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents and weapons and unconditionally renounced all methods of biological warfare. Henceforth the U.S. biological program would be confined to research on strictly defined measures of defense, such as immunization. The Department of Defense was ordered to draw up a plan
for the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons. On
February 14, 1970, the White House announced extension of the ban to cover toxins (substances falling between biologicals and chemicals in that they act like chemicals but are ordinarily produced by biological or microbic processes).
The U.S. action was widely welcomed internationally, and the example was followed by others. Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom stated that they had no biological weapons and did not intend to produce any. It was generally recognized, however, that unilateral actions could not take the place of a binding international commitment. A number of nations, including the Soviet Union and its allies, continued to favor a comprehensive agreement covering both chemical and biological weapons.
Discussion throughout 1970 in the General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) -- as the ENDC was named after its enlargement to 26 members in August 1969 -- produced no agreement. A breakthrough came on March 30, 1971, however, when the Soviet Union and its allies changed their position
and introduced a revised draft convention limited to biological weapons and toxins. It then became possible for the co-chairmen of the CCD -- the U.S. and Soviet representatives -- to work out an agreed draft, as they had done with the Non-Proliferation and the Seabed Treaties. On August 5, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted separate but identical texts. On December 16, the General Assembly approved a resolution, adopted by a vote of 110 to 0, commending the convention and expressing hope for the widest possible adherence.
The French representative abstained, explaining that the convention, though a step forward, might weaken the Geneva Protocol ban on the use of chemical weapons, and he did not consider that adequate international controls were provided. He announced, however, that France would enact domestic legislation prohibiting biological weapons, and this was done in June of the next year.
The Peoples Republic of China did not participate in the negotiations on the convention and did not sign it. At the 1972 General Assembly its representative attacked the convention as a "sham," and criticized it for not prohibiting chemical weapons.
The convention was opened for signature at Washington, London, and Moscow on April 10, 1972. President Nixon submitted it to the Senate on August 10, calling it "the first international agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of nations."
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee delayed action on the convention, however, holding it for consideration after resolution of the herbicide and riot-control issues involved in the Geneva Protocol (see section on the Geneva Protocol).
In the latter part of 1974 the Ford Administration undertook a new initiative to obtain Senate consent to ratification of both the Geneva Protocol and the Biological Weapons Convention, and ACDA Director Fred Ikle testified with respect to both instruments before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 10. Soon thereafter the Committee voted unanimously to send the two measures to the Senate floor, and on December 16 the Senate voted its approval, also unanimously.
President Ford signed instruments of ratification for the two measures on
January 22, 1975.
Under the terms of the convention, the parties undertake not to develop,
produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as weapons and means of delivery. All such material is to be destroyed within nine months of the conventions entry into force. In January 1976, all heads of Federal departments and agencies certified to the President that as of December 26, 1975, their respective departments and agencies were in full compliance with the convention.
The parties are to consult and cooperate in solving any problems that arise. Complaints of a breach of obligations may be lodged with the Security Council, and parties undertake to cooperate with any investigation the Council initiates.
If the Security Council finds that a state has been endangered by a violation, the parties are to provide any assistance requested.
Nothing in the convention is to be interpreted as lessening the obligations
imposed by the Geneva Protocol, and the parties undertake to pursue negotiations for a ban on chemical weapons.
In addition, articles provide for exchange of information on peaceful uses, amendment and review, and accession and withdrawal. The convention is of unlimited duration.
At the second Review Conference in September 1986, the parties agreed to implement data exchange measures to enhance confidence and to promote cooperation in areas of permitted biological activities. In accordance with the Final Declaration of that Review Conference, an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts was held March 31 - April 15, 1987, to develop procedures for implementing annual data exchanges.
At the third Review Conference in September 1991 it was agreed to reaffirm and extend confidence building measures agreed at the second Review Conference and to create an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all parties to identify, examine, and evaluate from a scientific and technical standpoint potential verification measures with respect to the prohibitions of the convention. The Ad Hoc Group met four times in 1992 and 1993, completing its work and submitting a consensus report circulated to all States Parties. As provided in the mandate, a majority of States Parties called for a Special Conference to discuss the final report and consider further actions. The Special
Conference, held in September 1994, agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group, open to all States Parties, to consider appropriate measures, and draft proposals to strengthen the Convention in a legally binding instrument. The Ad Hoc Group convened two substantive sessions in 1995, with additional meetings scheduled for 1996. The Ad Hoc Group will prepare a report, to be considered at the Fourth Review Conference of the BWC in the Fall of 1996.